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Foreword
The origins of this dissertation can be traced to a remark by Hans Neervoort,
my Dutch teacher at the Gymnasium. He said that philosophy would suit me
well: had I ever considered studying it? After considering it, and trying it
during my year at Mount Holyoke College, it turned out that it did suit me.
There was one problem (as both my mother and my father were quick to
underscore): what does a philosophy graduate do? To make sure that I would
find ajob, I decided to study law as well, and liked that too. Under supervision
of Govert den Hartogh at the University of Amsterdam, I wrote a thesis in the
field of legal philosophy.
Meanwhile, Wibren van der Burg had written a research proposal about
ideals in legal theory. For this project he needed someone with a background
in philosophy and law; he called Den Hartogh who mentioned me. This
opportunity was perfect to combine my wishes: a job, doing both philosophy
and law.
So I started work as a Ph.D. student (OIO) at the Schoordijk Institute in
Tilburg. First in a very small group with Wibren van der Burg and Paul van
Seters supervising my work, where my need for discussion was met in
animated weekly talks with Wibren and in meetings with the neighbouring
group from the section of Jurisprudence (Encyclopedie). Atter a year, my
project became part of the Pionier programme The Importance of Ideals in
Law, Morality, and Politics, which turned out to be the perfect environment
for doing research in legal theory.
My visit to the Center for the Study of Law and Society at Berkeley, and
the discussions I had with Philip Selznick, further shaped my thinking, in
particular my interest in American pragmatism.
After four years in Tilburg, I traded the position of a full-time researcher
for that of a teacher. Moving to the section of Jurisprudence meant an
opportunity to put my accumulated knowledge of legal theory to use. The
combination of teaching and writing turned out to be hectic but rewarding.
The result of these events is this dissertation. I want to thank all of those
who helped me, especially Bert van Roermund for his comments on Radbruch,
and B~rbel Dorbeck-Jung, Hans Gribnau, Philip Selznick, Pauline Westerman,
and Willem Witteveen for commenting on various parts of the manuscript.
Discussions within the Pionier-group, the section of Jurisprudence, and the
Netherlands School for Research in Practical Philosophy (OZSE), with
international guest professors in Tilburg, and with fellow Ph.D students and
other colleagues have all been helpful. All along, Wibren's criticism was a key
element in the shaping and sharpening of my thought. For the success of the
project his encouragement may have been even more important. In a similar
vi
way, the enthusiasm of Paul van Seters for my work and his knowledge of
Selznick's work contributed to its success. In the final stages his comments,
in particular his careful reading of the text, helped me to make thís a real
dissertation. The corrections of my English by Brian Morgan were
indispensable.
In each stage ofthis story, I encountered people who shaped its course and
became dear to me. My mother, of course, was there all along. So was my
father, soon together with my sisters. At school, Irma, Kirsten, and Marjolijn
were friends from the start; later I met Joost with whom I still share a love for
both talk and silence. In Amsterdam during the first months, I met Inge as a
housemate and Solange as a fellow student of philosophy. Fortunately, my
friendship with each outlasted the brief periods of living or studying together.
I cherish the evenings with Solange, especially those in expensive restaurants.
In Tilburg, successively, Anna, Wouter, Timon, and Bert arrived,
colleagues but also friends. Always ready for a discussion, a walk, or a drink,
and offering me a meal and a bed (or the use of an apartment) whenever I
needed one.
The last person I want to mention is Jean-Pierre. Having shared a life for
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Ideals in Legal Theory
An Introduction
1 Common Sense Understandings
In the nineteen-thirties there were two Dutch neighbours, Van Stolk and Van
der Goes, who were involved in a dispute over a footpath. Relations
deteriorated so much that Van Stolk decided to place a hideous construction,
a wooden pole decorated with old cloth, on his land to spoil the view of Van
der Goes. Van der Goes went to court. After the judicial decision that
placement of the construction was illegal, Van Stolk decided to make the
construction into a water tower, first without even bothering to connect it to
water, but later making it into a workable tower. Again Van der Goes went to
court, claiming that this constituted an abuse of ownership rights. Dutch law
contains the rule that the use of a right, which is legitimate in the abstract, can
be illegitimate in specific circumstances in relation to another person. Now
that the construction had the appearance of a working tower, the Dutch
Supreme Court had to decide what criteria had to be fulfilled to constitute an
abuse of rights. Simply harming the interests of another is not enough,
according to the Court; the owner must have the sole purpose of harming
someone and must have no reasonable interest in the exercise of his right.
Given the context and history of this case, these criteria were fulfilled in the
case of the water tower: building a tower simply to spite one's neighbour
constituted an abuse of ownership rights.'
This Supreme Court decision tells us much about the scope and nature of
the right to private property. The right to property creates a sphere of freedom
of movement and decision, in which a person can make his own autonomous
choices. This freedom is not unlimited, but every limitation needs to be well-
argued. As the Dutch jurist Paul Scholten said in his comment on this case:
"Ownership is not a power given for a specific purpose, but the recognition of
a freedom not to be defined."'`
Why, you may ask, this excursion into the law of property in a work which,
according to its title, is devoted to ideals in legal theory? Because the personal
freedom of which property is a guarantee can be understood as a legally
recognized ideal. Ideals are not directly obvious aspects of the law, but this
study was motivated by the idea that ideals are nevertheless important and
irreducible features of legal systems. How we should conceive of ideals
exactly and what place they have in law is the leading question of this book.
There are two Supreme Court decisions in this case, HR 13-3-1936, NI 1936, 415, and HR
2-4-1937, NJ 1937, 639; the first annotated by Paul Scholten.
In Dutch: "Eigendom is niet een met een bepaald doel gegeven bevoegdheid, maar een
erkenning van een niet te omschrijven vrijheid" (noot NJ 1936, 415).
2 The Concept ofIdeals i~i Legal Theory
`Justice is blind'. A recurrent image of law in art is the figure of Justice:
the figure of the blindfolded lady with scales and a sword. This figure
represents an ideal: the perfect administration of justice. Blindfolded -
without prejudice; carrying scales - in complete fairness; and carrying a
sword - backed by power to enforce the decision. The three features of the
image ofjustice all suggest omnipotence. The blindfold makes it seem as if a
judge can close her eyes to shut out any preconceived judgments about the
people involved in a case and decide it only on its merits. The scales suggest
the competence to weigh arguments minutely. Once a decision is reached, the
sword guarantees that it will also be effective.
The figure of Justice reflects some of the common sense understandings
about the ideals of law. Less obviously, so does the case of the water tower.
Justice represents unattainable characteristics of a perfect judge: an ideal
appears, first, to imply perfection, and, second, to imply unrealizability. At the
same time, ideals have appeal. Ask someone to give an example of an ideal
and often he or she will come up with a political slogan: `Liberté, Egalité,
Fraternité' or `Peace and Love'. These were the banners for political or social
upheaval; they moved people to political action. The ideal in its perfection
brings out flaws in the current situation and gives a direction for improvement.
It is, however, so lofty that we can never quite reach it.
In the case of the water tower, the ideal of freedom only appears after a
detour through a range of rights, relations, and responsibilities. The focus is
on the limitations of the right to property, but when the question is put how far
these limitations extend, we are suddenly confronted with the freedom of the
owner as the core value to be protected. The perception ofthe ideal is different
here, and so is the relationship between law and the ideal. Here we trace the
meaning of freedom negatively, by examining its limitations. It is clear from
the start that an owner's freedom cannot be exercised to the full. That would
be the ideal of freedom, which in reality is constrained by other people and
other values. Here we see more clearly than in the case of justice that the
realization of an ideal is hindered by all kinds of constraints and obstacles.
There is another difference between the two examples. The figure of Justice
is in a sense the impersonation of the aspirations of all legal agents; she is the
guiding light for the whole of law. In the case ofthe water tower, however, the
ideal of freedom remains in the background until we come to a difficult legal
question. Personal freedom informs our understanding of the case, but it
appears in a specific legal form here - as property rights. We might say that
freedom is an ideal which law is designed to protect. It is a reason to have all
kinds of legal rules, but it does not seem to be an integral part of our
understanding of law in the way that justice is.
The two examples raise questions about the role and character of ideals in
law: Is there a difference between an ideal like justice and an ideal like
freedom with regard to the connection to law'? Are these different kinds of
ideals? The case of the water tower also draws attention to the limitations to
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which an ideal is subject and the connections the ideal has to different
elements of the legal system. How should we conceive of limitations and
conflicts? Are these caused by the relation to rules or principles, by factual
circumstances, or maybe by other ideals? What to think of the relations of
ideals and rules, of ideals and facts'?
These are the kinds ofquestions that I aim to answer in this book. I will try
to unravel the concept of ideals, and provide a sensible interpretation of the
different features ofideals that came up in the two examples. Before I start the
investigation, however, I want to bring some order to the questions that guide
it, and reveal some of the theoretical background to these questions.
My main aim is to arrive at a defensible concept of ideals, which can be
used in a theory of law. This makes it necessary to pursue two main sets of
questions, the first set regarding the concept of ideals as such, the second set
regarding the role of ideals in a theory of law. An inquiry into the concept of
ideals raises philosophical questions about the nature of ideals and their place
in our world. In philosophy, ideals are traditionally connected with notions of
the good or notions of value. When considering the nature of ideals the
relation between ideals and values needs to be examined as well. Any
interesting view on the nature ofideals presents ideals in a certain context and,
most importantly, advances a view about ideals and reality. Thus, the first set
of questions are questions about the nature of ideals and their relation to
reality; this is the subject of the next section (1.2).
The second issue then is how to use such a concept of ideals in a theory of
law. Again, we can distinguish between ideals as such and the place of ideals,
now in the realm of law. In connection to theories of law, the question is
whether ideals are to be seen as a general category or whether there is a
specific category of legal ideals. If there are specific legal ideals, I also want
to know what role these have to play in comparison to other ideals. The
question of legal ideals as a category is further introduced in section 1.3. The
second aspect ofthe place of ideals in legal theory is how the concept of ideals
is connected to other aspects of the domain of law. More specifically, what
interests me is how the concept of ideals is related to other concepts that are
central to theories of law: rules and principles. To this issue I turn in section
1.4. Finally, section 1.5 gives an overview of the other chapters in this book.
2 Ideals and Values
The first set of questions concerns the nature of ideals in general. What type
of entity are we thinking about? The first indication can be drawn from the
observation that ideals function as guides for improvement. The unspoken
premise here is that ideals are worth aspiring to, that they are something
valuable. Ofmany things we are inclined to say both that they are an ideal and
that they are a value. Both justice and freedom can be regarded as an ideal or
as a value. So can world peace, love, solidarity, equality. Is there a difference
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between the ideal ofjustice and the value ofjustice`?
Thus, the first question regarding the general nature of ideals is whether a
meaningful distinction can be made between ideals and values. And if such a
distinction can be made, what does the difference between ideal and value
consist in`? In order to get a first impression of the kinds of questions arising,
it is helpful to look into the background of the two concepts.
As a philosophical term, ideal has a longer history than value. The
adjective `ideal' is derived from the Greek `idea', which was already used in
a philosophical sense in ancient Greece, most famously by Socrates and Plato.
From this use as an adjective accompanying the Platonic idea, the substantive
`ideal' was first used in the eighteenth century.' The term `value' arose in the
context of the economy, at first simply meaning: the worth of a thing.' Only
recently, near the end of the nineteenth century, did it acquire a broader,
philosophical meaning. It has become the generally used term both to refer to
the positive qualities of an object or state ofaffairs - speaking of something
`having value'; and to refer to people's basic commitments - speaking of
something `being a value'.
Since the concept of value has been introduced, it has become the subject
of vigorous debate and it has given rise to a wealth oftheories about the nature
of values. The problems that form the subject of value theory are equally
relevant in the context of a study of ideals: they concern the relation of ideal
to reality, knowledge of ideals, the possibility oftruth and criticism. Therefore
I will give a sketch of the main topics related to the nature of values and give
a brief typology of value theories.
In any inquiry into the nature of values, there are three theoretical
components which are sometimes hard to disentangle, but can be
distinguished. These are ontology, genealogy and epistemology; i.e. an
account of what values are, an account of their origin, and an account of our
knowledge ofthem. On these issues a number of `-isms' have been developed:
cognitivism and non-cognitivism, realism and anti-realism, naturalism,
subjectivism, etc.ó Most often, the focus is on a combination of ontological
and epistemological questions: do values really exist and how do we know
them?
The central question of value ontology is whether values exist mind-
1 It was used primarily in aesthetics and ethics, see the entry "Ideal" in the Dictionary of the
History of (deas (Wiener 1973, S49-SS2).
See the entry "Value and Valuation" in Tlre Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( Edwards 1967,
229-232).
f will not pay separate attention to the way values come into being; the issue is touched
upon in passing throughout this book. For extensive treatment of the issue, see Die
Entste{ru~rg der Werte (Joas 1997).
These are different positions in meta-ethics, that is, theories about the status of moral
judgments and moral values. For the time being, 1 will simply treat value as equivalent to
moral value; the issue ofdifferent kinds of value, more specifically legal and moral value,




independently in the extra-human world (Bransen 8c Slors 1996, 1).Value
realism answers this question positively, anti-realism answers it negatively.
In value epistemology opinion is divided over the question whether value
judgments can be true or false, that is, whether we can have knowledge of
values. Cognitivism asserts that value judgments are truth claims, while non-
cognitivism denies this.
Cognitivism and non-cognitivism are broad categories: each comprises a
number of theories respectively asserting and denying that values are subject
to judgments of truth and falsity. Two important varieties of cognitivism are
rationalism and moral realism.' The first theory claims that value judgments
are true by virtue oftheir relation to a self-evident first principle. Justification
is a process of rational deduction from that principle. Moral realism claims
that value judgments are true by virtue of their correct appreciation of the
moral quality ofa situation. Emotivism and prescriptivism are influential non-
cognitivist theories.~ Emotivism claims that value judgments are expressions
of feelings of approval or disapproval, while prescriptivism claims that value
judgments are commendations for the choice of objects and actions. In both
cases, value judgments are not assertions that something is in fact good or bad;
they express a person's feeling or attitude towards it.
The connection between epistemology and ontology is found in the reasons
why value judgments are or are not capable of being truth claims.
Epistemological realism makes truth or falsity dependent upon the existence
of a value in the extra-human world. It is backed by a realist theory of the
ontological status of values. Value judgments can be true or false because
values exist: they are correct or incorrect appreciations of those values. Other
cognitivist theories, however, are supported by an anti-realist ontology.
Rationalism does not claim mind-independent existence of values. Truth of a
value judgment depends on a self-evident value, but that value only needs to
be self-evident for human beings - there is no need to claim independent
existence. Non-cognitivist theories are very clearly anti-realist: they make
value judgments directly dependent on human, mind-dependent, feelings or
attitudes. Thus, we see that the two pairs of opposed positions do not
correspond: there is a large field of cognitivist anti-realism, in which we can
locate theories such as rationalism.
The distinction between realism and anti-realism has the advantage of
clarity, but it leaves open a number of questions, particularly regarding anti-
realism. What positive theories are connected to the idea that values do not
exist mind-independently in the extra-human world? Pondering this question
My account of the varieties of cognitivism and non-cognitivism is based on Arrington's
book on moral epistemology ( 1989). References can be found there. Well-known
proponents of rationalism are Alan Gewirth and Bemard Gert; John McDowell and Mark
Platts are leading moral realists.
Emotivism was advocated by Ayer and Stevenson ( see Stevenson I 963). Prescriptivism was
developed by R. M. Hare ( 1952).
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leads to a host of other concepts which determine the shape of these theories.
Two pairs of such concepts are especially relevant to my project: objective
and subjective, absolute and relative. All ofthese figure in discussions on the
ontological status ofvalues, but not always with a clearly delineated meaning.9
The issue of value objectivity and subjectivity is the most slippery. The
claim that values are objective has been described as the ontological claim that
values are "part of the fabric of the world" (Mackie 1977, 15). This can be
interpreted as ontological realism, as saying that values are part of the fabric
ofthe extra-human world, a position which one could also call objectivism.'o
Often, however, it is the more modest claim that values have a specific,
verifiable, basis in social reality. This means that values can be objective, but
still mind-dependent and part ofthe human world. Ofsubjectivity, we can give
a similar account: strict subjectivism is the doctrine that values are no more
than an individual's mental states." Again, there is the more modest idea of
subjectivity that values always need to be recognized by a subject to exist.
Once the restricted versions are rejected, objectivity and subjectivity become
combinable features. We can then say that values have objective and
subjective components. It then remains to specify to what extent values are
objective or subjective. I wil] reserve the terms objectivism (or ontological
realism) and subjectivism for the strict views on value objectivity and
subjectivity. There is, however, also an intermediate position in describing the
ontological status ofvalues: the idea thatvalues are intersubjective. Values are
then seen as the shared standards of a human group, which means they are not
dependent on an individual's affirmation but neither do they need to have a
basis in reality.'' We can draw a parallel with the existence of a legal rule,
which is not part of the non-human world either, but part ofthe shared norms
of a group. Exactly in what sense a rule or value can be said to exist when it
is intersubjective is a difficult question because of the ambiguity of the idea
that it is shared. The claim that values are intersubjective needs to be backed
9 Of course, and this makes it more complicated, they are not restricted to the question of
ontology: they have epistemological relevance as well. Often, ontological and
epistemological arguments for a position are mixed togethec For example, relativism is
usually a denial of the epistemological claim that cross-cultural assessment ofbeliefs about
values is possible, backed by the ontological claim that values are never more than the
intersubjective standards of a particular group.
Objectivism is the term used by Mackie. I think the term ontological realism is clearer
because it refers directly to the real ity ofwhich objective values are supposed to be part. See
Bransen 8c Slors (1996) for a discussion of ontological realism.
A good example of subjectivism is the theory of Gauthier, who claims that values are an
individual's considered preferenccs (1986, 49).
An intersubjective view on values is part of Rawlsian constructivism. In his recent work,
Rawls relies on intersubjective agrecment about certain political values by way of a





by an account of what the shared quality of values consists in.13
The contrast between values as absolute or relative is important because of
the development ofvalue relativism.'~ Value relativism is primarily a position
on the validity of values; it denies the absolute validity of values - the idea
that values can be valid on their own account without the need to base validity
on something else. Value absolutism, as the view that some values are valid
without further justification, combines well with the epistemological view of
rationalism: the idea that ultimate values are self-evident can be the basis for
the claim that they have absolute validity. It can also be combined with
versions of epistemological and ontological realism. The common
denominator of different kinds of relativism is the idea that the validity of
values is always relative to a certain context. The most well-known type of
relativism makes values dependent on culture: values are only valid for those
people belonging to the culture of which those values are part (Harré óc
Krausz 1996, 11). Thus, cultural relativism and an intersubjective ontology are
natural companions. Relativism can be more radical than that, however. It can
shade into subjectivism when the validity of a value is seen as relative to one
person's belief or feeling. It is important to realize that relativism can be
combined with either cognitivist ornon-cognitivist claims.' S One can hold that
value judgments can be true or false within a given culture, or that such
judgments are a matter of shared sentiment.
All ofthese concepts play a role in this study. The theories I discuss, all use
them with somewhat different meanings. I will use the conceptual distinctions
made here as a framework to place them in. The focus on ideals makes for a
specific perspective. My starting point is the relationship between ideal and
reality, that is, I will try to answer the question: what is the ontological status
of ideals? In Chapter 2, I will develop two distinct concepts of ideals,
connected to philosophical traditions. The distinction, which is based on the
relation between ideal and reality, cuts across the typology of value theories
sketched here, but I will use the positions indicated here to clarify variations




The issue of objectivity, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity is further complicated because
objectivity and subjectivity are sometimes used as mutually exclusive terms. For instance,
Mackie who denies value objectivity, calls himself a subjectivist but defends the view that
values have an intersubjective basis (1977, 26).
For an overview of types of relativism, see Harré 8c Krausz 1996. Relativism is by no means
limited to theories of value. Harré and Krausz distinguish two catalogues of relativisms: by
subject (semantic, ontological, moral and aesthetic relativism) and by negation of types of
absolutisms (23-24). It is the latter catalogue that is important here. Harré and Krausz
distinguish between three absolutisms: universalism, objectivism, and foundationalism (4-
5). Relativisms can be distinguished as to the kind of absolutism they deny. Objectivism
corresponds to ontological realism, foundationalism to rationalism. Universalism is the view
that values are valid for all human beings.
Cognitivist relativism is defended by Gilbert Harman and David Wong, see Arrington
(1989, 202-247) for a discussion. Non-cognitivist relativism quickly shades into
subjectivism.
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3 Moral Ideals, Legal Ideals
My interest is not in ideals as such, but in ideals that arise in a legal context.
I have said that my aim is to investigate the concept of ideals, but that
investigation is qualified by the focus on law. This raises the question whether
a general concept of ideals suffices to understand ideals of law. Such a
question can be understood in two ways: first, as the question whether there
are special features of legal ideals creating the need for a specific concept;
second, as the question whether to distinguish different categories of ideals,
falling under the general concept of ideals. Is there reason to distinguish a
special category oflegal ideals or are all ideals equally relevant to law? Here,
I want to explore whether the concept of ideals used in moral theory can be
applied to ideals in a legal context as well. My reason to focus on moral theory
is that this is the field in which the concept of ideals is used most often.
The dominant view of moral ideals is as follows. Moral ideals are usually
contrasted with moral rules; they are said to differ in that rules specify what
is morally required, while ideals indicate what is encouraged (Gert 1988, 172).
Thus, ideals are exceptional moral standards, which ask for actions going
beyond obligation (Beauchamp 1991, 242). In some respects, such a
characterization of ideals seems easily transportable to other contexts than
morality. In a legal context, we can also think of ideals as exceptional
standards, which ask for actions going beyond obligation. However, there are
a number of connotations that come with this concept as developed in moral
theory that are less apt for a legal context.
The most important of these connotations is the attachment of the ideal to
a particular person. In the accepted view, an ideal as a standard of laudable,
but non-obligatory conduct is usually accompanied by an important distinction
between the meaning of the ideal for the person following it and its meaning
for others (Urrnson 1958, 204). For the person committed to it the ideal
generates moral demands but not for others. Generally, it is not a standard
used to criticize the person holding the ideal either. An example is the case of
a doctor volunteering to practise medicine in a war-zone. Such a person feels
that his ideal of being a good doctor requires him to do his job under any
circumstances however hazardous: it feels like a duty. No other person,
however, would be prepared to hold this doctor to a duty to risk his life. We
applaud his behaviour but do not think it is a matter of obligation. It is
especially this view of ideals as personal standards that is less applicable to
ideals of law. This is clear when we consider the examples of justice and
freedom with which I began this chapter. It is possible to regard justice and
freedom as standards to which a particular person is committed, but this does
not seem to be the central meaning of these ideals for law. One can also
understand justice and freedom as ideals that are part of, or underlie, the legal
order itself; or one can understand them as the shared ideals of the legal
community. The connection between law and certain ideals appears to be more
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direct than via the personal commitment of individuals.
Its personalized character makes the dominant moral concept ofideals less
apt as a concept applicable to ideals of law. It can also be criticized for being
too restrictive to cover all moral standards that can be seen as ideals, because
the distinction between the obligatory and the supererogatory is not as hard
and fast as this view presents it. Therefore, this does not seem to be the right
starting point in search ofa general concept of ideals. There are, however, two
other options to pursue: 1) a general, non-moral, concept of ideals that is
equally applicable in all practical contexts, including both the moral and the
legal,1ó and 2) a broader concept ofmoral ideals that is also applicable to law.
In the first case, the idea is to identify the features of ideals in general,
covering anything from the rational actor in economics to romantic love and
world peace. Central to such a concept would be that ideals are normative
standards specifying a state of affairs that is worth pursuing. In the second
case, an alternative is suggested for the specific interpretation identified as the
dominant view of ideals in moral philosophy. The moral character of ideals
is seen as an integral part of the concept, but ideals are not seen as personal
and by definition non-obligatory. Such a concept would resemble the general
concept of ideals as normative standards except in the respect that ideals are
to be pursued on moral grounds. Both options will appear in this book. Both
concepts seem to fit my examples of justice and freedom, so that at first
glance the first question of the need for a specific concept of legal ideals
seems to receive a negative answer.
Thus, it is apparent that it depends on the restrictiveness of the general
concept of ideals whether it is applicable to ideals of law. Both of the
interesting options seem equally applicable. Neither ofthe two options decides
the second question whether there is a need for a specific category of legal
ideals. The need for a category of legal ideals arises if there are other reasons
than conceptual differences to conclude that some ideals have a specific and
strong connection to the field of law. If a general, non-moral concept of ideals
is advanced, it is a plausible next step to distinguish categories of ideals that
have relevance to certain domains or contexts in order to gíve the concept of
ideals explanatory power. The question remains how strong the connection
between a certain context and the relevant ideal is; that question will be
addressed. Ifa moral concept of ideals is defended, the need for a category of
legal ideals may seem less obvious. To some, institutional characteristics
define the realm of law, and the role of ideals is always extra-legal. In that
case, a category of legal ideals is superfluous. To others, law is so directly
connected with moral ideals that there is no need to single out a special group
of legal ideals. Here, we can recognize well-known positions on the
16 E.g. along the lines of Von Wright in The Varieties of Good~ress, a study ofdifferent forms
of the notion ofgoodness (1963).
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connection between law and morality." The issue of law and morality is one
that is closely linked to the question of the category of legal ideals. Although
the recognition of specifically legal ideals is less obvious in the second option,
both a general concept and a moral concept of ideals do leave room for a
distinction between moral and legal ideals. In the first case, both moral and
legal ideals can be seen as subcategories of one general concept of ideals; in
the second case, legal ideals can be seen as a subcategory of moral ideals.
4 Rules, Principles, Ideals
In legal theory today, the concept of ideals is not commonly used. Law is
usually described in terms ofrules and, more recently, principles. Sometimes,
values are also seen as a necessary category to understand law, but not ideals.
Why introduce them`?
Rules can be seen as the basic normative category. In their most common
form, rules are prescriptive norms of conduct: they determine how one ought
to behave. Do not hit your children; brush your teeth twice a day; pay your
income tax. But rules are not always simply prescriptive as in these examples;
they are to an important extent connected to institutions. This is already
apparent when we consider the duty to pay income tax. We only have that duty
because there is a system oftax law with rules that institute income tax. Tax,
contract, marriage, these are all institutions that are created with rules and,
once they are instituted, produce other rules.18 Institutional rules are an
important part of law, and they can serve to ground the distinction between
primary rules and secondary rules made by H.L.A. Hart (1994, 91-99).
Primary rules are rules of obligation, while secondary rules are about the
primary rules: they specify how to identify a rule as part of the system (rules
of recognition), how to change a rule (rules of change) and how to apply a rule
(rules of adjudication). Secondary rules are necessary for the existence of a
legal system; they distinguish a legal system from other codes of social rules.
Thus, we see that law is and should be primarily understood as a system of
rules. That, however, is not the whole story. Those who focus exclusively on
rules have been rightly criticized for ignoring the role of other normative
concepts in law, the role of principles. Dworkin's criticism on Hart's legal
positivism is one of the most interesting defences of the importance of
principles, and I will use it to introduce the differences between rules and
n
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These positions, legal positivism and natural law theory, will be discussed extensively in
Chapter 8.
1 follow MacCormick (MacCormick 8c Weinberger 1986, 4J-~8). He distinguishes between
institutive rules (determining when an instance of the institution comes into existence),
consequential rules (determining what consequences follow when it is in existence), and
terminative rules (determining how the instance ends). What MacCormick calls the
'philosophical' sense of institution (as a concept regulated by a set of institutive,
consequential and terminative rules) used here is to be distinguished from the sociological
sense of an institution, referring to an organized form of social activity (55-56).
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principles. According to Dworkin, rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing
fashion, while principles are not because they have a dimension of weight or
importance (Dworkin 1978, 24-27). In the case of a conflict between rules,
one rule takes priority in such a way that the other rule is not valid in that case.
A principle, on the other hand, can yield to another principle while retaining
its significance. For example, consider two rules, one specifying that
ownership of an object is established by securing possession of that object, the
other specifying that ownership ofimmovable property is established by being
officially registered. These two rules conflict, but that conflict is solved by
giving priority to the second, more specific rule, construing it as an exception
to the more general rule. When principles are involved in a conflict, this leads
to a determination ofthe relative importance of each principle with one taking
precedence in the specifc case. This does not fix their relative weight in cases
to come. Consider two principles of judicial procedure: the judge's duty to
decide a case within a reasonable period of time and the judge's duty to
motivate his decision well. There will be cases when these duties conflict, but
one cannot say beforehand that the relative importance of the two principles
will always be the same.
These differences in kind between rules and principles have been explained
by Robert Alexy as stemming from the character of principles as
`Optimierungsgebote' (1985, 19). This means that principles are norms which
prescribe that something be realized to the highest degree possible considering
the legal and factual possibilities. Thus, principles can be fulfllled to a certain
degree, whereas rules can be either fulfilled or not. Rules are norms that are
fixed within the realm of legal and factual possibilities (20). A rule about due
care will specify to what extent care has to be taken, while a principle about
due care will demand the best care possible, which makes it open-ended.
Alexy shows how their character as Optimierungsgebote can explain
differences between principles and rules, both those noted by Dworkin and
those mentioned by others. It explains the different role in conf7icts: the
principle's demand for the highest degree of realization survives non-
application while the fixed demand of a rule is either met or not. Often,
principles are seen as different from rules because principles are more general
norms than rules (e.g. Raz 1972, 838). This is a rather vague criterion on its
own, because rules themselves can also be on different levels of generality or
specificity. However, a higher level of generality is a likely result of the
relation between rules and principles. An important reason why rules are fixed
determinations is that they are the outcome of a weighing of principles. The
more general nature of principles is then explained by the fact that only the
rule takes into account the limits of law and facts. It is a principle of criminal
law that a suspect taken into custody must be brought before a judge as soon
as possible; it is a rule of Dutch criminal law that this must be within three
days.
Alexy's account of principles is also illuminating because it provides a
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starting point for considering the role of ideals. He points out that principles
are not straightforwardly deontological but also have an axiological dimension
(1985, 24). A principle is not simply a prescriptive norm; it prescribes the
highest degree of realization of an ideal or value. To put it in terms of Alexy's
definition of Opti~nierungsgebote, we can say that the axiological dimension
is found in the `something' which is to be realized according to a principle.
Or, following MacCormick: "Thus legal principles are the meeting point of
rules and values" (1985, 73). Values or ideals are the desirable states ofaffairs
that one aims to realize, and principles are the norms prescribing how to go
about this realizatíon under certain legal and factual conditions.
In this way we get a threefold system of normative categories relevant to
law: rules, principles, and ideals or values. For descriptions of rules and
principles, I follow Alexy, Dworkin, and MacCormick; in this book I will
concern myself with ideals and values. As I have indicated above, this
involves examining whether ideals are to be distinguished from values. I will
also consider whether the relation between ideals and principles as sketched
here remains plausible in the light ofa thorough study of the concept of ideals.
5 The Structure of This Book
The subject ofthis book is the concept of ideals in legal theory. In section 1.1
I identified my aim as developing a defensible concept of ideals that can be
used in legal theory. Before I start the inquiry that will hopefully lead to such
a concept, I should first say something about the form in which I will present
it.
To pursue my aim I have chosen the strategy of comparing and evaluating
two existing theories that focus on ideals and law: the theories of Gustav
Radbruch and Philip Selznick. The choice of these two theorists was
motivated by two ideas. First, the idea that the most profitable study would be
of theories that combine a view of ideals with an interesting theory of law.
Second, the idea that the most profitable study would compare two theories
with rather different philosophical backgrounds. Both Radbruch and Selznick
make ideals or values the focus of their theory of law. Radbruch sees law as
that part of cultural reality which aims to realize the idea of law consisting of
the three values ofjustice, purposiveness, and legal security. Selznick sees law
as a normative system oriented towards the master ideal of legality. The
philosophica] tradition to which Radbruch belongs is that of the neo-
Kantianism developed by Windelband and Rickert. Selznick, on the other
hand, is highly influenced by the American pragmatism of John Dewey. The
two philosophies differ considerably in their account of the nature of values
and ideals, of the relation between value and reality, and of the role values
have in philosophy and science. I will compare and evaluate the theories of
Radbruch and Selznick on the issues of the nature of values and the role of
ideals in law. On the basis of that comparison I will draw conclusions about
Introduction 13
a good conceptualization of ideals or values and about the role of ideals in
law.
To finish this first chapter, I will give a short overview of the content of the
remaining chapters of this book. In Chapter 2, I start by giving a general
picture of the philosophical discussion about the ontology ofideals. I describe
two philosophical traditions advancing different concepts of ideals: a
transcendent and an immanent concept. The main point of disagreement
concerns the relation between ideal and reality. I will go into the developrnent
of ontological and epistemological views within each tradition and consider
the characteristics of ideals that follow from these views.
The next four chapters provide an examination ofthe theories ofRadbruch
and Selznick, each consisting of a chapter describing their theory and a
chapter evaluating their views on ideals. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with
Radbruch's theory. In Chapter 3, I will introduce his theory insofar as it is
relevant for an understanding of his views on ideals and law. I will go into his
main methodological theses and their neo-Kantian inspiration. I will give a
brief sketch of his legal philosophy and the much-debated `turn' in his post-
war work. In Chapter 4, I will focus on values and law, and evaluate his ideas.
I will discuss Radbruch's conception of values, the relation between value and
reality, the different elements of the idea of law and the role these have in law.
In Chapters 5 and 6, Selznick's theory is the subject of discussion. Chapter
5 serves as an introduction, in which I go into his sociological perspective,
pragmatist philosophy and the main aspects of his theory of law: legal
naturalism, and his theory of legal development. In Chapter 6 I will evaluate
his theory of ideals. I discuss his combination of pragmatism and naturalism,
the latency ofvalues, the concept of the master ideal, and the role of ideals in
the relation between law and society.
Chapter 7 provides a comparison of Radbruch and Selznick and an
assessment of their strengths and weaknesses. On the basis of that evaluation
I then develop a combination of the satisfactory elements of their theories and
apply that combined theory of ideals to law. Finally in Chapter 8, I discuss the
present state ofthe debate between legal positivism and natural law and argue
that a satisfactory intermediate position can be developed on the basis of the
theories ofRadbruch and Selznick that does more justice to the value-oriented
nature of law.
Chapter 2
Two Concepts of Ideals
1 An Ontological Distinction
In the present chapter I propose a distinction between two concepts of ideals.
In pursuit of the question what a defensible concept of ideals must look like
I have focused on the relation between ideal and reality. There are two basic
ways of viewing that relation: as opposition or unity. I refer to the concept of
ideals that sees ideals as essentially opposed to reality as the transcendent
concept of ideals; the concept that sees ideals as an integral part of reality I
call the immanent concept of ideals.
The distinction between the two concepts thus has its starting point in the
different answers to the ontological question what ideals are. In the course of
this chapter it will become apparent that the two concepts also differ
considerably in regard to both the question of gaining knowledge of ideals and
that ofjustifying adherence to ideals. Epistemological difficulties can provide
reasons for a revised account of the ontology of ideals. The epistemological
positions depend on the ontological status ofideals, because the kind ofentity
ideals are is to a large extent determinative of the way in which we have
access to ideals and ofthe reasons admissible for the justification of the belief
in certain ideals. The development of the different concepts of ideals can be
seen as a search for the most plausible account of both their ontology and
epistemology.
The distinction between a transcendent and an immanent view on ideal and
reality is the starting point for discussion of t~vo traditions of thinking about
ideals. Both traditions originate in a clear and strong assertion of, respectively,
the transcendence and the immanence of ideals. The development of the
traditions is explained by the reaction to problems generated by these strong
core positions. Thus, I sketch a move towards less extreme accounts ofthe two
concepts, in which opposition and unity are interpreted more modestly.
My aim with this chapter is twofold. First, I want to give a description of
the two concepts of ideals that will shed light on the features of ideals. In the
first chapter, I have already raised a number of questions and issues regarding
the nature of ideals. For example, from the discussion of justice, it became
apparent that, at first sight, ideals seem to be unrealizable standards. In the
discussion of freedom underlying property law, the ideal appeared as implicit
in the legal rules. Features such as unrealizability and implicitness will be
subject of discussion here. I have also raised the question whether ideals and
values are different or identicaL In this chapter, I will examine which of these
characteristics are included in the different concepts of ideals and I will pay
attention to the other characteristics following from the concepts. Secondly,
I want to use this discussion to formulate hypotheses that can guide my study
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of Radbruch and Selznick. These hypotheses will concern both the
characteristics of the concept of ideals and the problems generated by each
concept. My perspective in j udging the promises and problems of the concepts
is on the role that ideals should be able to perform. There are two functions of
ideals of which a concept should give a satisfactory account: ideals need to
serve as standards of evaluation and ideals need to give guidance to practical
concerns.
2 Ideals as Transcendent
Ideals appear as transcendent if one starts from a dualistic view of the world.
Dualism in the context of this discussion means the dualism of fact and value.
There is more than one way to understand the fact-value distinction: most
commonly it is understood as a logical distinction between types ofreasoning.
First advanced by Hume and Kant, it is the idea that one cannot derive a
statement of value, ofwhat ought to be, from a statement offact, of what is the
case.' The fact-value distinction I am concerned with here is more
fundamental: it is not a distinction between types of statements but an
ontological distinction between kinds of existence. Facts, as parts of
perceivable reality, are ofa different nature than values. The question then is:
what are values? How are they different from facts, and in what way are they
related`? I will start with a discussion of the Platonic view, as the clearest
account ofa transcendent concept of ideals, and go on to discuss Kantianism,
constructivism, and subjectivism as reactions.
Fact and value can be seen as forming two different realms, the natural
world in which we live and a world of perfection, of how things ought to be.
This is the structure of a Platoníc world of ideas.' Such a view has three
central features: the ontological status of the world of ideas, its relation to the
realm of fact, and our knowledge of it. In Plato's theory the realm of ideas was
primary: the world as it should be was also seen as the real world. The
perfection of the realm of ideas entailed that it was eternal: there is no reason
why something perfect should perish. Similarly, being perfect, that is
completely good, also meant that it was true - falsity implies imperfection,
a lack or incongruity. Ifone identifies Platonic ideas with ideals, which I think
As Stuart Hampshire points out, Kant dcfended the stronger thesis that there is an
unbrídgeable separation betwcen moral and factual judgments, while Hume was only
concemed that derivations of `ought' from `is' are not logically conclusive (Hampshire
1949, 162). Hume's is-ought problem has been the subject of vigorous debate in ethical
[heory (e.g. Searle 1964), non-observance of the distinction is known as the naturalistic
fallacy (see Frankena 1939).
See Reale (1990, 47-63) on Plato's theory of ideas. Reale distinguishes six basic
characteristics of ideas: being intelligible, being incorporeal, being in the fullest sense, being
unchangeable, being self-identical, being a unity (49). In my discussion I focus on the first
four. On the separation between ideas and reality, see also Devereux (1994, 193).
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is defensible,3 ideals in this view are perfect, eternal and true. These are large
claims, which need to be substantiated. That, however, is problematic because
of their separate realm of existence: how can these features of ideals be proven
when ideals form their own distinet realm? Some connection is needed, first
of all, so that we can know something about ideals, and, secondly, so that the
significance of ideals for the world which we inhabit is made clear.
This connection brings in a second dualism: that of mind and matter. The
link between the world of ideals and the natural world is established via the
human mind (Reale 1990, 48). By way ofhis rational capacities a person gains
insight in the character of ideals. We obtain information about ideals because
we have special rational capacities that allow us access to them. This does not
do much to clarify the rather mysterious picture that has arisen: a world of
perfect ideals to which we have a direct link because ofour rational capacities.
But there is another, more indirect connection in Plato's view that should not
be overlooked. Ideals form the patterns on which the world of which we are
part is based. A beautiful thing, for instance a flower, is a reflection of the idea
of beauty; however imperfect a reflectíon that flower is, it shows something
of the idea of beauty. For Plato this means that ideals are the source of the
valuable aspects of our world.~ This gives ideals an important role in the
constitution of the world.
For our knowledge of ideals, this means that there is a direct and an
indirect way to gain it: direct revelation to the mind, and indirect proof in the
world as we see it. This second route cannot stand on its own, however,
because we do not know to what extent the idea] has influenced the make-up
of our world unless we have some idea of the ideal in its pure form. We need
some understanding of perfection to recognize how imperfect the things are
that we perceive. How do we know the world ofideals? The Platonic view was
that humanity has special capacities that enable it to understand the ideal
world. Human beings have been gifted (perhaps by a divine creator) with
intelligence that gives them a grasp of another realm. This is in part a highly
problematic and in part an attractive argument. What is attractive, is the idea
that the human mind has traits that give it a special relation to ideals. What is
problematic is how the link is established between mind and the external
realm of ideals.
The problem of the exact relation between ideals and the mind that knows
them can be solved simply and radically by doing away with the external ideal
altogether. Why should we suppose that there is a perfect world of ideals
3
a
As noted in Chapter 1, the use of the term ' ideal' as a substantive is relatively recent, the use
of the adjective `ideal' was already used as referring to idcas by the Greeks. f use ideals in
the context of Platonic philosophy as well, because many of the features attributed to ideas
by Plato are later seen as features of ideals.
It is precisely because the ideas are of another (metaphysical) realm, that they can be causes
ofour (physical) reality, according to Plato. Something could only be a cause of something
else if it was external to it, thus ideas could be causes because they were transcendent (Reale
1990, 58).
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simply because we have a notion in our heads of a realm of perfect value?
There is no reason to assume that there is something out there that causes
these notions of ideals to appear in one's mind: people are capable ofthinking
ofideals without impulses from outside. This line ofreasoning is strengthened
when it is combined with the Cartesian separation between mind and matter.
Descartes in his theory ofthe Cogito raised doubts about the possibility ofany
certain knowledge except concerning one's own thought (Descartes 1637, 32).
On the one hand, there is the mind or thought of the subject, on the other the
matter of the outside world. If one accepts this account of the fundamental
difference between mind and matter, it becomes plausible to regard such
notions as ideals as internal to the mind that thinks ofthem, that is, as notions
that are generated by mental processes themselves instead ofnotions reflecting
a pre-existing world. In such a view, two dualisms are joined: the fact-value
distinction combined with the mind-matter distinction leads to the view that
ideals are generated by mental processes.
This shift from an interpretation of transcendence as a separate realm to
transcendence as part of intelligent thought is developed most forcefully in
Kantian philosophy.5 The Kantian version oftranscendent ideals sees abstract
ideal notions as necessary elements ofhuman thinking.`' This means that ideals
are acknowledgeable for every rational being; they are abstract notions that
regulate our pursuits because they formulate ideas of what things should be
like that all rational beings must accept as valid.' There is a rational necessity
to the most abstract ideals that nobody who fully employs his rational
capacities can deny. The argument is that we need to accept such notions in
order to understand ourselves as willing and acting creatures. More broadly,
we need to accept the validity of certain ideals in order to construct coherent
theories ofwhat we are and what the social world is. Kant himself employed
such an a priori argument to show that freedom is presupposed by our
understanding of ourselves as moral beings.8 His notion of freedom was a
formal notion; it did not specify a certain content. In the same way, one could
argue for abstract notions of justice, equality, truth, etc. as necessary
My account cannot do justice to the complete system of Kant's own philosophy. The
arguments here are inspired by Kant's ideas, and can be found in various neo-Kantian
theories. Ofthese, I have primarily used Heidelberg neo-Kantianism ofthe late 19'" century,
and the 20`h-century work of Emmet and Rescher.
A Kantian theory of ideals argues for transcendent ideals (as not part of reality) by way of
transcendental arguments, that is, arguing from the preconditions necessary to make
knowledge or experience possible (see Walker 1978,14-23). Thus, I use `transcendent' to
refer to the ontological status of ideals, and `transcendental' to refer to a Kantian type of
argument.
The regulative function of ideals is stressed by Emmet (1994), who studíes the role of
various Kantian ideals in practical philosophy.
This argument can be found in the Grundlegi~ngzurMetaplrysik derSi[ten (1785, 454-455).
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presuppositions ofunderstanding ourselves and the world we inhabit.9 In what
sense should one understand this necessity of abstract ideals? Here the old
Platonic argument resurfaces - at least to a certain extent. In the discussion
of the Platonic world of ideas, I discussed the need for an idea of perfection
in order to understand the source of value in our world and to see to what
extent ours is a world of imperfection. Similarly, in a Kantian argumentation,
abstract ideals of goodness, of justice, of truth, of beauty are necessary
presuppositions of our thought or cultural world. In contrast with the Platonic
ideas, these abstract ideals are not seen as having an independent existence,
but are notions that persons necessarily think of, that is, they are `present' in
people's minds without any claim to separate existence. The most rigorous
version of the rational necessity of ideals is that in which the specific content
ofcertain ideals is taken as necessarily true and universally acknowledgeable.
That, however, raises problems for the theory. How can we argue for
substantive notions of e.g. justice or freedom on the basis of the a priori
argument that such a notion is necessary to understand ourselves or the world
we live in? The argument depends on a rational procedure, which can in
principle be reproduced by any rational being, by which one can establish that
a certain ideal must be presupposed to understand oneself. The extent to which
certain ideals follow from such an argument is limited, however. This line of
argumentation, based on a priori necessity, only works for formal value
notions: we may need to have some idea of, for instance, goodness but it is not
possible to argue for a specific content as an inescapable presupposition of our
life. If a formal, abstract, ideal notion is all we can establish, then the
regulatory, guiding role of ideals is severely limited.
To deal with the limited guidance of abstract ideals, the constructivist
version of a transcendent concept weakens the claims of rational necessity. In
this weaker form of argument, ideals can perform important theoretical and
practical functions. Ideals are then seen as necessary elements in the
construction of theories.'o Claims regarding the necessity of ideals are more
modest: the ideal is regarded as necessary for the construction of a coherent
theory, but only in the context ofthat theory. The ideal is the object ofrational
argument, but not necessarily valid for all rational beings. When discussing
constructivist views, the term `ideal' can seem ambiguous because there are
often two kinds of elements involved in such theories that have an ideal
dimension. For instance, in Rawlsian normative theory the person in the
original position represents, among other things, idealized impartiality and
rationality (Rawls 1971,142-150). The ideal dimension ofthose aspects ofthe
theory differs from the ideality of, for instance, views ofthe good life, another
9 Kant himself did not extend the line of argumentation to the cultural world as such. It is
used by certain neo-Kantian theorists such as Rickert (1928, 269-70) and Radbruch (see Ch.
4).
'o See for instance Van der Burg (1997, 27) and Daniels (1980, 55-56) on ideals in wide
reflective equilibrium.
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ideal element in Rawls' theory (e.g. 1971, 472-473). The first type of ideal
element is rightly regarded as an idealization, a methodological tool to clarify
argumentation. It should be distinguished from an ideal because an ideal
demands to be pursued. Unlike an ideal, an idealization lacks the appeal that
stems from being worthy of aspiring to." Ideals are one kind of element in
theory construction: they are abstract notions regarded as appealing because
they present something valuable. They can thus be seen as part of existing
views and as normative standards.
In this picture of ideals, their validity has either a subjective or an
intersubjective basis, depending on whether the coherence sought in theory
construction is viewed as coherence ofone person's views or as coherence of
the views of more people. Constructivism with an intersubjective basis is the
more interesting kind because it gives ideals a more solid justification. Ideals
are justified by their acceptability to those who work with them, in
conjunction with their fit in the theories ofwhich they are part. Because they
are constructed, their validity depends on their coherence with the rest of the
theory, which is something assessed by those who use that theory. In this
view, the idea ofrational acceptability has been relativized somewhat to allow
a more substantive vision of ideals than the Kantian theory of a priori
necessity proposes.
A more radical criticism ofthe Kantian view is advanced by the fourth, and
last, version of the transcendent concept that I will discuss: the subjectivist
fortn of the transcendent concept. This version moves much further away from
the Platonic view ofideals than both the Kantian and the constructivist views,
because it also jettisons the rational component of the Platonic view and the
intersubjective basis of ideals. In this subjectivist view of ideals, they are no
more than personal desires or preferences.'' One person's idea] might be to
own the latest BMW sports car, while another might desire a truly democratic
society. The ontological status of these ideals is the same: they are both no
more than personal preferences. On this view, ideals escape the domain of
argumentation. Because they are essentially personal, there is no way of
convincing another person of the validity of your own ideal except by
appealing to that person's own desires and preferences. The importance of
ideals in such a view is found in one function only: because ideals are personal
and unknowable, they should be kept beyond the limits of debate and theory.
Nothing can be said of them that can generate shared knowledge. This is an
A good example of idealization in a theoretical context is the rational actor in economic
theory. Economists use the ideal of a completely rational actor in their models to get a
clearer view ofeconomic processes, although they know very well that real life economic
actors also act, and sometimes should act, on other impulses or motives than are covered by
the ideal of rationality. The ideal of rationality serves as an element in a model of pure
economic reasoning; it is a tool to isolate such reasoning in the expectatíon that this will
illuminate the functioning of economic processes.
E.g. Gauthier: value seen as a measure of individual preference (1986, 59); or Russell:
value seen as expressed emotion (1935, 40).
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extreme view, of course, radicalizing the mind-related character of ideals by
locating them in the thought and imagination ofa particular person. There are
other, less radical, relativized forms of the concept of ideals, but they usually
depart from the more immanent, practice-related view of ideals, which is the
subject of section 2.3.
The radical character of the subjectivist form of ideals ensues from the
combination of the transcendent with the personal. These two characteristics
both lead to the idea that ideals are in no way determined by the world of fact:
the transcendent character ofideals because it makes them otherworldly, their
personal character because it makes them the result of an individual's whim
or desire. In the other direction, there is a connection between ideal and fact.
Because people act on the basis of their ideals, ideals play an important role
in determining the parts ofreality to which people belong and with which they
interact. Such relations are seen as one-directional influence of ideals on
reality: ideals play an important role in the constitution ofreality, but facts do
not have a direct influence on ideals.
In the other modes of the transcendent concept of ideals, the relations
between ideal and reality are developed along similar lines, but in a more
subtle way. In the Platonic view, we saw that physical reality is one ofthe two
ways in which we know ideas, because the ideas are at work in reality as
causes. In the Kantian view, reality as we perceive it is the starting point for
reasoning: the ideal is necessary to understand certain aspects of reality. We
need to presuppose an ideal as ordering force to give a rationally satisfactory
account of things. In the constructivist view, factual considerations are
important for the development of theories because theories - at least insofar
as they are descriptive - are developed to explain puzzling facts. Ideals are
also thought of in reaction to certain factual phenomena, but in the context of
a theory. The exact construction of the ideal, however, depends on the way it
hangs together with the rest of the theory, as does its justification. Ideals are
justified by their coherence with a theory and by their acceptability in the
context of that theory. Facts, of course, play a part in this process of
justification but only in their capacity of providing reasons for theorists. By
this I mean that coherence and intersubjective agreement between the users of
the theory justify the ideal, not the facts themselves, which only provide
reasons why some version of the ideal counts as acceptable for such people.
In the construction of ideals, facts are reckoned with but they are not an
independently decisive factor for the determination ofideals. Here too, ideals
are in the end confined to the realm of the subjective.
Subjectivity is a key notion to understand the latter three versions of the
transcendent concept. There are two senses of subjectívity that play a role
here. In one sense of the word subjective, these views are in agreement that
ideals are subjective, namely when subjective is understood as pertaining to
the subject, that is to a thinking, self-reflective being by virtue of these
qualities of thought and self-reflection. There are a number of different ways
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in which the idea of value as part of the human mind can be developed,
ranging from the idea that abstract value notions are necessary presuppositions
of human life, to the idea that values are identical to unreflected preferences.
Secondly, subjectivity can refer to a specific epistemological quality of a
belief: it then means that there are no criteria for establishing the truth of a
certain belief, and that truth is a matter of persona] conviction. That ideals are
subjective can thus mean, first, that ideals are part of the thought of intelligent
beings, and, second, that ideals are no more than one person's unverifiable
beliefs. In the first sense, it is accepted by all three transcendent theories that
ideals are subjective, while the subjectivist view is the only one defending that
ideals are subjective in the second sense. The weakest point of seeing ideals
as subjective in the second, epistemological, sense is that it entails that there
is no way of really knowing another person's ideals and no way of criticizing
them. This goes against our way ofreasoning in most practical pursuits.
Features of the transcendent concept
After this discussion of the dualistic origin of the transcendent concept of
ideals and of the different forms of this concept, I can now identify what
general features are distinctive of the transcendent concept. The transcendent
concept of ideals has four features of ideals as its core: ideals are perfect, they
are abstract, they escape complete formulation, and they are inherently
unrealizable. Perfection is the most important characteristic deriving from the
Platonic view of ideals. Whether the ideal is regarded as the underlying, true
reality or as a mental construct, is of no consequence for the form the ideal
takes: in both cases, the ideal appears as a flawless entity.13 And although their
perfection derives from different sources in these theories, it is by virtue of
their perfection that transcendent ideals can have their specific role in
argumentation. They function as standards that can explain certain concerns
or directions of deliberation and action. There are ways of organizing things
ofwhich one can only make sense by seeing them as under the direction of an
ideal. Similarly, ideals are needed to recognize and designate the flaws in a
situation or argument. The perfection of ideals makes them into standards
against which one can compare real-life situations and thereby isolate certain
features ofthat situation. Theoretically, working with perfect instances makes
it possible to gain more precise insight into the exact mechanisms ofprocesses
and to break down a phenomenon into its composing factors. Practically too,
it is helpful to know in which respects a situation does or does not answer to
a perfect ideal, because that points out directions for improvement.
The other features, abstraction, impossibility to formulate, and
" According to Nicholas Rescher, perfection is one of the three features of a Kantian view of
ideals, combined with being archetypal, or paradigmatic, and imaginary (Rescher 1987,
1 I S). 1 think the quality of being imaginary can be identified with being subjective (in the
broad sense) in my account. I disagree with Rescher about ideals being archetypaL this is
still too much a Platonic notion of an ideal.
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unrealizability, are very closely linked to the perfect character of ideals, and
to each other. To a certain extent, abstraction is needed to reach perfection: it
is in concrete situations that imperfections abound, which need to be stripped
away to generate a perfect ideal; but the abstract character of transcendent
ideals amounts to more than ignoring imperfect details. A perfect instance of
something can still be relatively concrete: it is fairly easy to create the image
ofa perfect car on a computer, which is still a concrete object, in an imagined
form. The difference with a transcendent ideal is that the ideal cannot in itself
be presented as a concrete object: the ideal is always at a distance from
particular instantiations of it. This is why an ideal always appears to escape
complete formulations of it: the abstract qualities that belong to it are never
quite captured in a concrete example.'~ The ideal of truth can be expressed in
a true theory or statement, but this does not exhaust the meaning ofthe ideal.
True theory A and true statement B are examples of what truth might mean,
but as soon as one considers how the truth of theory A relates to the ideal of
truth, one notices that there are a lot of provisos involved in the truth oftheory
A. The theory is true `considering what we know now', `based on the evidence
gathered so far', ete. The ideal of truth, in contrast, implies complete
knowledge, or full evidence. In comparing the abstract ideal to different
concrete instances ofit, different dimensions become apparent against which
the ideal promises more than can be found in such particular instances. Any
specific formulation of the ideal, trying to give a definitive definition, fails
because formulations are given with certain contexts in mind, while the ideal
transcends such contexts. The dimensions ofperfection and abstraction make
ideals reach beyond any specified expression.
The combined features of being perfect and abstract also lead up to the
fourth main feature of the transcendent concept of ideals: ideals can never be
completely realized. The impossibility of formulating the meaning ofan ideal
completely might appear to be similar to the impossibility of realizing an ideal
completely, but these are different matters. That ideals are inherently
unrealizable does not necessarily imply that they cannot be formulated.
Human beings cannot fly without props, but that does not mean that one
cannot formulate exactly what a flying human being would be like. The
inherent unrealizability of ideals means that they are necessarily of such a
nature that they are incapable ofbeing completely fulfilled: there is always a
residue ofthe ideal that escapes realization. To a large extent, unrealizability
is based on the perfection of ideals: the flawlessness in every aspect that
characterizes ideals is unattainable in the real world. The world has many
features that bar perfect arrangements, features ranging from scarcity of
resources to the development ofnew illnesses. Combinations ofsuch features
make it impossible to realize one's ideals: on the way to perfection, one
'" Amongst those stressing the impossibility of complete formulation of an ideal: Van der
Burg (1997, 25) and Emmet (1994, 61).
24 The Concept of Ideals i~r Legal Theory
always encounters obstacles that force one to settle for less than perfection.
The impossibility of formulating ideals completely contributes to their
unrealizability indirectly: because every formulation focuses on only some
aspects of the ideal, attempts at realization on the basis of such a formulation
are bound to fall short. Defining justice as every person having an equal share
of resources may make justice seem realizable, but once attempts are made to
divide equally, even only as a thought experiment, it becomes clear that the
ideal ofjustice also encompasses considerations of need and merit. So it may
be possible to realize justice as equality in some manner, but that is a far cry
from complete realization of the ideal ofjustice. The inability to formulate
ideals thus reinforces their unrealizability.
In my discussion ofthe features ofideals, as advanced by the transcendent
concept, I have not distinguished between the different versions of the
transcendent concept. For most of these, it is indeed unnecessary: the Platonic,
Kantian and constructivist versions ofthe concept ofideals may have different
ontological bases, but the four features of ideals that were discussed can be
recognized in all of these theories. However, a slightly different story needs
to be told about the radically subjectivist account of ideals. As we saw, the
ideal element is subdued in subjectivist theories: ideals are no more than
personal values or preferences. As such, all the features mentioned are
significantly revised in a subjectivist theory of ideals. They all become relative
to a particular person. It means that ideals are not inherently unrealizable, but
unrealizable for the person who holds them, and that they are perfect only in
the eyes of the beholder. The feature of abstraction seems to lose relevance
altogether: one of the main characteristics ofa subjectivized view of ideals is
that abstract values such as justice or freedom acquire the same status as
personal ideals such as becoming a great athlete. The latter category is pre-
eminently concrete, in the sense that such a personal ideal is always a vision
of oneself in an ideal position. Thus, abstraction is no longer a defining feature
of ideals in the subjectivist view. Similarly in this view, the inability to
forrnulate the meaning of an ideal is not a defining feature of ideals as such.
There are ideals that are hard to formulate, the more abstract ones, but others
can be given precise content. The ideal of being a great athlete can be defined
in terms of winning world championships and breaking world records, while
a commitment to the ideal ofjustice does not entail the possibility ofa precise
definition. The ideal ofjustice as a subjective value may be rephrased as a
preference for living in an environment ofjust relations, but that still does not
give a formulation of what justice is about. The general argument about
impossibility to formulate ideals applies to this subgroup of subjective ideals
as well. In a subjectivist view, however, the points about abstraction and
formulation do not create category differences: ideals are on a sliding scale
from highly abstract to concrete and personal. The shared characteristic is that
they are personal preferences, which can take all kinds of different forms.
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3 Ideals as Immanent
The immanent concept of ideals is connected to world views with a monistic
basis. A monistic theory sees the world as essentially a whole, in which
different aspects can be distinguished, but these aspects always remain
inseparable parts of the whole. With regard to the nature of ideal and reality,
a monistic view of the world entails that the ideal is simply an aspect of
reality. In itself, this statement is still obscure: what does it mean that the ideal
is part of reality? What should we understand as the ideal? How should we
conceive ofreality? In this section I will discuss four versions ofan immanent
concept of ideals, starting with the most explicítly immanent view, the
Aristotelian version. Modern naturalism is then presented as a more modest
account, to whose problems pragmatism and reductionism, in turn, are
reactions.
As with the transcendent concept, the origin of the immanent concept of
ideals is found in Greek philosophy: in the work of Aristotle. In Aristotle's
teleological view, the end or good of every being is entailed by its specific
nature. For human beings, the good is eudaifnonia, happiness or the good
life.15 The idea that the good for man is given with his biological nature
indicates that for Aristotle the good is immanent in the natural world (Reale
1990, 319). This can be illustrated with the well-known example ofthe acorn
and the oak. The acorn already contains the essence ofthe full-grown oak. The
idea is that it lies in the natural course of development that the ideal comes to
realization. Of course, this does not mean that this necessarily happens. The
acorn can be eaten by a wild boar and never grow into a tree, and similarly, a
situation can arise that prevents the realization of the ideal. However, that is
not the normal run ofthings: the good is what a being naturally aims to be and
will normally succeed in becoming. In the Aristotelian view, the ideal is
inherent in the natural phenomenon, it is realizable, and it has a biological
basis. Thus, Aristotelian philosophy has a rich view of reality: it contains
purposes and ideals because these originate simultaneously with the
phenomena themselves.
This Aristotelian view generates two serious problems. First of all, the
biological explanation for the ideal ofeach species leads to an unduly unitary
view of ideals.1ó Because we humans share a common human nature, there is
one best way to live, which we are even by nature inclined to pursue. Such a
view cannot make room for a plurality ofideals and genuine conflicts between
them. All values are perceived and evaluated as either conducive to or
detracting from the supreme good for man. This way conflict can always be
For discussion of the place of the notion of eudaimonia in Aristotle's philosophy, see the
essays of Nagel, Ackrill, Wilkes and McDowell in A.O. Rorty (1980).
On the point of the unity of the good, there is disagreement among interpreters whether
Aristotle did indeed see the good as one; I follow Larmore (1992), who defends that
Aristotle held such a monistic view.
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resolved in the light of the human good. It means that, ultimately, there is no
room for incommensurability ofideals: all ideals are explicable in terms ofthe
supreme human good. This is highly problematic ifone wants to recognize the
equal validity of competing ideals in situations of conflict. In addition to this
problem generated by teleological biology, there is the more general difficulty
of the inherence of an ideal. Even without the biological basis, the view that
an ideal is completely determined by the character and functions of a
phenomenon is problematic. This would mean that the precise character of the
ideal is generated and fixed by the shape of the existing phenomenon. This
raises a question regarding the development of an ideal: can the ideal only
change when the phenomenon to which it is connected does? Seeing ideals as
inherent in phenomena implies that they can only change together. Especially
in connection with human activities, it seems more plausible to allow that
ideals can develop and change in different directions in the course of
performing these activities. Seeing ideals as inherent aspects restricts the
source of development of the ideal too much.
The modern form of value naturalism addresses these two points of
criticism: it tries to make room for plurality ofideals and for the possibility of
development.'' Instead of the complete inherence of ideals in reality, it
defends the more modest proposition that ideals have roots in natural
phenomena, out ofwhich they can develop in di fferent ways. For example, the
ideal of love has roots in the biological phenomena of sex18 and parenthood.
If one sees the function of sex as reproduction and the function of parenting
as guiding the young to adulthood, one can see that these are possible without
love, but also that they function better when love is involved. Raising children
is perhaps the clearest example: a child's development is distorted if it grows
up in a loveless environment. The precise contours of the ideal of parental
love can vary: being either a strict or a liberal educator can follow from the
idea of a loving parent. The value of giving a child a secure and warm
relationship can take different forms.
Thus, modern naturalism retains the biological basis of ideals, but
interprets it as providing the roots and general contours of ideals which can be
developed in different ways. Human nature remains important because it
explains the general structure ofhuman life, with social interaction as a central
component. People are constituted in such a way that they naturally incline
towards life in a setting with other people. It means that the reasons for the
claim that the social aspects of human life are important are based on
biological inclination. Once the social character of mankind is seen as an
is
Modern value naturalism or ethical naturalism is defended by the neo-Arístotelian Martha
Nussbaum and by Philip Selznick. It is to bc distinguished from empirical naturalism, "the
general metaphysícal doctrinc that nothing exists beyond what is open to empirical
investigation" (Darwall 1998, 27). The metaphysical view underlying modem value
naturalism is still teleological.
An example given by Santayana (1905, 9) and by Selznick ( I 961, 90)
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integral part of what is natural, it is a small step to extend the argument about
the natural basis of ideals to social practices. If people have certain natural
characteristics, and having a need for social interaction is one ofthem, one can
argue that organizing life in social practices is natural as well and
consequently these practices are a natural phenomenon. I should note that this
does not entail that specific social practices are thereby also justified by the
naturalist argument. It needs an additional argument to be able to say that a
certain social practice has a natural basis, if this is to mean more than being
a possible expression of man's social nature.
Precisely on this point, modern naturalists introduce relativity into their
theories.'9 The idea is that, although certain forms oforganization and certain
basic natural values are universal because related to the nature of man,
concrete practices and their accompanying values are relative to the culture of
which they are part. The argument in naturalistic terms is that it is one of the
universal characteristics of human beings that they need to be part of
particular and local cultures and practices (Selznick 1992, 103). There is a
general human tendency to laugh and play (Nussbaum 1992, 219) but there are
immense variations in games and jokes among different groups and
subgroups. One might even argue that an important way of creating and
enhancing group identity is by developing specific forms ofhumour and play.
The commitment to certain universal values, which follows from an argument
based on human nature, therefore does not preclude appreciation ofthe values
of local practices.
In the context of social interaction, ideals are closely linked to the practices
of which they are part. In relation to natural phenomena, we saw that the
argument was that ideals have their roots in those phenomena. In a similar
fashion, one can argue that ideals find their roots in social practices. Ideals
have an inherent connection to social arrangements meaning that social
arrangements have their specific accompanying ideals. The practice of
friendship is guided by the ideal of friendship; the practice of education is
guided by the ideal of good teaching. This view of ideals as connected to
social arrangements is part ofa view ofthe social world as consisting of more
or less integrated practices. Ideals and practices are seen as mutually
dependent: an ideal develops because there is a social practice, which in turn
is kept viable by being guided by integrating values. The orientation towards
values serves as a shared focal point of the participants in a practice: by
understanding the directions given by the ideals ofthe practice, its participants
can develop it further. When ideals are this closely linked to practices, we also
need to know how to understand practices. Practices can be defined as
coherent and complex forms of socially established cooperative human
" See, for instance, the combination of universality and local variation in Nussbaum (1992,
224).
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activity.'" Practices range from family ]ife and friendship to politics and
medicine. Particular instances of each practice may differ, but they are seen
as instances of one practice because they are similar in the core activities, the
role of participants, the guiding norms, and, of course, the ideals of the
practice.
Because of this view of integrated practices, modern naturalism does not
completely escape the criticism made of the Aristotelian view. It still leaves
little room for variation in the different instances ofa practice: the same ideal,
the same norms, the same roles are seen in every instance of it. This implies
a problematic unitary vision of ideal and practice: wherever the practice is
found, the accompanying ideal of that practice is at work as well. In
naturalistic theories, ideals are important aspects ofapractice because they set
the direction for full development of the practice. Modern naturalism, in its
more modest interpretation of the natural basis of ideals, leaves room for
development and change of the ideal. Although ideals are rooted in natural or
social phenomena, they are not completely determined by the factual situation.
The ideal reaches beyond the situation because it formulates ways in which the
situation can and should evolve. However, by seeing ideal and practice as a
mutually dependent unity, naturalistic theories still fall prey to the first
objection to Aristotelian naturalism: how to account for the variety of ideals.
The modern naturalist is no longer committed to a unitary view ofthe human
good per se, but does apply the same logic to specific practices. There is
always a core meaning to the ideal ofpractice that follows from the nature and
function of the practice. Thus, the good for a certain practice is one
overarching ideal. Variety only has a place within these parameters. Thus,
there is no place for radical reinterpretations of the meaning of ideals.
This is a point taken up by the pragmatist account of ideals.'' Here, the
natural ontology of ideals is dropped: ideals are no longer seen as following
from (human) nature. Instead, the provisionality of ideals is stressed by
making the link between an ideal and its factual basis more temporary and
contextual. This is mainly the result ofa different interpretation ofthe ideal's
basis in reality. In a pragmatist theory, the focus is not so much on enduring
and universal natural and social activities, but on the problem-solving
experience ofpeople. Ideals or values are seen as part of concrete experience
in the sense that they are seen as the proposed solutions to problematic
situations. Similarly to the naturalistic view, ideals are rooted in factual
phenomena, but here the point of departure is the experience of a problem, not
,o The idea of practices is to a certain extent inspired by the theory of Alasdair Maclntyre
(1984, I 87-196). However, for my purposes Mactntyre'sdistinction between intemal goods
and external goods and its connection to practices which involve internal and institutions
which involve extema) goods ís unhelpful. Both practices and institutions seem to involve
both intemal and external goods; and both are directed by ideals or values. Therefore, I use
the term `practice' in a broader sense, without special reference to internal goods.
As found in the theories of William James and John Dewey. 1 mainly use Dewey (I920;
1929) in my description of pragmatism.
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the inherent leaning of a phenomenon towards a certain value.
The focus of the pragmatist view on problematic situations makes ideals
concrete, contextual, and provisional. They are concrete because they are
connected to experienced practical problems. For instance, an ideal of
friendship is invoked when two friends have an argument because one ofthem
feels cheated. Recognizing that they both have an ideal of friendship as a
special form of loyalty can restore the bond between the two." What the ideal
means is determined in relation to the problem they have. The ideal is
therefore a concrete proposition for this situation. By the same token, it is
contextual: the meaning of the ideal is limited to the specific situations in
which it works. The factual circumstances of the situation determine the
character of the ideal because the ideal is the answer to this specific problem;
it is only possibly relevant in other situations with similar features. The ideal
has a hypothetical character: its validity depends on its problem-solving
potential because it is only valid insofar as it contributes to a better situation.
If it turns out that the ideal does not or does no longer help to improve
situations, it needs to be replaced or adapted. Of course, it also fol]ows that,
as long as the ideal does lead to more satisfactory experiences, it remains
valid. Its provisional character means that the ideal is always subject to critical
scrutiny.
Seeing ideals as connected to concrete factual situations gives the
impression that one can gain knowledge of ideals by simply attending to the
facts. This would be a straightforward way to solve the problems of plurality
and change posed to Aristotelianism: gaining factual knowledge would suffice
to understand ideals. Although this is not the pragmatist view, such a solution
is part of the fourth influential theory with a monistic basis: the reductionist
version ofmoral realism. Reductionism defines reality as the objective world
whose existence we can ascertain by way of sensory perception. The main
difference with the other theories discussed here is that reductionism replaces
the teleological view of reality with a narrower empiricist view.23 In such a
strict view of what is real, the ideal can only be said to exist if it is reducible
to what can be perceived with our senses. Such a reductionist view has been
defended by ethical theorists who have argued that value is reducible to
interest, or to perceivable manifestations of like or dislike.2' Reductionism is
a rather typical form of an immanent value theory, because by saying that
value is identical to some other quality it denies that value is in any
23
„
It is important to recognize that in such a situation reference to an ideal can only solve the
problem íf the ideal is something they share. If it is the ideal of only one of the friends, it
cannot restore their friendship and may even be more divisive. It seems that pragmatism has
little eye for this negative side ofvalues (compare Selznick 1992, 174).
In terms of the distinction in metaphysical views of note 17: reductionism is a form of
empirical naturalism, while Aristotelianism and modern value naturalism are forms of
teleological naturalism.
E.g. Perry: interest as the source of value (1926), or Railton: values as objective interests
reducible to natural and social facts (1986, 685).
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meaningful way a distinct aspect of reality. Aristotelianism, modern value
naturalism and pragmatism have a different view ofthe scope of reality. Their
view ofreality is broader than that ofreductionism, because they include value
as a distinct dimension ofwhat is real. For my purposes, the reductionist view
is not the most convincing version of the thesis that fact and value are one: it
raises the question why we would want a concept of value and fails to give
convincing reasons in its answer.'`5
Considering reductionism does point out the distinctiveness of the
pragmatist view ofreality and knowledge. We saw that the pragmatist way to
understanding an ideal is by examining the practice or situation to which it is
connected: by studying how things work and how people act, one also gets to
know the ideal that is part of this. Two things should be noted in connection
to the epistemology implied by these ideas. First, that pragmatism holds an
inclusive theory of knowledge;'6 and, second, that it implies the
interdependent understanding of fact and value. What I mean by an inclusive
theory of knowledge, is based on the importance of experience in these
theories and the continuity seen between all aspects of that experience. Our
access to both the facts and the values of our life is through our experience of
them: "knowledge deals with the world in which we live" (Dewey 1929, 82).
Thus knowledge has a broad scope: everything that we encounter can be the
subject ofknowledge. It is this view ofknowledge as based on our experience
which can plausibly tie the understanding of the ideal to its factual basis:
experience not only shows what is happening but also what works well and
what is problematic. Here the second point comes to the fore, because
occurrences and their worth cannot be grasped independently. The way we
experience things is mediated by our values and the values that drive us are a
product of what happens to us. The clearest case for this line of argument is
the interplay between negative experiences and ideals.Z' A painful experience,
e.g. being denied a certain benefit you were expecting, is directly related to an
ideal, in this case of fairness. Your experience cannot be understood without
reference to this ideal, but neither can you grasp the ideal without having such
experiences.
This idea of mutual understanding of ideal and experience also points out
what is problematic about the pragmatist view. Ideals lack an independent
source of validity: they are justified by their contribution to a satisfactory
experience. However, our understanding of what is satisfactory is determined
by reference to ideals as well. Thus, the ideal is required to function both as
26
Therefore, I will not include reductionism in my further discussion of the immanent
concept.
Pragmatism in general can be described as the application of the scientific method to any
human activity: everything can in principle be the subject ofknowledge, and every problem
can be [ackled by applying the method of intelligent inquiry (Dewey 1929, 200-201).
More elaborate on this point: Van den Brink 1998, who sees moral emotional reactions as
the main direct link to ideals (202-205).
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standard ofevaluatíon ofexperiences and as justifed by these experiences. A
solution to this problem, a problem of circularity, could be found in a strict
distinction between the end or goal of an activity and the ideals that are
helpful in reaching that end. Thus, what is satisfactory is understood in terms
of that end, while ideals are justified by their contribution to it. However, there
are two reasons why this solution is itself problematic. First, this only
relocates the problem, because now the end or goal is indeterminate: how do
we determine what that end should be? Secondly, this is discontinuous with
pragmatism's doctrine about means and ends. One ofthe central concerns of
pragmatist theory is arguing against the separation ofineans and ends (Dewey
1929, 223). The means used to pursue an end must be evaluated in terms of
their consequences for that end, but the reverse is true as well. Ends or goals
can also be criticized if they require the use ofunacceptable means. Therefore,
means and ends should not be regarded in isolation, but evaluated together and
in a larger context. This does entail that there is no easy way to solve the
problem of circularity.
Features of the irnrnanent concept
The discussion of different versions of the immanent concept of ideals has
paved the way for a consideration of the cardinal characteristics of the
immanent concept ofideals. So far, I have focused on the interpretation given
to the ontological character of ideals: in what sense and to what extent does
immanence imply that the ideal is an integral part of a being or a practice.
Thus, the first important characteristic of the immanent concept of ideals is
their inherence in a natural or social phenomenon. We saw that there was a
move away from the complete inherence of the Aristotelian view. In modern
naturalism, the immanence of ideals is no longer interpreted as their inhering
completely in a factual phenomenon. The immanence of ideals should be
understood as referring to the basis of ideals in reality. In pragmatism the
connection between ideal and reality is softened again: the basis in reality
becomes a basis in the problematic aspects of social practices. In general we
can understand the ideal's inherence as follows. The interplay between ideal
and reality can be seen as a variety ofthe connection between the possible and
the actual, with this difference, that the ideal is not merely a possibility but a
desirable possibility.'`8 The ideal sets out a direction, a possibility, for
improvement of an actual situation. But not everything is a genuine
possibility: the actual sets boundaries on what can appear as an option for
improvement. In the same way that the possible is constrained by the actual,
the ideal is constrained by the reality out of which it originates. The debate
within the tradition of the immanent concept is over the heaviness of this
constraint. The reality of ideals should be viewed in terrns of this connection
28 Characterizing the ideal as possibility is an idea borrowed from Dewey (1920, 150): "[The
ideal and rational~ represent intelligently thought-out possibilities of the existing world
which may be used as methods for making over and improving it" (also 1929, 227).
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to actual situations and practices: it arises out of and is effective in existing
situations.
Apart from the inherence of ideals, there are a number of other
characteristics of the immanent concept that should be discussed here. On
some aspects ofthe concept there is agreement between the theories discussed
here, but about others there is debate similar to, and to an extent following
from, that about inherence. The features that can be seen as shared among all
versions ofthe immanent concept are the identity between idea] and value, the
realizability ofideals, and their implicitness. Whether ideals are universal and
enduring is a matter of debate, as is the question of the objectivity of ideals.
The identity of ideal and value and the realizability of ideals are best
treated together, because they are closely connected. Seeing ideals as
immanent in practices makes ideals and values indistinguishable. This is
because, in comparison to the transcendent concept, the unrealizability of
ideals is diminished significantly by connecting ideals to developing
phenomena and practices. As ideals are part of those phenomena, they cannot
rightly be said to go beyond them very far. To be sure, ideals indicate
desirable possibilities and in that sense reach beyond the factual situation. But
this is a temporary condition: they are again absorbed in the situation when
they are effective. The immanent concept sees ideals as essentially realizable,
although this does not mean that they are always realized. The core meaning
of ideals is that they point the way towards a desirable development of a real
practice. In the three different accounts of the immanent concept this implies
that the right end can in principle be reached, either because it is part of a
natural course of development or because it is a feasible answer to a problem.
This does not necessarily mean that they are always practically realizable:
ideals present aspects of what is good, but they do not set out a course that
leads to the good overall. In concrete situations ideals conflict with each other,
and trying to realize an ideal brings about problems that could not be foreseen
when it was formulated. Because ideals in the immanent concept lack a
transcending and unrealizable character, there is no reason for a distinction
between ideals and values: ideal and value have the same characteristics and
perform the same functions.
All three theories defend the idea that ideals are implicit or latent in factual
phenomena. This characteristic of ideals is derived directly from their being
an inherent part of factual situations, but something more is meant by it. That
ideals are latent in existing situations means that they are present before they
are explicitly referred to, and that the articulation of ideals is a matter of
formulating and elaborating on what was already there in a rudimentary
form.29 This idea has two important corollaries: explicit ideals have to build
on their implicit precursors, and ideals have a role to play even if they are not
'9 The idea of latency is an important element ofSelznick's theory of ideals and will be treated
extensively in Chapter 6.
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explicitly recognized.
The frst point conveys that the idea of latency does not purport to imply
that ideals are present in a full-blown shape; articulating an ideal fills in a
vague idea of it, which not only adds to the implicit meaning of the ideal but
can also modify it. The argument about the relation between implicit and
explicit ideal makes both a descriptive and a normative claim. The descriptive
claim is that the idea of implicit ideals is the best explanation for the recurring
but temporary significance of ideals. When tension arises between ideal and
practice, the need arises to articulate the ideal in the light of the perceived
problem. The alternative description would be to say that ideals only come
into existence when they are proposed in answer to a problem. The latter
description, however, is less able to account for the arising ofthe problem than
the former. With the idea of implicitness we can explain that the move away
from the ideal creates a problem and makes formulation ofthe ideal necessary.
The normative claim is that explicit ideals function best when they are based
on the implicit ideals of a practice. Ideals that are formulated while ignoring
their relation to practical concerns are sterile and lack guiding power; they do
not work because they underestimate the constraints and demands of the
practical situation. The implicit ideals of a practice are intertwined with and
evolve along with that practice, but explication is necessary to clarify the ideal
and to determine its exact meaning. However, explication can have drawbacks
when the intuitive appeal of an ideal is interpreted wrongly (Blok c4~ Vedder
1998, 195).
This brings me to the second point: the role of implicit ideals. In the
immanent concept of ideals, there is room for a guiding role of ideals even
when they are not the subject of conscious deliberation or affirmation. One of
the features of experiential knowledge is a learnt intuitive insight in how
things are done. Without being able to formulate what it is that he does, a
pianist can have superb knowledge of an interpretation of a piece of music.
Similarly, a guiding value can exercise influence when it is intuitively known
or felt as good. Implicit ideals are unproblematic ideals: as long as a practice
runs smoothly, its guiding values can remain unarticulated. When problems
arise, the need to articulate the ideal surfaces. Things are experienced as
problematic because the right course to take is not immediately clear. In such
situations, explicated ideals can provide propositions for solutions of the
problem.
There is difference of opinion on the extent to which ideals can be said to
be universal and enduring. In the naturalist version, ideals appear as more
enduring than they do in the pragmatist version of ideals. A pragmatist theory
stresses the revisability of ideals or values by referring to such standards as
hypotheses to be tested (Dewey 1929, 221). As they are tied to concrete
problems, ideals are valid as long as they help to guide a practice. Ideals are
justified by their success in improving ways of life and keeping them
satisfactory. When they no longer have a role to fulfil in practical deliberation
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and action, they lose their validity. The ideal of the self-reliant, land-owning
cítizen, which was central to republican thought, is an ideal which no longer
has meaning in twentieth-century society where democracy and government
function very differently from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of
republicanism. To make the point in full, a much longer argument would be
needed, but the core idea is clear. Ideals change along with the historical
circumstances; different circumstances and contexts give rise to new or altered
ideals. A naturalist theory by taking the nature of man as its starting point is
committed to a view of ideals as more enduring. The point of connecting
values to nature is to give them a firm foundation so that such values retain
their relevance as long as human beings are the same kind of creatures. Of
course, this does not exclude the correction of the empirical judgments about
human nature. It is very well possible that certain features have been
interpreted wrongly, which can entail that the accompanying values also turn
out to have a different meaning. It then of course depends on theories of
knowledge and truth what is viewed as a correct new interpretation,"' but in
a naturalistic view such matters affect facts to the same extent as basic values.
The values that depend upon facts of human nature are as enduring as those
facts themselves.
A similar, but less acute, difference can be discerned regarding the
universality of ideals. Ifone sees ideals as dependent on human nature, they
must be valid in respect of every human being. As we saw above, naturalists
only defend universality of a limited number of basic values, which can be
worked out differently in loca] contexts. A pragmatist view, focusing on the
connection between ideals and particular situations, is more inclined to stress
the differences between values according to the situation at hand. Such a view
does not necessarily rule out the possibility of values with a universal scope,
but these have relatively little practical relevance. If the validity of ideals is
dependent upon their success in improving problematic situations, vague
universal values have an indeterminate status because they often do not point
out a specific course to take. For pragmatism the central category of ideals is
that of ideals closely connected to specific practices.
In this description of the immanent concept of ideals, the emphasis on the
connection between ideal and reality creates the impression that ideals are
seen as objective. Ideals are seen as aspects of the natural and social world. On
the other hand, the focus on experience as the source of knowledge might be
interpreted as pointing in the opposite direction, that is, locating values in the
subjective experiences of people. The ontological objectivity of ideals is
directly related to the degree to which ideals are seen as inherent in reality. An
Aristotelian view of ideals makes a stronger claim for ontological objectivity
'o The two extremes are correspondence theories and coherence theories of truth where the
first in short tells us that true knowledge is determined by correspondence between
propositions and the world 'out there' and the second that true knowledge is determined by
the coherence of theory and observation.
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than a pragmatist view. In a pragmatist view the subjective quality of ideals
comes more to the fore: for a pragmatist an individual's creative mind has the
crucial role of formulating and developing ideals. This does not mean,
however, that pragmatism denies that ideals have a basis in reality: they arise
out ofa situation to which they remain related. Similarly, the emphasis on the
real objective basis of ideals made by naturalism does not mean that
naturalism denies the importance of a subjective component in formulating
and recognizing ideals. Immanent accounts ofideals try to combine objectivity
and subjectivity by locating ideals in human experience, which has objective
and subjective components. The objective aspects of experience are the real
interactions between a person and the world around him, while the subjective
aspects are that person's intelligent appreciation ofthese interactions and the
creative thinking that guides them. The different versions of the immanent
concept recognize both sides of experience, but differ on the precise relation
between ideals and experience. Naturalism emphasizes the latency of ideals,
the roots ideals have in real interactions, whether these roots are recognized
or not. Pragmatism puts more emphasis on the intelligent input of the subject,
the person using and testing ideals in problematic situations. The ontological
objectivity of ideals thus becomes less important in pragmatism, but this does
not mean that pragmatism distances itself from a conception ofthe validity of
ideals as objective. We saw that subjectivism denied the possibility of
establishing the validity of ideals: these cannot be justified or criticized. In a
pragmatist account, ideals can be justified by their contribution to practical
situations. An ideal that works to improve a situation has objective validity for
that reason. Although we saw that the pragmatist arguments to justify ideals
are not entirely satisfactory, retaining an objective basis for justification is
valuable and can possibly be used to construct better arguments."
4 The Merits of the Two Concepts
The ideal dimension of values
The two concepts of ideals are developed on the basis of different ontologies,
but this does not mean that there is nothing they share. There are features that
both concepts have in common, and amongst those there are the features that
justify referring to the two concepts as concepts of ideals. The first, most
basic, feature that is shared by the two concepts is that ideals are seen as
values. The main difference between the two concepts is that the transcendent
concept sees ideals as a specific kind of value, while the immanent concept
sees ideals and values as identical. The features of perfection, abstraction,
impossibility of complete formulation, and inherent unrealizability figure in
most versions ofthe transcendent concept as the characteristics distinguishing
" I will return to this point in Chapter 6, where I discuss Selznick's combination of
pragmatism and naturalism, and in Chapter 7, where I try to improve the pragmatist theory.
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ideals as a subcategory of values. In the immanent concept the characteristics
of ideals and values are the same. That ideals are, a subcategory of; values is
the main reason why ideals are deemed worthy of striving for. Ideals suggest
what should be, and by that token call for realization. That ideals or values are
something to be realized is the second feature on which the two concepts are
in agreement. This feature has a third feature as a corollary, that ideals or
values transcend reality, at least in a minimal sense. If values are to be
realized, they must extend beyond what is the case now, which means they
transcend reality. These second and third features provide the reason for
referring to the concepts as concepts of ideals. Demanding realization and a
transcending quality are the ideal aspects of values. Even though these are the
aspects whose meaning is among the most contested by the two concepts, they
do justify talking about ideals instead of values.
We can speak of ideals when there are conceptions of states of affairs that
have not been realized yet, but are worth pursuing. However, that values have
an ideal dimension, in the sense that they are as yet unrealized, has not been
demonstrated. Here we leave the common ground between the two concepts,
for the ideal aspect of values has a different basis in the two types of theories.
Seeing ideals as transcendent relates the ideal aspect ofvalues to their non-real
character. Value conceptions guide the arrangement ofsocial reality, and thus
attempts are made to realize them, but however successful this is, true
realization is impossible because the nature ofvalues is such that they defy a
transformation into something innerworldly. We have seen that they do
influence reality, but the result of rearranging the world in the service of
values is never more than the reflection of these values. In this sense then,
transcendent values are inherently unrealizable, and necessarily ideal.
The story from the view of ideals as immanent is more subtle. Ifvalues are
just aspects ofreality they would seem to be realized already, because they are
simply part of what is there. This is only true to a certain extent, or rather at
certain times. In problematic situations, what is desirable diverges from what
is the fact: then values become propositions about the direction to be taken to
reach a better situation. Only then do values reveal their ideal side; in
satisfactory circumstances the existing situation has value. Values are
sometimes realized, sometimes unrealized, but not inherently unrealizable. It
is possible, however, that large projects or complex practices - oriented
towards ideals as practices are - are never perceived as completely
satisfactory: the ideals of that practice may retain aspects that are not
completely realized. Law seems to be such a complex practice in which,
whether because of changing circumstances or its complex character, ideals
never turn out to be completely realized. Even if values are not inherently
unrealizable, in such cases of practical unrealizability referring to them as
ideals makes clear how the values at stake continue to be one step ahead ofthe
practice.
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Problematic aspects
In my discussion of the two concepts of ideals, I have paid little attention to
objections that can be raised against them or to the problems to which the
concepts are prone. In the two previous sections, I have examined the various
characteristics of two concepts of ideals, but that leaves part of my main
question unanswered: to what extent are these concepts defensible and what
is their exact role in legal theory? Both of these questions can only be
answered in full after detailed examination of specific theories using the
concepts, that is, of the theories of Radbruch and Selznick.
Regarding the role of ideals in legal theory, I can only give an indication
of my basic understanding of ideals and law, which contributes to my
assessment of the way ideals are portrayed and used in these legal theories.
First of all, it is important to keep in mind that law is a social institution that
is meant to answer certain shared concerns in a society, e.g. to coordinate
behaviour or to resolve cont7icts. For the role of ideals in law this means that
they have to function in a shared institution. Whatever else this entails, two
minimal requirements follow: ideals have to be capable ofjustification in the
context ofthat institution, and ideals should have a meaningful role to perform
in law, otherwise they would be dispensable. A concept of legally relevant
ideals should include an account of their justification and specify what role
ideals have in law.
On the basis of the discussion in the previous sections, I can suggest
possible answers to the question of the strengths and weaknesses of the two
concepts. The points made here can then be used as hypotheses in the
examination of the arguments of Radbruch and Selznick. Generally speaking,
the two concepts of ideals each have one main problem area. For the
transcendent concept, it is a problem of the knowledge of ideals; for the
immanent concept, it is a problem ofthe justification of ideals. In both cases,
these problems take different forms in different versions of the theory. The
epistemological problem is the most urgent for a Platonic version of the
transcendent concept of ideals. Somehow we know what ideals of goodness,
of justice, of beauty are, but how does that process work? Some kind of
rational intuition is supposed to be at work, but it is very hard to understand
what that amounts to.''` Kantian conceptions take this objection into account
by redefining ideals as mental entities, which solves the mystery of intuition
but still places much weight on rational insight in a different way. Its
arguments on the necessity of accepting ideals as valid still require that all see
this reasoning and its results as justified. It requires that everyone can in
principle reproduce the argument and end up with the same ideals. This can
'Z A theorist who accepts the rational intuition of Platonic Forms is T. K. Seung. He sees
ideals as abstract and íntuited, these ideals then need to be concretized by construction.
However, his defence of Platonic ideals is based on a purely negative argument: there is no
other way to develop critical standards, so these must have a transcendent source (Seung
1993, especially xii-xiv and 194-196).
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only be done for ideals in a formal sense, which cannot perform their role of
evaluative standards because for this they need content. Ideals in this sense are
heavily underdetermined.
It is not surprising that the constructivist and the subjectivist versions ofthe
transcendent concept drop the claim to knowledge of ideals and make less
ambitious claims based on intersubjective agreement and subjective
preference, respectively. A subjectivist view of ideals does not connect ideals
to any kind of objectivity but also reduces ideals to intra-personal
considerations. They cannot be used as standards of evaluation to criticize or
justify shared arrangements or the views of others because their meaning is
confined to one person's beliefs. In the context of law, this is especially
problematic because law is always a shared institution. A subjectivist view of
ideals can only serve to point out false claims of objectivity (when legal
arrangements are based on values) or serve to support arguments to bar values
from the field of law." It cannot give values a place in the institution of law
as such.
The constructivist view ofideals, which replaces objective knowledge with
intersubjective agreement on a coherent theory, seems to fare better. It can
incorporate a range of ideals, from very abstract and general to relatively
context-specific ideals; and it can also bring ideals into line with factual
knowledge. However, it has its drawbacks as well. First of all, the
epistemological status of ideals remains unclear. By replacing knowledge of
ideals with agreement about their fit in a coherent whole, the question is left
open how we arrive at the construction of ideals. Some additional account of
their status seems needed. One might even say that the question of the
ontology of ideals is side-stepped completely. A constructivist theory can in
principle incorporate any theory ofthe nature ofideals that leads to a coherent
whole. The Rawlsian version I have discussed here, is Kantian in its
inspiration and defends a Kantian conception of ideals. One could imagine a
different version, however, that includes an immanent ontology. This point
means that constructivism cannot provide answers regarding the nature of
ideals that I need for a satisfactory account. It needs to be supplemented to
yield a complete view. Secondly, the justification of ideals suffers from
circularity: because it is based only on coherence, the elements of the
construction are justified in terms of each other. This problem of the
circularity of justification is something a constructivist view shares with
theories using the immanent concept of ideals.
The problems of the immanent concept stem from the difficulty to justify
ideals. The naturalist view tries to do this by appealing to a natural teleology;
it makes ideals follow from a view of natural human development. It
presupposes a unified theory of what human nature is and its aspirations,
comprising a natural tendency to realize ideals, which is not initially credible
" I will return to these issues in Chapter 8.
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to all. Other conceptions of nature are possible, and a naturalist theory carries
a burden of proof to show that a robust theory of human nature, which can
give rise to ideals, is to be preferred. On a slightly different level, the problem
of unified conceptions surfaces again. Naturalist theories connect ideals to
social practices, thus linking an ideal to a particular kind of factual
arrangement. But by this focus on the latency of ideals in social facts too little
attention is paid to the variety of interpretations that can be given to a certain
ideal in specific cases. If a naturalist wants to maintain that one kind of
practice generates only one specific conception of its accompanying ideal, he
needs to argue what that conception is and why other interpretations will not
do. On the other hand, ifhe acknowledges this variety as legitimate, he needs
to specify what the natural basis of ideals comprises. In the second case, the
question also arises whether these various interpretations can really be said to
be expressions of one ideal or are best seen as different ideals. If ideals are
seen as providing unity to practices, interpreting variety as difference is
problematic.
The problem of variety does not arise in a pragmatist theory because such
a theory connects ideals to specific problems, and thus sees ideals as primarily
context-bound from the start. However, there is a more general problem of the
immanent concept of ideals that does affect pragmatism seriously, and that is
the problem of circularity. Because a pragmatist view bases the justification
of ideals on their contribution to the solution of problematic situations, it
needs to specify what counts as a successful solution. That, however, again
depends on standards of evaluation, that is, on ideals. This is a problem for
any immanent concept of ideals, unless a convincing argument can be given
for an independent justification of ideals, for instance the robust theory of
human nature proposed by some naturalists.
On the basis of this inventory of problems three theories seem to offer
promising lines of further investigation: Kantianism, constructivism, and
pragmatism. However, because the constructivist position is rather vague
about the issue ofvalue ontology, I have chosen to concentrate on the Kantian
and pragmatist views of ideals. These both provide interesting accounts ofthe
nature of ideals. The Kantian view of ideals has the advantage of strong
arguments for formal standards, but it remains to be seen whether it can be
supplemented convincingly to provide meaningful standards of evaluation.
The pragmatist view of ideals is an adaptive theory, which can react
adequately to changing circumstances and provides means to examine
personal opinions on ideals critically without reference to controversial eternal
standards. However, the circularity ofjustification forms a serious problem for
which a solution must be found to arrive at a completely satisfactory theory
of ideals.
First however, we need to examine what special demands the context of
law places on a theory of ideals. Law is a special kind of institution, and
40 The Concept of Ideals in Legal Theory
addressing the role of ideals in law creates a number of new questions about
ideals. What is the relationship between ideals, principles, rules and facts?
What role do ideals play in determining the connections between law and
other domains of society? These are some of the questions which arise in a
consideration of a legal theory of ideals. The best way to address these and to
trace the functioning of the different concepts of ideals in legal theory is to
study specific theories which propose views on ideals in law. Therefore, the
next part ofthis study is concerned with the legal theories ofGustav Radbruch
and Philip Selznick.
Chapter 3
The Theory of Gustav Radbruch
1 Introduction
The subject of this chapter is the theory of Gustav Radbruch. Radbruch, who
lived from 1878 until 1949, was a prominent philosopher of law, criminal law
jurist and social-democratic politician in Germany. Most of his ]ife he taught
at German faculties of law, in K~nigsberg, Kiel, and Heidelberg, but he also
served as minister of justice for a short period in the Weimar Republic. In
1933 he was fired as a professor in Heidelberg by the Nazi regime and he led
a private life until his rehabilitation in 1945, when he became Dean of the
Heidelberg faculty of law.'
Radbruch was a scholar with a wide range ofinterests, whose writings vary
from a draft of a criminal code (1922) to essays on Shakespeare and Goethe.
His main interests were legal philosophy and criminal law theory, both of
which he pursued throughout his career.' His political interests are not only
apparent from his career as a social-democrat, but also from his writings on
socialism and his contributions to public debate. During the Nazi regime he
was unable to pursue his usual subjects because these were deemed
threatening to the state. He turned to more historical and literary subjects,
writing a biography of Feuerbach and a collection of essays on biographical
and literary subjects: Gestalten und Gedunketz. As the result of a year in
Oxford, he wrote a short account of English law: Der Geist des Englischen
Rechts (1947).'
However, what interests me here is Radbruch's work on ideals and law,
which for Radbruch was a subject of legal philosophy. His methodological
point of view entailed that there is a separation in the subject matter and
method of legal philosophy and legal science, the first of which is occupied
with the values of law. Since Radbruch saw legal science as separate from
legal philosophy, it seems warranted to focus on his philosophical works.' The
a
For more biographical information, see Kaufmann's íntroduction to the Gesanitausgabe
(GRGA l, p. 7-88), his biographical study ofRadbruch (Kaufmann 1987), and Radbruch's
autobiography Der Innere Weg (Radbruch 195 I).
His dissertation on the concept of action in criminal law is witness to both (Radbruch 1903).
See volumes 7-10 of the Gesamtaasgabe for his work in criminal law.
For the Feuerbach biography (Pau! Johann Anselni (von) Feuerbach: ein Juristenleben
erzdhlt, 1934) see GRGA 6; the essays in Gestalten wtd Gedankeu (1944), depending on
their subject, are to be found in GRGA 5(literary writings) and GRGA 16 (biographical
writings); Der Geist des Englischen Rechts in GRGA 15 (comparative law). On Radbruch
in Oxford (1935-1936), see Vulpius 1995.
Page references are to the Gesomtousgabe (GRGA). Here I have used the fírst three volumes
of the GRGA, which deal with his legal phílosophy. I refer to the year of first publication
and the page in the GRGA. Thus, the Rechtsphilosophie is 1932, p. 205-450 (in GRGA 2).
(continued... )
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reader will notice that references in the following discussion are
predominantly to the Rechtsphilosophie of 1932.s The reason for this is that
the Rechtsphilosophie is Radbruch's most complete account of his legal
philosophy. Although he has elaborated on many ofits themes and has revised
some of its tenets, the fundamental ideas of his theory, especially those on
values, are presented most clearly in the Rechtsphilosophie. Therefore I have
opted to concentrate on this book and to confine the discussion ofother works
to points where these provide important additions or changes to the argument.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. I will start with an explanation
of Radbruch's philosophical principles, his methodological dualism or
triadism and his relativism, and relate those to theorists who influenced
Radbruch's thinking. I will then turn to Radbruch's theory of law and try to
show how his philosophical position shapes his legal theory. Finally, I will
discuss the famous issue of Radbruch's turn from legal positivism to natural
law and consider the relevance of this issue for this study.
2 Radbruch's General Philosophical Views
In this section I will discuss Radbruch's views on general philosophical
questions, such as his ideas on method and the nature of philosophy and
science.b I will relate these general ideas to law in the next section. Radbruch
builds his philosophy on two pillars: methodological dualism and relativism.
I will first discuss his account of dualism and go on to examine related themes
that seem to relax the dichotomy involved in his dualistic view. I will
conclude this section with a discussion of Radbruch's relativism.
Methodendualismus óc Methodentrialismus
Radbruch's methodological starting point is the Kantian distinction between
is and ought (Sein und Sollen) (1932, 230). Because there is a strict separation
between what is and what ought to be, arguments concerning the ought, or the
realm of value, can only consist of value statements. Any conclusion about
values can only be justified by appealing to higher value statements, not by
using statements offact. This is what Radbruch calls methodological dualism
(Methodendualismus).We should preserve the clear distinction between is and
ought in all our scientific pursuits and never base judgments of value on
factual judgments or vice versa.
The dualism of is and ought was given great emphasis by the neo-Kantian
"(...continued)
In the edition prepared by Dreier and Paulson, there is a table comparing the page
numbering of the different editions of the Rechtsphilosophie ( 1999, 234).
' The I 932 edition was the third, but the first two editions appeared under the title Gruiid~èige
der Rechtsphilosophie (1914) and were so much revised in I 932 that the two can be
regarded as separate works.
b Science is the translation of Wissensc{taft, which ís a broad notion ofscience, including all
academic disciplines.
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school of thought at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the
twentieth century. The Heidelberg or Southwest-German neo-Kantian school,'
ofwhich Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, and Emil Lask are the main
exponents, developed the distinction between reality and value (Wirklichkeit
urrd Wert) into a doctrine about the nature of philosophy and science.
Radbruch goes beyond the ideas of the neo-Kantians in many respects,
especially in regard to law, but some of his basic philosophical tenets are
based on the ideas of Windelband, Rickert, and Lask.~ The Heidelberg neo-
Kantians saw the distinction between reality and value as the basis for the
distinetion between science and philosophy: science is concerned with realities
and philosophy with values. The three traditional branches of philosophy -
logic, ethics, aesthetics - can be seen as examining the determination of
value in relation to the three highest values: the true, the good, and the
beautiful (Windelband 1903, 27-28). While philosophy is the critical
examination of the validity of values, science is the examination of empirical
realities. These, however, are not all of the same kind: there is nature and
culture. The two are distinguished by their relation to values: nature has
nothing to do with values, while culture designates the reality that is oriented
towards values. Examples of this are art, which pursues the value of beauty,
and law, which strives for justice. Therefore, there is an important distinction
within the sciences between natural and cultural sciences (Rickert 1926, 14).
Basically, the cultural sciences have human pursuits and constructs as their
object, and history is the prime example of a cultural science. The neo-
Kantians emphasized the differences in method between these two types of
science, but that is not something Radbruch makes much use of in his legal
philosophy.9
What is important to dwell on, are the different ways of regarding the
world that Radbruch develops on the basis of this systematization. There are
four, which Radbruch describes as follows: the value-blind perspective of
natural science, the evaluating perspective of philosophy, the value-relating
perspective of cultural science, and the value-overcoming perspective of
Contrasted with the Marburger neo-Kantian School of Cohen and Natorp, which was an
important influence on the legal philosopher Stammler. Hans Kelsen is also regarded as
influenced by neo-Kantianism, although opinion isdivided which school exercised the most
profound influence (see Dreier 8c Paulson 1999, 237n). Generally on neo-Kantianism, see
Ollig 1979.
See Radbruch's own references in the foreword to 1914 (GRGA 2, 13) and the first footnote
in 1932, 221. On neo-Kantian influences in Radbruch's work, see further Kim 1966 (6-47),
Seidel 1999 (62-69), Kdnig 1999 (222-229j.
Windelband and Rickert saw the cultural sciences as primarily concerned with particular
events, while natural sciences aimed at the development of general laws. Rickert referred
to `die individualisierende Begriffsbildung' and `generalisierende Begriffsbildung' (1926,
56-57). History is the prime example of an individualizing cultural science. Only in his
discussion on the character of legal science does Radbruch characterize legal science as
individualizing (1932, 355).
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religion. "' The value-blind and the evaluating perspective are each on one side
of the gulf between reality and value. Natural science is only concerned with
facts, while philosophy is concerned with values. The other two perspectives
are attempts to bridge that gap: the value-relating perspective studies those
realities that mean to realize values, while the value-overcoming perspective
goes beyond fact and value because religion values everything equally in the
last instance. In Radbruch's view, religion is forgiveness: the willingness to
see the value even of sin and error (1914, 52). Going beyond value and
disvalue is not the primary way to regard law: law is a reality meaning to
realize value, and therefore the proper subject ofthe value-relating perspective
(1932, 227). Because the perspective of religion does not have a very
prominent place, Radbruch omits the value-overcoming perspective when he
characterizes his method in legal philosophy as Methodentrialisrnus (1932,
251)."
Since Radbruch characterizes his method both as Dualismus and as
Trialistruts, the question arises which of the two characterizations is the more
fundamental. Although a full answer can only follow after a closer
examination of the idea of value-related reality (see 4.3), I can here point to
indications that Radbruch did not see the value-relating perspective as really
bridging the gap between value and reality. The value-relating perspective
studies realities that are related to values in that their meaning is to realize
values, but it still studies empirical cultural realities. The cultural science of
law (Kultunvissenschaft) studies facts, but only those facts that have meaning
in relation to values (1932, 356). To understand cultural phenomena, it is
necessary to see that their meaning is value-realization, but the value-relating
perspective is not concerned with the meaning ofthe values as such, that is the
subject of philosophy. Science is concerned with reality, and philosophy with
value: this methodological distinction also holds for legal science and legal
philosophy, of which I shall say more in section 3.3.''
Stoffbestinrmtheit der ldee~ Natur der Sache
The value-relating perspective is not the only element in Radbruch's theory
that appears to soften the dichotomy of is and ought. Two other elements that
can be regarded in that light are the Stoffbestininrtheit der ldee and the Natur-
[n German: wertblindes, bewertendes, wertbeziehendes, wertuberwindendes Verhalten,
respectively (1932, 222).
He does pay attention to the religious perspective: in the section on the religious philosophy
of law (1932, 325-329). It also underlies his ideas about mercy (1932, 410-413).
Very critical ofRadbruch's use of inethodological dualism is Bonsmann ( I 966, 81-84), who
attributes Radbruch's designation of value as completely outside of reality to a(neo-
Kantian) misinterpretation of Kant's epistemology. I will address the puzzles of the unreal
character of values in section 4.2.
~~
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der Sache."
The idea of the Stoffóestimtntheit der ldee plays on the double meaning of
`bestimmt', which can signify `determined by' as well as `meant for'.
Stof~bestitntntheit der ldee means that the idea is determirted by the matter to
which it is related, because it is tneant for that matter. Radbruch gives the
example of sculpting to make this clear: a sculptor will make a different
sculpture when he uses marble than when he uses bronze (1932, 231). The
material in which a sculptor works in part determines the idea he has of the
work ofart he wants to make. This relation between matter and idea is true of
every idea. Justice is not a free-floating value, it is related to its matter, law,
and therefore it both determines and is determined by the reality of law.
However, this mutual influence does not entail that both idea and matter are
of equal importance. For Radbruch the logical priority of the idea is clear: it
is only because the idea is meant for a certain kind of matter that this matter
has a role to play in the determination of the idea (1932, 232). It is not
warranted to conclude that the idea must be of a certain kind just because the
matter on which it works displays those features. To do so, would be merely
intuitive and cannot be a method to gain knowledge. Radbruch makes a
distinction between the logical and the causal relations between facts and
values: causally facts influence the formation of a value judgment but facts
can never logically be used in the justification (Begr-ilndung) of the value
judgment (1932, 232).
Therefore Radbruch warns against inductive reasoning - seeing the idea
present in the matter - as a danger of reasoning based on the Natur der
Sache. This legal doctrine is essentially the idea that existing factual relations
in part determine what rules should regulate these relations. Radbruch believes
it goes too far to draw conclusive evidence from the Natur der Sache, although
other than that it has important uses. First of all, the idea of the Natur der
Sache makes us sensitive to the conservative element in law (1948a, 140).
When new regulations are made, one has to reckon with existing natural,
social and legal facts which limit the freedom of designing new rules.
Secondly, the Natur der Sache can make us aware that our very ideas about
law are limited by the historical era in which we live (1948a, 141). And
thirdly, every idea is meant for, and is in its essence partly determined by, its
matter: Stoffbestitrtrntheit der ldee (141).
Thus, the doctrine of the Stoffbestimmtheit der ldee is seen by Radbruch as
a part of the theory of the Natur der Sache. It is also the essential part of the
theory to understand the extent of the relaxation of the dualism of fact and
This is a subject that became gradually more important during the course of Radbruch's
work: it is absent in the Gnutdnïge der Rechtsphilosophie (1914), then in 1923124 the
StojJbestimnttheit der ldee first receives serious consideration. Both ideas appear in 1932,
but the most extensive treatment ofNatur der Sache is to be found in two post-war works:
Vorschule der Rechtsphitosophie (1948a) and Die Natur der Sache ats juristischer
Denkform ( I 948b).
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value. Radbruch holds on to that dualism in the last instance. He says himself
that the Natur der Sache narrows the gap between fact and value, but in the
end the idea is determinative:
(...) in its relation to the Natu~- der Sache, which, as meaning of the given, is
located on the side of Being, the idea of law should have the ]ast word.
Although the Natur~ der SacHe confronts the idea of law with the demand to
shape the given legal matter meaningfully, the ultimate judgement belongs to
the idea of law (1948a, 141). ~a
Radbruch is unwilling to see the Stoflbestitttnitheit der ldee as a complete
reconciliation of fact and value. In the light of our topic, the nature and role
of ideals, it is of eminent importance to know how far the relaxation of the
dichotomy goes, and whether values are seen by Radbruch as completely
contained in their own realm. We should allow for the possibility that a
detailed examination of the doctrine of the Stoffbestimmtheit der ldee shows
that fact and value are brought together more than Radbruch acknowledges.
However, the pursuit of this question is best reserved for the next chapter,
where Radbruch's ideas on the nature of values will be treated in more detail
(see 4.3).
Relativism
Besides the distinction between reality and value and its methodological
consequences, the other crucial aspect for understanding Radbruch's theory
is his view on value relativism. His central thesis on relativism is that it is
impossible to find a theoretical basis from which to judge the ultimate worth
of a value statement (1932, 235). There are no scientific criteria to decide
which ultimate values have the highest worth; thus, from the standpoint of a
philosopher, all value systems have equal worth. I speak in terms of ultimate
values and value systems deliberately. In Radbruch's theory, value relativism
is about the ranking ofultimate values and value systems are characterized by
the order this ranking takes.
Radbruch's specific kind of relativism is a relativism ofdiffering political
doctrines. In the context ofphilosophy oflaw, the important value systems are
political systems. An individual has the choice to commit himself to one of
these value systems. Radbruch categorizes political value systems according
to their highest values: individual, collective or work-related values (1932,
279). Thus, such value systems subordinate everything to either the individual
good or the collective good, or to the work (not person-related) values oftruth
" My translation. In German: "Auch gegenuber der Natur der Sache, die sich als Sinn der
Gegebenheit auf der Seinsseite bewegt, hat die Idee des Rechts das letzte Wort zu sprechen.
Die Natur der Sache tritt zwar der [dee des Rechts mit der Forderung sinnhafter Gestaltung
des gegebenen Rechtsstoffes entgegen, jedoch gebuhrt die letzte Entscheidung der
Rechtsidee."
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and beauty. Radbruch classifies the different political doctrines current in his
days according to this scheme as individualistic, transindividualistic or
transpersonal. Thus liberalism and social democracy are varieties of
individualism, while conservatism is a transindividualistic doctrine.'s
This way of ordering demonstrates the first main task of a relativist
philosophy in Radbruch's view: it is to systematize value judgements into
coherent systems and to demonstrate the real meaning of such value systems
(1932, 233-234). A philosopher should think value judgments through, and lay
bare and assess the assumptions on which they are based. Secondly, the task
of a philosopher is to devise a typology of value systems, such as the three
types of political doctrines formulated by Radbruch (234). Such a typology
involves giving an account of the connections between different value
systems. Thirdly, a relativist philosophy can also show the connection between
the ends of a given system and the means employed and show the effects of
pursuing these ends (233). What the ultimate values are, is not a question but
a given for Radbruch: the good, the true, and the beautiful.1ó His relativism
does not question the status of these ultimate values, but the way they are
employed in systems of belief which rank them differently.
Radbruch did not only endorse relativism from a theoretical standpoint; he
also thought it had practical consequences. These consequences, however,
concern political arrangements, not one's personal beliefs. Endorsing
relativism as a scientific doctrine does not mean that one should be guided by
relativism in one's own practical pursuits and daily action. Even if there is no
theoretical ground for a choice, one should live one's life guided by a chosen
value system. Relativism is a theoretical requirement, but not an ethical
requirement:
Relativism, however, belongs to theoretical and not to practical reason. It
implies a renunciation of the scientific establishment of ultimate decisions and
not a renunciation of the decision itself (1932, 235-236)."
A relativist should still believe in his own opinion as the right one, even if he
knows that it cannot be proven to be so.




The third, transpersonal, type of doctrine is not represented by any existing political
doctrine, but it would be a view that saw the goal of society as serving other values than a
form of the good, for instance, devoted to the truth-finding ofscience. For a good discussion
of Radbruch's systematization of political doctrines, see Dreier 1999.
In this respect, he follows the neo-Kantian [radition, see Windelband 1903, 41-42.
Windelband, however, did not regard these values as the object of relativistic choice (see
Seidel 1999, 70).
Translation Wilk (1950, 57-58). ln German: "Der Relativismus gehórt aber der
theoretischen, nicht der praktischen Vernunft an. Er bedeutet Verzicht auf die
Wissenschaftliche Begrundung letzter Stellungnahmen, nicht Verzicht auf die
Stellungnahme selbst."
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in the political realm.'g He believes that certain substantive claims follow from
his type of relativism. In an article entitled `Der Relativismus in der
Rechtsphilosophie' (1934) he expounds this substantive content. Its claims are
more far-reaching than one would at first sight expect. First of all, relativism
establishes the validity of positive law (1934, 18). Because there is no
knowing which opinion about what the law should be is right, we need another
ground for deciding which rules to follow. This ground is the fact that a rule
is positive law. But relativism also determines some of the content of law:
since there is no way to decide which is the right opinion, all opinions should
be heard. Therefore, relativism leads to liberal rights, such as the freedom of
speech and the freedom of religion (19). The next step is that relativism, by
proclaiming opinions equal, also demands the equality of the bearers of the
opinions, which in our political reality means demanding a democratic state
with majority rule (20). By way of these examples Radbruch wants to show
that it is not necessary to adhere to traditional natural law doctrines in order
to ground substantive claims about the law.19 It is debatable whether pure
relativism indeed gives rise to all these claims, but an investigation of that
question will have to wait until the next chapter. Here we can conclude with
the observation that for Radbruch relativism is not a cynical doctrine of
indifference, but a view which is closely connected to strong ethical opinions.
3 Legal Philosophy and Legal Science
We have arrived at the point where we should turn to Radbruch's legal theory
in detail. I have touched upon aspects of his legal philosophy in the discussion
of relativism and as an example in the exposition about philosophy and
science. Now I will show how these general points shape his legal theory and
how he builds on this foundation. But before we start, there is one point that
should be clearly kept in mind. In his manner of reasoning Radbruch is very
much a Kantian. He often uses the Kantian scheme of constructing a priori
concepts which are necessary preconditions of reasoning. This means that
there are things we cannot think or say without presupposing the existence of
a certain more fundamental idea. A famous example is Kant's idea that we
need to presuppose our own freedom in order to think of ourselves as moral
IB Baratta and Seidel characterize Radbruch's relativism as `positive relativism' because ofthe
political ideas Radbruch derives from it (Baratta 1959, 515; Seidel 1999, 95). Baratta points
out that Radbruch's relativism finds its inspiration in Goethe (1959, 510). For Brecht, the
political aspect of Radbruch's relativism is reason to argue that Radbruch saw democracy
as the highest value. He rightly points out that Radbruch's claim that substantive political
values follow from scientific relativism is problematic (Brecht 1959, 337).
That Radbruch felt the need to emphasize these substantive claims can be explained in light
of the political situation at the time. With this paper (first presented in France and first
published in French; most German journals did not accept his work in those years) he
distanced himself from the Nazi regime shortly after it came to power (Kaufmann, GRGA
I , 79).
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beings. Radbruch accepts this type of reasoning, deductive arguments based
on a priori concepts, as a matter of course. This should be kept in mind to
understand Radbruch's argument for the relations between law, its idea and
its concept.
Legal science as a culturalscience and a norrnative science
I sketched the neo-Kantian distinctions between philosophy and science, and
between two types of empirical science and I touched upon their use by
Radbruch. How do these distinctions bear upon the legal sciences? The
domain of legal philosophy is the evaluating perspective on law, i.e. legal
philosophy is concerned with the meaning ofthe legal values. Legal science,
on the other hand, is concerned with the reality of the law. And, because law
is one ofthe realities which means to realize values and thus a cultural reality,
legal science is a cultural science. These are the basics, but Radbruch adds a
number of refinements.
Legal philosophy is not limited to studying the meaning ofvalues, it is also
concerned with the method and the prerequisites of legal science. And it is
self-referential: in a legal philosophy its own method and starting points are
subject of discussion as well. These points are most clearly made in Lask's
Rechtsphilosophie: he distinguishes the methodological side of both legal
philosophy and science, the value philosophy of law, and the cultural science
of law (1905, 306-307). The "meta"-philosophy of inethod is very prominent
in the general part ofRadbruch's Rechtsphilosophie: the question ofthe proper
tasks of legal philosophy and legal science runs through the whole of it.
Radbruch relates the nature of legal philosophy closely to the nature of law as
a cultural phenomenon; for him legal philosophy is first and foremost the
cultural philosophy of law (1932, 251). It is a cultural philosophy because it
endorses the idea of Methodefitrialismus, of three perspectives.
Legal science is a cultural science, which means it makes use of the value-
relating perspective: it understands the reality of law as having the meaning
to realize the idea of law, which most importantly consists of the value of
justice.'̀o But there are different ways to regard this reality: one can
concentrate either on its factuality or on its meaning. If one does the first, one
can engage in different sciences which have factual aspects of the legal reality
as their object: sociology and psychology of law, legal history, etc. Ifone does
the second and concentrates on the meaning of the legal reality, i.e. the
meaning of the positive legal order, one engages in legal science proper: "the
science concerned with the objective meaning ofpositive legal orders" (1932,
343).`' Thus, legal science proper differs from other cultural sciences related
Zo The construction of the idea of law will be discussed extensively later in this section.
Z' Translation Wilk (1950, 140). In German: "... die Wissenschaft vom objektiven Sinn
positiver Rechtsordnungen."
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to law in employing the method of a normative science," by studying the
objective meaning of legal norms. But it does not go beyond the law in force,
the positive law, so its object is not the purely normative, its object is the law
as it is. This way Radbruch identifies legal science, in the narrow sense, with
what we usually refer to as legal doctrine (Rechtsdogmatik), the study of the
meaning of an existing legal system (Dreier 8c Paulson 1999, 238). Legal
science is devoted to that part of reality that is law, but how do we determine
what that is, how do we recognize law? For that we need the concept of law,
to which I will now turn.
The concept of law and the idea of law
For Radbruch, the concept of law depends on the idea of law. Since both of
these notions have remained unclear so far, I should explain them here.
Radbruch takes three steps in developing the concept of law in relation to the
idea of law (Dreier 8t Paulson 1999, 240-241). First, the idea of law is that at
which the reality oflaw is oriented. The idea oflaw is the value that is specific
for law, while the concept of law is based on this idea. It is a concept of law
as the reality which means to serve the idea of law: "Law is the reality the
meaning of which is to serve the legal value, the idea of law." (1932, 255).`''
The second step is to identify the idea of law as Gerechtigkeit. The idea of
law is thus used by Radbruch as a synonym for the value towards which law
is oriented. The only candidate for this position of the idea of law is
Gerechtigkeit, justice. This value is an absolute, axiomatic, value which
cannot be derived from any other value (256). Radbruch considers the
possibility of reducing justice to a form of the (moral) good. He rejects this
view because the moral good is a value of the individual human being, only
a human being can be morally good, while justice does not have the individual
as its object but the relationships between people (256).'; Radbruch uses a
second meaning of the idea of law, not as a synonym for justice, but as a
notion composed ofdifferent elements which all play a part in determining the
law.'S I will give an account of these elements under the next heading.
The third step is to describe the features of law as the reality oriented
,z In German: Normwíssenschaft (Radbruch 1932, 355). Normwissenschaft is distinguished
from Seinswissenschaft. Again Radbruch im~okes the distinction between `is' and 'ought'
but now to distinguish two aspects of legal rules: the factual aspect of being an imperative
or command and the normative aspect of establishing an `ought' (354-355). Hc also uses
this distinction to establish the connection between law and morals (see below).
Translation Wilk (1950, 73). In German: "Recht ist die Wirklichkeit, die den Sinn hat, dem
Rechtswerte, der Rechtsidee ru dienen."
Radbruch held a different view in the Grunrtzeïge, where he did not see Gerechtigkeit as an
absolute value (he mserved that qualification for goodness, truth, and beauty) but
constructed it as aderived value that has Genreinschafisteben as its substratum, which serves
the highest values (1914, 57-58). Remnants of this view are still visible in the 1932
Rechtsphitosophie. See also Bonsmann 1966, 19-22 and 39-41.
Kaufmann refers to Gerechtigkeit in a broad scnse, as the idea of law, and Gerechtigkeit in
a narrow sense, as one of the three elements of the idea of law (1997, I 54-155).
„
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towards justice. First, the concept of law points out a reality that is both
positive and normative, a characteristic this reality shares with other kinds of,
what Radbruch calls, psychological factualities. This is a term Radbruch uses
to point to phenomena that are part of factual reality, but which at the same
time apply standards to other parts ofreality. An example Radbruch gives is
the conscience, which he sees as a factual psychological faculty which judges
other factual occurrences as good or bad (1932, 260). In the context of law,
this factuality is the precept (Aitordnung). Because it is oriented towards
justice, it shares that value's social character; both justice and precept are
concerned with the relations between people. They also share the
characteristic of being general. Thus, law can be defined as "the complex of
general precepts for the living-together of human beings" (261).'̀6 From its
relationship to justice, Radbruch derives the characterization of law as a
positive, normative, social and general order.
The concept of law is derived from a philosophical characterization of the
reality of law, in conjunction with the idea of law. The features of law in the
definition above are based on the characteristics ofthe value ofGerechtigkeit.
Thus, the concept of law is an a priori concept which constitutes what law is.
We can only recognize certain aspects of reality as law by using that concept.
Law is not something that comes neatly packaged and labelled, it is
constructed on the basis of the concept of law. The concept of law is the
criterion for separating law from non-law (1932, 261). The concept of law is
a necessary concept: without it, there would be nothing recognizable as law.
As a consequence of this, the concept of law is not a part of legal science,
but precedes it. Legal science takes law as it is as its object, but the question
what law is can only be answered by looking at the world from the point of
view of the concept of law (1932, 261).
The elements of the idea ojlaw
Maybe the most important part of Radbruch's legal philosophy is his
development of the idea of law. We saw earlier that the idea of law as the
specific value of law had to be justice. Justice is the value which has the
relations between people as its substratum. Radbruch uses the Aristotelian
distinction between commutative justice and distributive justice to argue that
distributive justice is the basic form of justice (1932, 258). Commutative
justice is the absolute justice ofgoods, e.g. a certain pay for a certain job. The
second is the relative justice between people, e.g. reward according to
someone's merit. Distributive justice provides the principle of equality, while
commutative justice presupposes that those concerned have an equal right. If
two workers both deserve to be paid for their jobs, commutative justice
requires that if they both do their job, they both ought to get paid. Deterrnining
zb Translation Wilk 1950, 76; in German: "der Inbegriff der generellen Anordnungen fur das
menschliche Zusammenleben". Radbruch's later definition of law is slightly different: "...
der Inbegriff genereller, posítiver Normen fiir das soziale Leben" (1948a, 151).
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whether their two jobs have equal merit and deserve equal pay is a question
ofdistributive justice. Thus, distributive justice precedes commutative justice.
That makes distributive justice the basic form of Gerechtigkeit, but it is
only a formal value. Distributive justice requires equal treatment ofthose who
are equal and unequal treatment to the degree of inequality. It does not
specify, however, whom to regard as equal or unequal and how to treat them
(1932, 278). Therefore, justice may be the value that is specific for law, but
it merely determines its form. It needs to be supplemented in order to
determine the content of law: for this, Radbruch introduces the value of
Zweckmr2f3igkeit.''
This second element determines the purpose of law. Because it is part of
the idea of law it must be based on an absolute value like the value of
Gerechtigkeit, that is either the true, the good, or the beautiful. For Radbruch
it is obvious that the only one of these three that the law can serve directly is
the good (1932, 279). However, there are many different views about the good
and the purpose of law. Here, Radbruch makes use ofhis theoretical doctrine
of relativism: the ranking of different goods and values depends on political
doctrines. Therefore, the purpose of law cannot attain a final deterrnination,
it will differ according to the dominant political doctrine. This presents us
with a problem: what should the la~v be if its content cannot be conclusively
determined? This problem leads to the third element of the idea of law: legal
security (Rechtssicherheit). Because a final determination of the purpose of
law is impossible, but the law still has to provide one order to govern society,
this order has to be posited (1932, 302). The value of legal security demands
that the law be positive. This leads to the paradoxical tenet that the idea of the
right law requires that it is positive law: "So, most oddly, the positivity of the
law itself becomes a prerequisite of its rightness: to be positive is implicit in
the concept of right law just as much as rightness of content is a task of
positive law" (303).~~
Although the element of ZweckntuJ3igkeit can only be regarded
relativistically, the other two elements are unmistakable in their demands. The
requirements that the law be positive and that like be treated alike, hold good
whatever the political constellation is. There is one last question to be
answered concerning the elements of the idea of law: how do they relate to
each other, or, which of the three is the most important`? This cannot be
determined once and for all. Even if we know that justice and legal security
have general validity and the determination ofZweck~rt~iJ3igkeit does not, this
„ This is hard to translate. W ilk gives 'expediency' but literally it says'according-to-purpose-
ness'. Its meaning is somewhere between `purposiveness' and `expediency'. 1 usually
employ the German term.
"Die Positivitát des Rechts wird damit in hdchst merkwiirdiger Weise selbst zur
Voraussetzung seiner Richtigkeit: es gehbrt ebensosehr zum Begriffe des richtigen Rechts,
positiv zu sein, wie es Aufgabe des positiven Rechts ist, inhaltlich richtig zu sein." (transl.
Wilk 1950, 108)
zs
Tlze Theoty of Gustav Radbruch 53
does not give any indication about their ranking. Once again, the relativistic
stance of Radbruch's philosophy confronts us. Both the determination of
ZtiveckmdJ,3igkeit and the order of the elements of the idea of law have to be
regarded relativistically.
On precisely this point, the internal ordering of the idea of law, Radbruch's
views have undergone a change over the years, which became the subject of
an ongoing debate. I will consider the debate about his supposed change of
views in section 4.
Law and morals'9
For a clear understanding of Radbruch's legal philosophy, one essential part
of his theory still needs to be discussed: his view on ethics and on the
differences and connections between law and morals. Of all his ideas,
Radbruch's ethical theory is maybe influenced the most by Kant. Radbruch
follows Kant in seeing morality as something concerning the individual will
and in using the notion ofautonomy to indicate the essence ofmorality. Being
moral means freely following the moral law, willing to do what is right. A
moral agent is autonomous when he freely and rationally decides to do what
is required by the moral law. Therefore, the true subject of ethics is the
individual will: what is most important is the individual's inner disposition to
do what is right. This entails that the relevant judge of an act's rightness or
wrongness is the individual conscience. Radbruch uses these ideas as the
ground for his view on the relation between law and morals.
First of all, this individualistic notion of morality shapes Radbruch's ideas
about the distinction between law and morals. He discusses the distinction in
terms of the internal versus the external (1932, 264). Radbruch points out that
the contrast between law as concerned with the external and morals with the
internal is ambiguous. He distinguishes four ways to understand it, and gives
his own interpretation of each. First of all, the distinction can point to the
subject matter of law and morals. Radbruch interprets this as referring to the
main interest of each. The domain of morals is concerned with the individual
and its inner motivation, while law is concerned with social life
(Zusammenlebetz), which makes it interested primarily in the external conduct
of the individual (1932, 265). Law is interested in the inner life of an
individual only to the extent that it is relevant for conduct in the community.
The second understanding of the distinction relates to the purpose of law. The
legal value of an action is the good it does for others or for the community,
while moral value is the intrinsic good of an action (267). As a consequence
,q It is important to realíze that Radbruch makes specific use of the terms Moral, Moralitát,
and Ethik. 1 use the English 'morals' as a translation for Moral, the cultural reality that is
contrasted with law, and morality in its specific meaning as the quality contrasting with
legality (Moralitcit versus Legalit6t). Ethics (Et{:ik) is the philosophical discipline concerned
with questions regarding morals. For Radbruch, this is Kantian ethics. See also Dreier 8t
Paulson 1999, 244.
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morals demand certain actions simply because it is one's duty to perform
them, while law demands actions in the interest of someone else (267). Most
important for Radbruch are the third and fourth understandings of the
distinction, which concern the moral and legal duty. The third understanding
connects morals to morality and law to legality (268); the fourth connects
morals to autonomy and law to heteronomy (270)."' Radbruch disagrees with
both characterizations.
Here Radbruch makes an important move: for him, as for Kant, the only
true duty is the pure, moral duty. This is because Radbruch characterizes a
duty as the subordination of the will to a norm (1932, 268). In his
individualistic ethics this can only be an autonomous decision. Why is this so
important? Because only morality can give rise to duties, morality is in two
ways the necessary complement to law. It is the ultimate source of law's
obligatory force and the ultimate end of the law (271-272). The first point
follows directly from the idea that the only true duty is a moral duty. Because
law imposes obligations on the individual from the outside, such obligations
are not an autonomous act of the will and are therefore not true duties. For an
individual to incur a duty it is necessary that he morally accepts it as
obligatory. Therefore, law needs morality to back it with a sense of duty. The
second point, that morality is the ultimate end of the law, follows from this
autonomous idea of duties in a more indirect way. Because a person can only
be moral by deciding autonomously to subject him or herself to a norm, the
law needs to create room to do that. The norms of the law must be such that
it allows individuals to be free in order to be moral. It is therefore important
that the law gives the individual rights which guarantee freedoms (272). One
of the more concrete examples which show how important the individual's
morality is for Radbruch, is his view on Scha~zdgesetze (shameful laws). To
the individual conscience, a law can be so abhorrent that it cannot be regarded
as valid by that individual (1932, 315). This follows from Radbruch's idea that
the validity of law is in the last instance dependent on moral acceptance by
each individual. All that law can be in such a case, is a heteronomous power
(1932, 316). He extends this reasoning in his article on relativism (1934)
where he also discusses conscientious objectors: he believes the criminal law
should contain special norms to deal with this category of offenders, because
their transgressions are motivated by their moral convictions (1934, 19).
Theirs is a tragic conflict between a legal demand for compliance and a moral
duty, which the law should recognize as special even if it cannot allow such
conduct to go unpunished.
In short, the relationship between law and morality is such that law should
'o These are all important notions in Kantian ethics and legal philosophy: morality refers to
duty as being affirmed in the individual's conviction, while legality refers to duty as simple
subordination to a norm; autonomy means that the source of a duty is one's personal will
making a free rational decision, ~vhile heteronomy means the source ofa duty is the wil) of
another. For a clear discussion of Kantian ethics, see Korsgaard 1996.
The Theon~ of Gustav Radbruch SS
enable people to be moral. But because this is essentially something only an
individual can do out of free will, by creating the possibility of morality, law
also creates the possibility of immorality. The content of law and morals may
differ greatly, but their relationship is vital even though it is full of tension
(1932, 273).
4 From Legal Positivism to Natural Law? Radbruch's Turn"
In textbooks on legal philosophy, there is little consensus on the
characterization of Radbruch's position. Sometimes he is regarded as a legal
positivist, sometimes as a natural law thinker. Often, both characterizations
are used for the argument that his pre-war views were positivistic, while his
post-war work is a defence of natural law.'' This thesis, that Radbruch's
philosophy of law underwent a major change in response to the Nazi regime,
is the subject of the debate on Radbruch's turn.
In the English-speaking world Radbruch is best known as the subject of a
debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lon L. Fuller. In 1958 Hart wrote an article
about the separation between law and morals in which he reproached
Radbruch for a naive rejection of the separation between law and morals as a
reaction to the horrors of the Nazi regime (Hart 1958, 31). Fuller replied that
Hart had gravely misunderstood Radbruch and that Radbruch provided a better
account of the dilemma of unjust law than that given by Hart (Fuller 1958,
656-657). The debate between Hart and Fuller and their interpretation of
Radbruch has been analysed by various authors,33 so there is no real need to
repeat it here. Moreover, the Hart-Fuller debate is more about the
consequences of positivistic and natural-law responses to Nazi law than it is
about Radbruch's position.
While both Hart and Fuller focused on Radbruch's postwar writings, their
approach differs from the debate in German legal philosophy, which
concentrated on the change in Radbruch's position itself. The main question
in the German debate was and is how we should interpret Radbruch's views
and whether his postwar writings form a coherent whole with his earlier work.
The central text in this debate is `Gesetzliches Unrecht und ubergesetzliches
Recht' (1946) in which Radbruch proposes his famous formula:
Preference is given to the positive law, duly enacted and secured by state power
as it is, even when it is unjust and fails to benefit the people [unztii-eckmciJ3ig],
unless its conflict with justice reaches so intolerable a level that the statute
becomes, in effect, 'false law'[`unrichtiges Recht'] and must therefore yield to
justice. It is impossible to draw a sharper line between cases of statutory non-
In German: Umbruch.
For a good discussion of the characterization of Radbruch's theory by interpreters, and of
the thesis of his turn, see 5eidel 1999 (1 12-1 I5; 159-164).
Two recent examples are Ward 1992 and Paulson 1994.,j
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law and statutes that are valid despite their flaws. One line of distinction,
however, can be drawn with utmost clarity: Where there is not even an attempt
at justice, where equality, the core of justice, is deliberately betrayed in the
issuance of positive law, then the statute is not merely `false law', it lacks
completely the very nature of law (1946, 89).3'
This passage has generated endless debate among scholars. The question is
whether the formula means that Radbruch converted to natural law theory. As
I said, an affirmative answer is usually combined with the idea that
Radbruch's earlier position was positivistic. The debate about Radbruch's turn
therefore depends on specific interpretations of both his earlier and his post-
war work. Before I go into the different positions, I should indicate what the
common ground between Radbruch scholars is. There is agreement that
Radbruch changed his views, probably in reaction to the terrors of the Nazi
regime. He revised his ideas about the relationship between the elements of
the idea of law. Instead of his completely relativistic account of 1932, in
which he said that the ordering ofthe elements ofthe idea of law depended on
differing political views, he now proposed a specific ordering of the elements.
Zweckmcif3igkeit should never be allowed to dominate, it should always be
kept in check by the other two elements (1946, 88). Those two, Gerechtigkeit
and Rechtssicherheit, he believed to have a closer connection: the security of
the law is itself a requirement of justice, so that Rechtssicherheit is really an
integral part of justice (compare Baratta 1959, 521). To find a way to
determine which of the two should prevail in any particular instance, he
proposed the formula of the degree of injustice. The formula is usually
regarded as consisting of two components: the first component being the
intolerability formula, the second the betrayal formula.'' The second
component sets a clear threshold, in Radbruch's view. When a statute does not
even attempt to realize equality, it does not fall under the concept of law as the
reality meaning to realize justice; therefore, it is not law at all. The first
component is vaguer, because it says that the conflict between legal security
and justice can be so great that the positive law, the statute, which serves legal
security, has to yield to justice and not be applied. The first component has
been used by German courts, most recently in cases against former DDR
,a
3;
Translation Paulson (1994, 317). In German: "(...) daf3 das positive, durch Satzung und
Macht gesicherte Recht auch dann den Vorrang hat, wenn es inhaltlich ungerecht und
unzweckm~(3ig ist, es sei denn, daf3 der Widerspruch des positiven Gesetzes zur
Gerechtigkeit ein so unertr~gliches Maf3 erreicht, daf~ das Gesetz als "unrichtiges Recht" der
Gerechtigkeit zu weichen hat. Es ist unmóglich, ein sch~rfere Linie zu ziehen zwischen den
Fállen des gesetzlichen Unrechts und den trotz unrichtigen lnhalts dennoch geltenden
Gesetzen; eine andere Grenzziehung aber kann mit aller Sch~rfe vorgenommen werden: wo
Gerechtigkeit nicht einmal erstrebt wird, wo die Gleichheit, die den Kem der Gerechtigkeit
ausmacht, bei der Setzung positiven Rechts bewu(3t verleugnet wvrde, da ist das Gesetz
nicht etwa nur "unrichtiges Recht', vielmehr entbehrt es uberhaupt der Rechtsnatur."
In German: Unertr~glichkeitsformel und Verleugnungsformel. See e.g. Dreier 8c Paulson
1999, 245; Seidel 1999, 165.
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border guards (see Seidel 1999, 40). It has been made applicable by
interpreting the demands ofjustice to recognize human rights, as laid down in
international treaties.
There is a group of authors who believe that the change in Radbruch's
conception of the idea of law constitutes a major break between Radbruch's
earlier, more positivistic ideas and natural-law flavoured postwar views.'6
They defend this idea with reference to Radbruch's earlier coneeption of the
role of the judge. In 1932, Radbruch said that an individual citizen could
conscientiously object to a shameful law, but that the judge has the duty to
serve legal security and to uphold the law (315). It is clear that he no longer
thought so in 1946, in regard to extreme injustice. Opposing this interpretation
are those who believe that Radbruch's postwar position is simply part of an
ongoing elaboration of the idea of law." They defend the view that Radbruch
always considered Gerechtigkeit as the element specific for law and had
always thought it more important than Zweck~rlciJ3igkeit. The change they see
is mostly a shift in accentuation of Gerechtigkeit instead of Rechtssicherlaeit
(Kaufmann 1987, 153). They also deny that the change in the position of the
judge constitutes an clear break; Paulson, for example, regards it as a
correction of an earlier mistake (1995, 500).
But even if this debate is the key in which most Radbruch studies are set,
this does not necessarily mean it is important in the context of my study about
the role of ideals. Does an understanding of Radbruch's shifting views tell us
anything about the role values play in his theory? I do think Radbruch's turn
is relevant for this study, main]y because the turn is about the central idea of
his legal philosophy: the idea of law. However, it is not necessary to discuss
the issue exhaustively; it does not relate to our concerns in all its aspects.
There are three questions regarding Radbruch's turn that need to be answered.
First of all, we need to know whether Radbruch's turn entails a change in his
opinion about the character ofthe elements of the idea of law: does Radbruch
have a different conception of the nature and the role of these values? This
leads us to a second, broader question: does Radbruch's turn imply that he
gave up his relativism about values? Thirdly, there is a more specific question
about the element of justice: does Radbruch move from a formal to a
substantive view on justice?
First of all, it is clear that the shifting meaning of the elements of the idea
of law does not affect the character of the idea of law itself or its connection
to the concept of law (1948a, 150-151). About the role of values as such we
J6 Apart from Fuller and Hart, important proponents ofthis vie~v are von Hippel (1951, 37-39)
and Dreier (1981, 37-39), although Dreier in the 1999 article with Paulson seems to have
changed his view to the unity thesis. Also Tjong (1967, 85-88), Seidcl ( I 999, 186-196) and
Brecht (1959, 361), who see his later views as incompatible with his earlier relativism. In
the article by Paulson there is an overview of those for and against the 'Umbruch' theory
(1994, 318-319), similarly in Seidel 1999 (159-164).
For example: Wolf (1959, 498-503), Baratta (1959, 537), Kaufmann (1987), Paulson
( I 995 ).
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can be brief, insofar as this issue is connected to Radbruch's turn: the change
in views concerns the relations between the elements of the idea of law, not
the importance of values altogether. Throughout his work, Radbruch
maintained his dualistic method and his view of law as a value-related reality.
The view that values have a constitutive role in law is neither strengthened nor
weakened. The shift concerns the relative status of the three elements of the
idea of law: they are each awarded a more specific place within the idea of
law. The absoluteness of justice is reaftïrmed: justice is the most important
element in determining the law. Like justice, legal security retains its status
as a universal component of law, but it is more directly connected to justice
itself: since legal security demands the repeated, and therefore equal,
application of the laws, it can be seen as a part of the value ofjustice. I will
return to the changing conceptions ofjustice and legal security in a moment,
but now I want to focus on the value ofZit~eckniuf.tigkeit. Of the three elements
of the idea of law, the changes in the role of ZN~eckirt~if,3igkeit are the most
fundamental. Radbruch emphasizes that this element should be kept in check
by the other two: because the content ofZtiti~eckinciJ.3igkeit is determined by the
political theories of the day, it is dangerous to let it rule completely. We
should notice here that Radbruch does not change his account of the nature of
Zweckjnd~3igkeit, but is instead tracing the consequences of the value thus
conceived. Because the content ofZireckni~iJ.~igkeit cannot be determined once
and for all, its power needs to be limited.
And that brings us to our second question: how much of his value
relativism does Radbruch retain in his postwar ideas'? We saw that it was the
relativistic account of the nature of Zii~eckm~iJ3igkeit that led him to a change
in the relations between the three different values, so that this part of his
relativism is still fully endorsed. As we know, Radbruch applied his relativism
to the idea of law at two points: to the determination of the element of
Zti~~eckinciJ3igkeit and to the ranking ofthe three components ofthe idea of ]aw.
The first part remains unchanged, but what about the second, the relativistic
account of the relations between the components? This is the main point of
change in Radbruch's views. Unlike his ideas in the Rechtsphilosophie, in
which he was unwilling to prescribe any preconceived ordering, but let it
depend on political world views (1932, 306), he now explicitly ordered them.
Zweckni~if3igkeit should never dominate and becomes the least important,
Gerechligkeit should reign supreme, and Rechtssicherheit, being interpreted
as a part of Gerechtigkeit, follows closely. This move is not completely
surprising because Radbruch had indicated in 1932 that all three elements are
determinative of law (303), so that a complete disregard ofjustice and legal
security, to which the Nazi focus on expediency had led, made a renewed
focus on all three elements necessary. This can be interpreted as a reminder
not to forget that all three elements are determinative of the idea of law, or as
the claim that a rearrangement was now necessary in order to restore the
balance within the idea of law. Paulson points out that the latter interpretation
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that Radbruch simply shifted the accent to accord with different historical
circumstances makes his post-war views as relativistic as his pre-war views:
maybe another change ofcircumstances might lead to a different arrangement
ofthe three elements (1995, 499). Such an interpretation neglects the changes
in Radbruch's conception of justice and the central place in his postwar
account of the ordering within the idea of law.'g
This leads to my third question: did Radbruch move from a more fotmal
to a more substantive account of justice? At first sight, it seems that, because
of the more rigorous task ofjustice, Radbruch extends the meaning ofjustice
to a substantive account ofwhat is just. His ideas about the degree of injustice
that determines the limits of legal security suggest that he has a substantive
view of what constitutes (in)justice: one needs to know what counts as
injustice to see when the balance between legal security and justice tips in
favour ofthe latter. And indeed Radbruch appears to thinkjustice is something
more than a purely formal notion of equality: in the Vorsclrule he characterizes
the conflict between legal security and justice as an inner conflict ofjustice.
Legal security demands the equal application of unjust laws and thereby
serves the equality demanded by justice, while at the same time contradicting
justice by supporting unjust laws (1948a, 150). In extreme cases the second
aspect ofjustice should prevail, but what that second, substantive, aspect of
justice is, remains unclear. On the other hand, in the vorschule Radbruch still
describes justice as a purely formal notion, a notion unable to indicate who is
equal or how to treat people equally (1948a, 143). The clearest indication that
Radbruch did move towards a more substantive conception ofjustice, is found
in the first short post-war paper, `Funf Minuten Rechtsphilosophie'. Here he
interprets justice as moral equality, as applying the same measure to all and
guaranteeing human rights to all (1945, 78-79). He no longer leaves the
criterion of equality to be completely determined by ZwecknruJ3igkeit, but
gives justice a substantive core. Human rights are not interpreted completely
ahistorically, however: Radbruch refers to a growing consensus on human
rights with a historical basis (1945, 79).39 Therefore, it seems to me that
Radbruch definitely extended the meaning of justice, but did not himself
consider it a major break with his previous ideas.
It is time to assess the results of this discussion of Radbruch's turn. As far
as is relevant in the context of this study, Radbruch's position does not change
drastically. His views on the nature ofvalues do not seem to have changed: his
;s
,9
Seidel sees a definite ordering of the elements of the idea of law as conflicting with
Radbruch's doctrine of the antinomies between the elements, because he sees that doctrine
as logically entailing that the three elements have equal weight (1999, 189). Such an
interpretation is unduly restrictive; I will present my own interpretation of Radbruch's
antinomies in the next chapter (4.4).
See Dreíer 8c Paulson 1999, 245. Scveral authors (e.g. Tjong 1967, 88; Seidel 1999, 195-
196) point out that Radbruch does not develop his post-war views systematically: it is
unclear what the exact consequences of a more substantive conception of justice are for his
other ideas.
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account of the idea of law and of its elements remains similar. Likewise,
values have the same central, constitutive role in his theory. The major change
is in his relativism: this admits of more side-constraints, but is not thrown
overboard in his description of the value ofZweckrncif3igkeit, nor as a general
philosophical principle. His views onjustice seem to have moved a little in the
direction ofa substantive role ofjustice, but since Radbruch still describes his
conception ofjustice in formal terms in connection to the concept of law, it
seems unwarranted to interpret this as a serious shift in position. In the next
chapter I will look more closely at Radbruch's conception ofvalues and I will
come back to the issues that have arisen here, especially to the question of




After discussing the main components of Radbruch's philosophy of law, it is
time for a specific consideration of his view on ideals. In the last chapter,
some of the issues to be raised here were already hinted at. Radbruch's
methodological dualism commits him to a specific view of values. His view
on the relation between value and reality is influenced by the idea of value-
related realities and the Natasrder Sache. The change in his post-war view led
to consideration of the relation between the three elements of the Rechtsidee
and Radbruch's conception of justice. But before I turn to examination of
these issues, let me give a short overview of Radbruch's view on ideals.
Radbruch's theory ofvalues' starts from the idea that fact and value should
be sharply distinguished, that is, from the premise ofinethodological dualism.
Values are not part of the factual reality we perceive, but go beyond that
reality: they are isbenvirklich (1923~24, 453). What they are cannot simply be
derived from factual situations; their nature is of another kind than that of
facts. About values we do not have scientifc knowledge, which means that
their validity is not susceptible of proof. Values are ultimately a matter of
choice depending on someone's world view. Therefore, Radbruch
characterizes his position on the nature of values as relativistic. The
background of these ideas is formed by the theory that the world as it
confronts us appears as a chaotic whole in which we perceive things as
possessing or lacking value. In our immediate experience we do not realize
that things do not possess value but that it is our own consciousness which
assigns value to things (1932, 221). But because we are thinking creatures that
become aware that our own self is something distinct from this given world,
we come to recognize that it is our own mind that assigns value. It is important
to recognize that for Radbruch value is not part of the way things are. Instead,
valuing is seen as a uniquely human feature, as something we use to make, and
to make sense of, our world.
In Radbruch's philosophy values have a dual role: they are constitutive of
realities and at the same time they are the standards with which we evaluate
those realities.z However, not all of reality is formed with the help of values.
The physical world as such, which is the subject of the natural sciences, has
nothing to do with values. The realities that are created with values as their
constitutive principles are cultural realities, which together form the whole of
human activities. Cultural realities are value-related (wertbezogen): they aim
' The concept of values, not of ideals, is the basic concept for Radbruch. Whether a
meaningful distinction between the two can be made, will beconsidered later in this chapter.
z In German: "das konstitutive Prinzip und zugleich der Wertmaf3stab" (1932, 227).
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at realizing some human good and they should be understood as meaning to
serve the values which are at their basis. Therefore, those values are also the
evaluative standards for the given reality: they are the standards by which we
assess the success of a given reality at what it tries to do.
The domain to which Radbruch primarily applies these ideas is, of course,
the law. The part of reality that we see as law is set apart by being related to
the value ofjustice. This means that our concept of what law is, is based on
the value ofjustice and that we use justice as a standard ofassessment for law.
Radbruch refines this account of law as a cultural reality by distinguishing
three values that together form the idea to which law is related: expediency
and legal security in addition to justice. Here, Radbruch's value relativism
plays an important role: the relation between the different values ofwhich the
idea of law consists differs according to world views.
A number of conceptual questions present themselves when we connect
this account ofRadbruch's theory of values with the general questions of this
study. First of all, Radbruch uses the terms `value' and `idea'. Does he also
distinguish between values and ideals, or are these basically the same in his
theory? I have discussed the idea of law and its constituting values and we
have come upon the concept of idea and the concept ofvalue in other contexts.
How do these two concepts relate? Radbruch makes a fairly casual use of the
terms `idea' and `value', sometimes appearing to distinguish between them,
sometimes using them as synonyms. For the time being I will follow him in
this, but at the end of this chapter I will attempt to construct a more precise
distinction between these terms, on the basis of the substantive issues that I
will discuss first.
What are the issues we need to get clear to be able to use Radbruch's ideas
for the construction ofa theory ofideals in jurisprudence`? First ofall, we need
to know what values are, that is, what ontological status of values follows
from Radbruch's philosophy. More precisely, we need to examine the
meaning and consequences of his dualistic and relativistic method. This will
be the subject of section 4.2. Secondly, the relationship between values and
reality needs to be considered. Two parts ofhis theory, Stoffbestimmtheit der
Idee and the idea of Wertbezogertheit, are used by Radbruch to establish links
between the realms of fact and value, but it is still unclear how strong those
links are and what this entails for the nature of values. Section 4.3 will be
devoted to these issues. Thirdly, there is the question how values are
interrelated. To that end, in section 4.4 I will examine, in detail, Radbruch's
views on the relationship between the different elements of the idea of law.
The fourth substantial question, which will be treated in section 4.5, is what
role values perform in Radbruch's theory of law. The two main issues to be
dealt with are the way values operate in enhancing or reducing the autonomy
of the law, and whether there are values which can be regarded as specifically
legal. Section 4.6 will provide the promised reconstruction of the concepts of
ideal, value and idea. Finally, I will evaluate Radbruch's theory in the light of
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the leading questions of this study and consider which aspects of it are
promising or problematic for the development of a jurisprudential concept of
ideals.
2 The Nature of Values
In order to find out what Radbruch's views are on the nature of values, it is
best to return to his methodological dualism. From the antithesis of fact and
value we may not get a precise idea of what values are, but we can at least
gather information about the differences between values and facts. As we saw,
the basic idea of dualism is that statements concerning the `ought' cannot be
derived from statements concerning the `is'. This entails that ought or value
statements can only be justified by a deduction from higher value statements.
This in turn leads to the conclusion that there are some axiomatic ultimate
values, the end or starting point ofany justification ofa value judgment (1932,
233). These ultimate values Radbruch regards as absolute (256). This means,
first of all, that they cannot be derived from any other value, i.e. that they
function as axioms. Secondly, Radbruch takes it to mean that they have
absolute validity (absolute Geltu~7g) (279). In neo-Kantian philosophy,
validity is contrasted with existence (Rickert 1926, 21; Lask 1905, 280). While
factual reality exists, values transcend concrete existence: values cannot be
said to exist, to be, but only to be valid, to have Geltung. Thus, dualism entails
that values have a mode of "being" that transcends reality, and this mode is
described as validity. The absolute validity of ultimate values should be read
as indicating an independent source of validity: ultimate values are not valid
by virtue of a relationship to another value, but in their own right.
An essential difference between facts and values is that we can know the
first category (Erkenntnis), but can only avow our values (Beke~mtnis) (1932,
233). Complete knowledge- implicitly understood by Radbruch as scientific
knowledge- is only possible regarding the realm of fact, the realm ofvalues
is ultimately a matter of choice and allegiance. The denial that values can be
known, which Radbruch sees as following from the dichotomy of fact and
value, is the basis of Radbruch's value relativism. Because values cannot be
known, the only way to ground value judgments is by retracing them to the
fundamental values of the world view in which they are embedded. Which
ultimate values are part of that world view, or which are the most important
components of it, can only be chosen by the person who holds it. We know
that Radbruch saw as the task of a relativistic philosophy to clarify and
systematize world views. He believed many things can be said about the
coherence of beliefs and about their consequences and presuppositions.
Moreover, he thought that there are only so many distinct and coherent views
possible, which philosophy can spell out. This optimism about the
achievements of philosophy indicates that Radbruch wants to limit his
relativism to core values. There is no way of correcting someone's belief that
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the community is more important than the individual, because that is
something which is susceptible to choice only. It is possible, however, to show
that one cannot hold the community and the individual both to be the ultimate
locus of value without contradicting oneself; or to show that certain more
speci~c values, for example intrinsic value of the family, only fit with the
view based on community value. However, the core values, which can only
be chosen, do form the ultimate basis of the different world views. As a
consequence, Radbruch's relativism has far-reaching effects: the basis of the
different world views, to which all value judgments can be retraced, is
insusceptible to knowledge, proof or argument. Because all opinions
concerning values depend on such a world view, any examination of the role
of values in phenomena that are value-related - such as law - will need to
look at those values in relation to the world views of which they are part.
Radbruch illustrates this in his discussions of specific legal subjects in the
second part ofthe Rechtsphilosophie. For instance, in the chapter on the legal
conception of the person, Radbruch traces different theories of the legal
person back to their origins in the three basic philosophical positions he
distinguishes (1932, 366).
Thus, there are two important currents in Radbruch's value theory: the
recognition of absolute, ultimate values and the relativistic choice of those
values as the basis of a value system. What complicates matters, is that
Radbruch uses two catalogues of highest values: the four absolute values of
the good, the true, the beautiful, and the just, and the three possible
understandings of the good: individual, collective, and work values (1932,
256; 279). The values of truth, beauty, goodness andjustice, the elements out
ofwhich world views are built, are not in need of further justification: they are
independent and self-evident (selbsturrdig irrrdselhstverst~irrdliclz) (1924, 461).
Additionally, Radbruch holds that there are only three categories of objects
capable of being valued: human individuals, human collectivities, and the
products ofhuman work. The individualistic view sees the individual good as
the ultimate object of value; the transindividualistic view sees the collective
good as ultimate object, for instance the nation or the community; the
transpersonal view sees cultural works, for instance works of art, as the
ultimate object of value. The reason why Radbruch limits the range of value
systems to these three, is that he believes that all things valuable must be
connected to human beings:
In the whole world of experience, there are only three kinds of subjects
susceptible ofabsolute worth: individual human personalities, human collective
personalities, and human works. According to these substrata we may
distinguish three kinds ofvalues: individual values, collective values, and work
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values (1932, 279).3
For Radbruch it is evident that only what is human, understood in a broad
sense, can have value of itself. At its basis his philosophy is thoroughly
humanistic.' These two sets of highest values are related, but it is not
immediately clear in what way.
In the Grund~iige der Rechtsphilosophie Radbruch consistently adhered to
the traditional three ultimate values, goodness, truth, and beauty, which he
related to a specific part of reality (1914, 57). Truth and beauty attach to
human works, goodness to human personalities. Justice is not an ultimate
value, but a derivative value which supports the ultimate values. Radbruch
uses Lask's theory of the differentiation of ineaning (Becleutungsdifferen-
zierung): values are classified according to the subject to which they apply
(`auf die sie hingelten'). Justice applies to the relations between persons, but
such relations cannot be the subject of absolute value.
In the Rechtsphilosophie, Radbruch makes two important changes. He
distinguishes between the individual and the collective as human personalities,
and accordingly between the individual good and the collective good as
highest values. Secondly, he includes justice among the ultimate values. Both
can be explained in line with the idea of differentiation of ineaning: Radbruch
widens the scope of the reality that can be subject ofabsolute value to include
communal life and relations between people. The puzzle that now comes up
is how these are related, and especially how justice fits in the system of
highest values. Radbruch still adheres to the old scheme that only human
personalities (now as two types) and human works can be subject of ultimate
value: this leads to the conclusion that justice is not an ultimate value. On the
other hand, Radbruch includes justice among the ultimate values of beauty,
truth, and goodness. How to resolve this puzzle? The answer can be found in
Radbruch's formal conception of justice. He believes that this cannot
determine the content of law and he then appeals to a different set of values,
entering the idea of law via the value of ZweckmciJ3igkeit. This element of the
Rechtsidee can be understood as the gateway through which other values
enter. Only at this point does Radbruch introduce his typology of value
systems based on the highest values of individual good, collective good, and
work values (beauty and truth). In the context of legal philosophy, justice has
a different function (as the basic constitutive value of the concept of law) and
i
3
Translation Wilk 1950, 91-92. In German: "Es gibt im ganzen Bereich der Erfahrungswelt
nur drei Arten von Gegenst~nden, die absoluter Werthaftigkeit fáhig sínd: menschliche
Einzelpersónlichkeiten, menschliche Gesamtpers~nlichkeiten, menschliche Werke. Wir
kónnen nach Maf3gabe dieser ihrer Substrate drei Arten von Werten unterscheiden:
Individualwerte, Kollektivwerte und Werkwerte."
It is humanistic in the sense that human beings are at the center ofhis philosophy (see also
Baratta 1959, 506, who emphasizes Radbruch's humanism as the unifying theme in his
philosophy). This anthropocentrism may seem less adequate in our present age, now that
we have come to recognize that nature and animals are also worthy of concern.
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does not appear in political value systems.
I now want to turn to the other important role of ultimate values, as the
points of orientation for different cultural realities. The relationship between
value and reality will be discussed in the next section; here I want to draw
attention to the fact that Radbruch uses truth, beauty, goodness and justice as
the necessary standards for specific cultural realities. Again, it is seen as self-
evident which specific value a value-related reality means to serve.s When
Radbruch tells us that law is a value-related reality and asks to which value
law is related, it needs no argument that its value must be justice (1932, 255).
Thus, the four ultimate values are in two respects necessary: they are part of
the ultimate basis ofpeople's value systems, and they are the necessary points
of orientation for cultural realities.
We can now distinguish two, apparently opposed, characteristics of
Radbruch's value philosophy: on the one hand, relativism ofultimate values,
on the other, a number of necessary and self-evident values. Radbruch
believes that world views are ultimately a matter of personal choice, but he
also defends that there is a specific, limited set of views and of absolute
ultimate values to choose from. Moreover, these absolute values serve as
constitutive values of cultural realities. Ifone denies, as Radbruch does, that
knowledge about ultimate values is possible, how does one know that his
proposed typology ofultimate values is the right one? How does one establish
which value belongs with a certain reality? We need to consider if and how
these two aspects of his value theory can be reconciled.
The first thing that needs to be clarified is the exact character of
Radbruch's relativism. The term relativism can stand for a number of
positions regarding the nature of values.b Radbruch's value relativism should
not be confused with a form of subjectivism, i.e. the idea that values are
simply a matter ofsubjective preference. According to Radbruch, the opinions
people have about values can be traced to the objective ideas they express. He
believes in a true meaning of value statements which can be uncovered by a
philosophical investigation. Such an investigation finds its limit when it has
uncovered the specific constellation of values that form the world view of
which the value judgment under consideration is part. This must, of course, be
one of the three world views he has described. Unlike many contemporary
versions ofrelativism,' Radbruch does not see values primarily as relative to
the culture to which people belong. For him, different value systems are first
of all represented by different political parties. In his legal philosophy that is
what matters, because different political views enter the domain oflaw by way
5 This can be explained by Radbruch's reliance on Lask's theory of the differentiation of
meaning: each value is specified according to the reality which it guides.
b See section 1.2 and 2.2.
' For example: the view of Richard Rorty. See his chapter `From Epistemology to
Hermeneutics', in: Rorty 1980, p. 315-35G.
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of the value ofZtiveckntkf.3igkeit.g Where Radbruch differs from many present-
day relativists like Rorty is in limiting his relativism to values. While
relativism now often includes scepticism about all claims of true knowledge,
Radbruch thinks only knowledge of values is impossible to achieve.
Additionally, Radbruch limits his relativism in two further ways: first of all,
it only concerns ultimate values and secondly, it concerns them only in their
role as the core of world views, not when they are constitutive of cultural
realities. It is doubtful, however, whether relativism can be contained in this
way.
The appeal of a limited relativism depends on the plausibility of the
combination with the non-relative elements of the theory, and on the
persuasiveness of that part. In Radbruch's case this is the combination of a
relative theory of the good with other absolute values, most importantly
justice, which perform the important role of constituting parts of reality. The
arguments he gives for the absolute values are tenuous: absolute values are
self-evident, they must necessarily be accepted. I think the absence of
elaborate arguments can be explained from Radbruch's philosophical method.
Radbruch appeals to a neo-Kantian tradition of regarding values as being
beyond reality and having validity instead of existence. His arguments for
these transcendent values are transcendental, that is, they concern the
preconditions of our knowledge and cultural reality. Thus, the argument for
the self-evidence follows a Kantian scheme: as a human being, one can only
understand the point of law by seeing it as oriented towards justice. Such an
argument depends on the possibility of every rational being reproducing the
argument and finding it inescapable, because it is the only way that the reality
of law makes sense. However, the argument that law can only be understood
as oriented towards justice is not as self-evidently clear as Radbruch would
have us believe. Only in a philosophical system that grounds the idea of law
in transcendent values (a neo-Kantian system) does justice as the constitutive
value of law appear inevitable. In a philosophy denying this type of
Wertbezogenheit, law can as easily be understood as an instrument of power
or of efficient co-ordination. Seeing law as necessarily oriented towards
justice depends on the presupposition that such values are transcendent
absolutes.
Moreover, it is not clear why Radbruch does not extend his relativism to
justice. If the absolute value of the good can be interpreted differently
according to the object that is deemed most important, why not extend this
line of argument to interpretations of the absolute value ofjustice? Radbruch
a One could say that Radbruch focuses on the different value systems within a culture,
although he himself does not mention cultures in this sense. However, his philosophy can
easily accommodate the view that values differ over cultures. His typology of individual,
collective and work values could also be applied to different cultures. The argument that no
decisive evidence can be given in favour ofone set of values also holds in relation to whole
cultures.
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emphasizes that our relation to values is one of Bekenntnis, not ofErkenntnis,
but he does not apply this insight to justice: the value towards which law is
oriented can be no other than justice, and justice can be interpreted only as
equality. However, this is exactly what is contested in theories ofjustice. Such
theories question what the core meaning ofjustice is - equality or fairness?
- and whether justice should be seen as the supreme value of law or politics.
Because opinion is divided over such issues, it would seem to be in line with
Radbruch's relativism to extend it to conceptions of justice as well. That
would mean that his relativism would have a broader scope than he is willing
to award it. In the light of Radbruch's methodological starting points, that
would yield a more coherent theory of values. The problems of such a theory
arise in the account ofthe relations between values and reality, to which I now
turn.
3 Values and Reality
In the last section the distinct character of values was the focus of discussion,
and for a proper understanding of that character we needed to get a firm grip
on Radbruch's dualism. However, as we already noted in the discussion of
Stoffbestinimtheit in the last chapter, there are parts of Radbruch's theory that
go a long way towards bridging the gap between `is' and `ought'. Apart from
the Stof~bestimrntheit der ldee and the related doctrine ofNatur der Sache, one
can also regard the idea of cultural realities and the accompanying value-
relating perspective9 in that light. So this section concerns the relationships
between the realm of fact and the realm of value. More specifically, the
question to be answered here is whether `values and reality' should be read as
a primarily disjunctive relation - values on one side, reality on the other -
or as a basic connection - values irr reality. To that end, I will discuss the two
main leads in Radbruch's work for an exploration of this question: first, the
doctrines of the Stoffbestimrntheit der- Idee and Natur der- Sache, and second,
the idea of cultural realities with the related value-relating perspective.
The relationship between idea and rnatter
In the last chapter I left unanswered the question whether the doctrine of the
Stoffbestimmtheit der ldee leaves the dichotomy of fact and value intact as
Radbruch claims. If ideas or values are truly determined in part by the realities
with which they are connected, the assertion that there is an unbridgeable gap
between the two becomes untenable. The answer to this question is of great
importance in the context of this study, because the success of such bridging
would make a combination of transcendence and immanence possible: ideals
could then transcend reality and yet, at the same time, be grounded in reality.
From his dualistic perspective, in which anything belongs to either the realm
9 In German: `das wertbeziehende Verhalten' (1932, 95).
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of being or the realm of value, Radbruch denies that values can both transcend
and be based in reality. However, the idea of Stoffbestimnitheit does seem to
provide a real grounding of values. Radbruch devotes an early article to the
issue of Stoffbestimmtheit, `Rechtsidee und Rechtsstoff. Eine Skizze', which
provides a helpful account of the connections between idea and matter
(1923~24).
Radbruch argues that, although the idea can logically be seen as the form,
which shapes matter, we can only think the idea in relation to its matter. The
distinction between idea and matter can only be achieved by abstracting the
idea from the reality in which it works (1923124, 454). Thus, Radbruch
adheres to the distinction between the causal influence of reality and the
logical priority ofthe idea, but by making clear that logical relations can only
be conceived by departing from the given interrelatedness of idea and matter,
he seems to soften the distinction between the causal and the logical.
Radbruch makes his doctrine of Stoffbestimnitheit more concrete by
examining the interaction between legal idea and legal matter. Here we see
that the influence of ideas remains the key feature of his conception of legal
matter. In his discussion of the Natur der SucJie Radbruch tells us that one of
the meanings ofthis doctrine is that, when making new rules, the legislator has
to reckon with existing natural, social and legal facts. These facts, the matter
to which the idea of law is applied, limit what can be achieved with new rules
based on the idea of law. The thing to notice here is that Radbruch conceives
of facts, or reality in a broad way: not only natural facts, but including social
and legal facts. What is peculiar about the latter is that they have already gone
through a process of ineaning being attached to them. Social facts are not
simple, raw data; such facts already mean things to us because we look at
them through a conceptual framework. The reality to which the idea of law is
applied has been preformed with the help of other concepts and ideas
(1923~24, 459).
I believe it is this meaning (Sinn) which reality already possesses which
forms the bridge between matter and idea. By discovering the meaning of
some fact we separate the conceptual and ideal side ofa phenomenon from its
raw factuality. The meaning of facts derives from their being formed with the
help of ideas and concepts. So clarifying a fact's meaníng is essentially the
same as discovering the ideas and concepts that had a part in the creation of
that particular fact. This creates the possibility of connecting it to other ideas,
in our case, the idea of law. The relation between legal idea and legal matter
can be reinterpreted as the relation between the ideas determining the legal
matter and the idea of law. The legal method of the Natur der Sache focuses
on the meaning of the legal matter and reconstructs the political and social
ideas that shape it and tries to reconcile these with the idea of law (see 1948b,
235). The concept ofSinn can therefore be used as the bridge between matter
and idea, because it allows us to uncover the ideas present in the matter. The
connection between legal idea and legal matter is mediated by other ideas.
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However, the concept of Sinn is not unproblematic in itself. How do we
determine the meaning ofa factual situation? How should we conceive of that
meaning; is it part of reality or not`? For answers we need to consider the
nature of the realities Radbruch is interested in, the realities which have
meaning, that is, cultural realities.
Ca~ltural realities as value-related
We already touched upon the subject of cultural realities in the last chapter
when the study of law was characterized as a cultural science. In Radbruch's
system, cultural sciences are those concerned with the kind of reality which
means to realize some value (1932, 225). Cultural realities always involve
human activities: because human beings are the ones who assign value, only
human enterprises can form cultural realities. The concept ofa cultural reality
is broad: every human activity is guided by ideas or values and thus comes
under the category of cultural reality (227). Everything people do is done
according to some idea, however vague, of what the action undertaken should
be like or result in. The important point about cultural realities is that they are
only oriented towards values, a relationship which should be understood as
rather loose. One of Radbruch's examples, the practice of science, illustrates
this best. Science can be characterized as the search for truth, but to merit the
name of science, research in no way needs to succeed in this quest. A
completely erroneous enquiry still deserves to be called scientific as long as
truth is the value to which it aspires. We need to be able to understand the
enquiry as aiming to get closer to the truth.
Here we have reached the core of the idea of cultural realities: their
meaning (Sinn) is to realize values. Cultural realities are always meaningful
and their meaning consists in being value-related. Therefore, the most
important way to discover the meaning of a factual phenomenon is to find out
which value it is oriented towards and in what way. In some cases, for instance
science which is related to truth, there is one value which is the point of
orientation in a fairly straightforward manner. But more often - and this
might even prove to be the case in a seemingly simple case like science -
there are more values which guide the reality in question in a complex way.
The prime example here, of course, is law and its threefold idea. The way in
which the different guiding values of the law interact will be the subject ofthe
next section. Here I want to pursue the question how to determine which
values a given reality means to serve, because I believe this is a problematic
aspect of Radbruch's theory.
Radbruch takes for granted that there are obvious links between certain
realities and corresponding values. The idea to which law is oriented can only
be the value ofjustice (1932, 256), and art must be striving for beauty (222).
Radbruch sees the relation between such a reality and a value as a necessary
connection. Art can only be understood as meaning to realize the value of
beauty. But what about art that is meant as an expression of the identity of the
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artist, or art which only means to convey a conceptual point? In these cases,
beauty does not seem to be at issue, while we would still want to call the
object a work ofart. The problem is that Radbruch takes orientation towards
a specific value to be the defining criterion without arguing why we should
accept such a necessary connection between this value and this domain of
reality. The only argument for a necessary connection he gives is the general
argument that we need ideas or values to generate concepts with which we can
order the given reality around us. He does not provide an argument why we
should accept justice as the guiding value of the law or beauty as that of art.
The example of art illustrates the problem well: over the course of the
twentieth century we have seen a move away from the value ofbeauty towards
other values, e.g. the value ofauthenticity, the work of art as an expression of
the individuality ofthe artist, and ofarticulation, the work ofart as the vehicle
of ideas. It is doubtful whether beauty can still be regarded as the unifying
value towards which art is oriented, and orientation towards beauty is certainly
not the defining characteristic of art. It can still be defended that art is
necessarily oriented towards values - this could even be the basis of an
argument about the controversies over what art is - but it is not necessarily
oriented to one specific value. If one extends this argument about beauty to
other domains, it leads to a relativized conception ofvalues. The problem that
then remains is how one can account for shared practices and common
conceptions of social reality, if the values on which they are based are
manifold. Making the understanding of reality dependent on specific values
is problematic when these values are subject to radical reinterpretations or can
be exchanged for other values.
Now we can also see in what way the concept of Sinn is problematic: what
does the meaning of a cultural reality signify other than orientation towards
the value with which it is constructed? And how do we determine that
meaning if it is unclear towards which value a cultural reality is oriented?
Radbruch relies on the possibility of determining the objective meaning of a
cultural reality (1932, 344) to account for the meeting of value and matter in
social and legal facts. But if the value on which that meaning is based is not
univocal, the meaning ofsocial and legal facts becomes indeterminate and will
not be indisputable and objective. The heavy duty laid on value and idea as
determining meaning and thereby reality creates tension in the account of
cultural reatity, once Radbruch's concept ofvalue is shown to be questionable.
4 The Interaction of Values
In this section I would like to discuss the way values are related to each other.
Values cannot be regarded as isolated entities: realizing one value may
obstruct realization of other values, or attention for one value may assist or
demand the realization of another. How these relations should be conceived
of, and whether values really can and do interact, needs to be investigated. I
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believe Radbruch's theory can provide valuable insights into these problems,
particularly his theory of the idea of law.
Here we should recall some of the things Radbruch says about the role and
the structure ofthe idea of law. Central to Radbruch's views on the idea oflaw
is that it is both constitutive principle and standard of evaluation (1932, 227).
The first role points out the way the idea oflaw is the basis for the concept of
law, the second expresses that we use it to evaluate the legal reality. At times
it may seem a little artificial to separate two roles, because the evaluative and
the constitutive function reinforce each other to a large extent. It is, however,
important to separate the way values are the basis for evaluation of reality
from the way values determine our perception and constitution ofreality. The
reason for stressing this double role of the idea of law is that I believe
Radbruch uses it as the basis for two arguments about the internal structure of
the idea of law. The first argument is that the three values are necessary to
make the idea of law work as a constitutive principle; the second argument is
that the three values complement each other as evaluative standards.
In short, the argument about the elements ofthe idea of law was as follows.
The idea of law consists of three values - Gerechtigkeit, Zweckmr2f,~igkeit,
RechtssicherlTeit - of which we already saw that they require each other.
Justice as a formal standard of equality needs supplementation by
Ztiveckmcif3igkeit because it cannot by itself determine the content of law.
Zweckrncif3igkeit in its turn cannot give a final determination of what is to
count as law because the purposes law can serve are many. The value of legal
security is therefore needed as the basis for a decision mechanism, as a basis
for the validity of legal norms. Together these three values form the idea of
law as it should be; they determine the character of the lega] system.
As constitutive principle, the idea of law needs its three elements because
each on its own is inconclusive about the nature of law. Although justice
suffices to generate the concept of law,'~ it does not give us a complete idea
of what law is about. Radbruch only gives reasons why justice cannot stand
on its own, but one can construct arguments why ZweckrnáJ3igkeit and legal
security cannot either. ZtivecknzciJ,3igkeit, because it derives from the value of
the good, does not provide a clear boundary between law and other realities.
Legal security suffers from a similar shortcoming as justice: it is too formal
to give law true content, because it only demands positivity. For instance, the
principle that prohibits the retroactive effect of rules does not say anything
specific about the content of those rules. A legal system can be identified as
such, when it observes formal equality, has a purpose and claims to give
determinative decisions.
As standard of evaluation, the three elements are necessary because only
together do they give a complete idea of what law should aspire to. Each value
on its own is one-sided and can never give good direction. If a legal system
~o This theme will be treated more extensively in the next section.
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were oriented towards only one ofthese values instead of towards the idea of
law as a whole, it would become a one-dimensional system and a caricature
of law (1948a, 147). This is so because each value exerts a pull in a different
direction. Ger~echtigkeit creates a tendency towards general rules that abstract
from concrete inequalities between people, while Zweckmci~3igkeit,
representing the idea of the good, demands a solution that is tailored to the
specific needs of the situation (1932, 304). For instance, equal application of
environmental rules to all factories may clash with the concrete needs of one
specific community with such a factory. Legal security requires that law is
practical, easily applicable and understandable, with clear rules and sharp
boundaries, which can come into conflict with the demand for proportionality
made by justice and the demand for individuality made by ZweckinciJ3igkeit
(304).
The three values are thus precariously balanced: each tends to pull the idea
of law in one direction but is checked by the countervailing forces ofthe other
two. To know what the idea of law demands is not easy, since it requires the
assessment of opposing ideals. In combination with the notion of
Stof~besti~nmtheit, this idea of conflicting values generates a dynamic
conception of the idea of law. In every new situation we need to rediscover the
exact meaning of the three values and it may well be that the balance among
the three values shifts a little because ofthis reconsideration in the light of the
meaning of new facts. Radbruch rightly points out that the attempt to achieve
a balance between the different values can never have a completely
satisfactory result. The attempted realization of one value conflicts with the
realization of another: the gain in one direction will therefore entail losses in
regard to other values. Radbruch believes these conflicts between the different
components of the idea of law to be irresolvable (1932, 307). This has both
negative and positive effects: the negative consequence is that full realization
of values is impossible, the positive effect is that undesirable
overconcentration can be avoided as long as one remains aware of these
conflicts.
Radbruch constructs the idea of law on the basis ofan a priori argument of
the different components requiring each other. The thesis that the idea of law
as the reigning evaluative standard of law consists of conflicting values is
appealing. It can account for conflicting interpretations of what law should be
in two ways: because of a different assessment of what the governing values
of law are, and because of a different interpretation of the relations between
governing values. Again, the difficulty ofRadbruch's conception lies with the
argumentation for the components making up the idea oflaw: on the one hand,
a relation of necessity, but on the other, subject to relativistic interpretation.
Fortunately, this does not seem to be the only way to argue that the governing
values of law are a set of related but conflicting values. There is also the
possibility of an inductive argument: pointing out that a legal system in fact
is committed to a conflicting set ofvalues and using this empirical knowledge
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to argue that these values make up the governing ideal of law. That would
mean giving up Radbruch's strict adherence to logically acceptable deductive
arguments, and moving in the direction ofa more immanent account ofideals.
I will attempt to incorporate Radbruch's ideas of the interaction of values in
such an account in Chapter 7.
5 The Role of Values in Law
In previous sections we more than once came across the dual role ofvalues in
Radbruch's philosophy. We examined Radbruch's general idea of the
connection between values and reality and uncovered the structure of ideas
and cultural realities. Now, since the ultimate object of this study is to
construct a concept of ideals relevant in the context of law, it is time to focus
more specifically on the role values have in the domain of law. The guiding
question will be what Radbruch sees as the possibilities and limits of a value-
oriented approach when law is the object of study. Especially I want to
examine what one can learn from Radbruch about the role of values in
determining the character of the law as an autonomous system.
Jasstice as constitutive of legal reality
By describing law as a cultural reality, Radbruch draws attention to the value-
laden character of law. Law, as part of the cultural world, is formed by the
value it purports to serve. The idea of law as a cultural reality is a
straightforward application of Radbruch's Methodentrialisrnus, which
conceives of man-related reality as partaking ofthe realm ofvalue. All human
activities are done with leading ideas or values in mind, which is therefore
also true of law. None of this is surprising in the light of what we have seen
of Radbruch's theory, but it does yield strong conclusions about the
signifcance for law of values in general, and, more importantly, of the
specific values law serves. To put it crudely, the existence of law depends on
values, and the nature of law is derived from the nature ofjustice. It is the idea
of law, not the value ofjustice alone, that determines the reality oflaw, but of
that idea justice is the part that gives law its specific character (1932, 259).
The concept of law, which enables us to separate the legal from the non-legal,
is based on the value ofjustice. As Radbruch puts it himself: "Our discussions
have shown that justice is the specific idea of law, sufficient to unfold the
concept of law, but that it does not exhaust the idea of law"" (1932, 278). The
concept of law is our tool to recognize and to make law. Because it is based
on justice, understood as formal equality (treating like cases alike), law is
characterized as the totality of general norms for social life (1948a, 151).
" Translation Wilk (1950, 90). In German: "Aus unsern Betrachtungen ergab sich, dafi
Gerechtigkeit zwar die spezifische Rechtsidee ist, genugend, um aus ihr den Begriff des
Rechts zu entwickeln, daf3 die Idee des Rechts sich aber in der Gerechtigkeit nicht
erschi7pft."
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General norms, because the idea ofjustice as equality requires that rules are
applicable to al] alike; norms for social life, because the idea of justice
concerns the relationships between people. Radbruch thus uses values as the
very basis of legal reality. Of the values that determine the law, justice has a
special place because it provides the characteristics that distinguish law from
the other parts of value-related reality.
I believe that this use of justice as the specific constitutive value of law
commits Radbruch to a conception ofjustice that is at times at odds with the
way he uses justice as a value standard. In its constitutive role, justice
determines the form of law. In this capacity, justice needs to be formal,
because it serves to distinguish law from other parts ofreality and is not meant
as a standard of the quality of law. Radbruch wishes to avoid the natural law
idea that the quality of a legal norm, assessed by the standard of justice,
decides whether the norm is law or not. This is in part realized by seeing law
as a reality that only means to serve justice, but does not necessarily serve it
in fact. In addition, Radbruch needs room to allow for historical changes in the
idea of law, while at the same time providing a necessary criterion to
determine what law is. That is why he uses a formal idea ofjustice as the basis
for the concept of law, but brings in relativized elements in the idea of law. If
the idea ofjustice itself were more substantive, the concept of law would be
too restrictive. However, the idea of law as a whole determines more precisely
what the reality of law is like. One could say that justice is used to draw the
lines and the idea of law to complete the picture. That the exact
characterization ofjustice is a crucial element in Radbruch's theory becomes
apparent when we once more consider Radbruch's postwar writings.
We saw that Radbruch in his postwar work gives justice a more prominent
position.'Z Justice appears as the central element in the idea of law, the one
element that can never be set aside completely. The famous formula features
justice as the standard by which positive laws are assessed: when the
discrepancy between a statute and justice becomes too great, the positive law
has to give way to justice, and to be rejected as unjust (1946, 89). Here we see
that Radbruch uses justice in a different role than its constitutive one: justice
is regarded as the value standard by which existing laws are assessed. Instead
of the basis for an a priori concept of law, justice is now a standard applied
afterwards to legal norms already established as such. Radbruch combines this
test with another that is more in line with the argument that sees justice as
constitutive (1946, 89). That supposedly legal norms are not really law ifthey
do not even mean to serve justice, is consistent with the idea of law as a value-
related reality. If no link between justice and the norm in question can be
discerned, that norm cannot be part of the domain of law. But because justice
is no more than formal equality, this criterion is easily satisfied. As long as the
norm is general, positive and meant for social life, it can be brought under the
~Z See the discussion in section 3.4.
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concept of law. The question is whether justice as formal equality can also
serve as the standard of ric{itiges Recht (right, lawful law). At first sight the
answer seems to be that it can. Something counts as law if it satisfies the
concept of law: it means to serve the value ofjustice; and it counts as right law
if it realizes justice: it succeeds in serving that value." However, it is doubtful
whether formal equality suffices to provide an idea of richtiges Recht. As
Radbruch shows himself in the discussion of the idea of law, justice as formal
equality needs supplementation by other values to give a complete idea of law.
Justice alone does not generate enough content; it only demands generality
and proportionality. It can be used to condemn inequality before the courts or
unwarranted exceptions, but it needs more substance to provide a standard
with which a legal rule can be fully evaluated. In `Gesetzliches Unrecht und
ubergesetzliches Recht' Radbruch emphasizes the tension among the three
elements of the idea of law and uses justice as an independent standard of
evaluation for positive law. That means he has to choose between using the
notion of justice as formal equality, which means having an incomplete
standard of lawful law and expanding the notion ofjustice to incorporate a
substantive idea ofequality."The article is not conclusive about the choice he
makes, but an argument for a more substantive notion ofjustice can be made
on the basis of other post-war papers (see 3.4). Although the idea ofjustice as
formal equality is consistent with Radbruch's theory as a whole, a more
substantive idea of justice would strengthen the non-relative elements of his
theory. Radbruch's relativism would commit him to an idea of law that
depends on political views for its exact content, also when this political view
is as abhorrent as that of National Socialism. However, we have seen that an
understanding ofjustice as demanding observance of human rights is part of
Radbruch's post-war views (1945, 79). Such a stronger notion of equality
could be a standard that transcends the political views of the day. A theory
with Kantian inspirations such as Radbruch's could base such a view of
equality on Kant's idea of treating people as ends, never as means only.
This lengthy discussion of the idea ofjustice was meant to show that the
two different roles that values have in Radbruch's legal philosophy create
tendencies to conceptualize values differently. Justice as constitutive principle
works best when it is regarded as formal equality, while justice as standard of
evaluation is more powerful when seen as substantive equality. The
constitutive role of values, requiring a necessary relation between a specific
value and a part of reality, demands an unambiguous conception of justice,
best realized by seeing justice as formal; the role of evaluative standard,
requiring a robust criterion, demands a more substantive conception, that is
13 In the literature on the use of Radbruch's formula in German court cases, these two distinct
parts of the formula have become known as the criterion of renouncement and the criterion
of intolerability. See Mertens 1998, p. 275.
Ronald Dworkin's idea of equal concern and respect is an example of what I have in mind
here (Dworkin 1978, 180).
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inevitably more controversial.
The autonorny of law
There is one aspect ofthe relation between values and law that deserves more
detailed attention, which is the way values operate in the connections between
law and other parts of cultural reality. We know that Radbruch regards law as
a distinctive cultural reality with its own specific characteristics, but we have
not yet discussed to what extent and how values function in law's relation to
other realities such as politics or the economy. We have just seen that
Radbruch's basic idea is that justice shapes the specific nature of law. Being
related to justice guarantees law its autonomous character, because justice is
a specific value that is the basis of the separation between the legal and the
non-legal. But although law is a system with its own unique features,
Radbruch sees a number of ways in which it is influenced by other realms of
human activity, two of them in connection with legal values: the Natur der
Sache and the relative elements in the idea of law.
First of all, the Natur der Sache establishes relations between law and other
parts of life. We saw that law has to reckon with pre-existing social and legal
facts: law cannot ignore settled social arrangements (1948a, 140-141). It
means that law needs to be sensitive to the way people are accustomed to think
and act, and to mould legal norms in keeping with the ways of a society to a
large extent. Of course, this does not mean that progressive legal regulation
is ruled out. Radbruch simply warns of the impotence of legal rules that are
too distant from existing ways of life: there is a fair chance that a rule that
aims to overturn established arrangements will accomplish nothing at all
(1948a, 141). The conservative tendency ofthe Natur der Sache does not work
exclusively as social reluctance to change. It can be equally inhibiting when
a legal reform affects ingrained legal habits. It is a resistance to change both
within law and society. Similarly, the idea of law is bound by historical
circumstances. The idea of what law should be is always dependent on the
Zeitgeist, on presuppositions that are unchallenged in a certain historical
period (1948b, 237).
However, the elements of the idea of law are not all subject to those
changing ways of thinking to the same extent. Radbruch conceives of the
elements ofjustice and legal security as necessary. And even ifdoubts can be
cast upon Radbruch's conceptualization ofjustice, the idea ofa close relation
between law and justice is appealing. The elegance of Radbruch's idea of law
lies in his careful distinction between elements that are open to influences
from other domains and elements that protect law from such influences. It is
through the value of ZweckmciJ,3igkeit that different conceptions of the good
enter the idea of law. Radbruch sees this primarily as the political influence
on the idea of law, which is of course most important because the lawgiver is
a political body. But the same reasoning can be applied to, for instance, views
about morals or economics. The ordering of the different elements is relative
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to political views as well, so that Radbruch's theory can both accommodate
changes in the historical climate which influence the idea of law and
competing views which defend different versions of the idea oflaw. Although
the thought that j ustice and legal security are more intimately connected to law
than these political values is appealing, his arguments for justice as equality
as the necessary value element are inadequate. The statement that the value of
law can be no other than justice (1932, 256) does not suffice for a convincing
argument. The distinctions between different values influencing the law which
identify some as specific to law and others as external to it are useful, but the
neo-Kantian account of the nature of those values is not satisfactory.
6 The Concept of Ideals
It is time to attempt an answer to the conceptual questions I have put off until
now, and to assess Radbruch's relevance for the development of a
jurisprudential concept of ideals. One of the leading questions in conducting
my research into the concept of ideals has been how to view the relation
between ideal and value. If, as was my starting point, ideal and value are
related concepts, in what way exactly are they related? Are these two concepts
identical, and if they are not, what are the differences between them? What
does Radbruch have to say on these issues?
For Radbruch, the basic concept is that of value ( Werr). That is the concept
he uses as one ofthe two opposed poles set up by his dualistic principle: value
against reality. His main concern is to explain the differences between the two
realms which the concepts of value and ofreality designate, not to distinguish
among different concepts within these realms. In the first instance then, value,
idea, ideal, and norm are all used to refer to the sphere that transcends reality,
or fact, or being. On the dualistic model, all these terms refer to those things
that should be spoken of in terms of validity instead of existence. The terms
ideal and value are not used in any distinct sense, both appear as indicators of
the same realm, as opposites of nature (Natur) and reality (Wirklichkeit)
respectively (1932, 226). If at all, Radbruch appears to distinguish between
different terms only in order to draw attention to the different aspects of the
realm of value which differentiate it from the realm of fact.
This is most apparent where he uses the term idea15 in the place of value.
Radbruch uses the term idea primarily in relation to concept (Begrifn, more
precisely, concepts are seen as related to ideas. We saw that the concept of law
The term idea or ldee has a rich philosophical history to which Radbruch alludes
occasionally. The example of the table which Radbruch uses is a classic in the explanation
of Plato's theory. In German philosophy both Kant and Hegel made use of the term,
although attaching rather different meanings to it. In Kantian philosophy, the idea is a
necessary concept ofreason, while in Hegelian philosophy it is a fully realized or actualízed
concept ( Inwood 1992, 123-24). Radbruch's use differs from both, it is not as stringent as
Kant's and it does not connect idea with a realized state as Hegel's.
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is based on the idea of law. Broadly, ideas designate the conceptual tools of
the human mind that are used to recognize and generate things in reality (See
1932, 227). To use Radbruch's example, tables are made with a certain idea
in mind that comprises the purpose for building a table. In using the term idea,
Radbruch stresses that our conceptual apparatus is mind- or thought-related
and the way in which this forms our reality. Value, on the other hand, is the
term that emphasizes the normative, or to put it slightly redundantly, the
evaluative, character of this sphere: it provides us with standards of
evaluation. Now these characteristics, highlighted by the term idea and the
term value respectively, do not seem to reflect a difference in subject matter:
so far, the two terms are merely means of viewing the same thing from
different angles.
However, from his discussion of the idea of law we can gather a more
significant difference between idea and value. In this context, Radbruch
distinguishes between the idea that is composite and values that are its
constitutive elements. Here, the idea is used to refer to the whole to which law
is oriented, while values provide the different directions oforientation. Seeing
law as serving one idea, although consisting of three elements, makes clear
that it is the whole value complex that determines law. It conveys the insight
that the three values cannot be isolated because it is their interaction that
makes the idea oflaw. At the same time, conceiving ofthat idea as comprising
three elements allows us to recognize that the idea consists of distinct
standards with very different characteristics.
The most significant differentiation within the realm of value is made
between values and norms.1ó Although both are expressions of what ought to
be (Sollen) and are normative standards that transcend the reality to which
they are applicable, the category of norms has a closer connection to that
reality. Law is the reality in which this is most obvious, because law can be
considered as a system ofnorms. That is what legal science is concerned with.
Legal norms are the directly value-related content of the legal order, as
opposed to legal facts which are related to that order and thereby are indirectly
related to values (1932, 343-344). There are therefore three levels in play:
legal values, legal rules (Rechtsscitze) and legal facts. The intermediate level
of rules can be regarded as norms - because their meaning is part of the
realm of value, or as imperative - because they have effect as empirical
commands. In this way, Radbruch expresses the double character of law as
both an empirical reality and a normative order.
In Radbruch's theory there is no direct need to distinguish between rules
and principles, because his system conceptualizes all norms as directly related
to values. There is a possibility, however, of modifying Radbruch's theory to
incorporate a distinction between rules and principles. The point ofdeparture
16 The most extensive discussion of norms is in Chapter 5 of the Rechtsphilosophie (1932,
269-270). Radbruch distinguishes between the empirical working ofa rule (Rechtssatz), the
rule as imperative, and the normative meaning of a rule, the rule as norm.
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for constructing such a distinction is Radbruch's view of norms as
intermediary between values and facts. Ifwe can see norms as directly serving
values, we can maybe characterize them as guidelines to action that prescribe
how best to realize values. However, it needs to be further examined, fírst,
whether all norms can be seen as serving values, and second, whether there are
degrees or different modes of the value-related character of norms. If there
are, that may be a key to a distinction between principles and rules. In
Radbruch's system (legal) norms are necessarily value-related because being
part of the same realm of values they are based on the ultimate values that
form the basis of that realm. The second point, whether there are degrees or
modes of value-relatedness, is harder to answer, because there are no direct
starting-points in Radbruch's theory to work with. Because of his deductivist
model, however, there is reason to believe that the degree of distance to
ultimate values can vary: more general, less fact-related norms are fewer steps
removed from ultimate values. This means that a concept ofprinciples as more
general guidelines than rules is compatible with the spirit of Radbruch's
philosophy. If we relate Radbruch's ideas to contemporary distinctions
between principles and rules, Alexy's characterization of principles as
Optirriierufigsgebote" seems the closest to Radbruch's ideas, if we interpret
the optimizing demanded by principles as the optimizing oflegal values. The
determination of the actual content of legal principles, though, would be the
proper task of legal science, as the science concerned with the meaning of
positive legal norms (1932, 209).
7 Conclusions
After this examination ofthe different aspects of Radbruch's theory of values
I should now connect that discussion to the questions I have formulated in
Chapter 1. Here I will consider what Radbruch's answers are regarding the
three issues that I distinguished as components of the main question, how to
conceptualize ideals in the context of legal theory. The first issue concerns
different aspects of the ontology and epistemology of values and the relation
between values and reality, the second issue is the distinction and interaction
of different values, which in Radbruch's theory leads into the third issue, the
relation between values and law.
First of all, the ontological status of ideals is at issue. In Radbruch's view,
ideals are not in any way distinguished from values. Values or ideals form a
realm separate from reality, seen as transcendent. The transcendence ofvalues
means that they go beyond factual reality; they are uberwirklich. Other than
""Der f`ur die Unterscheidung von Regeln und Prinzipien entscheidende Punkt ist, daf3
Prinzipien Normen sind, die gebieten, daf3 etwas in einem relativ auf die rechtlichen und
tats~chlichen Móglichkeiten m~glichst hohen Maf3e realisiert wird. Prinzipíen sind also
Optimierungsgebote." (Alexy 1985, 19)
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this non-real and therefore transcendent character, Radbruch does not say
much explicitly about the nature of values. However, from his discussion of
the separation between reality and value we can gather that values are
subjective, in the sense that they are products ofthe human mind (1932, 221).
It is important to see that this does not mean that the validity of values is
dependent upon subjective preferences ofindividuals. Additional evidence can
be found in Radbruch's epistemological claim that a person's relation to
values is one of Bekeruitnis: although Radbruch sees the significance of this
relation in the consequence that one cannot know values, it also implies that
values are something to which a person commits him or herself and are not
identical with someone's feeling or preference. The validity ofvalues is based
on their relation to ultimate values, to which all values can be reduced. These
ultimate values have the character of irreducible axioms, whose validity is
absolute. Radbruch treats the characterization of values, as transcendent
entities whose mode of being is validity, as self-explanatory. However, the
meaning of validity and transcendence is not clear, let alone the ontological
status of values.18 Therefore, his conception of values needs to be
reconstructed. I think a likely detïnition of values in Radbruch's sense would
be the following: values are the necessary postulates of our normative
thinking, transcending physical reality and with a subjective basis.
Such an initial definition leaves many questions to be answered. The first
question concerns the transcendence of values: if we think of values as
transcending reality, does this necessarily mean that they are in no way
grounded in that reality? Radbruch's answer here is ambiguous: on the one
hand, he uses the doctrine of the Stoffbestimmtheit der ldee to establish that
values are influenced by reality; on the other hand, he speaks of the
transcendence of values as complete. He tries to reconcile these two
propositions by distinguishing between the causal influences of reality on
ideas and the justification of ideas. Causal influences can be recognized, but
cannot be used for the justifcation of ideas, because ideas can never be
justified by factual evidence. And even this causal connection between values
and reality is downplayed by attributing the meaning (Sinn) of social facts to
the influence of other values. This manoeuvring with the relations between
facts and values shows that, in spite of the difficulty of combining it with a
genuine connection between value and reality, Radbruch holds on to a strict
interpretation of his methodological principle that `is' and `ought' must be
distinguished. Although he tries to account for the links between the two
realms with the idea of Stoffbestirnrntheit, the reduction of the meaning of
social facts to their value-relatedness makes that idea rather an empty formula,
so that a real basis of values evaporates and the gap between fact and value
1e Compare Kaufmann: "...(eine nicht zu kl~rende Frage ist, als was Radbruch díe "Werte",
die "Rechtsidee" angesehen hat: schwerlich als etwas real Existierendes- aber als Axiom,
Postulat, Hypothese, transzendentale Bedingung?)..." ( Introduction in Radbruch GRGA I,
74)
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remains unbridged.
A second question concerns the dynamics of values: what does a
conception ofvalues, as transcendent necessary postulates, entail regarding the
changeability of values`? Here too, Radbruch's answer has two sides to it. The
ultimate values he distinguishes, the axioms of value systems, are necessary
or absolute, but the value systems that are based on them are relative to
personal convictions. This means that the basic values themselves remain
unchanged, but the weight that is given them is liable to change: different
constellations of values are adhered to in different historical circumstances
and according to different political views. This is also true of the idea of law:
it is seen as containing necessary and enduring elements, but as a whole it
undergoes continual changes because ofthe relativistic nature ofthe exact mix
of values that constitute the idea of law.
This brings us to a third question left open by the initial definition: does
Radbruch distinguish between different types of values`? Radbruch first of all
distinguishes the ultimate values that form the in-educible starting points of
value systems: the value of the good with its three alternative substrates -
individual, group or work- and the values oftruth, beauty, andjustice. These
ultimate values differ from values that are derived from them, as for instance
legal security derives from justice. Secondly, a distinction can be made
between composite values, which I termed `ideas' following the idea of law,
and their constituent values. The category of constituent values overlaps with
that of ultimate values, but only to a degree. The idea of law consists of the
ultimate value ofjustice and the derived values ofexpediency - derived from
the good - and legal security - derived from justice. Not all values are
therefore necessary postulates of world views, but that is the most important
category in Radbruch's theory because it forms the basis of the realm of
values. Radbruch does not pay attention to the exact relation between ultimate
values and other values; he seems to believe that value systems can simply be
deduced from a few ultimate values. That leaves open the question how to
reach the content of more specific values: perhaps from a combination of
values, perhaps by relating values to reality. Radbruch does not give a direct
answer. Probably because he sees deduction as an unproblematic method, he
does not specify what other factors enter into the determination of specific
values nor in what way: for instance, whether and how factual information is
incorporated.
One of the questions leading to this research was whether a meaningful
distinction can be made, in the context of law, between ideals and principles.
This is something which is not a direct issue in Radbruch's framework, but
something that can be derived from the distinction between values and norms,
which to him is the central distinction within the normative realm. From
Radbruch's distinction between values and nonns it follows, granted that we
should see principles as a type ofnorms, that ideals (as identical to values) and
principles have a completely different character. Radbruch does not make any
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distinction within the category ofnorms, comparable to that between rules and
principles. What is interesting, however, is that Radbruch sees norms as
intermediary between values and facts. Pursuing this line led to the suggestion
that principles could be seen as norms that are more general and more directly
related to ultimate values than rules. Following Alexy, principles can thus be
regarded as having a more open character than rules, because they directly
require optimization of legal values.
Now there is a basis for a slightly revised account of Radbruch's
conception of values, distinguishing between absolute and derivative values.
Derivative values are those elements of our normative thinking, transcending
physical reality and with a subjective basis, that can be deduced from the
absolute values that are the postulates of this normative thinking.
Because ofRadbruch's dualistic method distinguishing value from fact, the
question arises what the relations are between value and reality. In 4.3 I have
shown that Radbruch tries to save both his dualistic and triadistic principles
by focusing on the meaning ofreality. He uses the concept of ineaning (Sinn)
to keep the separation between value and reality intact, while at the same time
accounting for the value-laden character of the factual social world. By
understanding meaning as the previous influence ofvalue on factual situations
Radbruch reduces the relations between values and reality to one-way traffic:
there is no significant role for reality in the determination of values.
Nonetheless, in the other direction the relations between values and reality are
tight: values determine the character of all cultural (man-related) reality.
Radbruch thus defends a very strong thesis regarding the significance of
values for the human world: being value-related is the main defining
characteristic ofhuman reality. The important thing to see is that this does not
mean that values are necessarily realized: the cultural world is organized with
the purpose of value-realization but this is not always successful. In a simple
way, Radbruch's idea can be put like this: people do things and organize their
society from their view of what is right and good, but when trying actually to
work on the basis ofthese values, they find that existing arrangements, factual
circumstances and the attempted realization of other values frustrate the
realization of the values they support. The main problem that arises from this
view ofvalues and reality is how to allow for different appreciations ofvalues,
while at the same time accounting for the perception of a shared cultural
reality. Radbruch solves this by combining a necessary relation between a
domain of reality and a particular value with relativism of other values.
However, what he fails to establish is why the proportion between absolute
and relative elements should be regarded the way he does, more precisely why
the relative aspect of his theory does not affect truth, beauty, and justice the
way it affects the good.
The second main issue concerns the interaction between different ideals. From
the discussion of the three elements of the idea of law we learnt that values
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can at the same time require each other and conflict with each other. They
require each other because each alone is an incomplete guide to law, but they
also conflict because each leads into a different direction. Because the three
values of the idea of law conflict, they keep each other in check. Radbruch
sees the tensions within the idea of law as a guarantee against dangerous
overemphasis on one value. From this idea of a balance of values we can also
learn that even though these values may not be inherently unrealizable, they
are in effect unrealizable: each prevents the complete realization ofthe others.
Radbruch gives a convincing account of why complete realization is
something to be wary of. The three values can both reinforce and impede each
other's realization, but Radbruch deems the latter more important. His ideas
on the interaction ofvalues can be used as the basis ofan argument about both
positive and negative consequences of interaction, but in order to complete
such an argument the issue of positive interaction needs work. It will also be
interesting to see ifhis view on the interaction of values can be given broader
application than the idea of law: maybe other constellations of values can be
discerned in more specific fields of law. In his own applications of his ideas
to specific fields of law,19 Radbruch points to the direct influence of the
Rechtsidee and its three values; he does not develop more specific value
notions. For example, in his discussion of criminal law he shows how the
different theories of punishment emphasize one of the three different values,
but also how the other two values constrain the development of such theories
(1932, 402).
The subject ofinteraction, leading to discussion ofthe Rechtsidee, is primarily
interesting in regard to the issue I identified: the role ofvalues in law and legal
theory. We saw that justice is fundamental to the understanding of law
because it gives law its specific nature, distinguishing it from other parts of
cultural reality. Radbruch uses the different elements of the idea of law to
account for the only partly autonomous character of law: Gerechtigkeit and
Rechtssicherizeit are the elements that are specific to law, while
Zweckmczf3igkeit is the value through which political and social influences
enter the domain of law. The autonomy of law is therefore guaranteed by the
first two values, but this is counteracted by the influence of ZweckmdJ3igkeit.
In effect how open law is to societal influences, depends on the relative weight
of the three values in the idea of law.
The idea of law is also the standard of evaluation for the existing legal
system. The legal system can be assessed in the light of the idea of law, which
is the idea of law-as-it-should-be. The idea of law can thus be used both as a
source for criticism and as a source for justification of existing legal
arrangements. However, because the exact content of the idea of law is a
19 This is based on the second part (Besonderer Teil) of the Rechtsphilosophie (1932, 358-
444).
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matter relative to world views, there is not much that can be said about the
standard of criticism other than that it will contain the three elements
mentioned before. Because of this relativistic notion of the idea of law,
Radbruch's theory does not give concrete answers about the critical potential
ofvalues. To what extent values are used to criticize orjustify the law depends
on the conception of the idea of law defended by the different political views.
In Radbruch's system ofvalues, the set of"distinctively" legal values form
a category that is derived directly from justice. For Radbruch each domain of
cultural reality seems to have its own specific value, the value that sets that
part of reality apart. But the same values that perform this role of constitutor
ofone cultural reality are also influential in other domains. Thus, the value of
justice is the specifically legal value, from which everything that is specific
to law (including the value of legal security) is ultimately derived. But the
content and concrete character of law are also determined by other values,
Zweckmtif3igkeit or the good, which are not specific to the legal domain at all.
In a sense, the only truly legal value is justice, and other values are only
"legal" by virtue of their being related to justice.
Finally, we need to assess how convincing is Radbruch's argument about the
nature ofvalues and their role in legal theory. At first sight, his view of values
as transcendent and subjective, necessary postulates, seems acceptable. There
are, however, three aspects of his theory that make this view of values
problematic. First of all, there is Radbruch's use of the dichotomy between is
and ought. Radbruch presents it as a methodological principle, but also uses
it as a category distinction between fact and value. As a methodological
principle it is acceptable, because it reflects the importance of remembering
the difference between judgments of what is the case and judgments of what
ought to be done. But Radbruch absolutizes this distinction to the principle
that ought judgments can only be justified with reference to higher `oughts'
and connects to it a dichotomy of the radically different nature of facts and
values. Trying to combine this dichotomy with the establishment of links
between the realm of value and the realm of fact, Radbruch erodes the doctrine
of Stoffbestimmtheit and places undue emphasis on the influence of values on
reality, neglecting the influence of reality on values.
The second problem concerns Radbruch's method of reasoning.
Radbruch's theory can convince someone, like himself, who is devoted to a
deductivist method of justification, and who accepts the rational necessities
of the a priori reasoning of Kantian philosophy. A deductivist method is
problematic, however, if we accept that value notions are complex notions
which for their explication depend on the meaning ofother such value notions
(Vedder 1998). Legal security is not simply a requirement derived from the
value ofjustice; the meaning of the value is also connected to, for instance,
notions ofpersonal freedom. The complex character ofvalues is denied when
the relations between them are seen as straightforward deduction from higher
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values. Radbruch can hold on to the deductive model because he strictly
separates causal from logical arguments. The influence of facts and of other
values is then seen as merely causal and insufficient for a good justification,
which can only be achieved by a logical deductive argument. The problem of
such a priori reasoning is that it depends on strong premises regarding the
rational necessity ofaccepting certain arguments: a rational human being must
accept such an argument as the basis for understanding the world. Such
reasoning relies on the self-evidence of such arguments and the idea that
rational deliberation leads to inevitable conclusions. Leaving general criticism
aside, the relation between specitic values and law is not self-evident nor
rationally inescapable. Arguments are needed that are declared unnecessary
in a Kantian approach.
The third problem is the most fundamental to my mind: Radbruch's
combination ofabsolute and relative elements in his account ofvalues. In their
role of constitutive values of cultural realities, ultimate values function as
absolute and necessary reference points. But the absolute value of the good is
subject to relativistic interpretation in the context of competing world views.
Similarly, the exact make-up of the Rechtsidee, the relation between its
elements, differs according to world views. This limitation of the relativistic
aspects of a theory ofvalues seems arbitrary. It is not such a matter of course
as Radbruch seems to believe, that only expediency and the good have to be
interpreted relativistically, and that justice and legal security are beyond
relativistic interpretation. His a priori arguments for necessary relations
between values and reality depend on universal acceptability, but precisely on
that point his relativistic principle sheds doubt. If we take his relativism
seriously, all values become subject to relativistic interpretation. The main
problem then - if one accepts the constitutive role of values for cultural
reality - is how to explain the shared experience of one legal reality. The
most plausible reason why Radbruch tries to contain the relativistic aspects of
his theory is to avoid a completely relativized view of cultural reality and law.
To do that, he needs non-relative and necessary elements which cannot really
be combined with relativism to form a coherent theory.
I am sympathetic to what Radbruch tries to do with his theory: to give an
account of the role of values in law, which combines the idea that law is
necessarily oriented to certain values with an account of changing and
historically situated interpretations ofthose values. However, his combination
of absolute values with radical relativism does not provide a convincing
solution. Ifwe want to account for the experience of a shared legal reality and
a flexible interpretation of values, it seems wise to explore another conception
of ideals in law. It may be that a theory starting from different philosophical
tenets is more successful.
Chapter 5
The Theory of Philip Selznick
1 Introduction
Philip Selznick (born in 1919) is an American sociologist and social theorist.
He holds a Ph.D. in sociology from Columbia University, New York In 1952,
he became a professor in sociology at the University of California, Berkeley,
where he worked until retirement. He was one of the founders of the Center
for the Study of Law and Society at Berkeley, and the first chairman of the
Jurisprudence and Social Policy program at the Berkeley Law School. His
main fields of interest are organizational sociology, the sociology of law, and
general social theory. Over the last twenty years he has also been involved in
the debate between liberalism and communitarianism.
The main components of his work on the sociology of organizations, TVA
and the Grass Roots (1949), The Organizational Weapon (1960, orig. 1952),
and Leadership in Adrninistration (1957), all deal with prominent features of
organizational life: co-optation, strategy, leadership. The first two are case
studies, dealing with the Tennessee Valley Authority (1949) and the Russian
Bolshevik party (1960). The third (1957) deals with administrative leadership
in a more general fashion. Important works on the sociology of law are the
articles `The Sociology ofLaw' (1959), `Sociology and Natural Law' (1961),
`The Sociology of Law' (1968), Law, Sociery and IrTdustrialJustice (1969),
and Law and Society in Transition (Nonet óz Selznick 1978). His interest in
general social theory culminated in The Moral Con~rnonwealth (1992), which
brings together the different themes of his earlier work. It is held together by
the commitment to communitarianism, which is also expressed by its subtitle:
Social Theory and the Promise of Corramunity.
This chapter aims to introduce those aspects of Philip Selznick's work that
are necessary to understand his theory of ideals. This chapter is descriptive in
character, I will turn to the evaluation of his ideas in the next chapter.
Selznick's background in sociology and his interest in social theory are
important factors in his understanding of ideals, but even more important is
his philosophical outlook: his endorsement ofpragmatism. Pragmatism is the
main subject of section 5.2, where I discuss the theory of John Dewey and its
implications for Selznick's method. Sociology and social theory figure in
section 5.3, where I discuss his understanding of the two key theoretical
components of his theory that are most relevant to his view of ideals in law:
the sociology of law and communitarian social theory. I will then turn to his
particular view of law in section 5.4, which deals with the developmental
model of law and society and with Selznick's approach to the nature of law:
legal naturalism.
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2 The Influence of Pragmatism: Selznick's Method
In many ofhis works, Selznick acknowledges the profound influence that the
work ofJohn Dewey has had upon his own theory. In no aspect ofhis ideas is
this inf7uence as far-reaching as in his method. His manner of reasoning and
his theoretical points of departure express his allegiance to Dewey's
pragmatism most clearly. For a clear understanding of the extent to which
Selznick can be seen as a follower of Dewey it is necessary to have a general
idea of what Dewey's theory amounts to. Therefore I will start with a broad
sketch of Dewey's theory. In Chapter 2 I have already indicated what the core
of a pragmatist theory of ideals is. Here, my main point is that Dewey's ideas
about normativity and about moral and social philosophy can only be
understood when they are related to his views about science, especially about
scientific method. In the second part I will pay attention to specific aspects of
Selznick's theory that are based on pragmatist philosophy. I will conclude this
section with a discussion of inethodological themes in Selznick's work that do
not have direct roots in pragmatism.
Dewey's theory
Pragmatism, the theory advanced by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James,
and John Dewey, is most famous for its theory of truth and scientific method.
They argued against the correspondence theory of truth, truth as reflecting a
given eternal reality, and replaced it by a theory of truth as the effective
guidance of action.' The truth ofa proposition is revealed in the consequences
it has for our actions. A proposition is true if acting upon it is successful. This
entails that scientific method is experimental: hypotheses have to be tested to
know their truth. Here, I want to focus not so much on the theory of truth, but
on Dewey's method of inquiry and its application to all human concerns.
In Dewey's work a major theme is the continuity between inquiry in the
natural sciences and inquiry in social and moral subjects (1929, 201; 1920,
178). His belief that both physical science and moral `science' would benefit
immensely from the realization that knowledge of physical goods and
knowledge of moral goods are interrelated is his main drive for developing a
theory of experimental inquiry in the normative realm. His theory can be
described as an extension, a broadening, of the method ofphysical inquiry into
a much wider field. His reason for thinking that the scientific method is
worthy of being applied more generally, is that it has advanced enormously
whereas beliefs about morals or religion or politics are still determined in the
same way they have been for thousands of years (1929, 200).
In scientific inquiry, the emphasis is on doing, instead of contemplating.
A scientist confronts a problematic situation, formulates a solution of the
See Joas 1993, 19: "The concept of reality no longer expresses a correct representation of
realíty in cognition, which can be conceived of using the metaphor of a copy; rather, it
expresses an increase of the power to act in relation to an environment."
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problem, and tests this hypothesis in an experiment. For Dewey, the first and
the last steps are especially important. The first step because it means an
inquiry starts with a genuine problem: it is not something done for its own
sake, but to help us on in practice. The last step, because experimentation
means an active manipulation of conditions; the fact that in science
experiments are done, instead of passive observation of natural phenomena,
means that our own activity is seen as an influential factor. Science is an
active practice, not a passive contemplation of nature. But scientific inquiry
is not simply an active process, it is intelligent activity. Dewey introduces his
concept of intelligence as qualifying activities to replace the traditional
concept ofreason. In his view, reason suggested an eternal natural order that
can be grasped in a purely rational manner (1929, 170). Such a concept of
reason demeans experience and activity. Because it searches for order at a
deeper level of reality, it does not fit scientific inquiry as Dewey sees it.'
Dewey's concept of intelligence has a much broader meaning than the
traditional notion of reason:
We may, ..., give the name intelligence to these directed operations. Using
this term, we may say that the worth of any object that lays claim to being an
object of knowledge is dependent upon the intelligence employed in reaching
it. In saying this, we must bear in mind that intelligence means operations
actually performed in the modification ofconditions, including all the guidance
that is given by means of ideas, both direct and symbolic (1929, 160).3
Intelligence in operation means making use of ideas and acquired knowledge
in carrying out inquiries. The exercise of intelligence directs the course of
changes (171), and it demands judgment with regard to the selection of ineans
and the choice of ends (170). Intelligence as the exercise ofjudgment can be
interpreted as a reflection upon means and ends before you act. The important
point to keep in mind is that knowing is a form of doing (1929, 170).
Acquiring knowledge is a practice, an activity, and this practice must be
conducted intelligently in order to result in sound knowledge.
The connection between knowing and doing can also be taken to mean
something quite different: that knowing, in Dewey's interpretation as the
practice of inquiry, is extremely important for doing in its traditional sense,
as praxis. In this sense, connecting the two means that practical judgment, or
moral judgment, can benefit from application of the experimental method.
According to Dewey, inquiry is called for in problematic moral situations as
much as in other problematic situations. In a moral context, inquiry also
means intelligent application of an experimental method. This includes: the
analysis and clarification ofthe moral situation; "(...) tracing the consequences
ofthe various modes ofaction that suggest themselves; regarding the decision
Z See also Raymond Boisvert's work on Dewey's metaphysics (1988, I 19).
' See also 1929, 204: "intelligence in operation, another name for method".
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reached as hypothetical and tentative until the anticipated or supposed
consequences which led to its adoption have been squared with actual
consequences" (1920, 173). This view of moral decision-making as the result
of inquiry in a specific situation makes morality much more flexible than it
was traditionally. There is no fixed set of moral laws or a predetermined
collection of ends or human goods. What is right or good is determined by
consideration ofthe consequences of proposed actions. Acts to be performed
are specific, and therefore the moral judgments about such acts have to be
specific and concrete (1920, 175).
The most important consequence ofthe pragmatist view, that there are no
fixed ends, but a plurality of goods, is that the means ofattaining ends become
much more important. Dewey himself stresses the point time and again:
adopting the experimental way of thinking "(...) would place method and
means upon the level of importance that has, in the past, been imputed
exclusively to ends" (1929, 222). Pragmatism is easily misunderstood as being
mainly concerned with means, with what works, but for Dewey attention to
means is meant as the joint and equal attention to both means and ends. For
him, "the problem of philosophy concerns the interaction of our judgments
about ends to be sought with knowledge of the means for achieving them"
(1929, 30).
His rejection of the separation between means and ends also leads him to
stress the connections between instrumental and intrinsic good (1920, 178).
Things such as bodily health and economic prosperity are usually seen as
having merely instrumental value, as belonging to another order than the
higher ends ofaesthetics or religion. This separation between the two types of
ends is damaging in two ways. On the one hand, the separation can lead to a
spirit ofunreflected materialism, if the instrumental comes to be viewed as the
only end there is (1929, 215); whilst, on the other, ultimate ends that are
rightly called higher, have much richer meaning when they are part of human
life, when they are supported by effective means. This all requires that means
are seen to have intrinsic value as well and that the continuities and
interrelations between means and ends are always kept in mind.
The irrelevance of the distinction between different types of good follows
from Dewey's focus on problematic situations. When we are faced with a
problem, it does not matter whether it concerns a moral good or a natural
good; what is important is solving the problem. And in order to find the
solution to the problem all considerations should be taken into account: even
when a problem can be characterized as moral, non-moral considerations are
just as relevant as moral ones. Since we cannot know beforehand which
considerations will be most helpful, none should be ruled out. This is one of
the occasions where the pragmatic character of Dewey's philosophy clearly
shows: we should never rule out a potentially helpful notion beforehand just
because the notion is not in the category we are currently working with.
Categories and classifications are tools to order our thinking, they should
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never be regarded as absolute realities.
Dewey's influence on Sel~nick
Having a general idea of Dewey's thought, we can now consider how Dewey
has influenced the work of Selznick. Many methodological and structural
features of Selznick's theory can be understood as a result of the anti-
dogmatism that Selznick adopts from Dewey. Throughout his work Dewey
sought to expose the fallacious separation between means and ends, moral and
non-moral qualities, theory and practice, thinking and doing, the ideal and the
real (1929, 19; 1920, 149). Although it makes sense to distinguish between the
partners of these pairs conceptually, it is a mistake to think that these
distinctions point to ontological certainties. Too often the distinction is turned
into a dichotomy, a strict separation by which the links between the two
distinguished concepts are lost from sight. It is this rejection of dichotomies
that is the most pervasive influence of Dewey in Selznick's theory (1992, 21).
Both Dewey and Selznick criticize the kind of dogmatic thinking that has
produced dichotomies out of distinctions. Their own motto, in Selznick's
words: "We must avoid all dogma that blocks inquiry" (1961, 94; 1992, 21).
Selznick continually criticizes theories with absolutist tendencies.~ If we find
that people are immensely influenced by the culture they are part of, this does
not warrant the conclusion that there is no such thing as a common human
nature (1961, 93). If one cause or one relation is found to be of large
importance, that is in itselfno reason to conclude that it is the sole determinant
of the studied phenomenon nor that its counterpart has no role to play.
Selznick does not only apply this insight in empirical cases, it also
determines the way he handles conflicting theories. The most noticeable
reconciliation, upon which I will elaborate in section 5.3, is that between
communitarianism and liberalism, which led him to a position that he himself
calls "communitarian liberalism" (1992, xi). While retaining the basic values
of liberalism, Selznick emphasizes their cultural roots and framework, and the
limits that should be observed when these values are taken as guidelines
(1995b, 489). He underpins liberal values with a communitarian theory of the
person and society. But although communitarianism and liberalism play the
most prominent role in Selznick's work, they are not the only theories
Selznick tries to combine. Universalism and particularism, `nature' and
`nurture', natural law and legal positivism, are all positions that are
incorporated in Selznick's theory.s His strategy is to point out in which way
the truths of these positions are partial truths or are relevant for different
aspects of the problem at hand. It makes Selznick's pragmatism an inclusive
a Dewey's most direct attack on absolutism is Reconslruction in Plrilosophy (1920), the
lectures in which he criticized the dichotomies of traditional philosophy.
For the combination of universalism and particularism, see 1992, 193-201; for nature and
nurture, see 1992, 133-134; for natural law and positivism, 1992, 442-445. I will return to
the last theme in scction 4.
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theory: he always looks for the valuable aspects of theories under
consideration and looks for ways to give them a place in his own view.
Thus, a pragmatic way ofthinking shapes the general outlook ofSelznick's
theory and gives it a reconciliatory tone. There are, however, also more
specific themes in Dewey's work that are taken up by Selznick. Selznick
disputes two dichotomies that were also the subject of Dewey's writing: the
separation between fact and value and between means and ends. Both
distinctions are important in the contexts ofthis study. Ideals are often equated
both with values and with ends, so that a criticism of these two dichotomies
will also have consequences for the position attributed to ideals.
In Selznick's work, the fact-value distinction is raised in the context of the
proper way to conduct sociological research (1961, 85-86). It surfaces in two
ways: in connection with the subject-matter ofresearch, and in the approach
of the researcher himself. By the first I mean that the distinction between fact
and value can be applied to the research material: one can decide either to
focus only on facts or to study the combination of facts and values.b By the
second I mean that the distinction is used to reflect upon the position of the
researcher: how do his own values influence his work - is it possible to
attend to facts without letting one's own values interfere?
Selznick primarily relates the fact-value distinction to the subject-matter
ofresearch. Although he acknowledges that it is important to distinguish facts
from values, he does not see the distinction as reflecting an ontological
separation. He rejects the ontological claim that facts are something different
and disconnected from values. He sees facts and values as elements of the
same reality: values are immanent in reality. In conducting sociological
research this means that facts and values cannot be studied separately because
they deeply influence each other (1992, 21). In his view, social reality cannot
be genuinely understood without studying the interplay of facts and values.
This leads to the central theme of the next chapter: Selznick's doctrine of
master ideals. These are the ideals guiding the normative systems which make
up social reality. Social behaviour cannot be understood without knowledge
of these master ideals (1961).
The researcher's ability to be entirely objective is a problem generally
recognized in science. Selznick follows Kuhn in seeing scientists as heavily
influenced by their membership of a particular community and grants that this
determines their outlook and background theories (1992, 83-84). Scientists
share scientific ideals such as accuracy, scope, consistency, and these are the
ideals that influence their research. They have a common basis, but they are
not completely determinate: "Scientific ideals are neither impotent, nor
arbitrary, nor mere preferences. But they do allow for disagreement, and they
' In social science, the first alternative is associated with behaviourism, the second by
interpretivism (see Tamanaha 1997, 59-90).
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must be balanced against one another when a choice of theories is to be made"
(1992, 86). The general guidelines are agreed upon but they are interpreted
differently. And so they should, in the interest ofthe advancement of science.
Selznick does think the researcher's values influence his study of the facts and
the choice oftheory and method, but this is not really problematic because the
researcher's values are more than his own whims or preferences. Science
cannot be value-free, but the values that are influential have an intersubjective
basis: they are seen as justified by the scientific community.
The other distinction that merits discussion is that between means and ends.
Stressing the continuity between means and ends was a permanent concern of
Dewey's" and it is also one ofSelznick's main examples when demonstrating
the futility and dangers of dichotomies. Selznick values Dewey's views on
means and ends because of three insights in particular: that both ends and
means are instrumental, that both ends and means are valuable in themselves,
and that ends cannot be determined without assessing means at the same time
(1992, 328). The first idea, that both means and ends are instrumental, entails
that ends have a provisional status similar to means: both are assessed in the
light of the broader consequences they have. An end or goal is not beyond
scrutiny. On the other hand, the means by which an end is pursued are not
valuable simply as the instruments for the end. For instance, a parliamentary
debate may be instrumental in reachíng the goal of establishing a certain
policy. However, it is at least as important that there is an open discussion
about policy, and as such the debate has intrinsic value.'' The third idea, that
ends and means have to be assessed in combination, entails that both ends and
means can be criticized for the consequences they have upon each other. A
goal should not be pursued if the means to reach it are undesirable, and
similarly means should lead to a desirable end. The most important aspect of
these views on the character of ineans and ends is that ends are not taken as
given and that their acceptability depends on the instruments used in their
implementation. Ends are not final but subject to constant reassessment in the
light of the means necessary to achieve them.
For both Dewey and Selznick this conception of ineans and ends informs
their ideas about the role of reason or rationality. However, their focus on
excesses resulting from the place awarded to reason or rationality is different.
Dewey criticized the traditional concept of reason because it underrated
means, while Selznick criticizes the contemporary concept of rationality
because it ignores ends.
Selznick finds fault with many ordinary uses ofrationality as such uses see
rationality as instrumental, i.e. relating to the ways to reach a pre-existing
goal. The methods used to attain the goal or end can be assessed using
" See e.g. 1920, I 21; 1939, 227-230.
1z On intrinsic and instrumental value, see Raz 1986, 177-78.
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standards of rationality, but the goals themselves are not subject to this
assessment. Ends may be based on deep belief, democratic decisions,
considered preference, or mere fancy, their character or worth does not enter
in the rational calculus. This neglect ofends from the standpoint of rationality
can have serious consequences. An important instance of such a use of
rationality is a technocratic way of thinking. It leads to domination by
technology and to what Selznick calls "the tyranny ofineans" (1992, 55-56).
This expression describes the way that means tend to determine the course of
action completely, once ends disappear from sight. The best example of the
tyranny of ineans is the way technological possibilities determine what is
done: advanced weaponry is made because it can be made (1992, 56). The
tyranny of ineans shows to what excesses the divorce of ineans and ends can
lead. In order to keep both ends and means in check, the two should always be
related to each other. Where Dewey wished to refute the saying `the end
justifies the means', Selznick also warns of the reverse: means should not be
allowed to create an end. In Selznick's view, both ends and means are subject
to rational assessment.
Basic rnethodologica! principles
Now that it is clear how pragmatism forms the core of Selznick's theory and
how he interprets pragmatism's central tenets, we can turn to the way Selznick
develops his own methodological theory. Four distinct but related ideas are
especially important in the context of this study: the idea of variability,
normative theories, the distinction between weak definitions and strong
theories, and the distinction between baseline and flourishing.
Selznick extends the pragmatic idea that dichotomies should be avoided,
to the idea of variability. This idea consists in the recognition that empirical
phenomena only answer to characterizations and classifications to a degree
and that there are always variations among the phenomena placed in a certain
category. For instance, categorizing a procedure as democratic does not mean
that a choice has been made between two alternatives which completely settles
the democratic character of the procedure studied. At least as important a
question as whether the procedure is democratic is to wlrat degree it is
democratic. Selznick applies the idea of variability both in his criticism of
various theories and in his description of important social phenomena. In
theoretical criticism, recognition of variability is the counterpart of the
rejection of absolutist claims. Subjectivism is one of the main targets of this
criticism. Selznick recognizes the importance of subjectivity as a part of
empirical reality, but rejects the sceptical and emotivist doctrines of
subjectivism (1992, 81). Subjectivism has often been guilty of absolutist
statements which ignore the existence of variation, such as the thesis that
perception is theory-laden:
But to say that a perception is "theory-laden" or "theory-impregnated" suggests
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more than it necessarily asserts. Such characterizations do not say precisely
how far the process goes or just what takes place. In any inquiry some
observations and classifications are more theory-dependent than others (1992,
89).
Such theories forget that such sweeping statements cannot be made while
doing justice to the variety of empirical reality.
Selznick not only wants to say that there are always variations to be found
when attention is payed to the facts, but also that the most important
differences are differences in quality. In his own work, a central place is given
to the normative side of social phenomena: in organizational theory the
institution is the key concept, in legal theory it is the rule of law, or legality.
Paying attention to qualitative variability means that organizations are
assessed according to their institutionalization, i.e. to their infusion with value.
For law, it means that legal systems are evaluated on the basis of their
realization of legality, i.e. the progressive reduction of arbitrariness.
Institutionalization and legality are variable achievements (1992, 233; 1969,
13).
This interest in qualitative difference is the main exponent of Selznick's
evaluative approach to research, an approach that is based on his conception
of normative theories. I just pointed out that the recognition of qualitative
variability turns on the use of strongly normative concepts in sociological
description. A comprehensive approach based on such normative concepts
amounts to a normative theory. Selznick developed his idea of a normative
theory in an early article written together with Gertrude Jaeger: `A Normative
Theory ofCulture' (1964). In this article they fused the broad notion ofculture
used by anthropologists with the humanistic notion of culture as high culture.
Their theory of culture is normative because it connects culture with the
realization of values and its conditions. The distinguishing mark of a
normative theory is that it is strongly evaluative:
An understanding of the nature of the values at stake, and the conditions of
their realization, must form a part of the theory of culture. It is in this sense a
normative theory, one that does not shrink from identifying some cultures as
attenuated, some symbols as emptied out, some experiences as truncated or
distorted (1964, 666).
The concept of a normative theory applies not only to Selznick's
understanding of culture but also to law and management. Law strives to
realize the values of legality; management develops into the more demanding
governance, into acceptance of "responsibility for the whole life of the
institution" (1992, 290). Although a normative theory is evaluative, it does not
look exclusively to values, it looks at them in context. The pragmatist's
warning never to forget that things happen in experience, with specific
conditions and consequences, has been taken to heart: Selznick continually
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reminds us of the limits of and conditions for the realization of values. So
although a normative theory strongly evaluates - it assesses empirical
situations according to their realization ofvalues - it does this by examining
both the potential and the obstacles for value realization.
Selznick distinguishes different normative theories: a theory of law, a
theory of culture, a theory of management. These theories apply to particular
social phenomena, but these phenomena must firstbe identified as such: when
do we speak of law, when of management, when of culture? Selznick
recognizes the need for a threshold to delineate the field to which a normative
theory applies. Not all rule-guided behaviour is law, but when is the transition
made from a loose form of social organization to a legal system? For this
purpose Selznick distinguishes definition and theory: definitions mark the
boundary of the field to which a theory is applied.13 Definitions should be
weak: potentially interesting objects of research should not be ruled out
merely on the basis of a stipulated definition. Theories, on the other hand,
should be strong (1969, 4). In his legal theory, he uses a weak definition of
law based on criteria for authority: "The minimal elements of a legal order
exist when there are accepted criteria for testing and certifying the authority
of social obligations" (Nonet 8c Selznick 1978, 11).'~ His theory of law is
strong because it sees law as directed towards the ideal of legality, which
demands ever higher levels of achievement (1969, 12), and because most of
his theory is dedicated to an understanding of the value of legality and to the
conditions and complications it involves.
Selznick's idea of a strong theory is closely related to the idea of a
normative theory. To my mind, a strong theory is not necessarily normative
in the strong sense explained above: a strong theory need not be about the
realization of values. But in the light ofthe broad commitments of Selznick's
project we can say that for him strong theories are normative in the sense of
being value-oriented (1992, 360).
Selznick thus approaches his research subjects with a dual strategy:
delineating with a weak definition and arguing with a strong, normative
theory. This dual strategy is parallelled by another: the combination of
baseline and flourishing. Here the focus is different, although the structure is
similar: where the combination of weak definition and strong theory is used
for the purpose of lucidity in the theory as a whole, the combination of
baseline and flourishing operates within that theory to support a moral appeal
to give them equal attention. The idea ofbaseline and flourishing attaches both
to social systems - groups, cultures, moral systems - and to values. On the
In 1969, 4, it was `concept shading into theory', but the term concept can be confusing
because others (e.g. Hart or Dworkin) use it as a more inclusive term, closer in meaning to
definition. Therefore, I will use `theory' instead of `concept'. Selznick himself also prefers
`theory' over `concept' in his later work (See 1978, 1 I; 1992, 266, 358).
The criteria Selznick has in mind are Hart's secondary rules. He uses these as criteria
providing a weak definition of law throughout his work (see also 1969, 5; 1992, 442).
~~
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one hand, there are basic conditions ensuring the survival of a system or value;
on the other, there are the promises and appeal of the highest level of
achievement (1998, 25; 1961, 91). In order to avoid the excesses ofpessimism
and utopianism, one should always pay attention to both baselines and
flourishings, and when the theoretical climate tends towards the one, one has
to bring back the balance by focusing on the other.
One of the subjects to which Selznick applies the combination is the rule
of law. Often the rule of law is viewed as a set of principles ofrestraint, a way
to control the power of government and to prevent excesses. This is the
baseline view of the rule of law, in which it comprises the basic values of
accountabiliry, liberty, regularity, and social peace (1998, 25). But the rule of
law can also be viewed with an eye to its flourishing, and then more ambitious
values such as rationality, equality, fairness, and integrity appear most
important (1998, 17). To focus too intently on either the baseline or the
flourishing of the rule of law is dangerous: complete concentration on the
baseline values impoverishes the rule of law because there is no attention for
its potential for growth. But a concentration on the flourishing only is at least
as perilous because there is the chance that the most elementary and most
necessary checks are omitted.
The rule of law example illustrates the moral import that the combination
of baseline and flourishing has for Selznick. The well-being of a system, the
existence of a value depend on a concern for both basics and aspirations.15 It
is only by equal attention to both that we can ensure the best development of
social systems and their values.1ó
3 Selznick's Social Thought
In the introduction to this chapter, I have identified the four fields of social
studies with which Selznick has been occupied. In this section I want to
discuss two themes more closely which are important as a background to his
theory of ideals and law. First, I will discuss how Selznick understands the
discipline ofsociology of law. I will then turn to his ideas on social and moral
theory and discuss the extent to which these ideas are communitarian.
Sociology of law
Here I will outline Selznick's theory about sociology and law. I will not deal
with his theory on the nature of law as a social phenomenon, but address his
theoretical understanding of sociology in connection to law. This includes his
general understanding of sociology.
In his 1959 article on the sociology oflaw, Selznick addresses the tasks and
opportunities ofsociological research in a legal context. He distinguishes three
15 The idea bears close resemblance to Fuller's morality of duty and morality of aspiration
(Selznick 1992, 260n).
16 See e.g. Selznick 1992, 431.
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stages, from a very basic involvement with sociological truths, through a
dealing with specific socio-legal themes, to a dedication to overarching
problems of legal philosophy. At the first stage sociologists merely make
available basic sociological insights to legal scholars. Since this has a limited,
educational aim, it does not offer much opportunity for sociological research
itself, which should therefore turn towards the second and third stages. The
major task of the second stage is to derive hypotheses about law from
sociological theory and develop socio-legal research to test these (124). In
such research the most fundamental questions about the nature of law can be
avoided, but such questions are central for the third stage of the sociology of
law. At this stage, sociology of law moves towards legal philosophy and
addresses perennial themes such as the role of reason in law or the meaning
of legality.
This division into three stages is relevant in this context because it helps
explain Selznick's own interest in questions of legal and social theory,
questions of the third stage: he is interested in the meaning of legality or the
rule of law (1969, 1 1), in the development of the legal system as a whole
(Nonet óc Selznick 1978), in the connections between social and legal theory
(1992). This focus on theoretical questions has been condemned as the
practising of sociological jurisprudence instead of sociology of law (Black
1972, 713). For Selznick himself this is not problematic, because he sees the
subject-matter of legal sociology and sociological jurisprudence as a
continuum and uses both the terms legal sociology and sociological
jurisprudence for what he does. Again, we can recognize the pragmatist basis
of his theory in the tluidity of this characterization. What really sets Selznick
apart from a sociologist such as Black is the emphasis on normative theory
and the continuity between empirical research and a normative standpoint. The
debate between Selznick and Black is a debate between two very different
views of social science. For Black, the only proper object of social science is
observable behaviour, while Selznick deems it essential to connect behaviour
to the values held by the actors." According to Selznick, a social-science
perspective on law should pay attention both to the social conditions that
affect law and to the distinctively legal (1968, 50-~ 1).
Selznick reproaches sociology in general with a preoccupation with
informal structures. Although informal patterns are very important, they often
occur within a formal setting and this setting both influences and is influenced
by informal structure. In much of his own work, Selznick occupies himself
For an cvtcnsivc discussion of h~o typcs of social scicncc rescarch, bcha~ iourism and
interpretivism, see Tamanaha 1997. Black is usually regardcd as a representativc of
behaviourism, while Sclinick can be regarded an interpretivist. Ho~~ever, onc should kecp
in mind that intcrprctivism has radicaliud (c.e. in Critical Lcgal Studics) to a rclativist
position that is not Selrnick's. The debate benveen Black and Sclznick started with Black's
review of Lax, Socien~ and Indu.~n-iul J~estice, to ~~hich Selrnick reacted IBlack 197?,
Selznick 1973; see Nonet 1976 and Schuyt 1983, 94-109 for a discussion).
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with the interplay of formal structures, organizations and institutions, and
informal and implicit patterns.18 This is especially relevant to sociology of
law, which deals with a field dominated by the formal structure of law.
Selznick sees it as a task oflegal sociology that it have an eye for the interplay
of formal and informal elements, for example incipient law (1968, 55; 1969,
32-33). The idea of incipient law means that formal law can grow out of an
informal social setting. Changes in the social setting can generate the need for
new kinds of legal rules, rules which then emerge from the social
circumstances (1969, 33). A good example is the trend towards strict liability
for harm caused by manufactured goods (33). Through incipient law, changing
social patterns feed legal change naturally: established social rules or
expectations cannot be ignored by law and are incorporated. In Law, Society
andIndustrialJustice the continuity between law and other social institutions
is highlighted by pointing out the internal affinity of organizations with
principles of legality (1969, 17). Selznick shows how principles of fairness
and due process already acknowledged in organizations form a basis for a
broad law of governance, applicable to both public and private institutions.
Selznick sees a close affinity between sociology oflaw and legal pluralism,
the idea that we can find law in a range ofcontexts not necessarily connected
to the state. However, in order to identify these forms of law it is necessary to
have an idea of what law is, so this is also a subject with which a legal
sociologist must be occupied. The character specific to law is designated as
`the distinctively legal': "An adequate theory of law must identify the
distinetive work done by law in society, the special resources of law, and the
characteristic mechanisms that law brings into play" (1968, 51). For Selznick,
a focus on the distinctively legal does not limit the study of law to state law.
Law is based on authority, but authority can also arise in other settings than
the state. The distinctively legal is also expressed in Selznick's idea of law
having its own `master ideal'. The ideal that governs law is legality, "the
progressive reduction of arbitrariness in positive law and its administration"
(1976, 233).19 It is the specific aim of the law to realize legality, but as we
saw, this ideal also has meaning in contexts where only the first rudiments of
legal thinking can be discerned.
The connection between formal and informal patterns was also prominent in Selznick's
organizational sociology. In his case study of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), he
described the importance of both formal and informal co-optation. The TVA was an
administrative organization that had to work closely with pre-existing groups in the area.
The way it found to do this can be described as co-optation. Co-optation can be a deliberate
strategy of the organization's leadership, that, however, need not be the case. Deliberate and
open co-optation is what Selznick calls formal co-optation, but there is also an informal
type: uncalculated response to pressures from the community (1949, 14).
A recurring phrase, see also: 1961, 100; 1968, 52; 1969, 12; 1992, 445. I will discuss the
ideal of legality at length in Chapter 6.
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Communitarimi social theory
Selznick's magnum opus is The Moral Comnsontivealth (1992), the book that
weaves together almost all the themes that have interested him over the years.
However, those themes are combined from one particular perspective:
Selznick's version ofcommunitarianism. Selznick had already contributed to
the liberal-communitarian debate with a few articles (1987, 1989), but in The
Moral Commoizwealth he expounded his `communitarian liberalism' in full
with support from moral, social and legal theory (1992, xi-xii). His view is
indeed a blend of communitarian and liberal ideas, but it has a definite
communitarian grounding in his view ofthe person, his idea ofculture, and his
views on the values of community.
Selznick's view of the person is based on the idea of the `implicated' and
responsible self (1992, 201; 227).'" The implicated self is a person with
genuine attachments to the people around him: his sense of moral obligation
primarily derives from relatedness and identity. In the relationships with
significant others he is involved with his whole personality. "Out of this
meshing of lives and activities there emerges an implicated self whose
obligations are neither wholly voluntary nor wholly imposed" (205).
According to Selznick, the implicated self is not only recognizable in one's
responsibilities and ties to others, but also in a sense ofresponsibility for one's
own character. A responsible person is characterized by integrity and self-
governance guided by moral ideals (227-228). Being responsible combines
care for others with care for one's own character: it is to a large extent in the
relationships with others that the selfdevelops. Thus, the person in Selznick's
view is grounded in social bonds. Being a moral person starts with
acknowledging the obligations to particular others, and although universal
moral norms are equally important, these particular bonds are primordial
(194).
The idea ofthe responsible self is combined with a strong notion of culture.
Culture is that which is produced by, and sustains, shared symbolic experience
(Jaeger 8z Selznick 1964, 663). Culture is created by human beings when they
create symbols, when they give their ordinary, physical and instrumental,
environment expressive and person-centred meanings (1964, 660). These are
cultural symbols when they are shared by a group and are expressive of a
common history. Culture is needed by human beings: they need a tradition that
provides symbols and a sense of a shared background (1992, 395). Culture in
this strong sense of shared symbolic experience is not necessarily present in
all groups that we usually call cultures. Cultures in the latter, weak sense of
any group with a similar background can very well lack the integration and
shared values that are essential to shared symbolic experience. In fact, one of
20 The idea ofan implicated self is one of the key elements of the communítarian criticism of
liberalism. Extensive use of it was made by Michael Sandel, who criticized (Rawlsian)
liberalism for using an atomistic theory of the person, "the unencumbered self' (1982, 175-
I 83).
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the losses of modern Western society is precisely the weakening of culture in
the sense of shared symbolic experience (1992, 8). Thus, Selznick uses the
notion of culture for communitarian criticism of modern society.
The third central concept in Selznick's theory is that of community. He
defines it as follows: "A group is a community to the extent that it
encompasses a broad range of activities and interests, and to the extent that
participation implicates whole persons rather than segmental interests or
activities" (1992, 358). Community is not dependent on specific shared
understandings, but, like his concept of culture, the idea of community is
demanding because of the focus on involvement ofwhole persons. In order to
achieve this, a community must realize an intricate balance of values (364).
A good community allows for plurality and supports personal autonomy, but
it also nourishes a sense of a shared history and of identity, and builds
reciprocity, participation, and integration (361-64). The realization of these
values is the key to community, and in the range of values we can see how
Selznick blends liberal aspects into his communitarian views. Selznick makes
the elements of autonomy and plurality, which have a definite liberal
orientation, interdependent with elements that are characteristic of
communitarianism, such as historicity and mutuality.
In the idea of community, liberal and communitarian elements are
combined, which is indicative of a general strategy to use liberal ideas to
counter the negative consequences oftoo strong an emphasis on tradition and
social cohesion. Although the weakening of culture in modern times is
mourned, it is also an opportunity to find new values, to emancipate oppressed
groups, and to make decisions more rational. For Selznick, the regret for the
loss of integrated, strong cultures is counterposed by the gains of modernity
for liberal values such as autonomy and moral equality.'' Similarly, the
responsible self is built on a social basis ofparticular relationships, but moves
on to extend moral recognition to all human beings. We should never be
content with the conventional morality of the group, but should use critical
morality to improve it (394). The important underlying reason for defending
a communitarian liberalism is that the society to which Selznick belongs, the
American community, should be understood as a liberal community, one in
which liberal principles and values are part of the tradition and define the way
of life. So loyalty to the particularity of his own culture and a genuine
understanding of its values commit Selznick to liberal views. However, the
basis of this liberalism is thoroughly defended in a communitarian way, and
communitarian insights serve as a handle to criticize the excesses of
liberalism. The values he defends are a blend of the liberal and the
communitarian, but the basis ofhis theory - his account of the person and of
society - is communitarian.
21 This makes Selznick more positive about modern society than many other communitarians,
the most prominent pessimist about modern morality being Alasdair Mactntyre (1984).
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4 Legal Theory
Selznick's theory of law is an integral part of his broader social theory. This
is reflected in his main theses about law: the development in the changing
relations between law and society, and the importance of an empirically
informed study oflaw's values. Both the development model and the doctrine
of legal naturalism are important in this context, because they underpin
Selznick's view of law as oriented towards the master ideal of legality.
A developme~~~tal model of law afTd society
Selznick advanced his developmental theory in the essay Law and Society in
Transition: Toward Responsive Law, written together with Philippe Nonet
(1978). In this work they sketched a theory about the nature of law that
distinguishes three stages: repressive, autonomous, and responsive law. Their
theory is developmental because ofthe thesis that each stage of law generates
the need for the next stage because of internal problems. The stage of
repressive law is marked by a structure of law as command, in which law is
the instrument of existing political powers. The state uses law to mould
society to its will. Law is used as a pliable tool to secure the position of the
ruling elites (1978, 51). The system of repressive law runs into problems
because it depends on control by the state and its officials over society.
Repressive law depends heavily on the use of sanctions to force people to
comply. It does not pay enough attention to the need for the legitimacy of
power, and by this lack ofaccountability fails to secure consent ofthe citizens
(52). The pressures within the system ofrepressive law push the legal system
in the direction of autonomous law. Autonomous law is characterized by a
separation between law and the political state: the law has its own field of
expertise, the application and refinement of rules. The shift from repressive
to autonomous law shows in the shift of emphasis from legislation to
adjudication; repressive law works by making and changing the rules, while
autonomous law depends on procedure and the constraints of the rule of law.
But autonomous law has its own problems: because it is isolated and contained
in its own specialism, the links between the law and the society in which it
operates are weakened. The law offers only formal justice, justice according
to the rules, and this is often a far cry from substantive justice. This
discrepancy paves the way for responsive law, in which law and politics are
reunited in a flexible way based on general purposes, so that it can be sensitive
to concrete problems (1978, 79). Law is responsive when it attends to the
needs and values ofsociety. Responsiveness is made possible because the law
is based on generally formulated purpose instead of strict rules: the more
general nature of these purposes allows adaptation of the law in response to
people's interests.
This developmental analysis of law gives an instrument to characterize a
legal system or field of law and thus a way to understand the problems or
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possibilities of a given system. The more interesting part, however, of the
developmental model is its characterization of the dynamics of law. The
changes in law occur because ofan "inner dynamic", they are not forced upon
it from the outside but result from an adaption of the legal system itself when
it runs into problems (1978, 23). Each stage of the development has both
merits and defects, solving some problems but creating others. None of the
stages are balanced, they always lead to something else. The main danger of
responsive law is overreaching: when the purposes of the law become too
generalized they allow opportunistic interpretations and decisions (83).
Finally, responsive law can lead to the loss of law's distinctive identity, when
legal purpose and government purpose become one (116). The great risk then
is a relapse from responsive law to repressive law, because both types of law
are characterized by a large amount of official discretion (117). The main
difference between the two is that responsive law tries to uphold political
ideals.
In his later work (1992, 1998), Selznick stresses the way responsive law
builds on the achievements of autonomous law, especially on the centrality of
the rule of law. Both autonomous law and responsive law are committed to the
ideal of legality. Responsive law does not depart from rule oflaw thinking, but
changes the conception of the rule of law. Where autonomous law stresses
procedural constraints and formal justice, responsive law focuses on broad
principles and substantive justice. Selznick believes the promise of a
responsive legal order is already contained in the common law tradition: the
tradition ofjudge-made law that treats the law as given, yet adaptable (1992,
449). Common law judges take social usage as their key to adapt principles to
new circumstances and are thus committed to "the integration of law and
society" (463). Selznick argues that the Anglo-American legal climate was
congenial to a shift from autonomous to responsive law, because the common
law tradition contains the grain of a responsive approach. This sheds a
different light on the dynamics between the three stages oflaw. Here, Selznick
draws attention to the strands that can be found in a legal tradition that are
congenial to responsive values. Even when the overall characterization oflaw
as autonomous law is correct, the autonomy of the legal order need not be
complete. It is possible that a change towards a new stage can build on certain
elements that are already part of the tradition. This means the developmental
model must be applied with caution, although the thesis that development is
the result of an inner dynamic still holds: development is not abrupt but it is
possible to trace the shifts of emphasis in the history of legal systems.
Legal naturalism
In an early article devoted to sociology and law Selznick clearly took a
position in the ongoing debate between legal positivism and natural law by
giving the article the title `Sociology and Natural Law' (1961). In it he argues
that natural law shares with sociology its basic commitments, most
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importantly to scientific inquiry, to the centrality of ideals, and to discovering
enduring truths (]02). The combination of scientific inquiry with a central
place for ideals and for enduring truths is specific to Selznick's interpretation
of natural law thinking. He is able to connect his social science perspective to
natural law, because he sees natural law thinking as dependent on the
discoveries of the social sciences - discoveries about the nature of man, of
society, of law. His affinity with traditional natural law thinking depends on
the other two commitments, which they share: the quest for enduring truths
and the focus on ideals. These ideas are not accepted wholesale either:
Selznick interprets them in such a way that they accord with his pragmatist,
scientific perspective.
Traditional natural law theory found its enduring truths in divine revelation
or in self-evident truths about the nature ofman (see Chapter 8). For Selznick,
the source of truth is different: it is the result of (social) scientific research. In
his pragmatist view, this means that enduring truths are objective and may be
universally valid, but they are not absolute. Discoveries have been made about
man, society, and law that can be applied - with caution - in all contexts,
but their truth is subject to revision (1961, 101). They are the best we have got
now, but we should always be prepared to revise them in the light of new
evidence. Once again, the importance ofscientific inquiry is asserted: inquiry
is necessary for the critical examination of accepted truths. Not all enduring
truths are universally valid: not all truths about men, societies, and legal
systems have a universal scope, on the contrary, many are particular to one
group or system. However, this does not make it true that there are no
universal truths at all. Selznick thus accepts part of the natural law doctrine:
he agrees with the search for universal principles, but he is cautious about
their scope and he rejects the claim that they are true forever (103).
The other connection to natural law thinking is the attention he gives to the
role of ideals or values; again he interprets a natural law idea in a sociological
way. Selznick believes that social phenomena that are normative - what he
calls "normative systems" - can only be understood in connection with
leading ideals: normative systems are oriented towards ideals and in order to
understand the social phenomenon the ideal must be understood as well (1961,
86-87). Law is one such normative system, oriented towards the master ideal
oflegality."` The idea that law is inherently connected with certain values such
as justice or legality is a recurring idea in natural law theory. For Selznick this
feature is something that law shares with other normative systems such as
democracy, parenthood, or reason. All ofthese should be studied by the social
scientist with a focus on the ideals that guide them. This does not mean that
these ideals alone can give adequate knowledge of the normative systems:
behaviour of the participants, norms of the system, factual circumstances are
equally relevant, but they should be considered in relation to the governing
Z' I will discuss the notion of master ideals in detail in the next chapter.
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ideal. Because of this view of the proper approach to social science, as an
evaluative approach, Selznick believes in the possibility of combining social
science and natural law and proposes a theory oflaw that is ideal-oriented and
science-oriented at the same time.
Because of these differences with traditional natural law theory, giving
Selznick's theory the label ofnatural law theory is misleading. To express the
combination ofpragmatism and natural law, another term to refer to his theory
is needed. I will use legal naturalism, a term suggested by Selznick himself,
coined in a book review on Lon Fuller, whose theory he also brings under this
heading ( 1970, 1475). Selznick chose the term to emphasize the affinity
between legal naturalism and the pragmatic naturalism of Dewey's (1477).
Legal naturalism shares the pragmatist emphasis on scientific inquiry: "The
objective of the naturalist is a social science of legal ordering" (1479). It is
explicitly normative, concerned with legal values and ideals, but it sees the
relations between law and ideals as variable. Although legal experience is
intimately connected with values, it is an empirical question to what extent a
given legal system realizes those values. Legal naturalism with its focus on
empirical variability is able to assess the presence or absence of values in a
legal system.
Although Selznick has a clear affinity with natural law he also uses
elements from legal positivism. In The Moral Cornmonwealth he even tries to
reconcile the two old enemies. He uses two main strategies to achieve this
reconciliation, both familiar: a focus on values and a distinction between weak
definition and strong theory. Selznick insists that both natural law and legal
positivism are attentive to the values of the law, but they focus on different
values. Natural law sees justice as the central value of the law, positivism
thinks clarity, certainty, and autonomy are central ( 1992, 435-36). Selznick
agrees with positivism that these values are important, but he sees them as
subordinate to substantive justice. When they cease to serve justice and
enlarge arbitrariness, their worth should be reassessed (437). The other
strategy to bring natural law and legal positivism together uses the definition-
theory distinction. Legal positivism is interested in the question of the
definition of law: what are the criteria for calling a system legal? Selznick has
always used the definition ofHart, based on the existence of secondary rules,
which is eminently suitable to set up a threshold ( 1969, 5;1992, 442). Legal
positivism thus provides the weak definition of law that can form the basis of
Selznick's legal theory. However, it is only the basis; to develop a strong
theory of law he needs natural law which connects law and justice:
Natural-law theorists counter that law need not be understood as a mere datum
of social power or convention. They see in legal experience the development
ofexpectations and constraints, standards and aspirations, that push law in the
direction of justice, even though that push may not go very far at any given
time (1992, 444).
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Selznick follows natural law theory in the focus on substantive justice. In his
theory of law, it is used as a critical standard in the sense that legal
arrangements and legal values are assessed according to their contribution to
justice in society (1992, 433-434). Selznick presents his theory as a
reconciliation of legal positivism and natural law, but when we examine the
combination it is apparent that natural law theory has inf7uence on the more
central points. Positivism has a very limited part in his theory: its values are
subordinate to justice and its definition is no more than the threshold of the
theory. And, more importantly, one of its chief tenets - the separation of law
and morals'`3 - is rejected completely. Therefore, Selznick's theory is better
understood as a legal naturalism that owes a large debt to natural law, but to
make it more empirically informed, interprets natural law by drawing on the
pragmatist tradition.
The combination of pragmatism with natural ]aw's focus on human nature
is one of the key features of Selznick's view of ideals. In the next chapter, I
want to examine what view ofideals his pragmatist naturalism entails and how
successful this combination is between natural law's focus on enduring values
and pragmatism's focus on context and provisionality.




In the last section of Chapter 5 we saw that Selznick combines a pragmatist
emphasis on empirical inquiry with natural law's search for enduring and
universal ideals. In this chapter I want to examine in detail what this
combination, that is, Selznick's naturalism, yields by way of a theory of
ideals. This account of Selznick's views on ideals is a preliminary step
towards my main aim: evaluation of Selznick's theory in the light of the
leading question of this book. Does his theory provide a concept ofideals that
is useful in legal theory? To that end, I will consider both the acceptability of
the theory as such - its plausibility and consistency - and the usefulness of
his concept ofideals in a legal context. The remaining part of this introduction
will be devoted to Selznick's main argument about ideals.
Selznick introduced his theory of master ideals in his article `Sociology and
Natural Law' (1961). The main argument ofthe article is that sociology, and
legal sociology in particular, can learn from the natural law tradition to give
values a central place in its account of the social world. Selznick argues that
important social phenomena, such as parenthood, love, scholarship, or
citizenship, cannot be understood unless they are seen as oriented towards a
master ideal. All of these are "phenomena in the social world whose very
nature encompasses the realization of values" (1961, 86). The distinguishing
feature of such phenomena, called `normative systems' in this article, is that
they are governed by a master ideal. Friendship, for instance, is an intricate
mix of feeling, behaviour, thought, and norms that is held together by a
commitment to the ideal of friendship (87). This means that one can never
fully understand what friendship is, unless one knows what the idea] means at
which this normative system is aimed.
However, Selznick's argument is not simply a plea to study the ideal in
addition to the phenomenon in which one is interested. There are two
important reasons for understanding these phenomena as governed by a master
ideal: it gives an account of what is characteristic about them and it provides
a standard ofassessment. Seeing friendship as a normative system, or practice,
governed by the master ideal of friendship explains what the different
relationships called friendships have in common, that it is more than serving
one's interest, that it involves commitment and trust, etc. But the master ideal
can also serve as a tool to understand why some friendships are closer than
others, and what is problematic about a certain friendship. When the ideal is
related to concrete friendships, it serves as a standard of evaluation. A focus
on ideals brings to light the tensions and problems normative systems generate
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while trying to realize ideals. Understanding how a normative system and its
ideal interact gives insight in the functioning of the normative system that
cannot be attained by looking at observable facts alone (1961, 87). Of course,
it is possible to describe a phenomenon, for instance, parenthood, in a factual
manner, without regard for the values involved. However, a purely factual
approach cannot account for a parent's feelings of failure or for the
satisfaction a good parental relationship gives. These and other aspects of
parenthood can be readily explained by relating them to the ideal of a good
parent.
These ideals are not some outside standard, invented by a theorist as a tool
of analysis. Values have a natural basis: the ideal of parenthood arises
naturally from the biological ties of a parent and a child. In other words, the
ideal of parenthood is latent in that biological relationship (1961, 90). The
latency of ideals does not mean that every parental relationship is actually
realizing the ideal of parenthood or is even necessarily oriented towards it.
Many things can go wrong, but in the normal course of things parenting will
involve value orientation. The emergence of an ideal is likely, although not
necessary. Moreover, parenthood is a more satisfying experience when it is
guided by the ideal. Normative systems function more effectively when there
is a commitment to the ideals that are latent in them.
A focus on the ideal provides a basis for criticism of specific norms within
a phenomenon. This can be shown most clearly in the case of law. When law
is seen as governed by an ideal, as it is in the natural law tradition according
to Selznick, we see that realization of the ideal is the test for assessing specific
norms: a legal rule can be criticized for frustrating realization of the master
ideal of law. When the ideal is related to factual conditions, we can also see
that in changing circumstances upholding a norm which was effective
previously can now impede realization of the ideal (1961, 103).
When one studies normative social phenomena, it is necessary to pay
attention to the ideal that guides a phenomenon, and ask what that ideal means
and demands. But such a phenomenon should be studied as a living reality,
which means examining the ways in which realization of the governing ideal
is supported or undermined and the way the ideal interacts with other aspects
of the phenomenon at hand. A firm understanding of what the ideal demands
helps to get a grip on the problems within a practice. Knowledge of the
standard of achievement is necessary to evaluate problems and solutions -
without knowing the ideal, there is no way to determine which direction
solutions should take - even though it is not suftïcient to see what is right in
the circumstances. Knowledge of the ideal needs to be supplemented with
knowledge of facts and specific norms. However, the use of a master ideal as
a central element of a phenomenon points to the difference and the
connections between "the living reality" ofa practice and the ideal that it aims
to achieve (1961, 87).
In this chapter I will discuss and evaluate the four main aspects of
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Selznick's theory of ideals. I will first examine his argument about the
ontology ofideals and examine his combination ofpragmatism and naturalism
(6.2). I will then focus on one central feature of ideals in Selznick's theory,
their latency in the world of fact (6.3). In section 6.4, I will discuss his
doctrine of the master ideal. That leaves the role of ideals in law (6.5) and,
finally, my conclusions about Selznick's view (6.6).
Before I go on, I need to make one note about Selznick's theory in relation
to my aims in this book. Selznick does not provide precise answers to the
conceptual questions I raised in Chapter 1. This is most noticeable in relation
to the distinction between ideal and value. Selznick uses the terms ideal and
value as interchangeable, and does not seem to attach specific features to
either ideal or value. The most promising aspect in this respect is his concept
of a master ideal; therefore, I will address the issue of a possible distinction
between ideal and value in section 6.4. Until then, I will follow Selznick's
indiscritninate use of the terms ideal and value.
2 The Nature of Values
This section deals with the ontological basis of Selznick's concept of ideals.
It is important to realize that Selznick's approach to questions regarding the
nature of ideals and their distinctive features is profoundly influenced by his
soeiological orientation and his pragmatist method. Selznick is not primarily
interested in the development of a concept of ideals, but in a meaningful
account ofideals in societal practices. He is committed to a view of ideals or
values as situated in and determined by social reality, but a more precise
description ofthe concept of ideals can be avoided with reference to empirical
findings: the meaning ofideals is established by examining how they function
in a factual situation. This neglect of conceptual work makes it necessary to
reconstruct Selznick's argument about the nature of ideals that will at times
move beyond the letter of his work.
Selznick's account of the nature of ideals is made up of both pragmatist
and natural-]aw ideas. The pragmatist influence is apparent in his insistence
on the provisional status of ideals and their basis in problem-solving
experience. These are backed by the emphasis on empirical knowledge. The
natural-law influence is apparent in Selznick's grounding of universal ideals
in human nature and in his interpretation of the latency of ideals. In this
section I will discuss the implications of these two strands in relation to the
nature of ideals.
Selznick proposes four central theses about ideals or values that can be
read as following from his commitment to pragmatism. First, values are the
objective basis for the distinction between the satisfying and the satisfactory
(1992, 33). Secondly, values have their basis in problem-solving experience
(1992, 192). From this ontological claim about the immanent nature ofvalues
follows a third, epistemological claim: empirical knowledge is vital for
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understanding values (1992, 37). And, fourth, values should not be seen as
havíng eternal validity (1961, 101).
All of these claims are more easily understood, if we return to Dewey for
a moment and consider his ideas about values.' In Dewey's theory values have
their origin in experienced enjoyments, but unlike a subjectivist account of
values his theory takes felt enjoyments only as a starting point. Enjoyments
are not always right or good: an alcoholic enjoys drinking, but no one would
conclude that his drinking is therefore a good thing. Values come into the
picture when felt enjoyments are problematic, when we need to ask ourselves
what is good. Values are the standards "that are taken to have rightful
authority in the direction ofconduct" (1929, 204). How do we determine those
values? Here we should recall Dewey's insistence on the unity of inethod
between the (natural and moral) sciences. Values should be regarded as
hypotheses which are assessed by the application of the scientific method
(1929, 221). Their worth is determined by the consequences that are
discovered in this process. Thus, the most important aspect ofthe method used
in assessing proposed values is to review the consequences of adopting the
value. Values are assessed by their conditions and consequences: the validity
of a value is dependent on the means necessary to bring it about and on what
it results in when acted upon (1929, 212). Because values are determined in
this process of reviewing conditions and consequences, they can be regarded
as resulting from a methodical investigation. As the result of intelligent
inquiry, values are objective standards of criticism and guidance: they have
been tested and found sound.
Once through this process, values are reconnected with enjoyments: when
values are acted upon, states of affairs are brought about, objects are made and
chosen, that have genuine value. It is important to realize that in Dewey's
theory the term `value' is ambiguous: "Judgments about values are, judgments
about the conditions and the results of experienced objects; judgments about
that which should regulate the formation of our desires, affections and
enjoyments" (1929, 212). In the first sense, an object is a value when it is
judged to have value, but in the second sense the standard that warrants this
judgment is a value. For Dewey, the first sense of a value-object is primary:
it is the problem of an object having value or not that triggers inquiry.
However, we can say that this inquiry generates the value-standard: that by
which one judges the object. When the object is judged valuable, standard and
object coincide; when it is not, the value-standard remains a value to be
realized. Thus, value-object and value-standard turn out to be closely
connected but distinguishable. In general, the important point remains that
values gain objectivity by being subject to intelligent inquiry, and this makes
them crucial in criticizing and guiding conduct.
' This account of Dewey's theory is based primarily on the chapter "The Construction of
Good" in The Quest for Certainty ( 1929, 203-225).
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We can now return to Selznick's four pragmatist theses. All four can be
understood in the light of Dewey's value theory, although it is not always
entirely clear whether Selznick himself gives a consistently pragmatist
interpretation to these ideas. He does in regard to the first thesis I mentioned.
The distinction between the satisfying and the satisfactory - made by both
Dewey and Selznick - is directly related to Dewey's concept of value as the
result of inquiry. The distinguishing mark of the satisfactory as against a
simple enjoyment is that the first has value in the sense of having stood the
test ofcritical evaluation. Values can therefore be used to criticize judgments
of states of affairs: even if a state of affairs is seen as satisfying, that does not
mean that it is satisfactory in the light of the values concerned. With the
distinction between the satisfying and the satisfactory the idea is conveyed
that, although values are closely connected to direct, unreflected, feelings and
judgments, values are not reducible to these, but have objective validity when
they are warranted by intelligent inquiry.
A crucial point in the pragmatist argument is when to move from
unreflected enjoyments to inquiry into values. This is necessary when an
enjoyment becomes problematic: consideration of the value ofthe enjoyment
can point to a solution. This brings us to the second pragmatist aspect of
Selznick's value theory: their basis in problem-solving experience. Values are
discovered and developed as people learn from the problems they encounter
in their moral experience (1992, 37). This is the central point of Selznick's
argument about the nature of values: "(...) genuine values emerge from
experience; they are discovered, not imposed" (1992, 19). They are
discoverable because they are latent in social reality (1961, 90).' Value is part
ofthe social reality we inhabit; it is an aspect ofthe satisfactory arrangements
and objects in the social world. At this point, the immanent character of
Selznick's view of values is clear: values are inherent in reality. Exactly how
to interpret the immanence of values in Selznick's theory is not quite clear. It
is possible to understand his ontological views in the tradition of Aristotelian
natural law thinking, but also to understand them as based in a pragmatist
world view. This is part ofa broader pragmatist world view, which is holistic:
not only the ideal and the real, but also man and nature are part of one world
we can experience.' Because human beings are seen as organisms within
nature, their experiences are continuous with other interactions that occur. The
one aspect that distinguishes human interactions from others is that human
beings are capable of intelligent behaviour. Pragmatist ideas about values or
ideals have to be understood in the light of these ideas about the interactions
z
a
1 will examine the meaning of the latency of ideals in the next section.
Dewey explains his metaphysics most extensively in Experrence and Nature, emphasizing
the connection between man and nature: "Yet if man is within nature, not a little god
outside, and is within as a mode of energy inseparably connected with other modes,
interaction is the one unescapable trait of every human concern; thinking, even philosophic
thinking, is not exempt." (1925, 351).
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of human beings with their environment. An ideal is not thought up in
isolation, it is recognized when an experience is problematic and then used to
improve upon that experience. Thus, ideals are directly related to concrete
experiences, and they are determined by the specific circumstances of that
particular situation.
In this light we can understand Selznick's ideas on the objectivity of
values. Selznick describes an objective value as follows: "It is, or is the source
of, a good experience ofa certain kind" (Jaeger 8r. Selznick 1964, 667). What
is a good experience depends very much on the circumstances, primarily
social and cultural, of that particular kind of experience. Consider what
Selznick says about monogamy and polygamy:
But if some social arrangement, such as monogamy, is objectively valuable,
this does not mean that it is the exclusive source of value, even within its
special sphere. Nor does it mean that monogamy always and everywhere makes
the same contribution to human well-being, or has only positive attributes. That
the same can be said ofpolygamy does not vitiate the objectivity of the values
to be found in each (Jaeger 8z Selznick 1964, 667).
The idea that both monogamy and polygamy have objective value is not easily
grasped. In a subjectivist theory of values the value of both can easily be
explained: one group of persons holds that monogamy has value, while a
second group is in favour ofpolygamy. But if we do not locate the validity of
values in subjective beliefs, then how can opposing values both be objective?
The pragmatist answer is that both values are answers to experienced
problems that are real, but differ from place to place and time to time. An
explanation ofpolygamy could, for instance, be related to a problematic ratio
of male to female members of society. If a society is confronted with a large
number of its men dying young, polygamy has value because it ensures
continued existence of the society. At the same time, for a society in which
men and women have comparable life expectancy, monogamy is the more
likely value in this sphere. Explanations of this kind can be sought and
elaborated to make clear that there are often factual conditions that explain
and validate certain values. For a good assessment ofthe value of monogamy
and polygamy serious study oftheir conditions is needed, but the example can
serve to make certain things clear. Ifproblems differ, values will differ as well
because they are part of the problem-solving experience of people. But this
variety of values does not affect their objectivity, because their objectivity is
based on the connection between value and real problems and needs.
This brings us to the third pragmatist claim: the need for empirical
knowledge. Locating values in problem-solving experience makes a focus on
experience necessary to understand values. The way to know what problems
people face and how values help to solve these, is by studying situations
empirically. A second reason, at least as important, for emphasis on empirical
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evidence is that the pragmatist method is experimental: values have to be
tested to determine their worth. These considerations make clear what
Selznick's basis is for claiming that a social science approach to values and
a pragmatist philosophy converge (1992, 29). Both concentrate on the way
values function in everyday situations and are reluctant to make a priori claims
about the nature of values.
Connected to the reluctance to make a priori claims about values is the
fourth pragmatist thesis we find in Selznick's work: the denial of the eternal
validity of values. As said before, the objectivity of values is grounded in the
method by which they are reached. This does not entail that values have
unquestionable validity. The method of intelligent inquiry looks into the
conditions and consequences of values and these are not stable. Because
values are seen as hypotheses that are tested, their validity is always
conditional. Circumstances can arise, consequences can be discovered, that
call into question continued assertion of a value. Both our knowledge of the
circumstances giving rise to a value and the circumstances themselves can
change; in both cases we need to revise our view ofthe value's validity. When
we acquire better knowledge of the conditions of a value, it is our
understanding of the value that must be amended to incorporate this new
knowledge. When the circumstances themselves change, the value itself is
called into question and we must ask ourselves whether it is still valid under
new conditions. No value's validity can ever be final, eternal, or absolute.
The denial of absolute and eternal validity does not prevent Selznick from
making claims about the enduring importance of certain values or about the
universal reach of some values. Here he moves away from pragmatism and
supplements it with ideas from the natural law tradition to form his own
specifie form ofnaturalism.' Selznick himself stresses the continuity between
pragmatist ideas and (Aristotelian) natural law thinking, but I will argue that
the combination of the two is not quite as successful as Selznick claims. My
main point is that his argument for vague universal values in which he draws
on the natural law tradition is not compatible with pragmatism's emphasis on
change and experimental method. With the natural law tradition he shares the
attention for "enduring truths" (1961, 102) and the "quest for universals"
(103), which are at odds with Dewey's stress on uncertainty and change. To
As I did in Chapter 2, I reserve the term naturalism for the view that grounds ideals in
human nature (and thus believes them to be universal) but leaves leeway for different
interpretations. Both Selznick and Nussbaum can be seen as adherents of this view.
Pragmatism moves still further away from an Aristotelian view of ideals by leaving the
focus on a secure and universal basis for ideals. Selznick himself uses the term naturalism
in a much broader sense, including Aristotle, Spinoza, Hume, Santayana, Dewey, and
himself, referring to the view that ideal states are part ofnature (1992, 24). This is the thesis
I have called the immanence of ideals. Selznick calls Dewey's theory `pragmatic
naturalism', which 1 have simply referred to as pragmatism. In this chapter, I am challenging
the idea that Selznick's combination of pragmatism and natural law thinking yields a
defensible theory, denying that Selznick's own `pragmatic naturalism' is a good alternative.
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substantiate these claims I will turn to the discussion ofthe natural law strand
in Selznick's work.
Selznick believes that a number of basic values are adhered to universally.
These are the values that are connected to primary human needs and functions,
such as preserving human life, caring for close relatives, the need for affection
(1992, 96). The values of a basic morality occur across cultures because they
are based on the characteristics ofhuman beings as such: they go together with
the natural features of mankind (1961, 101-102). Because man is a social
animal, the existence of societies and certain features of them are natural as
well. The nature of man and, derived from that, the nature of society thus
determine that there are certain universal basic values. These are very general
values, of course, and Selznick does not deny that their specifications may
differ hugely from one society to the other (1992, 96). In the same way as
Selznick argues that man is by nature social and therefore there are natural
social values, he argues that it is a universal characteristic of human beings
that they need particular arrangements (1992, 102). The need for difference,
for practices peculiar to a culture or group, is a universal need.
However, the recognition of the need for particularity does not undermine
the importance of universals. For Selznick, the universal characteristics of
humans are as important as their particular features, and, we might add, he is
more interested in the first category than in the latter. At first sight, he appears
to remain faithful to pragmatism in his argument because he appeals to
empirical knowledge: both universal and particular characteristics can be
recognized when we study different kinds of human experience empirically.
But underlying this empirical recognition of universal values is a view of
human nature that has an Aristotelian inspiration. If we look at Selznick's
theory closely, we can see that this view on human nature carries the weight
of the argument about universal values. According to Selznick, such universal
values are an integral part ofbeing human: "When we say that certain values
are `inherent' in humanity we mean (1) they are necessary elements of a
certain level of existence, not of existence per se, and (2) they arise and are
sustained in the normal course of human experience" (1992, 102). Values are
not part of the most basic levels ofsubsistence, but part ofhuman flourishing,
emerging in the normal course of a human life. Universal values have a
biological basis: they accompany natural phenomena such as sex and
parenthood. Realization ofsuch values is essential to human well-being. What
is important to Selznick is moral well-being, which for him is essentially a
social kind of well-being consisting in the enhancement of fellowship (1992,
32). Selznick's conception of human nature as essentially social again comes
to the fore: moral well-being can only be achieved in the relationships with
others.
Selznick's highly normative vision of well-being is problematic because
it is supported by the idea of a natural development towards its realization.
Selznick holds the view that there is an immanent tendency towards the ideals
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or values that promise well-being (1992, 192). In this way Selznick equates
a tendency towards the good with the normal course of human life. He does
not argue, however, why this tendency to realize values is normal. This makes
his view of human nature unduly positive. To me it seems that, especially in
relation to each other, human beings are as capable of violence, taking
advantage, degrading others, as they are of fellowship, cooperation and love.
Selznick is right to say that the latter values are good for us, that they provide
moral well-being. However, it does not seem warranted to conclude that
human beings are naturally inclined towards these positive values.
In defence of Selznick, one could say that he does recognize that values are
precarious, that their realization is dependent on congenial conditions, that a
"malignant heart" is a possibility (1992, 175). He is not blind to the
widespread occurrence of delinquency and immoral behaviour (1992, 126).
There is, however, a tension he does not dissolve between the recognition that
moral value is precarious and the idea that moral value is realized in the
normal course ofexperience. Ifwe take the precariousness ofvalues seriously,
this means that it takes effort and watchfulness to ensure that these values are
sustained. If they are realized in the natural run ofthings, this means that it is
not necessary to make a conscious effort to sustain them. More is needed for
a convincing naturalist view of ideals than Selznick provides; the claim that
human beings are naturally inclined to realize values conducive to their well-
being cannot stand on its own.
Apart from this general criticism of naturalism there is a second problem:
the usefulness of universal values as standards of evaluation and criticism.
This point relates to the impossibility of combining natural law ideas with
pragmatism, because a pragmatist view sees this practical role ofvalues as the
key justification of inquiry into values. In short, my point is that vague
universal values do not provide meaningful guidance to the solution of
concrete problems and to understanding values in specific contexts.
Selznick acknowledges that the study of human nature can only yield
general values that still need to acquire a specific meaning in a context, but
insists that this does not make them pointless or irrelevant (1992, 103). The
main use he sees for such universal values and virtues is that they point to the
limits of variation: "What constitutes honesty or fidelity may differ in
different situations, but the generic virtue, properly formulated, can help us
distinguish the true from the false, the genuine from the fake" (101). It is
doubtful, however, whether a universal value can indeed be used to point to
clear limits. Consider Selznick's example ofthe ideal ofpreserving human life
(96). This indeed sounds like something every human being strives for, and
as something which we can use as a standard of criticism for certain practices.
But when we apply it to more concrete problems, it is not always so clear
whether the ideal provides a limit. Does it outlaw assisted suicide when
someone suffers from terrible pains without a prospect for recovery? Does it
prohibit killing a new-born baby by a mother who knows she is too poor and
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weak to feed it?5 Not everyone may agree about what is an inevitable
exception to the preservation of human life. The point is that it is not clear to
what costs it should be preserved. These are problems that cannot be solved
with an appeal to a universal value, because it is too vague to provide
direction. One needs to know the specific circumstances to understand what
the value means in a particular context and to be able to use it as a standard of
evaluation. The pragmatist focus on problem-solving experience is a focus on
concrete problematic situations in which we can invoke value-standards that
similar experiences have warranted. These are not standards that we arrive at
by studying the idea of humanity itself; they require attention to the particular
features of the situation and considering the consequences of acting upon a
particular value. Only then do values become meaningful.
Thus, in my view the more convincing ideas of Selznick's are the ones he
derives from pragmatism. His naturalist arguments do more to make his theory
problematic than they add to its applicability. There is, however, a good
reason for Selznick to appeal to a theory of human nature to ground his theory
of values. A purely pragmatist theory ofvalues has difficulty providing a full
justification of values because it restricts justification to the direct context of
problematic situations. To see what the problem is more precisely, we need to
return to the pragmatist construction ofgood by way ofthe pragmatic method.
A pragmatist theory claims that values are objectively valid when they have
been subjected to intelligent inquiry into their conditions and consequences.
When we look at that method critically, we see that its potential for generating
objective standards is limited. The pragmatist claims objectivity of values
because values have been tested with regard to their consequences. Racial
segregation does not have value because it has pernicious effects on the well-
being of people. On the other hand, friendship has value because having
friends enables people to flourish and to lead a meaningful life. There is a
problem with this line of argument: how do we judge the effects and
consequences of attaching value to certain states of affairs? It is necessary to
have some standard of what good consequences are, ifwe are to judge a value
by its consequences. To judge the consequences of a value we need to invoke
a value standard. That means a pragmatist account of values suffers from
circularity: good consequences determine the worth of a value, which is in
turn the standard by which the goodness of consequences is judged. Let me
explain by using one of Dewey's examples. We can say that when a fruit is
edible it has value. If we want know whether a particular kind of fruit, say a
mango, is edible, we test the consequences of eating it. If these are good, then
mangoes are edible and have value. But how do we determine whether the
consequences of eating a mango are good'? Here we apply a standard ofbeing
edible that we have acquired from experience: we have established that apples
5 The example of infanticide is given by Selznick himself, who apparently does not see it as
detracting from the ideal, although "the clash ofvalues is by no means beyond sympa[hetic
understanding" (1992, 97).
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and oranges are edible under certain conditions (not being rotten, for instance)
and we apply that knowledge to mangoes as well. But since we derive the
standard of being edible from experience with apples and oranges, we can ask
the same questions: how did we determine that apples and oranges were
edible? There is always the need of applying the standard that is at issue in the
situation at hand. The process need not be directly circular: other values are
part of the process as well, which can be used to judge the consequences. We
can say that eating fruit has good consequences because it is good for one's
health. In that process we do not question why we value our health, but
valuation is involved: the consequences are about other things that have value.
Consequences cannot be assessed neutrally, some standard of reference is
needed. The pragmatist account is not specific enough about the way to find
the relevant standards.
We can see clearly why Selznick invokes an account of human nature to
ground moral values: in this way, he can escape the circularity of a pragmatist
argument. His theory ofhuman nature, however, is not very helpful because
the link between vague universal values and specific problematic situations is
not established. Moreover, his rather optimistic view of human nature is not
the most plausible theory of what human beings are like. Although Selznick
rightly notes the need for a theory of the good (1992, 98), his own theory
based on human nature is not totally satisfactory.
3 The Latency of Values
In the last section I mentioned in passing that the immanence of ideals in
reality in Selznick's view can be interpreted in different ways. In Selznick's
view, the most important feature of the relationship of ideals and reality is the
latency of ideals. The idea of latency is subject to the same ambiguity as the
more general idea of immanence. In this section I want to discuss Selznick's
reasons for emphasizing the latency of ideals and the way it should be
interpreted. The most important aspect ofideals in Selznick's view is that they
need to have a natural foundation, i.e. a foundation in real groups,
relationships, and concerns. Ideals do not always have this intimate connection
with existing arrangements. Sometimes they are highly abstract or purely
imaginary, for example when they spring from utopian theory. But according
to Selznick such abstract ideals suffer from defects and vulnerabilities which
are avoided when ideals have a natural foundation.
The weaknesses of abstract ideals all derive from the same characteristic:
abstract ideals are too far removed from the experiences of everyday life.
There are five such weaknesses. First ofal l, abstract ideals are inflexible. They
do not adapt to the changes in factual circumstances that occur continuously,
which makes them vulnerable to challenges of irrelevance based on new
insights or new arguments (1992, 197). Secondly, abstract ideals are barely
any help for problem-solving. They are necessarily at a distance from concrete
118 The Co~zcept of Ideals in Legal Theory
contexts, and since problems arise within a specific context, such ideals do not
offer any solutions. Therefore, abstract ideals are often virtually empty
concerning the issues that really count. They can only work when
supplemented by theories about their meaning in context (1992, 215). The
third weakness is an invitation to overreaching. Because abstract ideals state
general goals without paying attention to contextual constraints, they invite
wholesale realization even when more modest realization would be more
appropriate. As a result, a caricature of the original ideal is likely to be
achieved (174). The fourth weakness is an encouragement to opportunism.
Abstract ideals state so little about what is to be done that they can be used for
window dressing by people who are only interested in serving their personal
objectives (249). Fifthly, abstract ideals are less stable. Because they are not
rooted in ongoing daily concerns, they are easily set aside when the
developing situation makes their realization more difficult (248).
According to Selznick, all of these weaknesses are lessened when ideals
have a grounding in the natural world. That ideals have a natural basis means
two things: that they are latent in experience and that they are viable (1992,
160). The idea of latency points to the roots that ideals have in people's
concerns in everyday life. Even if there is no explicit reference to ideals or
values in an existing practice and the people concerned are not conscious of
being guided by ideals, such practices contain beliefs, norms, and behaviour
that can be understood as oriented towards ideals. The idea ofviability means
that ideals should be a"live option": they must have a secure basis in people's
needs and wants and be able to contribute to their lives (160). Latency and
viability are two aspects of the same approach: while latency is about the
origin of ideals, viability stresses the ideals' potential for a meaningful
contribution to well-being. For Selznick, viability thus depends on the latency
of ideals, because without roots in experience ideals cannot be a real part of
people's concerns.
So far, I have only discussed Selznick's normative plea for ideals with a
natural basis, but this argument about the importance of latent ideals is
combined with two other, descriptive, claims. First, there is the claim that we
can "perceive latent values in the world of fact" (1969, 10). Second,
perceiving such latent values is necessary to understand the phenomena in
which such values inhere. Therefore, only the values that are latent in
experience are really important: they are of influence and without them we
could not understand the social world. Let me begin with the claim that we can
perceive latent values.
The naturalist argument says that seeing that values are latent in experience
means recognizing that phenomena have a natural potential for being valued
(1969, 10). Under normal conditions fathering a child will cause a man to
value the relationship he has with his child, i.e. to value being a parent. This
is a natural process because parenthood only functions well if parents value
the relationship with their child. It does not mean that being a parent will have
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value for every mother or father, but valuation serves a biological purpose:
they will be more successful as parents if they value that role. And if we
recognize that latent values play such a role in any social phenomenon, we see
that we need to understand what realizing the value means and how this
determines the most fully developed mode of a phenomenon. Only then can
we get a grip on the differences, similarities, and problems of various
instances of the phenomenon.
Latency does not mean that the value in question will always be realized,
even to a minimal extent. As I said before, emergence of the value is likely,
not inevitable. We should think of the latency of values as the potential for
value realization. Think of a talented musician: a child that has a gift for
playing the cello still needs to be taught and coached and needs to practise to
be a really good cellist. The ability to play the cello is latent in the child, but
if the child never touches an instrument, its ability will never be discovered,
let alone come to realization. Similarly, conditions have to be congenial for
values to be realized. And like musical talents, the potential of values
themselves is variable: in some cases more needs to be done than in others to
bring out the value or talent.
The analogy with talents brings up the first problem with the argument
about latency, regarding the descriptive claim that latent values are present.
If it is possible that a latent value may not be realized, how do you know that
it is there in a latent form? To put the point differently, there is no way to
prove the latency of values because it is a characteristic that remains implicit.
What Selznick tries to do, namely to give an empirical argument about latency
- we perceive latent values in the world of fact - cannot be done. An
empirical argument depends on the possibility of perceiving a phenomenon:
it assumes that there is some way to observe an occurrence or situation. It is
precisely this it is impossible to do regarding a latent value that has not been
realized, because such a value is not observable. The argument can only work
in a different way, by showing that the connection between values and the
natural functioning of human beings is a necessary one. In the previous
section, I argued that such a connection can in theory be established between
values and the good life, but not between values and human functioning as
such: values are necessary for a certain kind of life, but not for bare survival
(1961, 91). Such a connection, however, does not help the descriptive claim
about latency: there is still no way of knowing if any given value is latent in
the world of fact, when it is in no way realized.
How does this affect the rest of the argument about latency? It means that
the second step in the argumentation - the claim that we can only understand
social phenomena if we perceive the latent values within them - cannot be
taken directly. But there is a way around this problem. If we say that
relationships and practices can only function well if they are realizing values,
the study of values is necessary to understand what makes such phenomena
work. And I think that this premise is sound: a friendship is only successful
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if friends value the relationship they have. I agree with Selznick as well that
the really interesting aspects of social life have to do with reaching a certain
level of achievement. We want to make our legal system a good system and
we are not content with having just any legal system. To improve our legal
system we must bring it closer to the ideals that point out what a good legal
system needs to achieve. But such ideals cannot simply be pointed out in the
reality of law.
If Selznick's argument for the latency of ideals as perceivable in reality is
not convincing, a weaker form of the argument about the latency of values
may be based on the claim that they are necessary for the success of a
phenomenon. In this more pragmatist version, values are latent in reality
because they are answers to problems that occur in the reality of human
experience. This view of latency reduces it to a minimal basis in reality, but
it is combined with a stronger notion of implicitness. Values are latent in a
problematic situation in a minimal sense, because as standards to improve that
situation their meaning is constrained by the situation. As possible solutions,
values must have their roots in actual situations, and this connection is their
latency in the situation. The stronger sense in which a pragmatist view can see
values as present in experience, is as implicit standards that have developed
in experience and are applied without articulation. They have come to arise
naturally in certain situations because they have turned out to be the best way
to cope with such situations. Such values have become an implicit part of a
practice. The natural basis of values is now a basis in experience. Not every
value that is proposed has this quality, so the normative argument that values
should have a natural basis stands. Imagined utopias lack this connection with
real problems, they have not been tested in everyday experience and the
dangers of implementing them without regard for the real situation should be
kept in mind.
The points to be gathered from this discussion are the following. The idea
of latent values as present in potential cannot be supported by definite proof,
but that does not mean that the idea of a real basis of values should be given
up. Abstract ideals are too far removed from experience to be meaningful.
Values that count find their basis in the problems to which they are solutions.
The important point is that valuation is necessary to make people and their
relationships, practices, and institutions flourish. To understand how social
reality works, we need to see how certain levels of achievement are reached.
For that we need to grasp that values have a real connection to the concerns
of everyday experience and that we have to study values in that light.
4 Master ldeals
I started this chapter with a discussion ofSelznick's argument about ideals in
terms ofmaster ideals ofnormative systems. I then turned to the philosophical
foundations of his concept of ideals in pragmatism and natural law
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philosophy, and highlighted the idea of latency as the core of Selznick's
immanent concept of ideals. However, Selznick's most original contribution
to the theory of ideals has not yet received separate attention: the concept of
master ideals itself. Here, I want to address the implications ofsuch a concept.
Master ideals are defined as ideals governing normative systems. More
precisely, one master ideal is the ideal that governs one specific normative
system. Thus, the first claim made on behalf of master ideals is that they
express the unity of the normative system (1961, 87). The first question to be
raised is what this means: in what sense does the ideal provide the unity of the
normative system`? Following upon the precise characterization of master
ideals, one can ask whether the connection between ideal and unity is a
plausible one. The second claim made about master ideals is that they are
complex ideals, consisting of different standards of assessment and criticism
(1961, 94). In what sense should we understand this complexity? What is the
relation between the ideal and its constitutive standards? The third claim is
that master ideals are only incompletely realized in actual experience (1961,
88), or that they cannot always be completely realized (1961, 107). The first
aspect of that claim is unproblematic: the empirical assertion that a master
ideal is not completely realized in a certain situation. The second aspect ofthe
claim that they cannot always be completely realized is ambiguous: does it
mean that ideals can sometimes be completely realized, or that they can never
be completely realized? And what is a more interesting question: what makes
it so difficult to realize a master ideal completely?
The idea ofunity is present in Selznick's ~rst description of master ideals.
Of democracy, he says: "A democracy is a normative system in that much
complex behavior, as well as many specific norms, is governed by a master
ideal. Behavior, feeling, thought, and organization are all bound together by
a commitment to the realization of democratic values" (1961, 87). The ideal
of democracy is that which holds together certain behaviour and norms, and
makes them recognizable as democratic. Selznick insists that the master ideal
is part of the normative system, that is, it is a point of orientation and
commitment to the people involved in the normative system. The master ideal
can be identified by careful study of the normative system in question, so
presumably the study ofany normative system will lead to the uncovering of
a corresponding master ideal. If we study democracy, we will find a master
ideal of democracy; if we study friendship, we will find a master ideal of
friendship. Thus, for Selznick, the master ideal does indeed provide the unity
of the normative system: the ideal as part of the normative system is a
common point oforientation. If it does not serve as such in any instance ofthe
normative system, there is something wrong with that particular instance: the
ideal now serves as a standard of assessment. This account is problematic in
a number of respects.
If much turns on the empirical discovery of the ideal, the selection of the
normative system becomes highly important: how does one recognize a
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normative system as such? And what determines the boundaries of such a
system? Selznick points to public opinion, to democracy, to citizenship as
examples, but these are not phenomena that are readily perceivable in social
reality. One needs to select certain aspects as defining the normative system
to delineate the field of study. We have seen that Selznick adopts the strategy
of a weak definition here: an undemanding, non-normative, set of criteria.
This will determine the field of study in which we are to find the master ideal,
but it does not suffice to explicate the ideal itself. For that, a normative theory
needs to be formulated. One could formulate a master ideal and test this
formulation to see whether the proposed master ideal is equal to the ideal
actually adhered to in the normative system. To see how this might work, it
is best to consider an example.
Parenthood can serve to illustrate the problem: it is relatively easy to define
as the relationship between an adult and the child of which he or she is a
parent, either biologically or by accepting familial ties (in the case ofadoption
or stepparents). Relationships thus identi~ed can then be studied to discover
the ideal of parenthood to which the persons involved are (or should be)
comrnitted. A formulation ofthe master ideal ofparenthood probably includes
loving the child, caring for the child, protecting it from harm, providing its
needs for food, shelter, clothing, overseeing its education, etc. This might
seem straightforward, but when we consider a specific relationship that does
not involve a standard nuclear family, it is not so easy to apply. For example,
consider a child whose parents have divorced, living with his mother who
remarried. The stepfather may see himself as the child's parent, loving and
caring for it, committed to an ideal of parenthood. The child, however, has a
biological father who also tries to realize the idea] of parenthood, loving and
caring for the child. Are these two men committed to the same master ideal of
being a good parent? To the same ideal as the child's mother? For father and
stepfather, being a good parent may involve making space for the other father,
accepting the other's role. It is doubtful whether they will both see it that way,
but can we use the master ideal to criticize their views? The biological father
is at a distance, not living with his son, which asks for different behaviour. In
this case, some may argue that it is indeed the same ideal to which each is
committed, but that this must be interpreted differently in different
circumstances. There is a point, however, at which it becomes strained to
insist that the same ideal is adhered to. When the shared meaning of an ideal
is reduced to an abstract formula that is interpreted in completely different
ways, it is no longer in keeping with the idea that ideals must have a real basis
to insist that the abstract formula still can be seen as the unifying ideal
governing a normative system. To be a governing ideal, a master ideal must
be a genuine standard of evaluation, that is, one should be able to use it for
meaningful criticism. If parenthood can be understood as guided by very
different but equally valid interpretations of the master ideal of parenthood,
it will be these more specific interpretations that provide the standards of
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criticism. Once that is conceded, it is more plausible to see these
interpretations as governing ideals. Then there can be different ideals at work
in one normative system, and the thesis ofthe ideal providing unity collapses.
The unity thesis can also be collapsed in a different way. Selznick himself
says about rationality: "A familiar and widespread illustration is the governing
ideal ofrationality in economic and administrative systems" ( I 961, 91). Here
we see that the governing ideal governs a range of economic and
administrative systems. It seems unlikely that a bureaucratic government
agency and a new economy business company are committed to the same
master ideal, although it is likely that they are both committed to the ideal of
rationality. Here we see that the role of a master ideal as providing unity can
also dissolve because the ideal is relevant to a number of normative systems.
An ideal such as rationality is equally relevant to many normative systems -
e.g. to science, to economics, to administration - so that it is unlikely that it
governs one system especially. Such ideals do not hold together one specific
normative system, but cut across systems as a more pervasive ideal.
I think the conclusion is warranted that the relationship between master
ideal and normative system is not quite as tight as is suggested by the thesis
of unity. Both the possibility of different interpretations of a master ideal
within one normative system and the relevance of a master ideal across
different systems suggest that there may be many normative systems that are
governed by more than one ideal. Here is a possible connection to the second
claim that I want to examine: the complexity of a master ideal. One could try
to salvage the unity thesis by appealing to the complexity of master ideals.
The argument would then be that the master ideal consists of a number of
constitutive values which are of variable importance in different
circumstances. The commitment in a normative system is to the overarching
complex ideal, not to a specific combination of values, which makes room for
different interpretations.
In a number of passages Selznick appeals to the complexity of master
ideals. Legality is said to embrace "(...) standards for assessing and criticizing
decisions that purport to be legal, whether made by a legislature or a court,
whether elaborating a rule or applying it to specific cases" (1961, 94). Justice
is said to embrace a complex set of interacting variables; it is constituted by
principles such as equality and justification (1992, 431-432).6 Due process is
a master ideal restraining government, which consists of five more specific
ideals (1969, 252). Selznick makes a distinction between the ideal and the
specific norms that are required to realize the ideal (1961, 87). Normative
systems strive to realize ideals and specific norms regulating behaviour are
necessary to accomplish the realization of an ideal. The ideal is therefore
distinct from specific norms; the ideal can be used to criticize specific norms,
b In the discussion ofjustice, Selznick also connects the meaning of the governing ideal with
other ideals. In a communitarian theory, "(...) we enrich familiar forms ofjustice by infusing
them with ideals of mutual trust, respect, reconciliation, and interdependence" ( I 992, 433).
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asking whether the norm contributes to the realization of the ideal (1961,
103).' If we see ideals as a specific kind of standard of evaluation, it is
plausible to see the standards of which a master ideal consists as value
standards. In the example of parenthood, I included love, care, protection,
education, in the master ideal of good parenting. All of these can be regarded
as values or ideals: they indicate desirable states of affairs to be realized.
Selznick uses the concept of a master ideal to refer to the governing ideal of
a normative system; here, it appears as the governing idea demanding a set of
constitutive values.8 In the relation between master ideal and constitutive
ideals, the latter appear as subordínate to the former. The master ideal of
parenthood demands parental love and parental care, which means that ideals
oflove and care take on a specific form in the light of the ideal ofparenthood.
However, the ideals of love and care have relevance in other contexts as well,
and can even be said to appear as master ideals themselves in a different
normative system.9 The ideal of love can be said to govern the relationship
between romantically involved couples. It then takes on a different meaning
from that in parental relationships and gives rise to different constitutive
values. My point is that such ideals can take on the role both of master ideal
ofa normative system and ofconstitutive value subordinate to another master
ideal. As a consequence, there is no simple hierarchy of ideals: in some
contexts they are of greater importance, while in others they are of minor
importance; in some contexts they are a governing ideal, while in others they
are subordinate to another ideal. Thus, we return to Selznick's idea of
variability and the importance of empirical study: to understand the way a
master ideal works it is necessary to pay attention to the context in which it
appears and to gather information from empirical study.
Thus, we can understand a master ideal as a complex ideal consisting of
constitutive ideals performing a subordinate role in a particular context. Can
that context now be identified as a normative system to which the master ideal
gives unity? The answer must be that it cannot: the idea of a complex master
ideal says something interesting of the way in which different ideals can be
related to each other, but does not establish a relationship of commitment
B
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Here Selznick speaks only ofnorms in general. At times it seems as ifthe point only applies
to rules. However, although Selznick does not usually make a clear-cut distinction between
ideals and principles, the concept of principles has been awarded a specific meaning and
role in legal theory that would be underrated if principles were reduced to the constitutive
elements of ideals. For now, I will stay with the description of Alexy given in section 1.4:
principles are norms prescribing the highest degree of realization ofan ideal or value. I wil I
return to the role ofprinciples in Selznick's legal theory in the next section.
Here, my interpretation echoes Radbruch's concepts of idea and constitutive value. There
is an important difference, however, between Radbruch's view of values requiring each
other at a conceptual level and my interpretation of Selznick basing values on empirical
information.
The ideal of care does not seem to be a goveming ideal ofa specific normative system. In
this it resembles the ideal of rationality, which also appears as a pervasive ideal influential
in different nonnative systems.
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between normative system and master ideal. The unity that is established is
between the values that constitute the master ideal, not between the ideal and
the normative system.
The last claim I need to address is that of the unrealizability of ideals.
Selznick himself is not quite clear on the matter. He suggests that ideals are
usually not completely realized, but is careful in his formulation: "Legal ideals
cannot always be completely realized, ..., but they remain as living
potentialities, awaiting the appearance of historical developments that will
permit their application" (1961, 107). Selznick's reference to unrealizability
can be described as practical unrealizability: the historical or practical
circumstances can be such that it is, at a specific moment in time, in a specific
context, impossible to realize an ideal to the full. The main condition for the
realization of ideals is that circumstances have to be congenial to realization.
I would add that the complexity of master ideals seems to be a second source
for practical unrealizability: because the master ideal consists of different
constitutive values, it is hard to determine to what extent these values have to
be realized to advance realization of the encompassing master ideal.
In conclusion, the concept of a master ideal is, nevertheless, worthwhile
because it provides us with a notion to indicate important governing ideals in
value-laden phenomena of social reality. It can be used to argue why certain
values are especially important in a specific field and creates a perspective to
view relations between ideals. There is, however, one important aspect of
Selznick's theory of master ideals that must be discarded: the suggestion that
one master ideal provides the unity of a normative system. Variety of
interpretation and the possibility of different master ideals being equally
relevant to one normative system indicate that a truly pragmatist view of
master ideals, with an eye on empirical variation, should reject the idea that
there is a simple relationship between master ideal and normative system. In
a different sense, the concept of master ideal is useful: it can indicate that
governing ideals are complex ideals consisting of constituting values. These
values can be understood as holding together in a specific way because they
are related to a governing master ideal.
5 Ideals and Law
The subject of this section is the role ofideals in the context of law. In Chapter
1 I raised the issue of a specific category of legal ideals. In the light of
Selznick's concept ofthe master ideal, one could expect him to emphasize the
specific character of the master ideal of legality. But what exactly is the
character of that master ideal? In what way is it distinct from, or connected to,
non-legal ideals? Such a focus on the ideals within law will also require an
examination of the relations between the master ideal and other elements of
the legal system. The way the connection between legality and other, non-
legal, ideals is viewed also bears upon the broader issue of the relation
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between law and society. What role does Selznick give ideals in supporting or
undermining the openness of law towards society? These are the three issues
that will be discussed in this section: the master ideal of legality, the relation
ofthat ideal to other elements of the legal system, and the role of ideals for the
openness of law.
The ideal of legality
The ideal of legality has a central place in Selznick's view of law. Seen as the
master ideal of law (1961, 94) it determines, to an important extent, what is
specific about law. Legality is characterized as the "progressive reduction of
the arbitrary element in positive law and its administration" (1968, 52).
Legality, or the rule of law, is a complex ideal consisting of standards for
assessing the making and applying of rules and other decisions made in the
name oflaw (1961, 94). It is a procedural ideal in that it concerns the restraint
of power by principles of order, which enhance the conformity and
predictability of decisions (1961, 95). It aims to guarantee the quality of law
by setting standards of rationality, order and accountability.
At first sight the ideal of legality seems a main source of the autonomy of
law: it is the ideal which holds together law as a system, it is that which
governs the legal system. The standards which the ideal embraces are all
internal to the legal order. This impression of legality is reinforced by the way
legality is connected to justice. According to Selznick, legality is a part of
justice, which is itself an ideal with a much broader scope than the law alone
(1969, 12). Legality, in contrast to justice, is confined in its meaning to law.
Law and legality, reality and its governing ideal, are even mutually defining:
we cannot understand the one without the other. This suggests a clear division
of labour between the ideals of legality and justice: legality embraces the
values internal to law and is the guardian of law's autonomy, while
considerations ofjustice connect law to broader social concerns.
As long as legality is regarded as a procedural ideal, connecting justice to
openness and legality to the autonomy of law is possible. However, for
Selznick there are important substantive elements in legality. Legality is an
affirmative ideal with rich connotations:
Legality begins as a principle of restraint, but it promises more than a way of
moderating the uses of power. The "progressive reduction of arbitrariness"
knows no near stopping-place. The closer we look at that process, the more we
realize that it calls for an affirmative view of what it means to participate in a
legal order, whether as a citizen, judge, or executive (1969, 18).
The ideal of legality is a main determinant of what law is about, the meaning
oflaw is dependent on the meaning of legality. If we connect this thesis to the
discussion ofthe three stages of legal development, we see that a commitment
to legality is a feature ofboth autonomous and responsive law. In autonomous
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law legality is procedural as the dominant character of law is procedural. In
responsive law, however, the meaning of legality shifts from formal to
substantive justice (Nonet 8c Selznick 1978, 108). The character of the ideal
of legality parallels the character ofthe type of law to which it belongs. As the
law as a whole grows to be more substantive, so does the ideal of legality.
One might say that this is not surprising: if the ideal of legality and law are
mutually dependent, it follows that a change of character of the one entails a
change of character of the other. I believe it is not quite so simple: the
changing character of legality has consequences for the importance of the
ideal itself in the legal order. Responsive law is committed to a focus on
outcomes and its ideal of legality is committed to substantive justice. The
progressive reduction of arbitrariness is no longer interpreted as the refining
of procedure and enhancement of legal security, but as the mending of social
inequalities and supporting ofrights. The meaning of arbitrariness is seen as
injustice instead of unpredictability. But this interpretation of legality
practically reduces its meaning to justice: where is the place of legality as a
distinctive master ideal? A change in the character of legality makes it less
important in determining the character of law: legality and law both directly
serve the social ideal ofjustice. General social ideals gain importance while
the distinctively legal ideal of legality diminishes. I think there is good reason
to see justice as the master ideal of responsive law and to reserve the ideal of
legality for autonomous law. Distinguishing between different ideals as
belonging to different types oflaw makes it easier to see the prevalence ofone
ideal as an indication of the corresponding type of law: detection of a greater
concern for (substantive) justice is one of the markers of a development
towards a responsive legal order.
I have slightly exaggerated the change in the ideal of legality. In Selznick's
theory the procedural element of the ideal is not completely overshadowed by
the substantive element. Nor does he overlook the dangers of the emphasis on
outcomes, such as opportunism (Nonet 8z Selznick I978, 77). But the
conclusion I want to draw from this discussion of legality is not merely that
the ideal of legality should consist of the right mix of procedural and
substantive values. The distinctive character of law can only be protected if
its master ideal keeps its own distinctive characteristics, the intemal values of
the legal order.'o The ideal of legality is indeed supportive of the autonomy of
the law, and the more it incorporates general social values the more open the
law becomes. Selznick's theory breathes optimism about the openness ofthe
law, even if he warns against total reliance on the benign effects of the
interaction of law and society. Maybe we need to recall Radbruch's lesson
about the values of the law: the most important place is for formal justice and
legal security, both necessary to curb the excesses of the sovereignty of
political goals. Legality as a genuine master ideal can protect the integrity of
'o Here I think of Fuller's internal morality of law (Fuller 1969, 33-94).
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the law, an achievement which should not be given up too quickly.
Rules, principles, values
The shift from autonomous to responsive law is not only characterized by the
change of ineaning of legality, but also by a shift from rule-based to principle-
based reasoning. Reasoning from principles is necessary to accommodate the
generalization of purpose that is characteristic of responsive law. Principles
have a more general scope than rules, making them natural companions to a
system of responsive law with its focus on general objectives. Nonet 8c
Selznick (1978, 81) follow Dworkin's early formulations of the character of
principles: unlike rules principles do not apply in an all-or-nothing fashion,
principles have a dimension of weight, and they are seen as requirements of
morality (Dworkin 1978, 22-26). To my mind, the reason why principles are
important to a responsive legal order is that they are one of the main sources
of flexibility. Because of their dimension of weight, principles require
balancing in a specific case. This balance will differ according to the
circumstances ofthe case. Principle-based decision-making is therefore more
sensitive to the peculiarities of the case and more flexible.
Principles differ from rules in many respects, but the question that needs
to be answered in the context ofthis study is how principles differ from ideals
or values. In Selznick's theory, ideals and principles are closely linked. The
most extensive discussion of principles is in the chapter on law in The Moral
Comrnaiwealt{i. Principles oflaw are the elements ofa legal system which are
most directly related to legal values: "Principles of law ,..., formulate
legally recognized values rather than definite rights or obligations" (1992,
438). An important difference between principles and rules is that principles
are a direct expression of legal values, while rules are the result of a balance
of values which takes account of relevant facts. A difference between legal
principles and values is that principles have a clearly conventional element in
their authority. Legal principles derive their authority from convention or
tradition itself. In part, their authority is not substantial, i.e. based on the
acceptability of their content, but conventional, accepted now because they
have been accepted for such a long time. But the mark of principles ofjustice
is that the conventional element has limited meaning: such principles ideally
formulate the universal values of natural law. Of course, there are also many
values that have a conventional basis, but an explicit justification by appealing
to convention is not acceptable there. The most probable reason for this
difference is the conventional character of law. As we saw above, Selznick
takes for granted that value-orientation ensures the openness of law and that
this presupposes that the meaning oflegally relevant values is not confined to
the legal order. Then it makes sense to interpret principles as the legal
embodiment of social values, and this could account for the more conventional
character of principles.
As is usually the case with conceptua] distinctions in Selznick's theory, the
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distinction between principles and ideals is not watertight. Some principles
have a character that comes close to the one ascribed to values, for instance
in the case of principles ofjustice. Selznick is more concerned to stress the
difference between principles and rules, the more open character ofprinciples,
and the connection ofprinciples and values, than to concentrate on differences
between the two. The conventional authority of principles, however, is an
interesting thought to use as a basis for the distinction between principles and
values. So far, I have used Alexy's definition ofprinciples as prescriptions to
realize values to the highest degree. The idea of conventionality would add to
this definition that principles can not simply be appealed to as norms that
promote an important value, but that principles need to be justified as
acceptable within the given legal order. Legal principles are norms that are
recognizable as flowing from the existing legal system. This is not necessarily
the case with legally relevant values. Dworkin's example, the principle that
no man may profit from his own wrong, is recognizable as a fundamental
norm embedded in the American legal system, but the value it promotes is a
moral value of `doing the right thing' which moves beyond the legal order.
The norm is acceptable as a legal principle because it can be shown to be part
of the legal system.
The ideals of responsive law
In the discussion of the ideal of legality we saw that the meaning of legality
shifts when a legal system develops from autonomous law to responsive law.
In order to see how this shift in meaning takes place and what it entails for the
role of ideals in the relation between law and society, we need to take a closer
look at the transition from autonomous law to responsive law. In Law and
Society in Transition, the different types of law are characterized in terms of
openness and integrity (Nonet óc Selznick 1978, 76). In the previous chapter
we saw that responsive law is seen as a reaction to the isolation from society
that occurs in autonomous law. Autonomous law is primarily concerned to
protect its own integrity, emphasizing its own procedures and its independence
from politics. Responsive law restores the connections between law and
society by directing its attention to the general purposes of law: "sovereignty
of purpose" is one of the hallmarks of responsive law (1978, 78). The
sovereignty ofpurpose is said to ensure the openness and flexibility of law. In
Selznick's view the crucial step is to discover the values implicit in legal rules
and policies (1978, 79). Once the reasons for rules and policies, their point,
have been articulated, it becomes possible to use these values as a standard of
criticism of specific rules or particular policies, to base new rules or policies
on them, and to extend their meaning to other contexts.
It is an unspoken premise that a focus on values transcends the domain of
the purely legal: values are not just the values internal to the legal order, they
include values law shares with politics or other social concerns. However, this
is not a matter of course. Looking for values implicit in existing legal rules
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and policies does not ensure that the values found will be political values. It
can be argued that an autonomous legal system which comes to pay attention
to values will focus on different values from those of a responsive legal
system, on values internal to the legal system. Autonomous law is described
as preferring specific rules over general values and favouring the ideal of
legality in a procedural interpretation (1978, 54). The shift from autonomous
law to responsive law has three aspects that are important here - the shift to
general purpose and value, the shift to a substantive interpretation of ideals
such as legaliry, and the shift from isolation to responsiveness. It does not
follow directly that a shift from specified rules to general purpose, looking for
implicit values in legal rules and principles, is also a shift to more substantive
political values. A legal system that moves in the direction of general purpose
can interpret such purposes in accordance with the procedural values
highlighted in autonomous law. It is even less likely that attention to implicit
values will lead to a shift to curreiitpolitical values. Ifthe implicit substantive
values of a legal system are explicated, it is more likely that these will be the
values of a past political order that has influenced the formation of the legal
system than the values adhered to in present-day politics. It then seems that
the shift to general values cannot ensure attention from legal officials to values
of the current political order. The more plausible explanation is that it is the
responsiveness ofresponsive law that ensures the openness towards political
values." By this I mean that responsive ]aw is explicitly looking for political
values by responding to social pressures and needs. The responsive element
is what makes the "sovereignty of purpose" the sovereignty of political
purpose because it involves social and political actors in the formulation of
political values. It incorporates knowledge of the values adhered to by these
actors in the formulation of legal purpose.
The question that occupies us here is the role of ideals in the shift from
autonomy to openness. We saw that legality itself is interpreted more
generally in responsive law, moving beyond procedural fairness to substantive
justice (1978, 108). Where autonomous law makes a clear distinction between
justice and legality and concentrates on the latter, responsive law interprets
legality to accord with substantive justice. I believe that this move to
substantive interpretations of legal ideals is the key to the openness of law
towards society. Selznick's characterization of autonomous law as concerned
with procedure is right, but this includes a concern for procedural values such
as clarity and predictability. Law loses its distinctive character when this
concern with procedural values is traded for a focus on substantive values such
This is a point inspired by Gunther Teubner's criticism of Nonet and Selznick's theory of
responsive law: "(...) their analysis confounds two related but distinct trends in post-modern
law, namely, the move towards greater substantive rationality and the emergence of
reflexive rationality" (1 I83, 245). Teubner argues that the reflexive dimension is dominant
in post-modern law. Although I do not share his view, 1 think the distinction between the
two elements is helpful.
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as justice, liberty, or mutual respect. A main reason for this is that formal
procedures are precisely what distinguishes a legal system from other forms
of social regulation: law is not distinctive because of the content of its rules
- criminal law is the best example - but because of the way these rules are
formed and administered. This means that a concern for procedural values
ensures law's distinctive character. As I indicated in the discussion ofthe ideal
of legality, my opinion is that it is important to retain what is distinctively
legal. Underrating procedural values is dangerous because judgments on
substantive values alone are extremely difficult to give. To know what is just
is indeed a legal actor's unrealizable ideal.
6 Conclusions
As I did in the conclusion to Chapter 4 regarding Radbruch, I want to review
Selznick's answers to the main questions of this study. That means first of all,
his views on the ontology and epistemology of values, and the relation
between value and reality. Second, it means relating these ideas to law,
considering his views on the characterization of legal ideals and on the role of
ideals in law and society. I will start by giving a systematic overview of his
position on these matters and then turn to the problematic aspects of that
position.
As I have shown in section 6.2, Selznick's views on the ontology and
epistemology of ideals is a mix ofpragmatist and naturalist theses. Selznick's
basic thesis on the nature of ideals is that they are the governing standards of
social phenomena that have natural roots in social reality. From this statement
his theory of ideals can be built up. First of all, the idea of ideals having
natural roots in social reality is furthèr developed. Selznick invokes human
nature to argue that certain key ideals are necessary for human flourishing, for
the achievement of a satisfactory human life. These ideals are rooted in basic
biological phenomena such as sex and parenthood. Selznick extends this
argument to social phenomena of which one can give a parallel argument:
ideals are necessary to achieve a satisfactory functioning of a social
institution, such as law or democracy. The ideal has roots in the social
phenomenon because it is a standard based on the functioning of the
phenomenon. The link between the natural and social basis of ideals is
achieved by a sociological theory connecting life in society to the basic needs
of human beings.
The idea of ideals having roots in reality needs to be further developed to
make clear how the ideal as a standard of evaluation arises from its basis in
that reality. To do this, Selznick appeals to pragmatism's idea that values are
part of people's problem-solving experience. Looking at Dewey's argument
about values we find that a value standard can be articulated when an inquiry
is made into the conditions and consequences of a problematic situation. A
value is what gives rise to positive consequence and contributes to
13Z The Concept of Ideals in Lega! Theory
improvement of the situation. Values are developed as the result of reflection
upon their conditions or roots in a factual situation and realized when action
is taken to bring the situation in accordance with them. This means that in a
pragmatist view, values are only partly inherent in reality when they are used
as the standard to evaluate a problematic situation, only to the extent of their
factual roots. When they are realized, however, they do inhere in reality:
objects then have value. We now see that the pragmatist view of values is
dynamic. Because values are part ofthe interactions that make up experience,
they move from being standards to guide the changes to be made, to being
aspects of satisfactory arrangements.
Saying that values are developed on the basis of inquiry into problematic
situations also entails a claim about our knowledge of values. This is an
important aspect of Selznick's theory in which he adopts the pragmatist
method. His main epistemological claim about values is that they are
discovered by empirical study. This means inquiry into the particulars of
situations where values are at issue and finding out what circumstances give
rise to a value. Knowledge of values can be achieved by studying the
interrelations between fact and value in social phenomena. Connected to the
empirical knowledge of values as used in experience is the denial that we can
ever have absolute certainty about values. Because our knowledge of values
is connected to empirical situations, improved understanding of such
situations can cause us to amend our understanding of the connected values.
Dewey even makes the stronger claim that reality is continually changing: the
world is not a static environment. This means that the conditions giving rise
to values change, and that these values themselves need to be adapted to new
circumstances. Then we do not only have provisional knowledge of values, the
values themselves come to have provisional validity. I am not sure whether
Selznick follows this reasoning to the full. He certainly believes that our
knowledge ofvalues is never more than provisional, but because ofthe basis
of values in human nature and the nature of society, values themselves are
connected to the more enduring aspects of our existence.
Selznick distinguishes vaguely between different kinds of ideals. He does
not distinguish between ideals and values; he uses both those terms to refer to
the whole set. The first important distinction is made between the universal
values following from human nature and the values that are relative to
particular cultural arrangements. The second distinction is between master
ideals and, what I have called, their constitutive values. The first distinction
is not categorical: there is a gradual transition from universal to culturally
determined values. Moreover, there is usually a connection because vague
universal values are given different interpretations in different cultures. The
distinction between master ideal and constitutive values can be made because
Selznick refers to master ideals as complex ideals that govern normative
systems. They are complex because they consist of a set of subordinate
standards making different demands. Master ideals are important in Selznick's
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theory because they are the governing ideals of normative systems: the
behaviour of the persons involved, the specific norms of the system and the
values making up the ideal all need to be interpreted in the light of the
governing master ideal. As I pointed out, it is more fruitful to see the master
ideal as a role that can be performed by an ideal than as a separate type of
ideal. Ideals can both appear as the governing ideal in a normative system, and
can then be called a master ideal, or as a constitutive ideal ofanother master
ideal.
The concept ofa master ideal is central to Selznick's understanding of law,
so I can now turn to the second theme: the role of ideals in law. Let me first
discuss the issue of legal ideals. In Radbruch's theory we saw a fairly clear
distinction between specifically legal values and other social values. Selznick
uses the master ideal of legality to point to what is distinctively legal. Thus,
it seems that legality can be also be seen to be a specifically legal ideal.
Selznick is interested in the relationship between legality and broader social
ideals, primarily justice. However, the distinction between the ideal oflegality
and justice cannot be neatly maintained because of the dynamic character of
legal systems. Selznick sees legality as guarding the integrity of law in
autonomous law, while legality provides the opening to social ideals in the
stage ofresponsive law. In the course of changing from an autonomous legal
system to a responsive legal system, legality changes its character fairly
radically. The question can indeed be raised if it is still the same master ideal
of legality that governs both autonomous and responsive law. Legality is
defined as the progressive reduction of arbitrariness, but the interpretation of
arbitrariness in responsive law makes it much more substantive than it is in
autonomous law. Arbitrary leans towards the unjust in responsive law, and
because of this the distinction between legality and justice fades. Justice
comes close to being the master ideal of responsive law.
Apart from the change in the ideal of legality, Selznick also connects the
shift from autonomy to openness to principles and the generalization of
purpose. Thus, Selznick sees the attention to values as such as an important
determinant ofthe openness oflaw towards society. Principle-based reasoning
is less strict than rule-based reasoning and can therefore more easily
accommodate legal decisions that serve general social purposes. The idea that
attention to values as such makes law open to societal influence reveals that
Selznick has a bias towards substantive values. Procedural values that are
central to the autonomy oflaw, such as certainty and clarity, are subordinated
to substantive moral values such as justice and equality.
The problems to which Selznick's theory gives rise are to a large part
caused by his tendency to combine theoretical insights that are valuable
without considering whether this will still yield a coherent theory. One of the
consequences is that Selznick's theory is not very helpful to develop
conceptual distinctions. I found that for a good understanding ofhis theory of
ideals it was necessary to return to Dewey's ideas, but in my effort to
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reconstruct a theory of ideals I did not succeed in blending the different
components into a coherent whole. I think this is to a large extent the
consequence of Selznick's combination of pragmatist and natural law ideas.
The uneasy combination of the two is my tirst point of criticism. Related are
my second and third point, regarding Selznick's conception of human nature
and the vagueness of the values following from it. Unfortunately, rejecting
that conception ofhuman nature leaves pragmatism wíth a circular argument
to justify ideals. Apart from these points concerning the combination of
pragmatism and natural law thinking, there is a problem with Selznick's
concept of a master ideal, which makes the relationship between ideal and
normative system too close. More specifically, Selznick's conception of the
master ideal of legality is too inclusive; he does not acknowledge that there
might be a change of master ideal due to the development of law.
The main problem with the combination of pragmatism and natural law
thinking is that arguments that certain ideals necéssarily accompany human
nature are combined with an adaptive, concrete and provisional concept of
ideals. In a pragmatist conception the emphasis is on the relevance of ideals
in concrete problematic situations, while a natural law view concentrates on
universal and enduring ideals. This causes a strain because such universal and
enduring ideals can only be established at a highly general level and only give
vague directions. This detracts from their ability for guidance in concrete
problematic situations, which is the important role of ideals in a pragmatist
view. Connected is my criticism of Selznick's conception of human nature, or
more precisely, of his claim that value-realization comes naturally to human
beings. Selznick too easily concludes that, because ideals have roots in human
experience, human beings are naturally inclined to realize those values. His
point that ideals are necessary for human flourishing is convincing, but the
idea that realization of these ideals is natural depends on the presupposition
that people are naturally seeking to flourish. Since Selznick's vision ofwell-
being includes the enhancement of fellowship as moral well-being, this
constitutes a view of human nature that is overly optimistic. To convince,
Selznick needs to argue why human tendencies towards vice and harmful
behaviour are less natural. I have already touched upon my third point about
the vagueness of universal ideals. Even if Selznick's view of human nature is
accepted, the ideals connected to human nature are too vague to give direction
in concrete situations. To function as a standard of evaluation, an ideal needs
critical potential: it needs to specify what a valuable state of affairs is. Such
standards do not have universal reach because what is good depends to a large
extent on circumstances. Against these two critical points regarding Selznick's
natural law leanings, a wholly pragmatist theory also has a problem. Because
the validity of ideals is made dependent on the improvement they can make
in practical situations, on the consequences they have in concrete experience,
they are justified in terms of the good end to which they contribute. However,
they also determine what that good end is: the ideal sets the standard to which
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the situation ought to be brought. Thus, the justification ofthe ideal is circular.
If we want to use a pragmatist theory of ideals, this problem needs to be
addressed.
Selznick's concept of the master ideal is valuable because it enables one
to indicate ideals that are especially important in a specitïc field and to argue
that these have a closer relation to that field than other ideals. The problem
with Selznick's view on master ideals, however, is that the relation with the
normative system they govern is so close that the normative system and the
ideal are virtually defined in terms of each other and the ideal provides the
unity of the system. This is at odds with Selznick's belief in empirical
variation: there is no good reason to exclude orientation towards the master
ideal from the range of empirical variations. By this I mean that it is very well
possible that a normative system is governed not by one master ideal, but by
more than one, or that it comes to be governed by an entirely new ideal over
time. The latter possibility `~~ould fit in Selznick's own theory of legality.
Selznick sees the development of law from autonomous to responsive law as
a change in the meaning of legality as the master ideal of law. However,
because legality in responsive law is interpreted as the banishing of injustice,
it seems more in keeping with his ideas to see the development as a change in
governing ideal as well, from legality to justice. An argument can also be
made that the change from autonomous law to responsive law is not complete
and that both legality and justice are the governing ideals of law at the
moment. I will argue for the latter position in section 7.4. In this revised form,
the concept of a master ideal is a valuable tool.
Chapter 7
Developing a Concept of Ideals for Legal Theory
1 Different Concepts
In the previous four chapters I have examined the views oftwo theorists about
the nature of ideals and their role in the field of law. In this chapter I want to
compare my conclusions regarding these theories and, on the basis of that
comparison, w~ork on the further development ofa plausible concept of ideals.
Because I primarily want to use such a concept to assess the role of ideals in
law, I will apply the concept in the context of law and propose an account of
legal ideals.
From my discussion of the views of Radbruch and Selznick on the nature
of ideals it will have become apparent that the two theorists hold different
views on the ontological basis of values. Whereas Radbruch starts from a
dualistic point of view, Selznick is committed to a monistic point of view. At
first sight, it seems that one could attribute to Radbruch a transcendent concept
of ideals and to Selznick an immanent concept. However, exactly in what way
and to what extent their views correspond to the two types of concepts
developed in Chapter 2 needs to be examined. First, I want to show which
specific versions of the transcendent concept and the immanent concept are
endorsed by Radbruch and Selznick, respectively, and what this entails for
their conception of the specific features of ideals. In section 7.2, I will
examine whether Radbruch and Selznick have an answer to the problems
related to the two concepts of ideals, which were pointed out in section 2.4. I
will then concentrate on the pragmatist view of ideals as the most plausible
theory, and try to improve its weaker points (7.3). In section 7.4, I will connect
the discussion of concepts of ideals to law and, building on insights gathered
from Radbruch and Selznick, give a pragmatist account of the ideals of law.
Radbruch 's transeendence
To see which concept of ideals Radbruch endorses and to what extent it can
be characterized as a transcendent concept, we need to recall Radbruch's
characterization of values. In Chapter 4 we saw that Radbruch conceives of
values as retraceable to self-evident, absolute axioms. Radbruch follows a
Kantian mode of argumentation for his concept of ideals. He shares the view
of ideals as necessary elements of human thinking which order the world as
we know it. Although the basis of Radbruch's view is generally Kantian, there
are many specifically neo-Kantian elements in his view of ideals. First of all,
Radbruch is neo-Kantian in identifying ideals with values (Werte) and in
seeing the category of values as the central ordering force of the cultural
world. In this neo-Kantianism differs importantly from other types of
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Kantianism and the theory of Kant himself.' The central feature of a neo-
Kantian ontology ofvalues is that values are seen not as existing in reality, but
merely as having validity. Thus, by attributing different modes of existence
to facts and values, neo-Kantianism is a prime example of a dualistic world
view.
These characteristics of Radbruch's theory of Kantian and neo-Kantian
origin enable me to show in what manner and to what extent Radbruch's
concept of values is in accordance with the transcendent concept of ideals
presented in Chapter 2. The central features of that concept are that ideals are
perfect, abstract, inherently unrealizable, and not susceptible to complete
formulation. Although Radbruch does not speak of values in these terms, his
endorsement or non-endorsement ofthese features can be inferred from other
claims he makes. The absolute values serving as axioms of value systems can
be described as highly abstract: they are the fundamental concepts of
goodness, truth, beauty, justice. Evidence that these values are in themselves
seen as abstract can also be gathered from the attention Radbruch pays to ways
of giving these values more specific content. A noteworthy example is the
formal value of justice which needs to be supplemented with specific
interpretations of the good (1932, 278-279).
The issue of the unrealizability of values is complicated in relation to
Radbruch's theory. At iirst sight inherent unrealizability seems easy to
attribute to Radbruch: because he characterizes values as ubenti~irklich, as
beyond reality, the ideal and the real are by definition never joined
completely. If his dualism is thus taken to be synonymous with the inherent
unrealizability of values, Radbruch does indeed defend it, but this does not
quite do justice to his position. If unrealizability is taken to mean that there is
no way in which the demands made by values can be completely satisfied in
real situations, inherent unrealizability is harder to attribute to Radbruch. He
says that cultural realities have the meaning to realize values without implying
that such realization is impossible. However, even if Radbruch should be
interpreted as saying that cultural realities mean to realize values and therefore
in some sense must be able to realize them, it can be argued that he subscribes
to the view that values can never be co~npletelv realized in reality. This is
because values make such strong demands that a complete fulfilment is
impossible, and because values necessarily conflict. The claim to
unrealizability ofRadbruch's legal values is rather strong because the different
values require each other and conflict with each other out ofnecessity: the one
cannot be realized without, but at the same time is impeded by, the other
The central place of values and the connection to culture is specific to the neo-Kantianism
of Windelband, Rickert and Lask. Other modern theories with a Kantian inspiration
(Rescher 1987, Emmet 1994) are working with the term ideal instead ofvalue, focusing on
the appeal exerted by the unrealizable. The concept ofvalue cannot be found in Kant's own
theory because it was then only current in a restricted sense, meaning economic value. Its
modern use (as broader than economic value) dates from the late nineteenth century.
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values. This is not the inherent unrealizability that is directly implied by a
dualistic method, but unrealizability following from the difficulty to satisfy
the demands made by conflicting values.
Unrealizability because of the strict demands values make is connected to
the íssue of perfection. I identified perfection as a central feature of a Platonic
view of ideals, which carried over to Kantianism. It is not clear whether
Radbruch sees values as necessarily displaying perfection. In favour of the
idea of perfection the axiomatic values are seen as the epitome of what ought
to be: their absolute validity fits well with the idea of perfection. The idea of
perfection, of flawlessness, is an excellent reason for supposing absolute
axioms: perfection is exactly what makes the unqualified validity ofaxiomatic
values plausible and it can explain why these values can serve as the basis for
other values. It is, however, not the perfection of a perfect world: each value
in itself is flawless, but in Radbruch's theory the absolute values conflict, so
that there can be no harmonious realm of perfect values. Values are formal
ideas we construct, they do not inhabit their own realm ofperfection. In this,
his theory differs essentially from the Platonic view of ideals. It seems that
Radbruch could accept the feature of perfection, in the sense of the
flawlessness of an idea, regarding absolute values. We should keep in mind,
however, that in Radbruch's system this abstract account of values as ideas is
combined with a relativistic account of how values work in cultural realities:
then they do not appear as abstract ideas but as part of the value systems to
which people are committed. The concrete value judgments people make can
eventually be traced back to an absolute ultimate value, but the derivative
values that form the bulk of value systems cannot be seen as perfect value
ideas.
The last of the proposed features of the transcendent concept of ideals,
impossibility offormulation, cannot be attributed to Radbruch. Radbruch does
not appear to support the idea that values might be essentially impossible to
formulate completely. The value that takes centre stage in his theory,
Gerechtigkeit, is given a very precise formulation: it is the formal equality of
treating like cases alike. As Radbruch ofcourse acknowledges, formal equality
has only part of its meaning specified, namely that of the relationship it
constructs. But for him this does not mean that the value cannot be completely
formulated, only that it needs supplementation from other values. For
Radbruch, the key issue is that the value ofjustice cannot stand on its own,
which is connected to the issue of abstractness, not to that of formulation.
Selznick's imrnanence
In a manner reminiscent of Radbruch's combination of necessary absolutes
and relativistic elements, Selznick combines two strands of the immanent
concept of ideals: the moral universals of natural law and the provisional
values of pragmatism. Ofcourse, Selznick does not see these two as opposites
- because of his integrative theory one could hardly expect that - but as
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continuous (1992, 24). In his focus on universals, values that are valid for
every human being because they are grounded in human nature, Selznick can
be associated with an Aristotelian variety of natural law theory.' He is a
pragmatist in his emphasis of the provisional character of our knowledge of
ideals, of a scientitic approach, and ofthe continuities between, not only fact
and value, but also theory and practice, means and ends. Selznick combines
the Aristotelian concern for values in connection to human flourishing (1992,
102) with the pragmatist view of values as of variable importance grounded
in experienced problems (60).i
Selznick's commitment to pragmatist naturalism leads to a mixed
conception of the features of ideals. In Chapter 2's discussion of the features
of the immanent concept of ideals, I mentioned the following features: ideals
are identical to values, they are inherent in social reality, they are latent or
implicit in practice, and they are essentially realizable. Naturalism was seen
to differ from pragmatism in seeing values as universal and enduring. About
the identity of ideal and value 1 can be brief: in Chapter 6 we have seen that
Selznick uses the terms ideal and value as interchangeable concepts and that
he emphasizes similar characteristics in regard to both. However, Selznick's
position on the other proposed features of ideals merits more extensive
discussion.
The inherence of ideals in reality is as central to the immanent concept of
ideals as the inherent unrealizability is to the transcendent concept: it follows
directly from a monistic ontology, from the unity of fact and value. For
Selznick, the importance of the inherence of ideals lies in the basis of ideals
in nature and experience. On this point, the contrast with Radbruch is at its
greatest: whereas Radbruch is concerned to retrace values to an absolute
foundation ofindubitable validity, Selznick finds the validity ofvalues in their
experienced worth for human life. The factual basis of values ranges from
clearly biological to inherently social phenomena, unified in being found in
human experience. Because of this view of the natural basis of values his
theory can be characterized as naturalistic, meaning that values are seen as
based in human nature.
Selznick's theory ofhuman nature is supported by his pragmatist emphasis
on empirical knowledge: what human nature is has to be determined by
empirical research, the results of which are always subject to further inquiry
and therefore never completely certain. Similarly, knowledge of values has to
Selznick explicitly acknowledges the natural law connection in 'Sociology and Natural
Law' (1961, 85) and the Aristotelian connection in Tlre Moral Canmo~rwealth (e.g. 1992,
59, 209).
Selznick calls the combination of the two `naturalism'. (n my discussion of Selznick's
theory I try to separate the Aristotelianlnatural-law influences from the pragmatist influence
as much as possible. This is complicated by the fact that a form of naturalism is also an
aspect of [he pragmatist theory of John Dewey; when referring to pragmatism and Dewey
1 focus on the parts of the theory that are distinctive, i.e. the provisional validity ofvalues,
the emphasis on problem-solving and on consequences.
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be acquired by studying them as aspects of empirical phenomena. But
Selznick does not see values merely as answers to contingent problem
situations - which is the view of Dewey on values; instead, he shares the
natural law quest for enduring universal ideals. Selznick proposes to combine
the view that values answer concrete problematic situations with the idea that
there are a number of universal, nature-based values. Thus, his views on the
universal and enduring character of values are related to the different kinds of
ideals that can be distinguished. Ideals that have a basis in human nature are
universal and enduring, while the more concrete and local values need not be.
For Selznick, the inherence of ideals in reality is very closely connected to
the latency of ideals. I identified latency as the idea that ideals are present in
natural or social phenomena in a rudimentary form, even if they are not
recognized. In Selznick's theory the latency of ideals follows from their
having natural roots. It is because of the connection to a natural phenomenon
that ideals have a role to play even when they are not explicitly recognized by
the people involved. The social scientist studying the phenomenon can
articulate the ideal latent in it to understand and evaluate the phenomenon.
Again, his argument is a naturalist one: it is because of the connection to the
functioning ofnatural and social phenomena that ideals should be understood
as latent in these phenomena. Selznick does not say much about the role of
implicit ideals as such, that is, about ideals w-ithout their being articulated
either by a participant or by an observer. He is concerned to connect the
articulation of an ideal by a scientist to the real roots of the ideal; implicit
ideals only work for the people within the practice itself. The idea of ideals
remaining implicit but being effective standards is compatible with his views,
but not his prime concern.
Concerning the essential realizability of ideals, Selznick's view is not
immediately clear. As in many other aspects of his theory, he is concerned to
emphasize the variability in the realization of ideals.' Demanding and far-
reaching ideals may be unrealizable, but for modest ideals it is very well
possible that they can be realized. Selznick does not give criteria for assessing
the degree of realizability of an ideal except the rather vague idea that
demanding ideals are less easily realized than modest ideals. What makes an
ideal demanding? Part of Selznick's answer would be that this is a matter that
can be solved by examining ideals in the context of the empirical phenomena
in which they are at work. Here we can appeal to the idea of a master ideal and
its constitutive values. A master ideal consists of different standards, which
makes it more difficult to realize the encompassing ideal because different
values have to be realized all at once. Selznick himselfsuggests as much when
he points out that the attainment ofcomplex ideals depends on a precarious set
of congenial circumstances (Nonet 8c Selznick 1978, 26). Additionally, it is
probable that the constitutive values of a master ideal often make competing
' Personal communication, 8-2-1997.
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demands.`
Selznick is thus seen to defend an immanent concept of ideals that
combines aspects ofthe naturalist and the pragmatist versions ofan immanent
concept. By distinguishing different kinds of ideals, ranging from universal
moral ideals to specific, problem-oriented values, he sees ideals as having
particular features to varying degrees. The problems to which this combination
gives rise are the subject of the next section.
2 Assessment
The characterization of Radbruch's and Selznick's concept of ideals as
transcendent and immanent, respectively, does not yet reveal much about the
merits oftheir theories of ideals. Here, I want to evaluate the different strands
I distinguished in those theories and the connections that are made between
them. Both theorists combine different versions of the transcendent and
immanent concepts; I will examine how convincing those different versions
are and how successful the combinations between them are.
I will look at Radbruch's theory first. In Chapter 4, I have already indicated
that, in Radbruch's combination of absolute values and limited relativism,
there is a problem in keeping that relativism contained. There appears to be no
good reason to limit the reach of relativism to interpretations of the good,
assuming that it does not affect interpretations ofother absolute values. Thus,
the first point to be taken is that Radbruch's theory needs to be reinterpreted
to make a plausible, non-arbitrary division between absolute and relative
elements. The second point to be addressed is the plausibility of values as
constitutive principles of cultural realities. I argued that a convincing account
ofvalues as constitutive for reality necessitates a formal interpretation ofsuch
values, which impairs their ability to function as evaluative standards. That
leads to the third point: if the constitutive and evaluative functions are
separated and only constitutive formal values can be derived by a priori
argument, the question becomes urgent where to find evaluative standards.
Relativism is an answer to that, but it does not seem a very satisfactory one
because it does not provide objective standards ofevaluation. The second and
third points against Radbruch's theory are forms of more general objections
to the transcendent concept of ideals. If the argument from a priori necessity
can only ground formal ideals, stripped of content, the bulk of evaluative
standards have to be found elsewhere. It is only by giving up the strict
necessity of ideals that the transcendent concept can keep form and matter of
ideals together, but as we saw this makes the foundation of ideals less secure.b
To return to the first point: a plausible reinterpretation of Radbruch's value
5 This would mean incorporating some of Radbruch's ideas about conflict. I will present an
argument concerning the complexity of ideals in section 4 on ideals and law.
b This is the move made by the constructivist theory of ideals, which distinguishes it from
Kantianism (see section 2.2).
Developirrg a Corrcept of Idecrlsfor Legal Theory 143
theory, in my view, would combine a set of absolute formal values with a
relativism ofinterpretation ofall those values. Radbruch's relativism, we saw,
is particular in its idea that the choice of a highest value is limited to a choice
among strictly limited varieties. This limitation was based on the idea that
only what derives from human beings can be aw-arded true value -
Radbruch's anthropocentric principle. Now this principle, which can already
be questioned in regard to the ethical value of the good, becomes more
problematic if it is right to say all the absolute values are formal and need be
given content on a relativistic basis. Possible interpretations of the values of
truth and beauty, and maybe also of justice, cannot plausibly be limited to
versions ofman-based value. In regard to all of these values, it seems arbitrary
to exclude possible interpretations because they do not rank man-related
objects highest. If Radbruch's aim of a typology of value systems is taken
seriously, other possible interpretations of truth, beauty, the good, and justice
should also be considered. It seems that, for instance, the beauty of nature
could plausibly be regarded as a higher form of beauty than the beauty of a
painting. Radbruch's thesis that only a small part ofreality (connected to man)
can be the substratum ofhighest values is unduly restrictive. Radbruch's idea
that relativism concerns interpretation and choice of highest values in no way
seems to bar a broader range of alternatives of interpretation than he himself
offers. But what then remains of Radbruch's ambition of giving a typology of
values, a system of value systems? This could still be done, although it would
have to be done differently: taking as a starting point the formal absolute
values, possible interpretations will be constrained by the form ofthose values
and the range of choices would therefore not be unlimited.
Again, we have returned to the starting point of formal absolute values, so
it seems right to address the issue directly and move on to the second point of
criticism. In Radbruch's case, the argument of the a priori necessity of values
is made in relation to cultural realities. Cultural realities can only be
understood as having the meaning (Sirrrr) to realize values, and this necessary
relation between reality and value is how a value is constitutive of that reality.
Being oriented towards a specific value makes a cultural reality what it is,
which means that the value is necessary to distinguish a part of reality as a
specific cultural reality. The value must be presupposed if one is to make
sense of the cultural reality. To repeat Radbruch's example: the cultural
phenomenon of science only has a point, is only recognizable as a particular
part of reality, if it is supposed to be oriented towards truth. Therefore, there
is a necessary relation between truth and science. But, as Radbruch recognizes,
practising science and recognizing science as science is compatible with
variation in the achievement of truth, and also, I would add, with a range of
different interpretations of what truth is. If the unity of such a part of reality
is connected to the notion of truth, it does not depend upon a unified striving
for a full-blown ideal of truth. For instance, both a traditional biologist who
believes truth is what correctly maps physical real ity and a pragmatic physicist
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who believes truth is what works are intelligibly at work in the field of
science. The value that makes up the field of science must be on a more
abstract level transcending these differences in order to define that reality,
which makes it a very formal value.
At such a level of abstraction, values are virtually devoid of content, and
by that token, unable to function as independent standards ofevaluation. There
is a rift between the constitutive and evaluative functions of values, which we
have already encountered when discussing Radbruch's ambiguities in the use
ofjustice (Ge~.echtigkeit). To function as an evaluative standard a value needs
a degree of substance that is not compatible with the abstraction needed to
form a cultural reality. In order to evaluate to what extent a value is realized
in a certain field or situation, it is not enough to have a merely formal idea of
that value, it is necessary to have a full picture of what ought to be realized.
The example ofjustice can again be instructive. The formal interpretation of
justice serves well to identify what counts as law: rules or court proceedings
are recognizable as legal because they purport to treat like cases alike, that is,
to serve justice in the formal sense. However, if one wants to evaluate the
justice ofa certain rule or decision - the extent to which it realizes the value
ofjustice- it is not enough to assess whether like cases are treated alike: one
needs to turn directly to the merit of the decision of what counts as like or
unlike. In order to use the value of justice as an evaluative standard, one
always needs to go into the adequacy of the criterion employed to determine
what is equal or unequal. The outrage of punishing a redhead more severely
than a blonde is not in their being treated as unlike while they are alike: they
are unlike in this respect. The outrage is in employing the wrong criterion, a
trivial difference in hair colour, for inflicting punishment. Evaluating the
realization ofjustice can only be done by including the worth of the criterion
to distinguish equal from unequal.
The tension between the two roles of values in Radbruch's theory brings
us to the third difficulty: where to find evaluative standards. In their
constitutive role, as formal prerequisites, values have a secure basis: they can
be shown to be necessary for recognizing cultural realities. In their evaluative
role, such a secure basis is lacking. In my discussion of the relation between
the absolute and relative elements of Radbruch's theory, I have shown that a
coherent reconstruction of his theory would yield a formal core of all absolute
values and a relativistic interpretation of these values. Consequently, the
substantive values needed as evaluative standards will have to be relativistic,
that is, depending on the personal choice for a value system. For Radbruch,
this is the way values acquire content: the substantive side to the Rechtsidee
was the element relativistically determined. There is, however, a major
problem in determining evaluative standards by a relativistic method: the
problem ofjustification. If the substance ofa value is simply dependent on the
choice of a person or group believing in it, how can the use of that value as a
standard of evaluation, of criticism, be justified'? In Radbruch's theory, the
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interpretation of a value is a matter of personal choice or allegiance; no
reasons can be given for preferring the individual over the collective as the
highest good. Ifhis relativism must be extended to other values than the good,
this becomes an even bigger problem. That this generates difficulties is
apparent from Radbruch's own post-war writings: there, Radbruch gives
justice a more substantive interpretation, because the value ofZweckmuf3igkeit
does not yield an objective standard- it is this element of the Rechtsidee that
is relativistic. Radbruch himself saw the need for an indubitable foundation for
values. Unfortunately, his theory can only provide it to a small extent: only the
absolute values have a solid foundation as necessary preconditions of the
cultural world, and then only as formal values.
Selznick's theory promises us objectivity by locating values in the reality of
social life instead of in subjective consciousness. His theory does indeed steer
clear of most problems of Radbruch's neo-Kantianism, but it is not without
failings of its own. Because Selznick's theory connects values to human nature
and social practices, the way to establish the objectivity of values is by
reference to factual findings. In the place ofthe a priori argument for absolute
values, which is strong but hard to satisfy, there is the more contingent
empirical argument for values following from human nature. Such an
argument gives values an objective basis, but it is more contingent than the
argument from necessity in two ways: because knowledge about values and
human nature is provisional, and because human nature itself and its
accompanying values may change. This small set of values with a basis in
human nature is accompanied by other values with an even more contingent
basis in social practices. The merit of this kind oftheory is in the combination
of an empirically grounded objectivity with an open and dynamic character of
values. This is predominantly achieved because of the pragmatist theory of
knowledge that underlies it: because true knowledge is defined in terms of
what solves specific problems, it is liable to change in altered circumstances.
The claim to objectivity is preserved, but the conditions to be satisfied have
been made more dynamic. This has the advantage that values are not
necessarily all-encompassing, relevant to all situations, but neither are they the
whims of particular persons. However, although the theory provides an
attractive model of values, there are a number of problematic aspects to its
argument.
The difficulties arising from Selznick's theory parallel those ofRadbruch's
theory to a certain extent. One could say that both combine a secure basis of
universal values with an account of local values as more shifting or
provisional. Both also claim rather more for their secure basis than is
warranted. In Selznick's case, because of his strain against dichotomies, the
difference between the two parts of the theory is obscured by the stress on
gradual difference and variation, but there is a break between the basis in
human biology and the varieties of social practice. Selznick bridges the two
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via the social nature of human beings, but the role of the natural side of his
theory is rather different from the mainly social. The first and major difficulty
regards the ease with which Selznick draws unequivocal conclusions from
human nature. His argument is much weakened if his conception of human
nature is questionable. The second point of criticism also concerns the
universal values with a natural basis. Even if we accept Selznick's theory of
human nature, the vague values following from it do not give us much
direction. As wíth Radbruch's abstract absolutes, Selznick's vague universals
have little power as evaluative standards. Thus, more emphasis needs to be put
on the pragmatist element of the theory. The third difficulty concerns the
pragmatist conception of values: because of the connection between values
and consequences, the justification of values is directly circular. This is
problematic if values need to function as standards ofcriticism and directions
for change.
Selznick's view of the nature of human beings is distinctly teleological,
meaning that it includes a vision on human flourishing, the fulfilment of a
human life. Of major importance for human flourishing is the realization of
the values that are inherent to human life. What human flourishing is,
however, is hard to define. Selznick would agree that there are a multitude of
ways in which human beings can bloom, but there are certain natural paths
along which human development goes well (1992, 150). The main problem
that I discern is that Selznick identifies the values ofhuman life as natural, as
arising "(...) in the normal course ofhuman experience" (102). This creates the
impression that the positive aspects of human existence are somehow more
normal, or more natural, than its negative aspects. Of course, the positive
things are important for human flourishing as the negative are not, but that
does not make the negative less natural. The picture Selznick sketches of
human development as naturally geared towards flourishing gives the
impression that the negative things in human life are external impediments to
the inner drive of the human being towards the good. Let me illustrate this
argument. Selznick gives examples of the natural basis of values that purport
to show how values arise as a matter of course from completely natural
phenomena: the value of love naturally accompanies sex, giving birth gives
rise to the ideal of motherhood. Something is wrong, unforeseen, unnatural,
if these values do not arise. But is it not as natural that sex and love generate
jealousy, or that a crying child causes its mother frustration? Such negative
emotions can be seen as disvalues, if value is seen as what contributes to
flourishing. These things generally do not contribute to human flourishing, but
they do not seem to be less normal. It follows, ifdisvalue is as natural as value
is, that we cannot conclude that there is a tendency of development towards
a rewarding life as is suggested by the idea of natural human flourishing.
Selznick does acknowledge that there are also negative human tendencies
(1992, 171). He also believes effort is needed to counteract natural tendencies
towards evil (175). However, if this is the case, if humans always need to
Developirrg a Concept of Idealsfor Legal TJteory 147
work to overcome their natural dispositions towards wrongdoing, how can it
be that there is a"latent promise of growth and interaction" ( 171) or " a strain
towarcl an ideal pattern of interaction, obligation, or belonging" ( 192)`?
Selznick is very careful not to overstate his case for the natural basis of ideals,
but at bottom there is always the presumption that there is an inherent human
urge to strive towards the good.
One might also advance as an argument in favour of Selznick's view that
he does not defend the view that values are an integral part of any kind of life,
but only part of life with a certain level of well-being. This, however, would
miss my point. I completely agree that the realization of values is necessarily
part of a satisfactory kind of life. My argument is against the idea that it is
natural, a matter ofcourse, for human beings to achieve such a life: there is no
good reason to suppose that such a life of flourishing is more natural, or less
for that matter, than a life of frustration or misery. If a conception of human
nature is formed accordingly, it will be more neutral about the realization of
value; it will say that human beings are neither destined to promote nor to
frustrate value-realization. I must emphasize here that I agree with Selznick
that it is necessary to pay attention to values or ideals in order to distinguish
the good life from the bad. Saying that human nature does not lead us in either
direction is not saying that there is no such thing as a good life, only that our
nature does not provide the basis for concluding what is good.
I find a more agnostic view of human nature more convincing than
Selznick's view of the latent promise of humanity, but it too is only a theory
of human nature, and therefore not necessarily better than Selznick's theory.
Suppose conclusíve evidence can be produced in favour of Selznick's view of
natural values: what does that tell us about the role and character of such
values? Here we arrive at the second point of criticism. In The Moral
Commonwealth Selznick defends the idea of moral universals, general moral
values that are common to all human beings by virtue of their humanity.
Included in the morality of all societies are values such as, for instance, the
preservation of human life, affection and companionship, prohibition of
murder and theft, hospitality (1992, 96). These values follow from human
nature and the requirements ofgroup life (97), which through the social nature
of mankind can also be seen as natural. If this is all that the study of human
nature has to offer, the role of enduring universal values seems very limited.
Moreover, Selznick himself acknowledges that these general values are
worked out differently in particular groups and societies, so that the concrete
values held by a person or group are much more specific and widely variable.
Thus a serious question keeps presenting itself: what do these universal values
have to offer, how do they function as standards of evaluation, as tools for
understanding and explanation? I think the answer must be that they offer very
little. Take the value ofhospitality. In some cultural settings it is ofparamount
importance to open your door to any passing stranger, while in others this is
done only for your neighbours, or not even that, only for friends and family.
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This means, first of all, that the value of hospitality as such does not explain
much about the way a certain practice works. Apart from that, the general
value of hospitality is of no use as a standard to criticize behaviour or a
practice. One can hardly condemn a citizen of New York for not being
hospitable because she only receives close friends and relations as guests.
Both to enhance our understanding and to function as an evaluative standard,
the formulation of a value at least needs to take certain circumstances and
conditions into account. Both points of criticism give reason to turn to the
pragmatist parts of Selznick's theory instead of the naturalist part for a
satisfactory account of ideals, and to take more seriously the emphasis of "the
primacy of the particular" (1992, 193) than the search for "enduring truths
regarding the morally relevant nature of man" (1961, 102).
The pragmatist inspiration of Selznick's conception of values, which is the
subject ofmy third point of criticism, is best recognizable in Selznick's ideas
about knowledge of values and in his emphasis of the factual context of
values. I will not repeat all the particularities ofa pragmatist theory ofvalues,'
but some central ideas need to be recalled to make clear what are the positive
and negative points of Selznick's pragmatism. The strength of the pragmatist
view is in its down-to-earth view of values, which is visible in the direct
connection between values and concrete problems and the interest taken in
what is empirically known and learnt from experience. Such a view makes the
relevance of values to practical concerns immediately clear. That values are
embedded in the context ofexperienced problems makes knowledge of facts
and values interdependent: trying to grasp the meaning of values in the
abstract is as little use as trying to understand and solve factual problems
without taking values into account. However, at one crucial point pragmatism
fails to take this interdependency seriously: in the definition and perception
of problems and consequently also in the evaluation of the solution of
problems. What is seen as a problem goes unquestioned in pragmatist theory,
while a serious consideration ofthe continuity and interdependence of fact and
value (and of ineans and ends) should also involve the reasons for something
being problematic in the process of reflection. To grasp what is problematic
about a situation, why something needs to be done about it, standards are also
invoked: the situation is not the way it should be. Because a pragmatist theory
does not relate values to the origin of the problem, but only to the solution, its
justification ofvalues is directly circular: what has value is what works as the
solution to a problem, but what counts as a solution depends on the value
standard that gave rise to problem. At times Selznick seems to recognize this
problem of pragmatist theory, for instance, when he says that a theory of the
good is needed (1992, 98). Such a theory is one of the mechanisms which help
to avoid circularity. Selznick's specifcation of such a theory is only a vague
' See section 5.2 for a general discussion of Dewey's pragmatism, and the relevant parts of
sections 2.3 and 6.2 for more specific treatment of his theory of value.
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notion of human well-being, which should be empirically informed. It does
not give enough support to strengthen the pragmatist theory of values.
Let's pause and take stock. We are confronted with two theories of values,
both making an uneasy combination between two parts and both with some
strengths and some weaknesses. There are two dimensions along which the
two theories can be compared. The first is the dimension of absolute versus
relative elements in the concept of values. The second is the dimension of the
objectivity versus the subjectivity of values. The first dimension is about the
validity of values, about the extent to which they can be proven to be valid.
The second dimension is about value ontology, about the way in which values
can be said to exist. Radbruch concentrates on the first question and denies an
objective ontological status of values. Selznick concentrates on the second
question and denies that values can have absolute validity. The absolute and
the relative have a fixed place and a clear meaning in Radbruch's theory. In
his concept, values are of an absolute nature, or can be retraced to an absolute
value. These absolute values are subject to relativistic interpretation: their
concrete meaning and hierarchy are subject to personal choice. The strong
point of Radbruch's theory is its argument for the foundational, abstract,
absolute values. The existence of such values is necessarily presupposed by
our understanding of the cultural world. However, it only convinces if these
values are conceived as more formal than they appear in his own theory. And
it has the important drawback that the content of values has to be found
elsewhere. Radbruch's relativism does give values specific content but it is
more problematic, because it consists of a subjectivism of personal choice
combined with a very strict meta-theory of possible value systems.8
Radbruch's concept ofvalues is derived from the Kantian strand in his theory,
but in effect his relativism dominates because it is the choice and
interpretation of value that determines the concrete constellation of values
influencing the cultural realities. Selznick rejects an a priori and absolute
character of ideals as having an indubitable foundation. In his theory the
division is not between absolute and relative elements, because he does not
accept the possibility of the first. He makes a division between universal,
enduring elements and concrete, changeable elements in his value theory. In
his case, there is a division between general values derived from the naturalist
part ofhis theory which has universal irnplications but has little relevance for
concrete practices, and a more adaptive, context-bound theory with a
pragmatist basis which is dominant in the determination ofspecific values. In
his case, however, it is the pragmatist theory that is most important for the
concept of values: it is the continuity between fact and value that forms the
As 1 pointed out in 1.2, a non-cognitivist form of relativism (as which we can describe
Radbruch'srelativism, becauseoftheemphasison the unarguablechoiceofultimatevalues)
often shades into subjectivism, the idea that values are no more than personal preferences.
In Radbruch's case this has a limited role: only regarding the choice of ultima[e values.
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basis for Selznick's immanent concept ofvalues as latent in the world of fact,
and the pragmatist theory of knowledge that makes the validity of values
provisional and based on their practical worth. It is precisely these aspects of
the immanent concept of ideals that award ideals the combination of
objectivity and a dynamic quality that can make them into relevant standards
of evaluation.
In regard to the objectivity and subjectivity of values, it is Selznick who
argues for an objective ontology. Because Radbruch constructs his concept of
values from within the subject - it is the human mind that chooses to take the
value-relating attitude - the necessity of values is always in relation to that
subjective mind, which means that values cannot be objective in the sense that
they are a part of reality. Values do not exist, they are valid, so for Radbruch
the questions about values concern their validity. The objectivity of values in
Selznick's theory is achieved by a grounding of values in factual situations.
Values are objective because they follow from and answer to empirical
situations. This does not directly yield certainty about values: in a pragmatist
theory facts are also fluctuating events. The validity of values is based, not on
rational necessity, but on practical success: values are valid insofar as they
successfully answer the problems posed by empirical situations. Radbruch
rejects the objectivity of values in an ontological sense because of the gap
between reality and value, while Selznick defends value objectivity in this
sense because his conception of what belongs to reality is broader, including
value.
Thus, from the comparisons along these two dimensions we can gather
three main differences between Radbruch's and Selznick's theory of values.
First ofall, there is a difference regarding the core features of values: absolute
and abstract versus provisional and concrete. Second, there is the difference
in justification: rational necessity versus practical success as the basis for the
validity of values. And most importantly, there is the difference in regard to
ontology: dualism versus monism. These fundamental differences in their
theories make it impossible to combine aspects ofboth into a coherent theory
about the nature of values or ideals. The dichotomies that are central to
Radbruch's neo-Kantianism are precisely what is unacceptable in Selznick's
pragmatism. Moreover, it is not only in their views on values that the two
theories differ but also in their manner of reasoning. The points on which the
theories are convincing are such that trying to combine them would create
serious inconsistencies: justifying values by means of rational necessity is a
foundationalist strategy that is diametrically opposed to the contextual basis
of values that are latent in practice.
Because my aim is to develop a coherent and convincing theory of ideals
that can work for law, I need to take one of these theories as a philosophical
basis. That means either finding a way to build a theory about the substance
of values around the core of empty value forms of Kantianism or
strengthening the justification of values to lessen the circularity of
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pragmatism. The main problem with the first alternative is that the dualistic
ontology of Kantianism bars a role for facts in the justification of values:
factual matters can never be conclusive because the argument for values is
always in relation to ultimate starting points and their acceptability for the
subject that has to give a fïnal judgment. When the road ofrational acceptance
ends, nothing more than personal convictions remain as a ground for the
choice of a certain value. By rejecting the fact-value dichotomy, pragmatism
opens up the possibility to explain the content of values from factual
circumstances. The constraints on values that derive from their being
embedded in practice provide a basis in reality, which is absent in the Kantian
view which stresses the acceptance by the subject. In the pragmatist view of
values, there is no beginning or end to the justification ofvalues, which in the
Kantian view is formed by the absolute necessity offormal values. This yields
a profound difference in outlook because the pragmatist view eschews a
deductive model ofjustification: values are always in the middle ofpractical
concerns - they arise out ofthem and propose answers to them. It means that
the objective basis is concrete and contextual, that the justification of values
has to start with the specific situation in which they are embedded. The main
shortcoming of the pragmatist theory of values is that the circle of relevant
considerations to a specific value is drawn too narrowly. By widening the
range of considerations, including other values, the justification ofvalues can
be improved. On balance the pragmatist theory of ideals is preferable because
of its focus on the practical importance of ideals, highlighting their relevance
to concrete problems and its modest conception of value objectivity. So, now
that the reasons for preferring the pragmatist concept have been laid out, the
task of improvement of that concept needs to be taken up.
3 Improving the Pragmatist Theory of Values
As I have argued, a Deweyan pragmatist theory of values, despite its flaws,
appears as the better option to conceptualize ideals.9 However, some additions
and modifications need to be made to make the problem of circularity less
acute. There are two starting points in Selznick's theory that can be extended
with the help of other theories to improve the pragmatist theory. I already
touched upon the first idea in my criticism of Selznick's theory: the need to
have a theory of the good. This can be given more body with a constructivist
approach, for which Dewey's theory itselfprovides a point ofdeparture. The
second idea that can give a pragmatist theory of values a more secure basis
starts from Selznick's idea of the necessity of values for normative systems.
This can be improved by merging it with a theory of practices.
I have said before that the circularity of the pragmatist theory can be
lessened by paying explicit attention to a theory of the good. The naturalist
9 Following Selznick, l will continue to use the terms `value' and `ideal' as identical.
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basis of Selznick's theory is a step in that direction, but ~ve saw that it only
gives a very general idea. Moreover, not all the conclusions drawn from
human nature about values are convincing, and a modified, more plausible
account of human nature yields even less material to base values on. The
largest problem is that, because of the general character of theories of human
nature, these do not give enough grip to come to a full understanding of the
role ofvalues for specific problems. To grasp the role ofvalues in determining
problematic situations it seems more promising to look for more detailed,
specified theories. Although development of such theories goes beyond my
conceptual inquiry into values, I should say something more about the way
such theories might function.
For a pragmatist framework, we can build on ideas of Dewey about the
construction ofgood and the importance ofcontext. "' In the idea that the good
or value must be constructed, and cannot simply be found, we first of all
recognize Dewey's idea that a critical method must be applied to ascertain
what has value. We can extend this idea of construction by reflecting upon the
model of science which Dewey proposes to use in the assessment of value.
Science proceeds by formulating hypotheses and testing these in experiments.
Such a hypothesis is not formulated as a proposal e.i t~ilrilo, but is related to
two things: the context of the problem at hand and the theory which can
explain it. Pragmatism emphasizes the first, the context of the problematic
situation, but is by no means blind to the second, the theory that supports the
proposed hypothesis. For a satisfactory account of values, theories that can
justify them are a necessary component.
The importance of context, however, is a reason to limit the scope of such
theories. Dewey points out that attention to context cannot mean attention to
all that is possibly relevant to the problem we are considering. In a fruitful
investigation, most ofthe environment that surrounds a situation will remain
unquestioned. Attention to context means differentiating between what is
immediately relevant and what remains in the background; a selective interest
in certain aspects of the context is unavoidable (Dewey 1931, 98). In the
context of the search for a theory of values that is useful for legal theory, this
means making explicit what theories are necessary to support an account of
values that can be applied to law.
It is difficult to indicate such theories in the abstract, because of the
importance ofcontext. In general, I can say that at least a theoretical argument
for the specific values relevant in a legal context is needed. Arguments need
to be given that can justify the values in question and establish a relationship
between the particular legal field and the value in question. The hypothesis
that a certain value is relevant to that legal field needs to be backed by
theoretical considerations justifying the connection. Let me explain by
'0 1 refer to Dewey's titie of the chapter on values in The Quest for Certainty: `The
Construction of Good' (1929), and to the essay `Context and Thought' (193 I).
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returning to the example of private property I gave in Chapter 1.
I used a case about the abuse ofownership rights to indicate the importance
of the ideal of freedom in relation to the right to private property. The case of
the water tower raised the problem of the scope of such a right: how far can
the owner of property go in the exercise of his rights? To answer such a
question, the values underlying the right to private property need to be
examined. The ideal ofpersonal freedom can be advanced to justify the right,
but the scope of that ideal is limited by other value considerations. In relation
to property, these considerations will often be other values important to
society as a whole, e.g. environmental concerns. Freedom is also limited by
the rights of others, bringing in considerations of equality: in the case of the
water tower, two owners have similar rights which clash and thus limit each
other's exercise of rights. However, arguing that these are the values at stake
is not enough to determine the scope of an owner's freedom: simply stating
that freedom is apparently a value supported by the institution of property is
inadequate. The mere identification of values needs to be backed by a
justi~cation of the importance of private property for personal freedom. A
good argument can be made that some form of property is necessary for a
person's autonomy: the moral development ofa person requires independence
as an important source of self-respect." Such ajustification favours the power
of control over property, not the least because this can enhance moral
responsibility. Hence, one can argue that the free exercise of property rights
is needed to stimulate self-restraint. However, when someone fails to show
such self-restraint, legal measures are taken." There is a basic sphere of
freedom of ownership, but misuse of that freedom is not tolerated. A court
decision, as in the water tower case, restraining the abusive exercise of
property rights can be seen as a reaction to a lack ofresponsibility on the part
of the owner. In the case of the water tower this took the form of prohibiting
a use of ownership rights purely to spite one's neighbour.
I believe such an example illustrates how an account of values in a legal
context can be worked out. Considering a specific legal problem or a set of
rules can lead to relevant ideals. The theoretical background of such an ideal
can then be used to construct a more specific interpretation of the ideal.
Relating that interpretation to the details of a case or rule then gives an idea
of the meaning of the ideal in a particular legal context. The most important
role ofbackground theories is to explain the relation between ideals and a field
of law.
See Waldron 1988 and Munzer 1990 for full arguments. Waldron discusses the Hegelian
inspiration for this kind ofargument extensively. This justification has drawbacks. It cannot
be applied to all property: growth ofwealth no longer enhances self-respect after a certain
point, and the argument only applies to personal property. It also has strongly egalitarian
implications (if property is necessary for moral development, everyone has a right to it).
ln current Dutch law, the basis for a legal reaction is the rule prohibiting the abuse of rights:
article 3: l3 Burgerlijk Wetboek (Civil Code).
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A more ambitious project, but one popular with legal theorists such as
Radbruch and Selznick, is the attempt to identify values relevant to the whole
of law and to relate these both to more specific legal provisions and to theories
about the function of law in society. I will try to sketch my own ideas on this
subject, leaning on Selznick and Radbruch, in the next section. An additional
reason to focus on the broader context oflaw as a whole is found in the second
addition to pragmatism I propose: linking ideals to practices. The values
relevant to law as a whole can be seen as core ideals of the practice of law, and
as such they also form the background to more specific problems.
The idea of practices builds on Selznick's view of the link between ideals
and normative systems (1961, 86-91), and, less directly, on Dewey's emphasis
on the practical use of knowledge (1929, 82-83). Contemporary theories that
use ideas similar to Selznick's notion of a normative system usually employ
the notion of a practice. At times in this book I have also used the notion ofa
practice to refer to parts of social reality, of group interaction, without
specifying clearly what the term means or arguing for what it is needed.
Speaking of `practices' makes explicit that practices are part ofeveryday life
and everyone's experience. Adding the idea ofpractices to a pragmatic theory
ofvalues gives the pragmatic focus on problematic situations, to which values
answer, a background of functional domains with certain central values. In the
context of this study, this view of the background to specific problems is
important because it is exactly such a functional domain that is waiting to take
centre stage: law. But before we turn to the specific discussion of law, I need
to explain my understanding of practices, the role of values in them, and the
connection to pragmatism.
Practices can be seen as complex forms of socially established cooperative
human activity." A practice is a medium for people's actions in a social
setting, a way of acting that makes smooth cooperation possible. A practice
is a way of acting that needs to be learnt. This learning is to a large part by
experience, not primarily by one's own experience, but from the experience
of others who are also participating in the practice. Although existing
traditions are important to the functioning of a practice because they provide
a framework ofreference, participants have the freedom to use the practice in
certain ways and to innovate it: each can use it for his own purposes and add
new ways of expression to it. For example, consider the practice of portrait
painting. This can be seen as a gradually developing tradition ofpainting that
started ~vith figurative work that was continually refined, but under the
influence of individual artists the practice was extended to include new forms
In this account I combine aspects of Maclntyre's and Oakeshott's theories of practices
(Maclntyre 1984, 187-196; Oakeshott 1975, 54-60). Maclntyre's conception of practices
is problematic because it makes practiccs appear too homogeneous and coherent (compare
Tamanaha 1997, 170). Oakeshott pays adequate attention to the input of individuals and
their contributions to innovation of practices, but he fails to address the issue of the values
ofa practice.
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of painting, such as the cubistic portraits by Picasso.14
Value-realization is an essential part of every practice. Learning to
participate in a practice also means learning what the point of that practice is
and what can be achieved through it. Learning to be an architect involves
learning about both the technical and the aesthetic aspects ofdesigning a good
building. For this, the values that come with such practice need to be
understood. However, once our young architect knows what it takes to design
a good building, she can give her own interpretation to the technical and
aesthetic values and maybe modify the practice. Because the practice itself is
a medium that is continually evolving both in reaction to changes made by
participants and to changing circumstances, so are the values that accompany
it. Anyone subscribing to a practice has to commit himself to realizing the
values that are inherent to that practice in order to use the practice well. Let
me use the example of friendship to illustrate the role of values in practices.
We can regard friendship as a practice that is a specific kind of relationship
between two people. In a concrete friendship, two persons conduct themselves
according to norms and values that come with this kind of practice. The
particular actions they undertake together are not usually central to a
friendship: what is important is being able to share interests or opinions, to be
in each other's company and above all being able to trust each other. A good
friendship is characterized by the realization ofvalues oftrust, generosity and
commitment. However, how such core values of friendship are developed in
a concrete relationship depends on the interpretation these two friends give
them. The norms following from such values differ, depending on a number
of variables: in a friendship between two little girls letting one's friend borrow
a favourite toy may be the supreme form of generosity, while to a friendship
between adult women generosity may take the form of lending a willing ear
to the other's problems. Taking such variation into account is important to
understand the concrete shape of values, but it should be accompanied by an
effort to identify the core values of a practice because these are central to its
functioning well. Thus, understanding core values of a practice is necessary
in order to evaluate the way a concrete activity makes use of a practice.
Focusing on core values is not tantamount to saying that these are inherent to
a practice in any inescapable way. Because practices are open to whomsoever
learns to use them, and can be modified by their users, participants also have
a voice in criticizing and adapting core values. Both practices and their core
values are subject to change by innovative users. However, such changes are
gradual and slow: the core values of a practice have most often proven to be
highly important to run a practice well. Justice has been a core value of law
for many an age, and although its meaning has shifted in some respects, its
" I borrow the example ofportrait painting from Macfntyre, who does not however extend
it to include Picasso (1984, 189).
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focal points are remarkably stable.15 Care should be taken neither to
overemphasize nor to understate the evolving character of such values.
Let me then sketch the pragmatist value theory as it might look when such
a view ofpractices is incorporated. Values are an integral part of the practices
that qualify human behaviour. Such practices are needed to perform and
coordinate activities in a satisfactory way. Values play the important role of
inherent standards of evaluation that indicate the optimal way to conduct the
practice. Thus, values are developed in a practice and they are tested by their
success in guiding the activities performed by means of that practice. This
means that the evaluation of values themselves is done by relating them to
concrete activities - their capacity to guide, to suggest possibilities - and,
following from that relation, to a wider web of other values and practices, of
past experience and normative and descriptive theories. Values are flexible,
liable to change, to expand and to decay. They are learnt in the course of
participation in a practice and therefore largely acquired through experience.
They are latent in practices, which means, as Selznick says, that they are not
always realized but that they need to be if the practice is to function well.
They often remain implicit but can to a large extent be constructed and
articulated on the basis of practical use and norms that support them. Such an
explication ofvalues should be seen as a proposition, a hypothesis about the
meaning of the ideal. This is a moment in which the subjective interpretation
of the person who does the explicating looms, so care needs to be taken that
the articulation of the ideal is not accepted as definitive. Possibilities should
be kept open for improving on the articulation of ideals, both because better
interpretations are possible and because ideals evolve in reaction to changing
circumstances.
Combining a pragmatist theory of ideals with constructivism and the idea
ofpractices as the framework for concrete actions and problems alleviates the
problem ofcircularity ofjustiflcation. That an ideal itself is part ofthe reason
for having the very problem the ideal is supposed to solve is a kind of
circularity that is to an extent caused by neglect ofthe broader context of both
the problematie situation and the ideal. The limited focus on the concrete
context of a problematic situation can be overcome by adding a constructivist
appeal to relevant theories and an incorporation of practices. Constructivism
brings in relevant theoretical considerations, which go beyond the mere
consideration of the consequences for a problem; orientation on practices
indicates how ideals have roots in ongoing traditions - they are not merely
hypotheses formulated in reaction to a problem, they are standards that have
been developed as a part of an existing practice. This both enhances their
stability and it improves justification because reasons supporting ideals are
found in the way they improve the functioning of practices.
Both additions fit a pragmatist theory well because they tie in with
15 I will discussjustice more elaborately in the next section.
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tendencies recognizable in pragmatism itself. The constructivist element is an
extension of the pragmatist idea that there is a moment of construction
involved in the discovery of ideals: they have to be formulated as hypotheses
before they are put to the test. It means paying attention to the theoretical
reasons for formulating a hypothesis. Emphasizing the connection between
ideals and practices is close to pragmatist philosophy because it connects
ideals to practical experience. As long as care is taken to avoid an absolutist
interpretation ofthe ideals of a practice - a danger that is imminent when the
relation between a particular ideal and a practice is seen as necessary -
connecting ideals to patterns resulting from practical experience builds on the
pragmatist idea that ideals prove themselves in their everyday use.
This easy fit with pragmatism does have one important drawback: these
amendments lessen but do not solve the problem ofcircularity. Linking ideals
to practices gives a context to specific problems but this relocates the problem
of justifying ideals: if an ideal can be assessed by its guiding power for a
practice, how is the functioning of a practice evaluated other than by reference
to the ideal? The constructivist strategy of considering relevant theories
involves a moment of selection by the person concerned. This has the
consequence that there is always an arbitrary element: there are no hard and
fast rules for selecting theoretical considerations. Thus, although the method
puts the pragmatist focus on problematic situations in a broader perspective,
it does not provide an independent source ofjustification. This is the price to
be paid for having an adaptive theory of ideals without absolute and eternal
claims: ideals become flexible and sensitive to context, but thereby lose a
secure grounding.
To conclude this section I will trace the implications of this discussion for
the pragmatist concept ofideals. Many ofthe features distinguished in Chapter
2 have again come to the fore here. The inherence of ideals in experience, in
practice, is the key feature of the pragmatist concept. The starting point of
every inquiry into ideals is how they arise out of existing arrangements and
people's experience. They are inherent to societal practices, meaning not that
they are necessarily part of such practices but they are indispensable for the
good functioning of a practice. Any ideal is open to improvement in the form
of a proposition by those using it as a standard, but such propositions have to
be sensitive to, and be seen as interpretations of, the ideal's roots in
experience. Ideals are flexible and liable to change along with changing
circumstances, but some ideals continue to be meaningful over time. Such
ideals are most often core ideals of a practice, which consist of an intricate set
of constituting values which make competing claims. Because of their
complex nature these ideals continue to point to possibilities of improvement.
They are usually not completely realizable because they both consist of and
are related to other values, making it difficult to satisfy all its demands. The
exact meaning of the notion of complex core ideals can best be explained by
looking at the ideals of a specific practice, and I will turn to that task in the
I58 The Concept ofIdeals in Lega! Theory
next section when discussing ideals in connection to law.
4 Developing a Theory of Legal Ideals
Having established that the pragmatist conception of ideals, despite some
shortcomings, is the most convincing conception, the task remains to specify
its meaning for legal theory. In addition, I want to examine if valuable
elements from Radbruch's philosophy of law can be incorporated in a theory
with a pragmatist basis. Especially Radbruch's ideas about the conflicts
between law's values can serve to remedy some of the blind spots in
Selznick's pragmatism. I will reinterpret Radbruch's ideas to fit a pragmatist
philosophy, being aware that this moves far from Radbruch's own
philosophical and methodological views. I will organize the discussion around
three topics on which Radbruch and Selznick both have valuable ideas: the
central ideals of the law, the autonomy of law, and the meaning ofjustice.
The central ideals of the law
If the pragmatist conception is used as a basis for an examination ofideals and
law, the first theory presenting itself which connects that conception to law is
Selznick's doctrine of the master ideal. What insights does it give us and
where can we use Radbruch's ideas to improve it? Before I start the
discussion, I should strike one cautionary note. Both Radbruch's Gerechtigkeit
and Selznick's legality can be regarded as the ideal specific for law, but they
have a different basis and to a large extent a different function. The major
difference in the theoretical function of the two ideals is that Gerechtigkeit is
constitutive of the domain of law, whereas the master ideal of legality arises
out of the domain of law; the idea of Gerechtigkeit is necessary for the
existence of law, while the ideal of legality is only necessary for a good
understanding of law. In the context of a pragmatist theory, the constitutive
role ofRadbruch's Gerechtigkeit cannot have a place, so that the use made of
Radbruch's theory of legal values is not a full incorporation of his ideas.
We saw that Selznick takes master ideals to be the unifying values of
normative systems or practices (1961, 87). The understanding of a practice
and of an ideal is seen as continuous: we can only understand a practice in
terms of its master ideal and a master ideal in terms of its practice. There are
drawbacks as well as advantages to viewing law in such a way. As I argued in
section 6.4, defining law in terms of one master ideal of legality is liable to
create the false impression that the field of law can simply be explained in
terms of orientation towards one value. There is the suggestion that we only
need to search for the ideal governing the field to understand what is
characteristic of that field. On the positive side, thinking of law in terms of a
master ideal does draw attention to the possibility that the values that law tries
to realize express to an important extent what is distinctive about law.
Therefore, when the idea ofa master ideal is used with caution it is helpful to
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express the thought that our understanding of law is improved by thinking of
law as governed by certain core values. Care needs to be taken not to overstate
the case: whether law is guided by a master ideal should be seen as an open
question, and if law is guided by a master ideal, the question remains what that
ideal might be.
One ofthe problematic tendencies created by the concept of a master ideal
is that a relationship is taken to exist between practice and ideal that is a
union: the ideal is relevant to al] of the practice, both in the sense that it
governs the whole practice and that it can be recognized in the whole practice.
Such a view creates the danger of defining either practice or ideal merely in
terms of its counterpart: because there exists a practice such as marriage, the
values attached to the practice must be aspects of a master ideal of marriage.
In that case, the answer to the question whether the presence of a master ideal
is plausible in any given practice, is taken for granted. However, when that
question is taken seriously, an important issue arising is under what conditions
one can meaningfully speak ofone governing master ideal; more specifically,
it is a question of how to appreciate a plurality of opinion about governing
ideals. If the relation between master ideal and practice is viewed as mutually
determining, it approaches the constitutive role ofvalues found in Radbruch's
theory: understanding the practice as necessarily oriented towards the ideal
makes value-orientation a defining criterion of the practice. We saw how this
creates a tension between the constitutive and evaluative roles of values.
However, in Selznick's view of law, the relationship between the master
ideal and law is not quite so strong. Because he does not define law in terms
of orientation towards legality, the relation between the master ideal of
legality and the practice of law is more contingent. Law is defïned weakly,
following Hart, as a system of primary and secondary rules, without reference
to values. It is only when expounding his strong theory of law that Selznick
refers to law as governed by a master ideal.1ó This means that, in Selznick's
view, it is possible to study legal phenomena without taking the values
involved into account, but that this can only generate a meagre account of
what law is about. A weak definition of law serves to identify what is to count
as legal, but it cannot provide a complete account of the meaning of law. Only
when the values of law are studied as well does one gain a full understanding.
So, although the master ideal is not a defining criterion to recognize law as
such, it is necessary to understand law completely. Master ideals, by
indicating the direction of activity and effort in a practice, provide a handle to
understand what unites a practice. Selznick keeps open the possibility that
ideals may not arise because circumstances prevent them, all the while
implying that a practice without a mature ideal is lacking in quality. Although
we have established that the concept of a master ideal does not necessarily
mean that ideal and practice are defined in terms of each other, there is still a
16 The distinction between weak definition and strong theory is discussed in section 5.2.
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problem with seeing the master ideal as the source of unity for the practice.
The problem is the idea of a unifying value. Seeing law as oriented towards
the ideal of legality suggests that realization of this one value makes a good
legal system: ifarbitrariness is successfully reduced, the ]egal system is doing
well. Although Selznick distinguishes different types oflaw, e.g. autonomous
and responsive law, these are explained in terms ofdifferent interpretations of
the ideal of legality and different mechanisms to realize legality (Nonet 8z
Selznick 1978, 107-108). The continuity between the different types of law is
found in the ideal. Disagreement and differences are only admitted regarding
the meaning of the ideal of legality, not about the reign of the ideal as such.
I detect three problems in this conception of a master ideal: (1) it excludes
the possibility ofconflict between law's own internal ideals, (2) it downplays
changes in the governance of an ideal, and (3) it denies that other ideals than
legality may be of equal relevance to law. Because the theory ignores these
sources of change and conflict, it makes the values of law appear unduly
unproblematic. Legality is a complex ideal comprising many different
standards (Selznick 1961, 94), but eventually these are all seen as serving to
reduce arbitrariness. This creates the impression that the standards which are
part of legality will make concurrent demands, which is unlikely. To see why,
it is illustrative to look at Fuller's discussion of the principles of legality,
which, as he shows, make conflicting demands (Fuller 1969, 45). Take, for
example, two of Fuller's principles of legality: avoiding contradictions
between rules and constancy through time (1969, 39)." When a new rule is
made, this often requires adjustment of other rules to avoid contradictions
between the new rule and the existing body of rules, but too frequent
adjustment of existing rules detracts from the value ofconstancy through time.
These principles can both be seen as demands following from the ideal of
legality, but they do not form a harmonious set of standards.18
That Selznick's master ideal of legality offers an overly harmonious
conception of the ideals of law can also be gathered from the relationship
between legality and justice. Selznick pays attention to the way these two
become more closely connected in responsive law (Nonet óz Selznick 1978,
108), but does not acknowledge the possibility that legality can make demands
that are diametrically opposed to justice. In his view, legality has the law as
its specific domain of application but legality is subservient to, and does not
compete with, the broader ideal ofjustice.19 By virtually ignoring the conf7icts
All principles are quoted with approval by Selznick (1992, 438).
I have used Fuller's principles of legality as constitutive values of the ideal of legality,
sidestepping the discussion on the relation between principles and values. Again, Alexy's
idea ofprinciples as Optintierungsgebote (see 1.4) is useful: Fuller's principles can be seen
as aspirational norms prescribing optimal realization of aspects of legality.
In The Moral Comnronwealt{~j ustice and legality seem virtual ly synonymous when he refers
to the progressive reduction ofarbitrariness as 'the moral objective' of the science ofjustice
(1992, 445). In earlier work the scope of legality is seen as narrower than that ofjustice
(continued...)
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that can arise between legal values,'" Selznick circumvents the need to account
for and to deal with such conflicts. In this respect, much can be learnt from
Radbruch's theory.
Radbruch's threefold idea of law exemplifies an argument about the way
values are both mutually dependent and conflicting. The complexity of the
idea of law is caused by the limited scope ofeach ofthe values that it consists
of. These values therefore require supplementation by other values but this
opens the door to possible conflict: the values are relevant to the same subject
matter but make different demands. Radbruch only used the argument of
antinomies in regard to the idea of law, but a similar argument can be made
about other complex ideals. Whenever a set of values can be discerned which
are all necessary to form an ideal complex enough to govern a practice
meaningfully, there is the likelihood of a conflict between the values making
up the ideal. To salvage the idea of a harmonious ideal, two possibilities for
solving such value conflicts present themselves: one is by denying the
conflicts by saying that the complex ideal really consists of a balanced mix of
values, the other by locating solutions in the context of concrete cases. The
first option, establishing the weight of values is not really plausible. Let's
take up the example of the ideal of legality again, assuming for the moment
that it simply consists of Fuller's eight principles of legality: it is extremely
hard to determine before a concrete case arises how the conflicting demands
of those values are to be resolved.'' It is only when assessing a specific rule
that one can say that in this set of circumstances the constancy ofa rule has to
be given up and the rule changed because a contradiction has come to light.
Thus, the idea that conflicts can be solved in concrete circumstances stands a
better chance. In a specific context, the complex master ideal can even be
helpful to determine which value needs to prevail in the case at hand. When
confronted with values giving contrary directions, it is often easier to decide
in the light ofan overarching ideal. In terms ofthe example: in a specific case,
it may be relatively clear that repairing a contradiction is more important to
reduce arbitrariness than keeping the rule constant. However, the possibility
ofresolving conflicts between the elements ofthe ideal in concrete cases does
not bring true harmony to the complex ideal. Knowing which ofthe elements
should prevail in the given situation does not always detract from the
importance of the elements which are not realized in this case. Solving a
concrete value conflict is often accompanied by a sense of loss regarding the
19(...continued)
(1961, 95; I 969, 12).
Zo The only conflicts between legally relevant values Selznick explicitly recognízes are those
between the different demands of justice: "(...) within a given community, accepted
principles ofjustice are often in conflict and require trade-offs" (1992, 433). However, this
recognition is made about accepted principles ofjustice, not about fundamental values.
`' Fuller himself indicates that there is variability in the ranking of the principles and the
stringency with which they should be applied, depending on the branch of law and the type
of legal rule (1969, 93).
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unrealized values." This constitutes the important sense in which a complex
ideal is unrealizable: the demands it makes can never all be realized to the full.
Although we may desire complete realization of an ideal, this cannot be
achieved because the ideal consists ofconflicting elements. The elements of
a complex ideal form antinomies in Radbruch's sense: they require each other
to fortn a rich ideal but they make demands that cannot all be realized.
The second and third problem about master ideals are closely related and
best discussed together. The possibility ofchange in the governance oflegality
and the possible relevance of other ideals are both connected to the following
question: if the ideal and the practice of law are not defined in terms of each
other, how can the master ideal be determined`? Selznick's argument about
master ideals is based on the idea that there is an inclination in a practice such
as law towards value realization. From this premise it is easy to move on to
the idea that a certain practice inclines towards a specific ideal. This is part of
the argument in `Sociology and Natural Law', where Selznick pairs normative
systems with accompanying master ideals, which more often than not are even
named after the normative system. The ideal of friendship governs the
normative system of friendship, as the ideal of democracy governs a
democracy (1961, 86). This makes it seem as if the master ideal of such a
practice is simply a name for the set of values that guide the practice at a given
moment. This impression is strengthened when the place of legality in the
argument about the development of law is considered (Nonet c4~ Selznick
1978). One of the differences between the stage of repressive law, on the one
hand, and the stages of autonomous and responsive law on the other is that it
is not governed by the idea] of legality. Repressive law is not governed by
legal ideals, it is an instrument of power to those in charge and only serves
dominant social values. In the stages where law does serve a legal ideal, it
serves the same ideaL "The `master ideal' of responsive law, as of
autonomous law, is legality" (1978, 107). However, the ideal of legality
changes from a formalistic to a purposeful ideal; the emphasis on security and
procedure is traded for a focus on adaptation and moral aims. If both are
interpretations of the ideal of progressively reducing arbitrariness, what does
that mean for the continuity of that ideal? It seems that the interpretation of
what is seen as arbitrary and needing elimination is radically different. As I
have indicated before, legality in a responsive legal order comes so close to
justice that it is hardly distinguishable. In the context of Selznick's model of
legal development, it is possible to see justice as the master ideal ofresponsive
law and to reserve the ideal of legality for autonomous law. Distinguishing
between different ideals as belonging to different types of law makes it easier
to see the prevalence of one ideal as an indication of the corresponding type
of law: detection of a greater concern for (substantive) justice is one of the
Zz Thus, the conflicts between the elements ofcomplex ideals are potentially tragic conflicts
as described by Van den Brink (2000, 27-38): realizing the one necessarily frustrates the
others.
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markers of a development towards a responsive legal order. This does not
mean that legality and justice must be seen as exclusive ideals: we can also
think of legal systems which are plausibly viewed as guided by both legality
and justice, without one or the other being the dominant master ideal.
Once the argument is accepted that a certain master ideal can lose its
predominance over law, the question can immediately be raised what other
ideal might take its place and how such master ideals might be related. In the
context of Selznick's theory, the argument can be made that there is a shift
from legality to justice as the dominant ideal of law, because ofthe changing
character of law and its changing place in society. Here, I want to make a
different argument, not on the basis of Selznick's developmental model, but
by looking more concretely at parts ofpositive law that display the orientation
towards ideals and at theories about the function of law in society. Positive
law provides a specific context needed in a pragmatist theory, and a theory on
law's functions can provide some of the necessary theoretical background. I
hope this may give some indications ofwhich ideals can plausibly be regarded
as central ideals of law. Theories about law and society that are coherent with
the pragmatist theory of ideals, apart from Selznick's ideas, are other theories
with a pragmatist leaning such as the legal realism of Llewellyn and Fuller's
interactionism (Llewellyn 1940; Fu11er 1969; 1981). Both theories distinguish
certain purposes or social functions that law serves, recognizing that these
involve an ideal aspect.'̀ ' From the combination ofpositive law, legal ideals
and these theories, an argument can be constructed for certain central legal
ideals. A note ofcaution, however: the following is no more than an indication
of how such an argument can be built up. For a full argument, more detailed
information is necessary which would require a study of more specific legal
practices which are outside the scope of this work.
To derive the content of general legal ideals from positive law, one would
need to look at a shared orientation of the body ofrules of a legal system. To
see how this can be done, Radbruch can be taken as an example. In the second
part of his Rechtsphilosophie, Radbruch connects his legal philosophy to
specific parts of legal doctrine and examines the way values appear in these
fields of law. What is most striking about these discussions is that the
influence of substantive political values, instead of specifically legal values,
is paramount in most fields, except in procedural law. For instance, in the
main branches of private law, properiy law and contract law, an ideal of
personal autonomy is in tension with the value of social utility ( Radbruch
1932, 375, 380). The specifically legal values of Rechtssicherheit and
Gerechtigkeit can be recognized primarily in the formal aspects of law, in its
Z' Llewellyn's theory of the `law-jobs' contains reference to both the `bare-bones' and the
`questing' aspects of the law-jobs (1940, 1375). These resemble Selznick's combination of
baseline and flourishing. Fuller's theory contains acomparable combination ofthe morality
ofduty and the morality of aspiration, which are both present in the morality of law (1969,
5 ).
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structure and its procedures (e.g. 416-417). Radbruch's examination is not
comprehensive and it is inspired by the German legal system of his day; but,
taking the limiting factors of its historical and local character into account,
there are some general points that can be gathered from Radbruch's work. The
influence of general social or political ideals on the content of law is
dominant, but specifically legal ideals exert their influence by way of the
structural and procedural aspects of law. However, the question remains
whether Radbruch's identification ofjustice and legal security as the two legal
ideals can also be generalized. To see whether it can it is helpful to look at the
rules and principles of an existing legal system. To that end, I will proceed by
examining examples from Dutch law as additional material about positive law
before moving on to background theories.
I have chosen examples from three fields in Dutch law: constitutional law,
administrative law and private law. In each of these examples the orientation
of rules and principles towards legal ideals can be recognized. The clearest
example can be found in the Dutch constitution, which starts with an article
formulating a principle of equality - like cases are treated alike - and
forbidding discrimination on a number of grounds such as sex and race. This
article, which was included when the constitution was revised in 1983, can be
regarded as the codification ofa fundamental value that is generally accepted
as a part of Western political thought.'' Thus, the most fundamental
constitutional principle in Dutch law is the recognition of an ideal in a
formulation that closely resembles Radbruch's conception ofjustice as formal
equality. Although it is less formal than Radbruch's value ofjustice because
it identifies certain unacceptable criteria for unequal treatment, it is a clear
formulation of an ideal ofjustice as equality.
My second example is taken from Dutch administrative law: decisions by
administrative bodies have to conform to `genera] principles of good
administration' (algerraene beginselen va~i behoor-lijk bestuur).~s These
principles, which are used by courts to assess such decisions, concern, for
instance, the care with which decisions are prepared and taken, the way
decisions are argued, and the way powers are used. They can be described as
a combination of fairness and legality: they are meant to reduce the
arbitrariness ofdecisions and to make sure all the interests involved are given
due consideration. These principles can thus be described as formulations of
the meaning of the ideals of legality and justice in the context of government
administration. The principles give indications that Radbruch's strict
formulations of justice and legal security are too narrow - at any rate, to
understand the ideals of Dutch law. For instance, there is a principle
Compare Maris 1988, 41. He also points out that the precise meaning ofthe ideal ofequality
is contested. See also Van der Burg 1991, 201-207.
Van Wijk and Konijnenbelt identify twelve principles, most of which have been codified
in the Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht (Awb) of 1994 ( the general statute on administrative
law) ( I 997, 308-417).
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expressing the command to observe proportionality between the purpose of the
decision and the burdens put on those involved.Zb It is a consideration
demanded by the ideal of justice, but it does not follow directly from justice
as formal equality; thus, it gives an indication that the ideals of law need to be
seen as having a broader meaning.
The third example is taken from Dutch private law and concerns the
importance of the doctrine of reasonableness and fairness (r-edelijklreid en
billijkheid). In the Dutch Civil Code, there are a number of instances in which
legal subjects are enjoined to conduct themselves reasonably towards each
other, even setting aside legal rules when such a rule would have unacceptably
unreasonable or unfair results. What defines reasonableness and fairness is
kept open: it is an appeal to unwritten legal principles, to shared legal opinion
and the recognition of individual and social interests." The open character of
the doctrine ofreasonableness creates the possibility of a direct appeal to legal
principles and a sense of fairness in a specific situation. It calls for
consideration of what is fair in the circumstances of a concrete case, and
because of this it can be interpreted as a reference to an ideal of justice.
Because of the open character of reasonableness and fairness, such an ideal of
justice is in tension with demands of legality: the precise norms laid down in
the Code, serving the predictability of the law, can be set aside to give way to
fairness in the specific instance.
On the basis of this discussion ofpositive law the tentative conclusion can
be drawn that there are indications of an orientation towards ideals ofjustice
and legality in existing legal rules and principles. I will now turn to the
background theories and see if similar indications can be gathered from these.
I will be brief about these theories here, because I will return to the issue of
theories of law in the next chapter. Here I want to consider specifically if and
how legal ideals can be based on the specific social functions law needs to
perform. In order to examine those functions I will consider Karl Llewellyn's
theory on `lawjobs'. Llewellyn distinguishes different law-jobs that "(...) can
all be summed up in a single formulation: such arrangement and adjustment
of people's behaviour that the society (or the group) remains a society (or a
group) and gets enough energy unleashed and coordinated to keep on with its
job as a society (or a group)" (1940, 1373). The law-jobs are seen as the tasks
that need to be performed by a legal system to ensure the continued existence
of a society. Llewellyn recognizes that law-jobs can be performed at different
levels related to the extent that they enhance the quality of the society: they
can serve to ensure bare survival - the "bare-bones" aspect, or serve to
ensure efficient running or realize ideals leading to a fuller life - the
"questing" aspect (1940, 1375). The law-jobs include the disposition of
Z6 This principle is laid down in article 3:4 Awb.
Z' Redelijkheid en billijkheid is defined in article 3:12 ofthe Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW, Dutch
Civil Code) and it is invoked explicitly in the articles 6:2, 6:248 and 2:258 BW. (t is widely
used in Dutch case law.
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trouble-cases, the preventive channelling of conduct, the allocation of
authority, and the net organization of society as a whole.`g In their questing
aspect, these four functions of law can all be seen as in some way linked to
ideals of justice and legality. Disposing trouble-cases at its best serves the
ideal ofjustice: it is aimed at reaching a decision that is fair to all concerned
(1376). By channelling conduct, law makes life more predictable and less
arbitrary: these are aspects of the ideal of legality. The allocation of authority
is a matter of determining who makes decisions in a society and of
legitimizing that authority by subjecting it to procedural constraints (1386).
The latter aspect also reduces arbitrariness because it limits the power ofthose
with authority and because it formalizes the ways in which that authority is
exercised. The fourth law-job, net organization or drive, is the integrative
function oflaw: organizing the legal system as a whole and thereby giving the
society direction. It is in this function that the ideals of law and society are
primarily joined: there is a mutual influence of legal and cultural ideals. It is
here that the elements of justice that connect it to broad social ideals come to
the fore: justice as an integrative ideal (Selznick 1992, 431). As Llewellyn
puts it: "(...) it is under this Net Drive focus that one can most readily pick out
that phase of the Justice ideal which looks to long-range welfare of the
Entirety" (1940, 1391). Thus, this example of a focus on the social function
of law also points in the direction of justice and legality as leading ideals
specific to law; they are by no means the only ideals influencing law but can
be seen as ideals which in part give law its specific character.
In conclusion, it seems warranted to advance the idea that a constructivist
strategy might lead to two central ideals of law: justice and legality. These two
]eading ideals need to be interpreted broadly: justice moves beyond formal
equality, and legality is not restricted to the non-arbitrariness of determinate
rules.'y It seems best to abandon the idea that there is one master ideal of law.
Instead, we can distinguish a number of complex ideals that govern law in
variable measures, of which justice and legality are the central and most
encompassing ideals specific to law. Not only is there variation in the
prominence these ideals take in the practice of law, they themselves can be
seen to consist of a number of values that also have variable importance
according to context. Legality can fruitfully be seen to consist of the values
that Fuller takes as the internal morality of law; justice encompasses, among
other things, standards of desert, need, equal concern and respect. Neither the
complex ideals nor their constituting values can be said to have an a priori
higher standing: the importance of one ideal over the other depends on the
specific legal context, on the place of law in society at a given moment and the
tasks law needs to fulfil. The subject of law in society, however, brings me to
,R
'9
I will not discuss the fifth law job here because that law job (juristic method) is an aspcct
of the four otherjobs and not an independent function (1940, 13)2).
Thus, they incorporate but are not restricted to Radbruch's ideas of justice as formal
equality and legal security (which is here seen as part of the core meaning of legality).
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the next theme I wanted to discuss: how to regard the autonomy of law.
Law's limited acrtonomy
To describe my idea of the relative autonomy of law in respect of other
societal domains, I want to use Radbruch's idea of the threefold idea of law
as a handle once more. Radbruch identified two of law's central values as
specifically legal, namely justice and legal security, while seeing the third
value of ZweckmciJ3igkeit as the introduction of ethical and political
considerations in the domain of law. This conception indicates how to see the
two roles that values can take in the relations between law and connected
societal practices. I think Radbruch's idea can be expanded to form a more
general argument about the different values influencing legal practice. It then
reads as the thesis that in every concrete determination of what law means
there is an interplay between ideals specific to law and ideals from the other
practices involved in the case at hand. If there is a need for legal regulation of
a practice in which there is a set of clear and strong core values, such
regulation will take these values as a starting point and try to find a balance
between the values oflaw and those of such a practice. For example, in health
law one can recognize the ideals of a good doctor and of patient autonomy in
its rules and principles. But in the same set of lega] rules the observance of
values of legality can also be recognized. The balance struck between the
different ideals and values depends on the content of these ideals, on how well
the different demands can be reconciled in concrete regulation. At times, the
core values ofa practice may harmonize perfectly with certain legal standards,
but there are also cases where the demands of such a practice clash with
important legal values. There is always the need for adjustment in order to
realize the ideals involved to the largest extent.
If this picture of legal activity as involving the search for the right mix of
values is correct - it is rather crude now but I will refine it later on - it
means that the autonomy of law is both limited and variable. Autonomy is
limited because law always concerns other practices; it is never completely
separate and closed but is related to something else, be it the economy,
politics, art or medicine. Since all of these are practices that come with their
own core values, law has to take these values into account even if it decides
to disregard them. The possibility of disregarding the values of another
practice also indicates in what sense the autonomy of law is variable. The
more the core values of law are upheld, the more autonomous law will appear.
Selznick is right in relating the responsiveness of a legal order to the degree
in which it takes societal purpose seriously: a legal system is more responsive
and less autonomous to the extent that it serves the values of other societal
practices. The autonomy of law is not only variable over time, although this
is an important aspect because shifts in the relative autonomy or openness of
law change the character of the legal order. It is also variable in regard to
subject matter, constituting the degree to which law can uphold its own values
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while considering the values of the practice involved. So even if there is a
general responsiveness in a legal order, there is still room for variation in the
weight given to law's core values in the regulation of specific subjects.
Until now, I have spoken of the ]egal order as a whole as a practice
concerned with value realization. This image needs refinement in two
respects. First, my picture of the legal order creates the false impression that
value-realization is the main purpose of law. The point of this study is indeed
to show how paying attention to ideals or values can enrich our understanding
of law, but this should certainly not be read as a plea that law should only
serve to promote ideals. The fact that the concerns of law lie elsewhere as
well, has consequences for the issue of autonomy: the specific character of
law is not only found in the values that are distinctively legal but also in
mechanisms and institutions that are particular to the legal order. Legal
language and reasoning, the form of statutes and rules, courts and lawyers, all
of these are elements that contribute to the specific character of law. However,
the interesting issue in this context is how and to what extent that specific
character is expressed in law's central ideals, so I will not discuss the other
features relating to autonomy here.
Second, value-realization is not of equal importance in every part of the
legal order nor are the same values equally prominent. The most important
distinction here is between legislation and adjudication. If these are described
simply as primarily concerned with the making of rules and the resolution of
conflicts on the basis of rules, respectively, the first is directly concerned with
ideals and the second only indirectly. The making of laws is preeminently an
activity in which a balance has to be found bet~veen legal ideals ofjustice and
legality and the ideals ofother practices. An obvious need for balancing ideals
in legislation occurs because both legal ideals and politica] ideals are always
involved in the process of law-making. This is different in adjudication:
judging takes place in an institution (the courts) which is designed to keep
political ideals at a distance. A judge has the task of interpreting and
developing existing legal rules and principles, only taking political ideals into
account to acquire a better understanding of the law. That, however, is an
important qualification: even though adjudication is concerned with the right
application of the law, doing this can involve taking the values of other
practices into account. This is why the difference in value-orientation between
legislation and adjudication can be understood as a difference between a direct
and an indirect concern for values that are not incorporated in law. Similarly,
there is a difference in the focus on particular values, stemming to a large part
from the distinct primary functions of legislation and adjudication:
determining general policies versus deciding individual cases. The principles
of legality, distinguished by Fuller, are all relevant to the making of laws, but
they are not all applicable to the deciding of conflicts. For instance, a judge
has no need to worry about the generality ofhis ruling because his concern is
with the fair decision of a particular case, but he does need to make sure that
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his decision does not require the impossible. In a similar fashion, ideals can
consist of a different constellation of constitutive values according to context.
In the context of judging, the central point of the ideal of justice lies in
fairness to the specific interests ofthe parties involved, not in the right criteria
for unequal treatment. For the legislator, considering and deciding on the
criteria for unequal treatment is a key demand made by justice. These are only
rough contours of the differences in value-orientation between different parts
of legal practice, but I hope the main idea is clear. The role of the central
values oflaw is of variable importance in different legal contexts and so is that
of the ideals of other practices. The specific functions of legal institutions
entail prominence of particular values as well as a specific interpretation of
general legal values, which is something to be kept in mind when assessing a
general argument about legal values.
Justice
The relationship between ideals and law's autonomy is most acutely felt in
one of law's central ideals that has long been a focal point in jurisprudence:
the ideal ofjustice. Justice is not only recognized as a central ideal in legal
theories, it is also the subject of moral and political philosophy. Because it is
claimed as a key value both for law and for morality, especially political
morality,30 the question arises how to view the place ofjustice in both: is there
a special bond between law and justice or is justice primarily relevant in the
broader context of political morality`? On this question both Selznick and
Radbruch provide useful ideas. As I indicated in my discussion of the central
ideals of law, justice is best seen as a complex ideal consisting ofa number of
values which are more or less specific to law. In Selznick's terms, justice is
an integrative ideal, combining different principles (1992, 431). Selznick does
not, however, specifically identify elements ofjustice that are responsible for
its relevance to law, nor does he formulate a core meaning of the ideal of
justice itself; two things that are necessary to get a grip on the role ofjustice
in regard to the autonomy oflaw. How then to describe the ideal ofjustice and
its constituting values?
At the core of the ideal are two related notions: the idea of giving each his
due - the value of fairness, and that of treating like cases alike - the value
ofequality." The notion ofjustice as equality can be recognized in many more
specific legal values, such as the procedural equality before the laws and
The broad, political and moral, scope of justice is advanced in the well-known work of
Rawls, who begins A Theory ofJuslice with the description ofjustice as ` the first virtue of
social institutions' ( I 971, 3). Rawls also refers to the political and moral aspects ofjustice
in Polilical Lrberatism ( 1993, 1 1).
The combination of fairness and equality as the core of the concept of justice is also
propagated by Neil MacCormick ( 1978, 73). Fairness as the core ofjustice is proposed by,
e.g., David Miller (1976). Justice as equal treatment can also be found in - apart from
Radbruch ( 1932, 278) - Hart ( 1994, 159), Harris (1996, 171), and Aristotle ( I 934,
Nicomachean Ethics, V. iii).
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judicial impartiality, in prohibitíons of discrimination based on race or sex,
etc. That law aims to serve the value of fairness can also be seen in a number
of more concrete values, e.g. in the proportionality ofpunishment in relation
to a crime, and in the weight given to a victim's own fault in tort cases. This
core meaning of justice as a combination of equality and fairness is rather
formal, but underlying it are a number of more substantive values giving the
ideal body. Among these, a key value is that ofmoral equality: each person is
entitled to equal concern and respect.3' The value of moral equality,
expressing that each individual is ofequal worth as a person by virtue ofbeing
a person, underpins the formal equality of justice, making it more robust
because it creates a presumption ofequality in all cases: good reasons have to
be given to treat persons differently instead of equally. Other important
substantive values concern criteria of distribution, giving content to the value
of fairness by specifying the basis of what each is due. Among these, the key
criteria are need, desert, and again, equality. The criterion of desert calls for
distribution according to past performance, while the criterion ofneed centres
on a person's needs. The criterion of equality calls for equal distribution on
the basis of moral equality.
Two things should be noted about these more substantive values that are
part of justice: it is about these that opinions start to diverge, and to these
substantive values law has a less direct connection than to the formal core of
justice. On both points, Radbruch's theory provides valuable insights: he
argued that the formal value of Gerechtigkeit is speci~c to law and that the
substantive value of Zweckrnuf3igkeit invites differences of opinion. When
these thoughts are incorporated in an argument about justice as a complex
ideal, they acquire a slightly di fferent character because the all-encompassing
notion ofthe idea oflaw has been abandoned. On the one hand, seeing justice
as a complex ideal abandons the complete reach of the idea of law over the
realm of law, because it is not the only ideal that is a guide to law; on the other
hand, justice reaches beyond the boundaries of law, because it is also a key
value in morality andpolitics. These modifications do not alter the importance
of recognizing that the more formal and procedural aspects ofjustice are the
ones that give it a special relevance to law.
Distinctive of law is a far-reaching concern for procedural values, which
is most recognizable in the ideal ofjustice according to the law: it is the ideal
of doing justice in a case by administering the law correctly while observing
such values as impartiality andjustification.33 But the meaning ofjustice is not
exhausted by such procedural considerations: even when the primary concern
32 Developed by Ronald Dworkin (1978, 182) as an interpretation ofRawls' and Kant's idea
that each person should be treated as an end in itself, never as a means only.
Impartiality, i.e. exduding bias and self-interest, and justification, i.e. giving reasons when
imposing burdens, are two of the principles ofjustice recognized by Selznick (1992, 431-
32). Like the substantive values I distinguished, these procedural values are also part of the
complex ideal ofjustice.
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is the con ect administration of the law, the ideal ofjustice always impinges
upon deeper questions of substantive justice, which in the context of
administration means that applying the law involves considering thejustice of
the laws themselves, trying to interpret them in a way that best serves justice.
Here, again, conflicts between the different constitutive values of the ideal
appear: it is often impossible to give all values belonging to justice the weight
they ought to be given because they make conflicting demands. Such conflicts,
however, are even more apparent between the substantive values underlying
fairness: giving each person what he needs clashes with giving each what he
deserves or giving each an equal share. Therefore, it is not surprising that
theories ofjustice differ precisely over these substantive issues ofdistribution:
according to some, need should be given priority over desert, while some
claim the opposite, and still others advocate radical equality. The differences
between conceptions ofjustice are thus found in the interpretations of fairness
and equality, the core of the concept of justice. Different conceptions of
justice attach varying importance to the ideal's different constitutive values,
in part depending also on whether the focus is on justice in the context of law
or in another context. The substantive aspects ofjustice are more prominent
in the context ofpolitics, for instance, than in the context of law; and within
law, they are more prominent in the context of legislation than in that of
adjudication. This means that the substantive aspects of justice have a more
subdued role in law than the formal aspects. The shifting importance of the
different constituting values ofjustice can be differentiated further if more
specific situations and practices are examined: although fairness and equality
are central to both legislation and adjudication, the distributional criteria are
not usually at issue before the court. Similarly, when one considers criminal
law and civil law different considerations ofjustice gain prominence in each
field: in a criminal case, doing justice is closely connected to truth-finding,
making sure that an innocent person is not convicted, but truth is a value that
is less relevant in a civil suit, where uncontested facts are not further
investigated. The meaning of the ideal ofjustice is thus in part determined by
the context in which it operates. Apart from formulating core values, giving
precise indications of its meaning is not possible without considering a
specific context as well.
5 Conclusions
This chapter provided a direct comparison between the theories ofRadbruch
and Selznick, in order to establish which of the two provides a more
convincing theory about the nature of ideals. Both Radbruch and Selznick
make combinations of more universal and more contingent elements in their
theory, although these are more sharply separated in Radbruch's theory. For
both the combination is troublesome. Radbruch's abstract ultimate values
work well as formal prerequisites of our cultural world, but fail as standards
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of evaluation because the relativistic determination of their content prevents
their functioning as objective standards. Selznick's universal values depend
on a robust conception of human nature that remains unargued and which is
in tension with the adaptive, problem-solving view of ideals of pragmatism.
A more plausible theory of ideals in law can be built up from the best
elements of these two theories. The basis is a pragmatist theory of ideals.
Ideals are seen as arising in the course of people's problem-solving
experience, which means that their meaning is to a large extent determined by
context and that they are relatively concrete. Because of its empirical
orientation and its adaptive view of ideals, a pragmatist conception of ideals
is able to give ideals an objective basis without depending on absolutes and
rational necessities. However, by basing the justification of ideals solely on
their direct practical consequences, pragmatism overlooks the role of ideals
in determining what good consequences are. Thus, the theory results in a
direct circularity ofjustification. In order to alleviate the limitations of such
a justification, the pragmatist view needs to be enhanced by extending two
lines of argument implicit in it: a constructivist methodology and an account
of practices. Combining it with a constructivist method allows for a more
explicit role of background theories without turning these into an absolute
basis. An emphasis on practices provides a focus on ideals that are complex
guides to a field and are not as changeable as ideals tend to be in a purely
pragmatist view. These two additions, although not quite solving the problem
of circularity, do make it less acute.
With these additions the pragmatist concept of ideals takes the following
form. The key feature of the pragmatist concept remains the inherence of
ideals in experience. They are standards of evaluation inherent in societal
practices, meaning that they are indispensable for the good functioning of a
practice. Propositions concerning the interpretation ofthese ideals can be used
as hypotheses for their improvement. Ideals are flexible and liable to change
along with changing circumstances, but some ideals continue to be meaningful
over time. Such ideals are most often core ideals of a practice, which consist
of an intricate set of constituting values which make competing claims.
Because of their complex nature these ideals are not usually completely
realizable: they continue to point to possibilities of improvement.
Such a pragmatist theory of ideals still has one major drawback that is not
solved by improving the method ofjustification or by a more robust account
of the practices to which ideals are connected. Ideals appear as leading values
that evolve to suit a practice at any given moment, as guiding standards that
make practices successful. This optimistic view overlooks the important role
of conflict in the shaping of ideals. Following Radbruch, I argue that both in
the relationship between different ideals and within one complex ideal itself,
value conflicts are inescapable. This is mainly caused by the limitations of
single value elements; these are one-dimensional and therefore insufficient to
provide complete guidance to a practice. A central ideal of a practice will
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consist of different constitutive values, which are necessary to give the ideal
substantial meaning but which also make contrary demands. These tensions
within complex ideals make them dynamic: the exact mix of values will
depend on the concrete situation for which the ideal is employed as a standard.
It also makes the exact articulation of an ideal's meaning difficult:
highlighting certain value elements will obscure others. Furthermore, the
complexity of the ideal is a bar on complete realization - it is practically
impossible to satisfy all of its, conflicting, demands at once.
Such a complex ideal can serve as the master ideal of a practice, but again
we should guard against an overly harmonious view. In extensive practices,
such as law or education or medicine, leading ideals are not always reducible
to a single guiding ideal. When more than one central ideal can be recognized,
for instance justice and legality in law, the most conspicuous value conflicts
are between the different guiding ideals of a practice.
The central ideals of a practice are important determinants of the specific
character of that practice: the concern for these particular ideals give a practice
autonomy. In regard to law, we saw that the focus on ideals of justice and
legality is reflected in procedural concerns. However, the autonomy of a
practice is limited. A practice may sometimes appear to be a closed circuit, but
that appearance is false. Distinct practices are in contact, if only because
people are involved in more than one practice. Values form a point ofcontact
between practices in a special way. When exploring the meaning of a
particular ideal, one finds that a reference to other values is necessary to reach
a genuine understanding ofthat ideal. Not all of these values are internal to the
practice to which the particular ideal is connected. This can be seen clearly in
the case ofjustice. The special relation to law is caused by the formal core of
justice which is best described as a combination of fairness and equality. This
core meaning brings it close to the central functions of law. However, the core
of fairness and equality is intimately bound up with substantive moral values
such as the moral equality of persons and distributional criteria of inerit and
need. Because of this, justice not only serves as one of the guardians of law's
autonomy, but also as a link to moral and political domains. The ideals of a
practice thus provide connections to other practices. Even though an activity
may appear to take place solely within the context ofa specific practice, trying
to articulate the meaning of the ideals involved takes one beyond the
boundaries of that practice. This is even more strongly the case with the
practice oflaw, because law concerns itself with other practices as the subject
matter of its regulations. To achieve regulation of other domains, law cannot
ignore the values that come with them.
Chapter 8
Recognizing the Ideals of Law
Beyond Legal Positivism and Natural Law Theory
1 The Aims of This Chapter
In this chapter I want to link the ideal-oriented theories studied and developed
in the previous chapters to the main currents of legal theory today. Much of
the discussion in legal theory is still cast in the mode ofa debate between legal
positivist and natural law theories, in which sophisticated theories are
presented as improvements of the one or the other. Examples that come to
mind are MacCormick and Weinberger who present their institutional theory
of law (1986) as a sophistication of legal positivism, and the theory of John
Finnis (1980) as a rediscovery of the natural law theory of Aquinas.
In this chapter I will present ideal-oriented theories such as those of
Radbruch and Selznick as taking a position avoiding the pitfalls of both
positivism and natural law, especially because they give a good explanation
both of law's own central ideals and of the continuities between law and other
social practices. As an extensive preliminary step in the argument I will give
a description of the debate between legal positivism and natural law as a
discussion on the separation of law and morals. After describing that debate
I will evaluate both theories and argue that the difficulties ofeach position can
be explained in terms of a concern about the proper role of values. Legal
positivism is concerned to limit the role of values in its description of law.
Natural law theory, on the other hand, seeks to identify the values that law
necessarily incorporates. Therefore, a fruitful way of understanding the
opposition between the two is as a debate over the nature and role of values.
In the next section I will review the current debate by considering a number
of interpretations oflegal positivism and natural law theory. My discussion of
the debate will not be comprehensive; I will discuss key elements of both
theories to highlight the main points of disagreement. I will go on to trace the
value theories implicit in both theories in the third section, pointing out their
limits, and consider alternatives. In the third section, I will bring in the ideal-
oriented theories of Radbruch and Selznick as an alternative and relate these
to the questions dividing natural law theorists and legal positivists. Finally, I
will present some of the possibilities that a non-positivist and pragmatist
theory offers.
2 The Debate between Legal Positivism and Natural Law Theory
To locate the core of the contemporary debate between legal positivism and
natural law theory, a good place to start is with H.L.A. Hart's thesis on the
separation between law and morals. In the 1958 article on the subject, Hart
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formulates the Separation Thesis as follows: "(...) the contention that there is
no necessary connection between law and morals, or law as it is and ought to
be" (18, note 1). Hart advances the Separation Thesis as one of the central
tenets of legal positivism. The thesis has retained that position ever since,
although there has been extensive debate over its meaning both between legal
positivists and natural law theorists and among legal positivists themselves.'
In this section I will similarly take the Separation Thesis as a starting point,
and sketch the interpretations it has been given and their implications. In
addition, I will raise the question what endorsement or rejection of the
Separation Thesis means regarding the characterization of a theory as
positivism or natural law. Does acceptance of the Separation Thesis
automatically entail that a theory is positivistic? And conversely, does
rejection ofthe Separation Tliesis automatically make a theory a natural law
theory? If not, what features are necessary for these characterizations?
In the past, legal positivists have ascribed to natural law theory the position
that, because the separation of law and morals is rejected, an immoral law is
not really ]aw (e.g. Hart 1958, 31). Legal positivism can then be presented as
the superior position because it separates the question of legal validity from
the moral evaluation of laws. According to Hart, this has the advantages of
clarity, ofreflecting the common sense understanding of law, and of allowing
a critical attitude towards law (1958, 34). The responses of natural law
theorists differ. Finnis denies that any natural law theorist has ever held that
immoral laws are not truly laws (1980, 26). On the other hand, Moore
concedes the rejection of the separation between law and morals, although not
every clash with substantive morality robs a rule of its legal character (1992,
198). Before these positions can be characterized or evaluated, I should make
clear what the separation between ]aw and morals, or law as it is and ought to
be, can be taken to mean.
Primarily, the denial of a necessary relation between law and morals has
been developed in two directions by positivist theorists. First, it is understood
as the thesis that law can and ought to be described or identified with
reference to social facts and without resorting to moral argument. For short,
I will refer to this thesis as the Neutrality Tliesis.'̀ Secondly, it is taken as
meaning that there is only a contingent relationship between the content oflaw
and that of morality. I will refer to this thesis as the Contirzgency Tlzesis. The
Neutrality Thesis is an epistemological thesis about the concept of law and
answers negatively the question whether a reference to morality is necessarily
involved in the identification oflaw. The Contingency Thesis is an ontological
See e.g. Fuller 1958, Raz 1979, Finnis 1980, Coleman 1982, Lyons 1982, Shiner 1992,
Waluchow 1994.
This term is used by Klaus Fuf3er, who contrasts it with the Moral Fallibility Thesis (1996,
122). The thesis is defended, among others, by Joseph Raz (1979, 39), Hans Kelsen (1934,
38) and Norbert Hoerster (1989, 10). Fuf3er indicates that this is the prevailing interpretation
of the Separation Thesis in Germany (121).
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thesis about the moral content of law and answers negatively the question
whether law necessarily satistïes certain moral demands.
The Coritingency Thesis is ambiguous: the assertion that there is only a
contingent relationship between the content of law and morality can be
interpreted in two ways. Either it says that it is an open question whether law
satisfies moral demands, claiming that law is morally fallible, or to put it
differently, that law does not necessarily have positive moral value. This is the
Moral Fallibility Thesis.3 Or it can mean that law can but need not make the
same substantive demands as (part of) morality. The second interpretation can
simply mean that any overlap between the content of morality and that of law
is accidental, but it is often put more strongly: law only has moral content
when moral demands are explicitly laid down by law. In this form, it can be
referred to as the Explicit Moral Coritent Thesis.~
Thus, to sum up the distinctions made above, there are four theses to be
recognized, which can be seen as interpretations of the original Separation
Thesis formulated by Hart, which says that there is no necessary connection
between law and morals.
I. Neutrality Thesis:
Law can be identified with reference to social facts, without resorting
to moral argument.
II. Contingency Thesis:
There is only a contingent relation between law and morals.
(Connections depend on changeable factors.)
II.a. Moral Fallibility Thesis:
Law may, but does not necessarily have positive moral value. (Law
can be wrong from a moral point of view.)
ILb. Explicit Moral Content Thesis:
Only when moral demands are explicitly laid down by law does law
have moral content. (Moral demands have to be explicitly
acknowledged by legal officials.)
The Separation Thesis can be analysed as comprising two independent
components: Theses I and II. It is possible to hold either one without the other,
or to hold both. In its turn, Thesis II can have two distinct meanings: Theses
ILa. and ILb. Thus, the Neutrality Thesis, the Moral Fallibility Thesis, and the
Explicit Moral Content Thesis are the three different interpretations of the
3 Term used by Fuf3er ( 1996, 122). David Lyons refers to the thesis ofmoral fallibility as the
Minimal Separation Thesis ( 1982, 68). I prefer to call it the Mora! Fallibility Thesis,
because all the theses here distinguished are weaker or stronger versions of the Separation
Thesis, so referring to their content gives more information.
Term coined by Lyons ( 1982, 83). Lyons ríghtly notes that this thesis is logically
independent from the Moral Fallibility Thesis. Believing that law is morally fallible does
not commit one to believing that the moral content of law must be explicitly laid down.
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separation between law and morals over which positions differ.
The Neutrality Thesis builds on the idea that straightforward factual criteria
suffice to find out what is a valid legal rule - criteria such as the passing of
a bill by parliament or the pronouncement ofa rule by a supreme court. In this
explanation, an ambiguity in the formulation of the Neutr-ality Thesis is
overlooked: what level of generality is meant of the "law" that is to be
identified? As I have presented it now, law is understood as a speci~c legal
provision, e.g. the rule that one must drive on the right side ofthe road. "Law"
can, however, also mean law in general, at the level of the legal system, or
even more generally, the phenomenon oflaw as such. In the debate, positivists
and anti-positivists sometimes seem to be at cross-purposes because of a
different understanding of the appropriate level of discussion.
Similarly, the Moral Fallibility Thesis is slightly ambiguous in the form
presented here: that law does not necessarily have positive moral value can
refer to two levels of law, to individual legal propositions and to the legal
system as a whole. The different levels of moral fallibility of law are often
confused in the debate between positivism and anti-positivism. The Moral
Fallibility Thesis is independent of the Neutrality Thesis: belief in (both levels
of) law's fallibility is compatible with either acceptance or rejection of law's
neutrality.
Positions regarding the Explicit Moral Content Thesis, on the other hand,
usually combine with a specific position on the Neutrality Thesis: the more the
scope of the moral content of law is limited, the easier it is to accept both
theses. Wholesale acceptance ofthe idea that law incorporates moral standards
is incompatible with morally neutral identifïcation of the law, when the first
means that a reference to moral standards enters into the question of what the
law is on a given matter. However, some forms of the Explicit Moral Content
Thesis, which limit the extent to which moral standards can be made part of
law, combine very well with the Neutrality Thesis. As long as moral
considerations do not affect the identification of law, the combination enables
a positivist to explain the moral content oflaw without making law's existence
dependent upon morality. Whether or not the Explicit Moral Content Thesis
is compatible with the Neutrality Thesis, therefore depends on the scope
allowed the moral elements. An example given by Philip Soper can clarify the
point (1977, 18). Soper asks us to imagine a king Rex, in whose kingdom law
is identified by the social rule "Whatever Rex enacts is law". Rex only enacts
one rule: "All disputes are to be settled as justice requires". The identification
of law seems to be a morally neutral matter, because all it is dependent on is
the fact of Rex's enactment. However, because the content of this enactment
makes legal decisions all-dependent on moral considerations, there is no way
of determining what the law requires without resorting to moral argument.
There is one other important reason for the ambiguity of the Separation
Thesis: there is more than one way to understand the meaning of morality.
Hart made a distinction between positive or conventional morality and critical
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morality; positive morality being the accepted moral code of a society and
critical morality the principles by which positive morality and law can be
evaluated (1994, 169-184). Positive and critical morality are closely
connected: the latter builds on the former and can be understood as an
elaboration of underlying principles and values of positive morality (Den
Hartogh 1995, 69). However, in relation to the Separation Thesis it is
illuminating to distinguish between the two kinds ofmorality because they are
connected to different forms of the Separation Thesis. The clearest case is the
Moral Fallibility Thesis: in asserting that law does not necessarily satisfy
moral demands, the type of morality that is meant is critical morality (Lyons
1982, 65). Positive law can be criticized with the help of critical moral
principles in the same manner as positive morality; both positive law and
positive morality are fallible in the light ofcritical morality. It is different with
the Neutrality Thesis and the Explicit Moral Content Thesis. In connection to
explicit moral content, it is more plausible to regard the reference to morality
as a reference to morality as a whole. If the relevance of morality to law is
made dependent upon explicit acknowledgment ofmoral demands, such moral
demands are most plausibly conceived as the accepted moral demands of the
community (compare Waluchow 1994, 232). Defenders of the Neutrality
Thesis have less need to specify the type of morality they are referring to,
because the assertion that law must be described in non-moral terms
effectively rules out both types of morality. Because ofthis feature, however,
anti-positivists can attack the Neutrality Thesis both from the point of view of
positive morality and of critical morality.
Before I go into the subject ofadherence or rejection of these theses, there
is one point that should be kept in mind regarding the distinction between
positive and critical morality. The distinction is clearest from an external
perspective; from an internal point of view the distinction is less clear. For
instance, an observer who stands outside the legal system he is observing can
argue for the Explicit Moral Content Thesis by pointing to the way a legal
system makes reference to the positive morality of the society to which it
belongs. Such an observer can also evaluate that legal system, and the
accompanying positive morality, with an appeal to critical morality. These are
distinct activities. From an internal point of view, positive and critical
morality are not so clearly distinguishable. Although a participant in a society
can distinguish the society's morality from his own, he is part of that society
and will usually accept parts of societal morality as his own. To the extent that
he does, he cannot see the accepted morality ofhis society as merely positive.
And similarly, critical morality is an integral part of that person's morality,
not an external standard to apply to one's own morality: criticism becomes
internal criticism. For a participant, moral evaluation of the law will involve
the whole of morality, without a distinction between positive and critical
morality.
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Legalpositivism
Part of the confusion regarding the meaning ofthe Separation Thesis is caused
by Hart, who has described the Separation Thesis both in terms reminding of
the Neutrality Thesis and of the Moral Fallibility Thesis (1994, 184-85). Thus,
it is not surprising that Hart's ideas have given rise to many different
interpretations of the Separation Thesis as the core oflegal positivism. In later
work, however, Hart clarified his own position: in his reply to Dworkin in the
Postscript to the second edition of The Concept of Law, Hart denies that he
subscribes to the thesis that the identification of law must depend on social
facts only (1994, 247). There he also endorses the Explicit Moral Content
Thesis (269), in the sense that he acknowledges that law can make moral
demands if there is an explicit link to morality to be found in the sources of
law. Thus, most ofthe possible interpretations ofthe Separation Thesis can be
linked to different aspects ofHart's position. Over some thirty years, a number
of legal positivist theories have been developed, differing primarily in the
version of the Separation Thesis they defend.
An important distinction can be made between positivists who defend the
Neutrality Thesis as the core of legal posítivism and those who only defend
some version of the Contingency Thesis. The first position, exclusive legal
positivism, rejects any role of morality in the identification of law. Usually,
such authors also hold that law is morally fallible and that overlap between the
content of law and morality is a contingent matter. However, variations are
possible. It is possible to stress the need for a neutra] method of identifying
law, while at the same time holding that law and morality are not merely
contingently related. Nevertheless, the combination of the Neutrality Thesis
with at least some forrn of the Contingency Thesis is a common characteristic
ofexclusive legal positivism. The second position, inclusive legal positivism,s
rejects the thesis of the neutral, non-moral identification of law. Adherents of
this position recognize the importance ofmorality for the determination oflaw
but their adherence to positivism is shown in their insistence that such a role
for morality is a contingent feature of existing legal systems. For instance,
Waluchow argues that legal systems which include human rights charters have
created an opening for rights-based moral arguments and thus have given
morality a central place in their law (1994,115). The positivist character ofthe
theory lies in the demand that the community must explicitly recognize moral
considerations as part of the legal system for such considerations to carry
(legal) weight. Waluchow can thus be said to defend a version of the Explicit
Moral Content Thesis. Such inclusive legal positivism can be contrasted with
exclusive legal positivism as defended by Joseph Raz, who insists that the
concept of law can be identified exclusively by reference to social facts that
5 A term 1 borrow from the títle of Waluchow's book: lnctusive Legal Positivism (1994). It
nicely indicates that this type of positivism aims to include moral considerations in its
account of law. Among those holding such a position are Coleman (1982), Lyons (1982),
Soper (1977), and Waluchow himself.
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can be described in a morally neutral way (1979, 39).
Inclusive forms of legal positivism have arisen as a reaction to, and to a
large extent an incorporation of, Ronald Dworkin's criticism of the theory of
H.L.A. Hart.b In his early work Dworkin argues for the inadequacy of a rule-
based model oflaw in which all rules are identified by a test of pedigree, that
is, a test on the basis of social facts in the form of neutral formal criteria
(1978, 43). He argued that principles with an inescapably moral dimension
play a vital role in legal argumentation and interpretation, because hard cases
are resolved by an appeal to such principles. This caused legal positivists to
re-examine their claim of the separation oflaw and morals and led those who
advocate inclusive legal positivism to argue that they could incorporate the
role of moral principles without giving up their positivist position. Dworkin
primarily attacked the positivist denial of the role of morality in legal
interpretation, but the inclusive positivist has partly conceded his point by
recognizing a moral component in the identification of law as well as in its
interpretation and content. However, inclusive positivism still differs from
Dworkin in its insistence that such moral components are part of law only
contingently.
Thus, the Separation Thesis only has limited meaning in inclusive fotms
of legal positívism, which defend no more than the contingency of al]
connections between law and morality. By no longer claiming a non-moral test
for law's existence, inclusive legal positivism can be said to lose one of the
main advantages of a positivist theory: indicating a clear factual method to
identify law by relating the identification of law to its social sources.' On the
other hand, by incorporating the possibility of a reference to morality,
inclusive legal positivism provides a better description of existing legal
systems, which do contain moral argument and references to moral demands.
This raises one major question about legal positivism: does it still have the
advantages that were claimed for it by Hart, i.e. clarity, reflecting common
sense understanding, and a critical attitude? Before I answer that question, I
should pay attention to the opponents of legal positivism.
Anti-positivism
With the rise ofinclusive legal positivism the differences between proponents
and opponents of the Separation Thesis have become minimal. What
distinguishes the opponents ofthe Separation Thesis other than their rejection
b Hart is now usually seen as an inclusive legal positivist, owing to his Postscript in the
second edition of The Concept ofLaw. His earlier work, including the first edition of The
Concepl ojLaw, predates the distinction between the two types of positivism, and can be
read in both ways. Hart holds that law contains a necessary core of moral rules ("the
minimum content of natural law"), while he can plausibly be interpreted as accepting the
Neutratity Thesis as well. For example, Raz reads him as an exclusive legal positivist (1979,
53) and Waluchow as an inclusive legal positivist (1994, 84).
Dworkin makes this point in his `Reply to Critics' when he discusses the inclusive
positivism of Soper and Lyons ( 1978, 347-48).
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of the separation between law and morals`? Are they all natural law theorists?
Here, matters become even more complicated than in the discussion of the
legal positivist position, because advocating a necessary connection between
law and morality is not a thesis defended by all natural law theorists, nor are
all those who do defend it rightly characterized as adherents of natural law
theory. For instance, John Finnis, the foremost defender ofnatural law theory,
accepts (a fotm of) the Separatiorr Thesis. Ronald Dworkin, on the other hand,
does not accept the Separation Thesis but is hardly a natural law iheorist on
other counts. To gain some clarity about such anti-positivist positions the
following issues need to be resolved: we need an account of the forms of the
Separation Tlresis that are rejected, and we need to relate this to an account of
what exactly constitutes a natural law theory.
At the beginning ofthis section I noted that legal positivists have ascribed
to natural law theorists the claim that immoral laws are not truly law. Natural
law theorists are thus supposed to reject the Moral Fallibility Thesis. "Lex
injusta non est lex", the slogan that an unjust law is not law, is often attributed
to natural law theory (see Bix 1996, 226). However, most modern natural law
theorists and other anti-positivists only defend the moral infallibility of law at
the level of the legal system as a whole, not at the level of individual legal
rules.g Although it is true that no natural law theorists accept the Separation
Thesis in all its forms, the idea of the moral fallibility of law is precisely the
one interpretation of the separation between law and morals that they do
accept in some form. It is too easy to equate rejection ofthe Separation Thesis
with rejection ofthe Morcrl Fallibilitv Thesis and then condemn those denying
the validity of the Separation Thesis as holding that evil law is not law.
Because anti-positivists accept forms ofthe Moral Fallibility Thesis, the thesis
as such is insufticient to distinguish between legal positivists and their
opponents (Lyons 1982, 70).
In the brief discussion of Dworkin's objections to legal positivism we
already saw that one form of anti-positivism is the view that moral argument
is inescapable in legal interpretation. Dworkin was concerned to attack the
Neutrality Thesis, and show that it is impossible to identify law merely by
reference to formal factual criteria. In addition, he rejects the E.xplicit Moral
Content Thesis because the appeal to moral principles that judges make in
their justification of hard case decisions is not dependent upon any explicit
recognition of such principles in acknowledged sources: such principles are
part of law because they are part of the best justification of the law. By
looking at Dworkin's position, we see that the difference between inclusive
8 Fuller, for instance, defends the position that a legal system always has some moral value,
because a system needs to conform to the internal morality of la~v to be a legal system. In
the debate with Hart, Fuller argued that an evil legal system cannot easily incorporate the
internal morality; the procedural principles of internal morality constrain the substantive
norms of a system (1958, 661). This position has been hotly debated, primarily by Hart
(1965, I 287).
Recognizing the Ideals of Law 183
legal positivism and anti-positivism turns on the explicitness of the moral
content of law. Inclusive legal positivists are in agreement with anti-positivists
that law in the legal systems we know cannot be identified in a morally neutral
way. However, inclusive legal positivists insist that a legal system's
connection to mora] argument is contingent, while anti-positivists argue that
the connection between law and moral argument is necessary.
Anti-positivists differ in the kind of arguments they advance for a
necessary connection between law and morality, the three main positions
being advanced by Dworkin, Fuller and Finnis.9 Dworkin focuses on a theory
of adjudication: he aims to refute the Separation Thesis by showing that it
does not adequately describe the activity and argumentation ofjudges (1978).
Fuller seeks to show that there are necessary moral dimensions to the making
of legal rules; law has its own internal morality (1969). Finnis examines the
moral quality of law from the standpoint of a specific moral theory (1980).
Sometimes, all theories that defend some kind of necessary relation
between law and morality are labelled natural law theories.'o In that case,
theorists such as Fuller and Dworkin appear as natural law theorists as well."
However, a distinction can be made within the larger group of anti-positivist
theories between natural law theory and other forms ofanti-positivism: natural
law theories include a specific, objectivist, account of morality as the basis of
their theory of law. This is not a feature of all anti-positivists: neither Fuller
nor Dworkin claim a set of universal, objective moral values as the basis for
law. Fuller only claims a necessary connection between the principles of
legality and law, which are given because of the character of law as a
purposive order; he does not base it on an objectivist ethics (1969, 96-97).
Dworkin connects law and morality in the interpretation of the law by judges:
a judge has to make the best construction of the law both in the light of past
decisions and existing rules and in the ]ight of political morality (1985, 160).
He does not claim universal truth for specific principles or values (1978, 160).
However, precisely such claims are made by other theorists, which I will now
discuss under the heading of natural law theory.
Natural law theory
As I explained above, natural law theories are best seen as a specific type of
9
io
Later in this chapter, [ will argue that Selznick and Radbruch are also best understood as
anti-positivists, but here it is useful to limit the discussion to other anti-positivists because
I want to take some more time for the argument about Selznick and Radbruch than is
suitable in this sectíon.
See e.g. Brian Bix who distinguishes between traditional natural law theory, including
Cicero, Aquinas and Finnis, and modern natural law theory, including Fuller and Dworkin
(1996, 223-239). See also Charles Covell, who groups Fuller, Oakeshott, Hayek, Dworkín
and Finnis together as natural law theorists (1992, 27-28), or Lloyd Weinreb who considers
Fuller, Dworkin and Finnis to be natural law theorists (1987, 98-125).
Fuller himself contributed to this characterization by describing his theory as "procedural
natural law" (1969, 96).
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anti-positivism because they combine the idea ofa necessary relation between
law and morals with a specific theory about the nature of morality.
Characteristic of natural law theory is a specific, objectivist, position in the
meta-ethical debate about the status of moral judgments: the position that
there are objective criteria making moral judgments true or false. Modern
natural law theories typically defend moral realist or rationalist meta-ethical
positions.'' The well-known natural law theorist Finnis defends a rationalist
theory of moral judgment." Such a theory argues that a moral judgment can
be justified with a deductive argument based on ultimate moral principles
which are rationally validated (Arrington 1989, 75). Finnis argues that basic
values and basic practical principles are self-evident: they are obviously valid
to reasonable persons (1980, 64-69). Other natural law theorists, such as
Michael Moore, defend moral realism, the view that "the truth of any moral
proposition lies in its correspondence with a mind- and convention-
independent moral reality" (1992, 190). What these have in common is the
idea of universal and objective moral truths that can form the basis for a
critical theory of the nature of law. In that connection, between objective
moral truths and a theory of law, lies the second defining element of natural
law theory: the assertion ofa necessary connection between law and morality.
However, in what sense this is meant, or in other words, which of the theses
connected to the Separation Thesis are rejected, differs. An extreme version
of natural law theory would reject all of the theses connected to positivism's
separation of law and morals, which could indeed yield a view that all law is
(always) morally right because law is defined as the rules that satisfy moral
demands. Such a stringent interpretation of the necessary relation between law
and morality is not advanced by anyone. All natural law theorists acknowledge
that positive law at least does not coincide with universal and objective
morality. Both the Neutrality Thesis and the Explicit Moral Content Thesis are
rejected by natural law theorists as they are by anti-positivists in general.
There are variations in the extent to which they accept the Moral Fallibility
Thesis. The strongest version of natural law theory defended today is that of
Michael Moore, who sees it as a necessary condition for its being law that a
legal proposition is just, but acknowledges that additional institutional criteria
are necessary as well (1992, 198). What is more often defended, however, is
the idea that morally right law is in some sense more truly law than bad law
(Bix 1996, 226). Just law is the central case ofwhat law is, while bad law only
partly satisfies the criteria of what law is. The least ambitious of the natural
See Arrington 1989 for an overview of ineta-ethical theories. The positions discussed here
in relation to natural law theory are al I cognitivist positions, meaning that they believe moral
judgments are capable ofbeing true or false. By contrast, non-cognitivist positions believe
moral judgments are a matter of emotion or prescription (Arrington 1989, 1-3).
Such a theory is also defended by Beyleveld and Brownsword (1986), whose theory I will
not discuss in detail here. They use the meta-ethical theory of Gewirth to argue for a
supreme moral principle of generic consistency (1986, 1 19) to be used in a critique of law.
i3
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law theorists in respec.t of the necessary moral quality of law is Finnis. Finnis
uses his list of basic human goods to outlaw decisions that deliberately harm
these basic goods, and thereby formulates moral absolutes to be respected by
law (1992, 148). He claims objectivity for his criticism of law - it is bad if
it does not respect moral absolutes - but does not see unjust law as legally
deiicient. Positive law is morally fallible because it can fail in the protection
of basic goods and the observance of basic practical principles. With Finnis,
the necessary moral quality of law seems to be reduced to the main quality of
the central case of law: morally good law is what one has to look at to gain a
true understanding of what law is about. This perspective does give quite a
different edge against positivism's focus on neutral description, but it is a
meagre version of natural law's traditional necessity claim. However, his
ambitious theory of moral value does warrant a characterization of Finnis as
a natural law theorist.
As it is customary to locate the basis of natural law theory in arguments
about human (or divine) nature, it may seem curious to characterize natural
law theory merely in terms ofobjectivist meta-ethics as the basis for criticism
of law. Is there still a connection between modern natural law theories and
human nature? John Finnis makes much of the self-evidence of the basic
goods, because he is wary ofan invalid derivation of an `ought' from an `is'.
If the basic goods were to be derived from human nature, that would be a
violation of Hume's principle. However, Finnis does acknowledge that human
nature is relevant for the composition of the basic goods. If we were different
animals, we would hold other goods to be self-evident: the basic goods are
self-evident to us because of our human characteristics (1980, 34). Leaving
out any reference to human nature in the description of natural law theory
creates the false impression that any objectivist ethics is to count as a natural
law theory.14 Even though human nature is not the foundation ofethics for all
proponents of natural law theories, they do share a commitment to universal
moral values or principles that are connected to characteristic features of
human beings and human society.15 Whether it is in the context of Moore's
functional analysis or ofthe self-evidence proposed by Finnis, they all give an
irreducible place to human nature in the broader justification of moral values.
Human nature does play a role in modern natural law theories, although it
is more subdued than it was in traditional theories. It is important mainly
because the connection to human nature determines the form of argumentation
in the theory. The link to human nature provides a main reason to focus on
For instance, the moral realism of John McDowell is particularist or situational. He claims
objectivity ofparticular moraljudgments but does not deduce these from highest principles,
basic goods, or human nature (Arrington I 989, I 19-I 91). Such theories cannot be brought
under the heading of natural law theory.
Moore uses the theory of Finnis as the plausible theory of the good with a similar
connection to human nature (1992, 215); Beyleveld 8r Brownsword present a theory of
human interests as representing essential human nature (1986, 148).
is
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universal, objective mora] values and principles. Because human beings share
the same features, the basic goods are of value to everyone and the same kind
of reasoning holds for everyone. Therefore, natural law theory tends to focus
on the basic features of the law and how these are related to the objective
moral values. More particular judgments about law are deduced from this
universal core. Natural law theory operates on the most general level of legal
theory (Moore 1992,194). Because ofthis role ofhuman nature, the objectivist
ethics of natural law theory is best seen as backed by an argument about
human nature and reasoning based on universal values.1ó
3 Evaluating the Different Positions
To summarize, the main distinction to be made in the debate over the
separation of law and morals is that between legal positivism and anti-
positivism (compare Shiner 1992). The dividing line is over the possibility of
describing law without necessarily referring to morality. Within the group of
anti-positivist positions there is a second distinction between natural law
theorists and other anti-positivists. Here the major difference is between those
who give a specific objectivist interpretation to the morality that is relevant to
law, and those who interpret that morality differently. Within legal positivism
there is a distinction between those defending the possibility of the neutral
description of law - exclusive positivism- and those who merely assert that
there must be explicit reference to morality for it to be relevant - inclusive
positivism. If this is the range of positions concerning the debate about law
and morality, we should now consider which of these four is preferable and
for what reasons.
Legal positivisrn versus raaturallaw theory
A significant difference between legal positivists and natural law theorists can
be found in the way they view the moral fallibility oflaw. Positivism discerns
the discrepancy between positive law and mora] value, but remains agnostic
about the kind ofcriticism that should follow. This is because legal positivism
as such does not say anything about the moral demands to which law should
conform. Because natural law theory does propose an account of these moral
demands, it indicates in which way law can fail. It is a more comprehensive
16 Pauline Westerman proposes four assumptions as the key to natural law theory: "I ) there
are universal and etemally valid criteria and principles on the basis of which positive law
can be justified and~or criticised; 2) these criteria and principles are grounded in nature,
either physical nature, or more specifically, human nature; 3) human beings can discover
those princíples by the use of reason; 4) for positive law to be morally obligatory, it should
bejustified in terms of these principles and criterià '(1997, 12). She uses these to study both
traditional and modem (Finnis') natural law theory. She indicates that the assumptions do
not hold equally for all natural law theorists, but they can all be understood as more or less
relating to them (13). 1 have focused on the first assumption because that is the one modern
natural law theorists support in its entirety, but the others do have a supporting role.
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theory about law because it includes an account of critical standards.
Both legal positivism and natural law theory have serious failings. Legal
positivism, in its exclusive form, makes the distinction between the legal and
the moral too rigid. As a consequence, it is committed to an implausible
separation between two types ofjudicial argument, which both have a place
in the practice ofjudging but are to be seen as separated from each other from
the perspective of that practice. Because morality is as pervasive as law, a
"foreign law model" of the place of morality in judicial argument is
implausible. Such a model makes it appear as if morality can be conceived of
as a second normative system beside the legal system, which can be called on
when the legal system leaves a gap (Raz 1979, 50). Just as a reference to
French law is needed when the validity of a French will or testament is at issue
in Dutch proceedings, there can be the need to advance a moral argument
when the legal system does not provide an answer. Unlike a foreign system of
law, however, morality does not have a delineated scope and it overlaps (even
if, according to a positivist, only contingently) with the content of law. This
makes the line between legal and moral considerations ablurred one. Ifjudges
need to make use of both mora] and legal arguments, both will have to be
justified to be acceptable. The role ofjudges in the legal system is no different
when they are reasoning on moral grounds, because they still have to find the
best solution in the context of the legal system, and they still have to motivate
their decision adequately. This makes the distinction practically irrelevant.
In addition, exclusive legal positivism, when it only provides a theory of
law, is incomplete. Giving an non-moral account of what law is, but asserting
that moral evaluation of law must determine whether there is an obligation to
obey it (Hart 1958, 34), strengthens the need for an account of morality.
Positivism needs a moral theory to account for the important moral
components ofpractices connected to law. Moral considerations influence the
decisions of legislators, the reasoning ofjudges, and the implementation of
rules by administrators. To understand these practices it is necessary to
account not only for the legal components, but also for the moral components
determining these decisions. When such a moral theory is provided, exclusive
positivism is most often combined with subjectivism or non-cognitivism."
There is a good reason for this connection: believing that moral values are no
more than subjective preferences provides a strong reason to insist upon
neutral identification of the law. It is a normative claim to accept positivism
n E.g. Kelsen (1934, 15-16) and Hoerster ( I 989, I 0). The importan[ exception is Joseph Raz,
whose liberal-perfectionist theory ofmorality presupposes acognitivist position on values;
his stress on the availability of `adequate options' depends on the ability to know what is
good or bad (1986, 425-26). According to Samuel Shuman, a non-cognitivist ethical theory
is an essential element of legal positivism (1963, 15). However, in the recent debate on
exclusive and inclusive positivism, most authors remain agnostic on the subject ofthe status
of morality.
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as the right theory of law.18 On this view, allowing moral argument into the
legal domain would introduce subjective elements into the law, which would
undermine the authoritative position of law in society. Such a subjectivist
theory of values is problematic because it cannot allow for moral argument
and meaningful discussion about values.19 A consequence of this view is that
judicial moral reasoning, in the case of legal indeterminacy, is no more than
the judge's moral preference, which makes such judicial decisions highly
problematic. Law appears as the form of neutral order needed to keep
subjective moral views in check; the combination of positivism and
subjectivism has no way of acknowledging a positive role of values in legal
discourse nor ofcriticizing valuejudgments made in a legal context. This does
not dojustice to the arguments that are made about the values involved in ]aw.
Discussion proceeds by appealing to values that can be discerned as
underlying the legal order, values that can be recognized although they are not
explicitly part ofthe system ofrules. About such values meaningful discussion
is possible: they are not the preferences of legal actors, but they are latent in
the legal order. Judicial reasoning can appeal to such values.
The inclusive form of legal positivism seems to escape the criticism raised
against exclusive positivism because it acknowledges a role for morality
within the legal domain. There are difficulties, however. As Roger Shiner
argues, inclusive legal positivism defends an inconsistent position. Either the
emphasis is laid on the contingency of moral elements in the law, or the
emphasis is on the inclusion of moral elements as such (1992, 296). In the first
case, the identification of law turns on legal sources, which can also point to
moral principles, but which themselves have to be neutral social sources.
Otherwise morality is already part of law's sources, making it impossible to
determine whether the moral content of law is contingent. On the other hand,
when some source includes moral principles there is no near stopping place.
When some moral principle is identified by a legal source as part of law, its
interpretation and understanding are connected to a whole range of moral
considerations. Are these then suddenly outside the law? Ifthey are also part
of the law, there is no distinction between inclusive legal positivism and anti-
positivism. In order to remain a positivist theory, inclusive positivism has to
limit the relevance of moral considerations, but to do so it also needs the
Neutrality Thesis it is concerned to reject.
Consider a constitutional clause, for instance, the right to freedom of
expression. An inclusive positivist grants that such a clause makes reference
19
19
Waldron, following Postema 1986, stresses the importance of normative positivism, which
he describes as follows: "It identifies the contamination of legal decision by moral judgment
as a moral disadvantage; it says that we lose something of value thereby. It is by far the
most interesting fonn of legal positivism (and indeed it is hard to imagine how a positivist
definition of the concept of law could be sustained, without eventually having resort to
some normative thesis)" (Waldron 1992, 167).
See also the discussion of subjectivism in section 2.2.
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to a moral right: the meaning of the clause and the extent to which it reaches
depend upon the meaning of the moral right to freedom of expression.
However, he will say that this is only the case because a qualified institution
such as the legislature has laid down such a constitutional rule. This means
that there is a reference to (morally neutral) social facts to make the rule,
including moral elements, part of the ]aw. However, complete identification
ofthe meaning ofthe rule cannot be established without reference to its moral
components, and these cannot be identified by considering social facts alone.
Either the moral component of such a constitutional clause is seen as in part
determining the law, in which case the relation to morality is not contingent,
or the moral component is seen as reducible to social facts, in which case the
moral component ofa constitutional clause is not relevant to identification of
the law, and the Neutralit~~ Thesis holds. Since one cannot hold both, inclusive
positivism is an inconsistent position.
Natural law theory rejects a source-based model of law, and includes in its
theory of law the moral principles used to criticize positive law. It thereby
makes a distinction between fallible positive law and the eternal principles of
natural law. Although natural law theory gives a more complete account ofthe
relevance of moral considerations to the understanding of the law, its claims
on behalf of morality are too ambitious.'o Finnis seeks to show the validity of
a set ofobjective and universal moral values and principles but fails to provide
a convincing argument for that set of values and principles and also fails to
show that this set can serve to give meaningful criticism of the law
(Westerman 1997, 282-85). In the past, natural law theory has been accused
both of being a plea for anarchism and a plea for conservatism, that is, as
being too critical of positive law and as being too apologetic of positive law.
Although they are exaggerations, such accusations do point to the
indeterminacy ofnatural law's abstract principles: these can be used to defend
divergent concrete proposals (see Horwitz 1992, 271). The idea that such
universal objective values can generate meaningful criticism of concrete legal
rules is thus effectively undermined.
There is an additional problem with natural law's objective ethics: the way
to cope with conflict. Jeremy Waldron argues that the objective truth of moral
values leads nowhere, unless people can be brought to agree on those values.
When there is serious disagreement over the content of objective morality,
there is no discernable difference between opinions about objective moral
principles and subjective moral beliefs: both are equally arbitrary (Waldron
1992, 182). I am inclined to disagree with Waldron that there is no difference
between advancing beliefs in objective values and advancing subjective
opinions: in the first case there is a basis for arguments supporting your beliefs
- there are reasons that can validate your beliefs, while subjective opinions
Zo 1 focus on Finnis in my criticism, so it may not be valid for other natural law theorists in all
respects. However, the gencral strategy of natural law theorists is similar to that of Finnis,
so in broad tet7rts the criticism probably holds for other modern natural law theorists as well.
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depend on the choice you make. Especially in the context of legal argument,
this is an important difference, because lawyers are required to justify their
opinions about the law. However, he does raise a valid point against natural
law theory in that the theory needs to, but does not, indicate a way to handle
disagreement over beliefs. By making a strong claim about the right ethical
propositions, natural law theory takes on the burden to prove that these
propositions are right. The fact of disagreement creates the need to advance
something more than the self-evidence of basic values: if there is no
agreement on such values, a better argument is needed than that every rational
creature should be able to recognize the validity of the basic values. If there
are rational creatures which disagree and doubt the validity of basic values,
additional argument is needed to convince them that these basic values are
valid.
As inclusive lega] positivism proved to be an inconsistent position, the two
theories to be seriously addressed are exclusive legal positivism and natural
law theory. The two main objections against exclusive positivism are, first,
that it makes an artificial and practically irrelevant distinction between legal
and moral argument and, second, that it is either agnostic or too subjectivist
about the moral element of legal practices. Natural law theory does provide
a theory covering both, but the theory it advances on moral values has defects.
First, it only gives an argument about values on a level that is too abstract to
yield meaningful critical power. Second, the kind of argument advanced is
insufficient because it relies heavily on the problematic concept of self-
evidence which does not suffice in the face of disagreement. Because ofthese
objections against positivism and natural law theory, I now want to consider
anti-positivist theories that do not share natural law's theory ofvalues in order
to see whether there are plausible alternatives among them.
Forrns of anti-positivism: Dworkin and Fuller
Forms of anti-positivism have in common that both the Neartr~ality Thesis and
the Explicit Moral Content Tlzesis are rejected: anti-positivism claims that the
involvement of moral elements in law is a matter of necessity and, to some
extent, that the content of law necessarily has moral elements. Of the two
well-known anti-positivists referred to earlier, Dworkin is mostly concerned
to argue the first point, while Fuller is mostly interested in the second point.
Dworkin argues that legal argument cannot escape referring to moral
principles, while Fuller argues that law always incorporates certain principles
of a procedural morality. Both deny that choice has a large role to play in the
incorporation of moral standards in the legal domain, although they do allow
for a substantial amount of contingency in the content of the morality relevant
to law. This provides an important difference with natural law theorists, who
deny morality's contingency. More needs to be said about the theories of
Dworkin and Fuller. Do they provide viable alternative theories to exclusive
legal positivism and natural law theory?
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Ronald Dworkin's theory about the important role played by principles as the
overlapping element in law and morality is the most forceful criticism of
positivism ever made. Dworkin has shown how argumentation in judicial
reasoning makes no clear distinction between legal and moral elements
because the principles underlying such reasoning do not admit of
categorization as the one or the other. The background of this idea is formed
by Dworkin's constructivism, saying that it is the task of a judge faced with
a case to give the best possible interpretation ofthe law both with regard to the
institutional history of the legal system and in the light of the political
morality underlying that system. On the basis of the combination of a
dimension of institutional fit and a dimension of political morality, Dworkin
argues that every case has a right answer, which an ideal judge with full
information on both dimensions could give.
Dworkin's coherence method ofjudicial interpretation is appealing: it gives
a plausible account of the way judges argue for a decision by showing how it
accords with the body of statute and precedent and is in line with the law's
principles ofjustice. There are, however, some aspects ofthe theory that make
it less convincing. One ofthe main problems is Dworkin's exclusive focus on
the practice of judging. Although his account of judicial argument is
convincing, it is also limited to one specific perspective: he only accounts for
the internal point of view ofajudge. Dworkin considers the practice ofajudge
to be the central legal practice (1986, 14-15). There are, however, a number
ofother practices connected to law, which bring their own perspectives: that
of the legislator, the lawyer, the administrator, or the citizen. To these
Dworkin pays no attention. Although this is more understandable in a
jurisprudence focusing on the United States, in a broader context the other
perspectives are as important as that of the judge. Apart from these other
internal points of view in the legal iield, the other important perspective
ignored by Dworkin is the externa] perspective of the observer. That Dworkin
leaves out the external perspective is no accident: according to Dworkin, the
only way to really understand the practice of law is by its own internal
standards (1986, 54). In this, I think, Dworkin goes too far. By taking the
judge's point of view as the paradigm for a theory of law, Dworkin reduces
legal theory to a study ofjudicial argument, as the judge sees it (Tamanaha
1997, 184). Dworkin does not acknowledge that a more external view of law,
for instance, a broader view connecting law to other societal practices, can
yield insights that are as valuable as his own.
The second criticism that can be made of Dworkin's ideas stays within the
boundaries he sets on valid legal theory. It concerns the relation between the
two dimensions central to judicial argument, the dimension of fit and the
dimension of political morality. It is very hard to argue whether one or the
other should take precedence when the two dimensions make conflicting
demands. It is possible to imagine a system where one first checks
institutional fit completely, and only then turns to the question of what is best
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in the ]ight of political morality. Dworkin himself sometimes seems to regard
the dimension of institutional fit as establishing a threshold; once the point of
institutional adequacy has been reached, political morality is decisive.
However, what is institutionally adequate is obscure. The dimension of fit is
inconclusive in the same way as positivism's social sources are, so the
dimension of political morality is already needed to determine what is
adequate. That dimension, in its turn, is subject to similar objections as natural
law theory.
A third point of criticism is closely connected to the second point; it
concerns the idea of every case having a right answer. The idea of an ideal
judge always able to find a right answer is useful to understand the aspiration
of real judges to find the best answer. It is, however, an unrealizable ideal,
which, in my opinion, entails that real cases do not necessarily have one right
answer. The reason is the uncertain relationship between the dimensions of fit
and ofmorality which creates leeway in the kinds of answers that are possible
and defensible. If there is no hard and fast rule to decide how the two
dimensions should be reconciled, the possibility of different answers being
equally defensible becomes very real.
The two dimensions also give an indication of the way in which Dworkin
balances between Hartian positivism and full-blown natural law theory. The
first dimension is a(necessary) remnant ofthe relevance of social fact central
to positivism; the second dimension is an appeal to morality with objectivist
echoes akin to natural law theory.'' The mix is both an asset and a defect. By
providing a mix that combines good elements of positivistic and natural law
theories Dworkin avoids their blind spots and extremes. However, as we saw,
it is difficult to give a convincing account of how these two elements hang
together. Especially, it remains obscure how conflicts of institutional fit and
moral demands can be resolved.
Similarly to Dworkin, Lon Fuller developed an important part ofhis theory in
discussion with H.L.A. Hart. We have already seen that they disagreed on the
interpretation of Radbruch's post-war ideas, but there are more fundamental
points concerning the nature of law that have been the subject of their debate.
One ofthe most interesting themes concerns Fuller's internal morality of law.
This is the subject which generated the strongest criticism by Hart. To my
mind, it is one of the most inspiring and confusing parts of Fuller's theory.
In The Morality of Law, Fuller develops the idea that there are two kinds
of morality relevant to law: an external morality, consisting of a general code
of conduct, and an internal morality, consisting of principles of legality. The
principles oflegality impose procedural demands on the making ofrules: rules
ought not to be retro-active, they ought to be promulgated, they ought to be
Z' Dworkin elucidated his position on moral truth in a recent article (1996). He advances a
negative argument forobjectivism: since it is impossible to remain sceptical about objective
moral truth we have no choice but to accept value objectivity (89).
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general, etc. Fuller argues that observance of these principles is necessary to
good law-making, which he illustrates with the eight ways in which the
imaginary King Rex fails in his law-making efforts (1969, 33-39). Fuller's
argument is that significant failure to observe the internal morality of law will
result in a failure to make law: the principles of legality are necessary to the
existence of law. Hence, there is a necessary connection between law and
procedural moral principles. One might expect a positivist to object to the
necessity of the connection between law and these procedural principles. That
point, however, is conceded by Hart. He objects to the characterization of
these principles as moral principles. According to Hart, these are principles
of functional necessity without a moral character; Hart simply sees them as
requirements for the smooth and efficient operation of the law (1965, 1286).
Hart's objection raises an important point about Fuller's theory: how should
we understand the special character of the internal morality of law? I agree
with Hart that it seems wrong to characterize the principles of legality as
straightforwardly moral. Hart rightly points out that observance of these
principles is independent from observing the demands of external morality.
Unlike Fuller, Hart believes that it is very well possible for a legal system
which is wicked in terms of (external) morality to apply the principles of
legality faithfully. This seems right: there is no reason why observing certain
procedures would be at odds with an evil purpose. However, Hart overlooks
the fact that observance of principles of legality does enhance the value of a
legal system. The principles of legality do represent genuine values, which
concern the quality of a legal system. That a rule should be as clearly
formulated as possible is an appeal to the value of clarity, and realizing that
value makes the legal system a better system. The discussion whether these
values should be seen as moral obscures the relevant point that they are
internal to the legal order, and not external social values, whether these are
political, economic, or a social value in a more general sense which we might
call moral.
The characterization of the principles of legality as having value is
important in relation to another of Fuller's theses which he discusses in terms
of morality: the distinction between a morality of duty and a morality of
aspiration. The morality of duty lays down the basic rules for an orderly
society; the morality of aspiratíon formulates standards of excellence (1969,
5). This is parallelled by the typical reactions to transgressions of duty or
aspiration: a breach of duty is considered blameworthy, while a neglect of
aspiration is merely frowned upon. Although law can be seen as an instrument
to regulate only the morality of duty, the morality of aspiration is relevant to
certain aspects of law. Most importantly, the internal principles of legality
need to be understood as a matter ofboth duty and aspiration. For instance, the
principle of generality lays down a duty for the legislator to make rules
sufficiently general, that is, at least, not for one case only. On the other hand,
generality is an open requirement: it is a matter of excellence to be able to
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design the right level of generality for a given rule. Again, Hart is criticaL He
reproaches Fuller for misapplying the concept of a morality of aspiration to
the principles oflegality, claiming that it is absurd to think of such principles
as matters ofpraise or disdain. The root of the problem, according to Hart, lies
with the identification ofprinciples guiding purposive activity in general with
principles ofmorality (1965, 1286). I cannot follow Hart to his conclusion that
the distinction between duty and aspiration has no place in the discussion of
law. In a broader sense, such a distinction is helpful to indicate ways in which
law is not simply a matter of all-or-nothing answers, but is open-ended. The
behaviour of the participants in lega] processes cannot be understood as
simply doing their duty. A judge tries to live up to an ideal; it is not his duty
to be the best judge he can be, but it is a motivating ideal. The idea of
aspiration is especially helpful to understand the roles of key actors in the
legal process: Fuller shows how aspiration is relevant to understand the role
of the legislator, but it can be used similarly for a judge or a lawyer.
There is one important point to make on behalf of Fuller, and against Hart,
which concerns the more general moral value of law. One idea of Fuller's
which Hart glosses over too quickly, is that law- the enterprise of subjecting
human conduct to the governance of rules - has considerable value for the
organization of society (Fuller 1969, 96). This means that, although the
supporting value ofthe internal principles oflegality for the substantive moral
quality of the legal system is doubtful, there is a connection between the
principles of legality and the value of the legal system for society. When the
principles of legality are faithfully observed, they enhance the quality of the
legal system in terms of the value of legality and contribute to, at least, a
procedurally fair system. Such a system supports the social order (whatever
its substantive aims) and in that sense also serves a specific social value: that
of order.`' I do not wish to suggest that this is any more than a supportive and
subordinate value, but I think we can grant that a society, however noble its
purposes, needs procedure and order to put those putposes into practice. As
I understand order, it is a value-laden concept: if procedural principles are
taken seriously, order has a certain quality. The law's realization ofprocedural
values provides the order needed to realize substantive moral values, and as
a necessary ordering structure, law has value itself.''
The complications involved in the distinction between moral and non-
moral elements have been somewhat obscured by Fuller himself by his
„
In his review of Tlie Moralili of Law, Hart appears to hold a strict view of what counts as
moral: only substantive and ultimate principles count as moral ( 1965, 1291). Hart withholds
the name of ` morality' from principles with instrumental value, while Fuller has a much
broader view ofmorality. I side with Fuller in thinking that order, although it primarily has
instrumental value, is such an important supportive value that it should count as moral.
To what extent order contributes to the overall (procedural and substantive) moral value of
a legal system is an extremely difficult question. In some cases of a wicked system, it seems
that observing procedure might make the system more wicked because it is such a perverted
combination. I do not think any judgment on this issue can be made in the abstract.
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referring to his own theory as `procedural natural law' (1969, 96). The label
creates the impression that Fuller accepts the main tenets ofnatural law theory
with a procedural twist, but when we examine his theory it turns out that he
solves the tensions between law and morality in a way that only remotely
resembles traditional natural law theory. We have already touched upon the
most important point: by focusing on the internal principles of legality, Fuller
gives quite a different interpretation of the necessary connection between law
and morality. He expands the domain of morality to include law's internal
values and thereby looks for a different necessary connection from that of
natural law theorists. That there is an intrinsic connection between the
principles oflegality and law is much easier to argue than that law necessarily
serves substantive moral values. In the case of internal principles it is also
more plausible to use the same criteria for law's existence and its quality: non-
observance of the principles of legality precludes the existence of law, while
the degree of observance is also a measure of the quality of the system - in
terms of internal values, of course. Such claims are harder to substantiate in
the case ofnatural law's connection between law and substantive morality. We
have seen the problems involved in the argument for objective moral values,
and the difficulties in establishing the link between those values and concrete
legal rules. These differences lead me to conclude that the label `natural law'
is misleading in Fuller's case.
Both Dworkin and Fuller are best viewed as anti-positivists having
sympathies for natural law thinking; they depart so much from natural law
theory's tenets that they are best seen as advancing a different kind of anti-
positivism. In Dworkin's case, taking a strictly internal perspective leads to
a continuum of legal and moral considerations in legal argumentation.
Although this is plausible from that perspective, Dworkin leaves too little
room for other ways ofviewing law in which a distinction between legal and
moral considerations is valuable. Fuller's view is not limited to an internal
perspective and it gives a plausible sketch of the role of internal legal values.
He claims too much, however, when characterizing the internal principles of
legality as a morality. His point is clearer when the principles of legality are
seen as specific legal values, which support substantive morality by providing
order. Internal legal values are in many ways connected to moral values, but
they are specific to law, a point which is obscured in Fuller's account of the
morality of law.24
4 Radbruch and Selznick as Non-Positivists
Until now, I have considered well-known voices in the contemporary debate
between natural law theory and legal positivism: Hart, Raz, Finnis, Dworkin,
Fuller. Here, I want to consider the way Radbruch and Selznick can be related
z4 See also section 7.4, where the idea of specifically legal values was explored.
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to that debate. Neither Radbruch nor Selznick can easily be characterized as
positivist or natural law theorist: they both propose interesting forms of anti-
positivism. There is, however, an important preliminary point concerning their
theories, which causes me to prefer to call Radbruch and Selznick non-
positivists. Both hold positions which have much in common with anti-
positivism, but neither defines his position against positivism. Unlike Fuller
and Dworkin who take position in relation to the legal positivism of Hart,
Radbruch and Selznick oppose positivism for a different reason: their starting-
point is the value-oriented character of law.
Radhruch
One thing to be kept in mind when considering Radbruch's theory is that his
ideas predate the discussion between positivism and natural law theory in
terms of Hart's separation thesis. Radbruch discussed positivism and natural
law theory in the Rechtsphilosophie, but these were not the sophisticated
positions that have been developed since. Ifwe do look at his position in terms
of the current debate over the Separation Thesis, anachronistic though this is,
the most striking feature is that Radbruch's way of defïning law is a method
diametrically opposed to the method of identification advanced in the
Neutrality Thesis: he defines law in terms of value-orientation instead of
referring to a matter of social fact (1932, 255). One could say that, because
law is defined in terms of the legal value of Gerechtigkeit, the identification
of law by Radbruch's method does not need moral argument, so it is morally
neutral. However, the reference to value in the definition of law makes it
impossible to identify law on the basis of social fact alone. Law is that part of
the cultural reality engaged in the effort to realize justice. To identify law one
needs to consider the meaning of cultural reality; it is not enough to appeal
simply to facts. Identification of law is not value-neutral, because the
orientation towards justice has to be considered (1932, 264). Radbruch's very
definition of law is therefore non-positivistic. What kind of non-positivist
position does he hold?
We have already seen (in 3.4) that Radbruch's post-war writings are
sometimes seen as a form of natural law theory. In that earlier section I
dismissed the idea that Radbruch is a natural law theorist, because of two
important features of Radbruch's idea that law which completely disregards
the value of justice lacks a legal nature. First, the values involved are the
values specific to law: they are emphatically not moral values. Radbruch
distinguishes between different absolute values, of which only the good is a
moral value. This makes his theory different from modern natural law
theorists who do connect moral values directly to law. Second, Radbruch is
concerned with a baseline in value-orientation: the question whether a law can
be denied legal character is one of complete disregard of justice. Radbruch
does not use his absolute values to criticize law except in this limiting case;
his is a formal, not a substantive approach. In both respects his ideas differ
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from natural law's key idea that objective moral values are the critical
measure for law. Radbruch recognizes the important influence of (political)
morality on the content of law by way ofthe value ofZtiveckrnciJ3igkeit, but this
is also the component of the Rechtsidee that is determined relativistically. The
value of the good, ofwhich ZweckniáJ3igkeit is the legal translation, is subject
to different interpretations. Precisely the moral component in law is denied
objectivity. This relativism of Radbruch's is at odds with natural law's
objectivist ethics. Neither does natural law theory admit of such a limited
guiding role for values as proposed by Radbruch. Radbruch developed the test
of "ubergesetzliches Recht" to criticize the Nazi regime, but he limited such
criticism to two instances in which a legal system does not deserve its name:
when a system flagrantly disregards justice in the name of legal security, or
when a system does not even aim at the realization of justice (1946, 89).'s
Natural law theory promises more than the limited criticism of Radbruch's
twofold test, although it is doubtful whether it can accomplish much more than
Radbruch's theory, due to the vague nature of its values.
Radbruch thus advances ideas that prevent characterization of his theory
as positivism or as natural law theory. He deiines law in terms of value-
orientation, which makes the theory non-positivistic; but he is relativistic
about the content of morality, which makes it different from natural law
theory. The next question to ask, however, is whether Radbruch's theory
answers the objections raised against positivism and natural law theory. With
regard to legal positivism he does to a]arge extent. Because Radbruch sees
law as value-oriented he provides a complete theory, both of the nature oflaw
and of the nature of values. However, his relativism does not give enough
support to develop standards of evaluation. Radbruch does not make an
arbitrary distinction between legal and moral elements: his Rechtsidee
contains both specifically legal and external moral values and he explicates the
relations between these values. Compared to natural law theory, the
advantages ofRadbruch's theory are less clear-cut. Again, his account of the
Rechtsidee with its combination oflegal and moral values is more precise than
the more general account of objective moral values proposed by a natural
lawyer like Finnis. His account of the nature of values, however, suffers from
similar difficulties as that ofnatural law theory: Radbruch's view of absolute
values as being apriori valid also relies on a kind of self-evidence that is just
as problematic as that proposed by Finnis. I will not go into the other problems
besetting his theory, discussed in Chapters 4 and 7, which give enough reason
not to follow Radbruch's approach as a whole. The aspects of his theory that
have repeatedly turned out to be valuable - the relations and conflicts
ZS I wíll not again go into the ambiguity of justice in Radbruch's post-war work. f have drawn
attention to the tension between justice as a formal and a substantive value in several
instances, concluding that it is not clear which interpretation he favoured. If we could
conclude definitively that Radbruch thought ofjustice as substantive, he would come closer
to natural law theory than I have argued here.
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between the values of the Rechtsidee - can also be used in a pragmatist legal
theory.
Selznick
If we look at Selznick's theory in terms of the debate, it seems at first that he
can be brought under the heading of natural law theory. What Selznick calls
his naturalism has definite natural law leanings, which he has articulated in the
article ' Sociology and Natural Law'. Selznick shares with natural law theory
the belief in the importance of universal moral values, and the idea that these
are inherently connected to human nature (1961, 102). In a sense, he is more
of a natural law theorist than the other three anti-positivists discussed because
unlike Dworkin, Fuller, and Radbruch, he gives a prominent role to human
nature in his theory. But that is not the complete story. Selznick also gives a
key role to Hartian positivism in the definition of law. For the identification
ofa legal system Selznick adopts Hart's idea that there must be a combination
of primary and secondary rules (Selznick 1969, 5). Unlike Radbruch, who
positions his theory as contrasting with positivism and natural law theory
(1932, 240-251), Selznick is concerned to combine the insights ofthe two. We
should explore the question how the positivist and naturalist elements
combine.
Selznick's own explanation is that the combination is based on two features
of his own theory: the distinetion between weak definition and strong theory,
and the focus on empirical instead of analytical connections (1992, 442). To
the first claim I would add that the distinetion between weak definition and
strong theory is grounded in the perspective on law that Selznick uses: the
sociologist's (moderately) external perspective. This he has in common with
Hart. Because of that perspective, Selznick agrees on the need to identify a
legal system by way of a fairly simple factual criterion such as the occurrence
of a combination of primary and secondary rules. As part of his claim for a
weak definition of law, Selznick can be said to advocate neutrality in the
identification of a legal system. Unlike Hart, however, he combines this with
a strong theory: a highly evaluative theory of legal systems thus identified.
Selznick develops a(moral) value theory based on a human nature argument
that finds part of its inspiration in natural law ideas, and uses it to evaluate
strengths and weaknesses in existing law.
The affinity with natural law theory is found in the strong, evaluative,
theory based on human nature. He averts the traditional criticism of natural
law theory by denying a necessary connection between law and morals,
trading it for a variable empirical connection. At this point, I would say, both
his sociological background and his pragmatist philosophy moderate his
natural law claims. Selznick is more interested in empirical proof for
connections between law and moral values than in a conceptual argument that
the two cannot logically be separated. Nevertheless, he does argue for an
affinity between law and justice based on his general argument of value-
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oriented normative systems, without additional evidence. But the connection
is no more than affnity: "There is inclination but not necessity" (1992, 444).
Whether the promise ofjustice is fulfilled and in what circumstances it can be,
needs to be examined. Selznick criticizes both legal positivism and natural law
theory for not being sufficiently empirical (444).
Within Selznick's framework, the urge to incorporate both positivist and
natural law elements is understandable: he tries to combine a sociological
perspective with the recognition of value-orientation. However, the effort is
not completely successful because Selznick also incorporates some of the
problematic aspects of the theories. Most of these belong to natural law
theory. As I have already argued in Chapter 7, Selznick's idea of moral
universals is not quite convincing. That aspect of his theory is closest to
natural law theory and it suffers from similar weaknesses: the lack of a
convincing argument that certain values are universal, and the vagueness of
such values as critical standards. Selznick avoids most of the problems of a
positivist theory, mainly because he gives legal positivism a non-standard
interpretation. Selznick in part characterizes the difference between positivism
and natural law as an orientation towards different values: clarity, certainty
and autonomy in the case of positivism, substantive justice in the case of
natural law (1992, 437). But as I have tried to show in this chapter, positivism
is not concerned with the value-orientation of law at alL In the discussion
between Hart and Fuller, we saw that Hart interprets Fuller's principles not as
value-laden but as formal criteria. He also rejects the idea that aspiration has
a role to play in respect to these principles. These are indications that Hart
interprets clarity and certainty as baseline criteria, not as aspirational values.
If legal positivism is concerned with values it is so negatively, concerned to
keep them at bay. Selznick reinterprets legal positivism to fit his own
framework. Similarly, his acceptance of the neutral identification of law is
limited: it only concerns the identification of legal systems, not of specific
legal rules. Because of the limited role of positivism and the unsolved
problems of natural law aspects, the reconciliation of positivism and natural
law theory does not quite materialize.
This does not mean that Selznick's theory is not a valuable option. On the
contrary. There are a number of ideas in his theory which make it a viable
alternative to legal positivism and natural law theory. The most important one
is his pragmatist account of values. Although his idea of moral universals
resembles natural law theory, his theory of the nature of values is different
from natural law theory because of its pragmatist basis. Selznick rejects
absolute claims about value objectivity: the validity of values is provisional.
Additionally, Selznick has an eye for the context of ideals that is lacking in
natural law theory. His is a more dynamic view of values: Selznick's view
leaves room for adaptation of values to changing circumstances, which in
natural law's objectivist view is difficult. I should not, however, obscure the
fact that Selznick shares the natural law's idea of a core of enduring values,
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and to the extent that he does, he ís subject to the same criticism. But, as I
have tried to show in the previous chapter, the pragmatist side of his theory
escapes the criticism of vagueness and of unwarranted self-evidence. A key
idea deriving from pragmatism is the notion of variability. This is one of the
things Selznick shares with Fuller: they both focus on the degree to which law
exhibits certain features. In Selzníck's case, it is most notably the degree in
realization of the ideal of legality, which is parallelled by Fuller's account of
the aspirational aspect of the principles of legality.
The central shared insight of the anti-positivists Selznick, Radbruch, and
Fuller, is the belief that attention to values in the context of law should
primarily look at `distinctively legal' ideals. They all distinguish specifically
legal values from broader social or moral values, the differences lying in their
views on the relations between the two types of values. This is the point at
which their theories can be combined, as I have shown in section 7.3. If
Selznick's idea of a master ideal is modified to allow more leading ideals of
law, Radbruch's theory of the antinomies of law can be used to account for the
relations between these legal ideals and other social ideals. Fuller's principles
of legality can be seen as a concretization of specifically legal ideals of
legality and justice.
The focus on relations between legal and social ideals is underpinned by
yet another shared interest of Selznick and Fuller: the place of law in society.
Neither views law in isolation; they relate law to societal purposes.'̀6
Selznick's sociological view of law answers the question: what does the law
contribute to the functioning and flourishing of society? This creates an
important difference between his view and traditional natural law theory:
Selznick -and I think Fuller as well - takes conventional morality much
more seriously than a natural law theory does. Law should not only be
criticized from the standpoint of an objective critical morality, it can also be
criticized from the standpoint of accepted social ideals. Deweyan legal
pragmatism is committed to an experimental view of law's contribution to
social goals: its view of law is instrumental in the sense that it is primarily
interested in law's contribution to the good of society as a whole. It is not
narrowly instrumental, meaning that it does not evaluate law only in terms of
short-term goals and its efficiency in reaching those goals. But it does consider
law as serving societal ideals, which means law's autonomy is not taken for
granted but only warranted when it is needed to realize important values.
It is the pragmatist purt of Selznick's theory which makes a novel
contribution to the debate, more specifically it is Selznick's pragmatist value
theory that creates an interesting alternative in the debate in legal philosophy.
Selznick himself interprets the difference between legal positivism and natural
law theory as a focus on different values (law and order values vs. moral
26 This is most obvious in Nonet á Selznick 1978, and Fuller's The Principles ofSocialOrder
(1981).
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values). I do not think that such an interpretation of the debate does justice to
the different positions because it is in part the adequacy ofthe focus on values
itself that is at issue: legal positivism also has the message that law's values
are an element of law that is of minor importance. Other aspects of law, e.g.
its rules, its authority, are seen as much more central. Anti-positivists are
united in their rejection of that message: they believe that law's values merit
at least similar attention as other aspects of law. Selznick has a special
position because he gives such an extensive and inspiring account ofthe ideals
of law in society.
5 The Promise of a Pragmatist Theory'`'
Conclzrsions
The greater part ofthis chapter has been devoted to an analysis and evaluation
of the debate in contemporary Anglo-American legal theory between legal
positivism and natural law theory. My focus in analysing that debate was on
the relationship between law and morals, taking Hart's lead that a belief in the
separation between ]aw and morals is one of the marks defning legal
positivism. Using a set ofthree different meanings ofHart's Separation Thesis
to order the debate, I distinguished four main positions: exclusive legal
positivism, inclusive legal positivism, anti-positivism, and natural law theory.
In order to give a convincing account of the relationship between law and
morals, these theories need to address the nature oflaw, of morality, and ofthe
connection between the two. I will review the way these three aspects are dealt
with.
Exclusive legal positivism first appears as a straightforward and clear
descriptive theory of law, but it turns out to contain a number of problematic
propositions. Exclusive legal positivism highlights the nature of law as an
authoritative system of rules. The Neutrality Tltesis is the key meaning ofthe
separation between law and morals: identifying law is a matter of considering
social facts, for instance by tracing a rule to an authoritative source. This
would be a clear and simple test if it always worked. Unfortunately, as
exclusive positivists acknowledge, it does not. To rescue the theory, an
artificial separation is made between decisions based on law, that which is
neutrally identified, and decisions based on morality, when the neutral test
fails. If giving a good description of how law works would be the only
concern, this move appears strange. However, the urge to rescue neutrality is
understandable, once an account of morality is added to the theory. Exclusive
This title echoes that of John Patrick Diggins: The Promise ojPragmatisni. Moderi7ism and
the Crisis oJKnowledge andAuthority ( I 994). My approach is more optimistic than that of
Diggins: his conclusion is that the promise ofpragmatism has not been fulfilled. ! agree that
many who are labelled neo-pragmatists, e.g. Richard Rorty, do not contribute much to the
project of the first generation of pragmatists, i.e. Dewey and James, but 1 am optimistic
about what one could do with the theories of the original pragmatists.
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positivism makes sense when one holds a subjectivist theory of morality: if
moral judgment is essentially no more than a subjective preference, then it is
vital to keep such judgments out of the legal domain to safeguard law's
authority. And, if these judgments cannot be kept out completely, it is
important to distinguish clearly between moral and legal judgments.
Unfortunately, most exclusive positivists do not explicate their theory of
morals, which makes their theories incomplete. Moreover, a subjectivist
theory of morality is problematic, because it overlooks, first, the important
role ofshared moral values underlying both the legal system and the morality
of the individual, and, second, the possibility that subjective influences are
limited in law because legal oftïcials are trained to adhere to the morality that
comes with their role. Because the exclusive positivist view depends on this
theory for its rationale, its plausibility is undermined as well.
Inclusive legal positivism makes an effort to incorporate criticism of the
Neutrality Thesis by giving up that thesis and making the Explicit Moral
Content Thesis its core. It turns out that this position is unstable because it
tries to combine two inconsistent ideas. Inclusive positivism holds that moral
argument is part of legal reasoning but only because existing legal systems
have explicitly incorporated a reference to morality. Thus, the fact of the
moral content of law is contingent, but once moral demands have been
recognized they are inescapably involved in the identification of legal rules.
The inconsistency in this position arises because the moral element in law
opens up the legal system in a way that threatens the contingency of the moral
element. Either contingency is taken seriously, which means using factual
sources for the identification of legal rules. Or the moral element is taken
seriously, which means acknowledging that identification of legal rules
involves open-ended moral argument. Thus, inclusive legal positivism has to
accept the Neutrality Thesis to remain positivist or to reject both that thesis
and the Explicit Moral Content Thesis and become anti-positivist.
Anti-positivism rejects both the Neutrality Thesis and the Explicit Moral
Content Thesis. The identification oflaw necessarily involves moral argument
and moral demands are included in the legal system without being recognized
explicitly by an authorized lawgiver. In natural law theory these features of
anti-positivism are combined with an objectivist account of morality and a
partial rejection ofthe Moral Fallibility Thesis. Natural law theory holds that
certain moral values are objective and universal and that these moral values
form the basis of any legal system. There is variation within natural law theory
in the extent to which a failure to reflect moral values disqualifies a legal
system as law, but there is a bottom line of flagrant immorality beneath which
a system no longer deserves the name law. The focus of modern natural law
theory, however, is on the justification ofthe universal moral values, and that
is precisely where the theory encounters problems. Its method ofjustification,
which is based on the self-evidence of ultimate values, is insufficient to
provide a firm basis for a substantive theory of morality and law. The idea that
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anyone can acknowledge the validity of universal values does not hold up in
the face ofdisagreement. To the extent that these values do command general
support, their meaning is too vague to supply relevant standards to evaluate
law.
Other anti-positivist theories fare better because they do not make such a
strong claim on behalf of moral values. Unlike natural law theory starting
from a theory of moral values, their starting point is with the values of the law.
Anti-positivists recognize that legal values and principles are continuous with
moral values, but combine this with recognition of the distinctively legal. Of
anti-positivist theories the most compelling option is a non-positivist theory
that brings together ideas of Selznick, Fuller, and Radbruch. To identify a
legal system, a fairly straightforward institutional criterion such as Hart's
suffices: a combination of primary rules of conduct and secondary rules of
recognition, change, and adjudication. Specific legal provisions, however,
cannot be identified in such a way. Depending on the case in hand, both
traditional legal sources (e.g. statutes and case law) and principles and values,
legal as well as moral, must be taken into account. Legal ideals have an
important place in determining the specific legal character ofa system. These
ideals are gradually developed in the practice of law; they are complex
because they consist of more specific values with links to other, non-legal
values. These constituting values will often make conflicting demands so that
full realization of the ideal is hard to reach. This picture of law makes it less
easy to identify critical standards than it would appear in a natural law view.
Both the ideals internal to the legal practice and ideals of broader social
significance have to be reconstructed, which puts a serious responsibility on
the person articulating that reconstructed ideal. Articulating and using such
ideals is an inescapable part of a genuine fulfilment of the tasks belonging to
a legal order.
Non-positivism and pragmatisrn
Two main ideas characterize the non-positivism that forms the main subject
of this book: the recognition of distinctively legal ideals, and law's relative
autonomy, the interaction between law and other social practices. In 7.4 these
features were discussed as a result of an effort to combine the best of
Selznick's and Radbruch's theories of law, and they were an illustration of
what a pragmatist theory of values might yield. In the present chapter these
two features indicated a way out of the deadlock of positions pro and contra
the separation between law and morals. This can be done because of the shift
in focus generated by a non-positivist theory: the issue of separation is set in
the key of values. This enables one to distinguish between legal values and
moral values: the separation between law and morals then softens to become
a distinction between kinds of values. Law's distinctive ideals, such asjustice
and legality, belong intrinsically to law, whereas moral ideals have a more
contingent relationship to law. Distinctively legal ideals are an important
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reason for the autonomy of law, but because they are dependent on other,
moral ideals to gain full meaning, this autonomy is limited. As a consequence,
the initial separation between legal and moral values turns out to be a bond:
for a genuine understanding of a legal ideal we need to consider the moral
values with which it is intertwined. So morality enters when values are called
upon in interpretation, which constitutes a rejection of the Neutrality Thesis:
to identify the law in such a case includes reference to moral values. Similarly,
a non-positivist view rejects the Explicit Moral Content Thesis: because the
boundary between law and morality is blurred, it is not possible to pinpoint
when moral considerations enter the field oflaw. On the other hand, the Moral
Fallibility Thesis must be accepted, for at least three reasons. Although law
contains its own critical standards, the most important ones in the form of
legal ideals, these are incompletely realized. Moreover, the articulation of
these ideals is in the hands of the people who use them as critical standards;
their judgment as to the quality of the law depends on their interpretation of
the ideals as well. And flnally, the bulk of substantive critical standards used
to evaluate law are moral values, the social and political values law was
designed to serve. It is an open question to what extent law really does serve
them.
Although it may be clear what is non-positivist about the position
advocated here, the pragmatist character ofthat position needs a more detailed
account. There are two aspects which are primarily responsible for the
pragmatism underlying this value theory oflaw: the provisional, experimental
view of (legal) ideals and the view of law as a practice. Both aspects remain
obscured in the context of the debate between positivism and natural law:
there the focus is on law as a system of rules, principles and values - on a
body of legal norms. For a pragmatist, this is not enough: law must also be
regarded as a practical enterprise. To use the familiar sociological phrase:
there is not only the law in the books, but also the law in action.'̀8 I have
primarily regarded ideals as the leading values that can be found in a legal
system. As such, ideals are on a par with legal rules and principles as part of
positive law: the material with which people engaged in legal practice work.
Once we make that practice the main object ofattention, the role ofnorms and
values in people's activities and the influence of people's activities on norms
and values becomes a key issue. That is the core ofa pragmatist view on ideals
in law: the relationship between ideal and activity.
The same relationship is central to the pragmatist understanding of ideals
as arising out of problem-solving experience. Thus, the shift in focus brings
in that dimension of the pragmatist theory as well. I will not repeat the
specifics ofthe pragmatist theory ofvalues, but I will pay attention to the way
Zg The phrase originates with Pound (1910). Another way to formulate the difference: law as
a product versus law as a practice (Van der Burg 1999, 65). This is more precise than
Pound's formulation because the difference does not attach to the written law only,
unwritten norms are part of law as a product as well.
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it works in the context of law. Certain peculiarities of the practice of law
determine the particular development of ideals: these peculiarities are related
to, again, law's relative autonomy and the procedural nature of its central
ideals. The tendency towards autonomy found in law finds expression in the
need for coherence and the related conservatism. There is a need to make the
body of norms into a coherent legal system without gaps and especially
without contradictions. As a result, new ideas are interpreted in line with
existing legal principles to form a coherent whole: cherished principles are not
surrendered, they are slowly adjusted. That is the autonomous tendency, which
is counteracted by the responsive tendency. Law is not isolated, it is about all
kinds ofother practices: when these generate new problems, the legal practice
has to respond. Of the two, this is the preferred quality of law in a pragmatist
view. Law is instrumental in solving concrete social problems, and because
these problems change legal answers must adapt (Dewey 1924, 361).'9 Legal
practice then appears as a way of coping with changing social situations and
a change in positive law is one of the mechanisms to do this successfully.
Gradually, the practice oflaw will incorporate the change in values that occur
in the practices with which it interacts. For instance, Dutch law of tort
expanded the rules of consumer protection in reaction to a greater concern for
product safety.
This more or less direct incorporation of social values is subject to
transformation in the light of law's own ideals. The practice of law tends to
resist uses ofpositive law for purposes that conflict openly with legal ideals.
A good example is the Dutch political decision, out of a need for more
efficiency, to abolish the right of appeal for refugees. The procedural ability
at law to be recognized as a refugee was thus severely limited. The rule was
challenged because it contradicted legal ideals of equality and a fair trial. It is
soon to be reversed: a bill now under consideration in parliament reintroduces
the right to appea1.30 Such an example shows that the procedural ideals ofthe
law are powerful checks when responding to social problems. This is a feature
of law that is to be applauded rather than deplored, even in an instrumentalist
view such as pragmatism. Law can be viewed as providing the means to social
29
io
Because of the insistence that law interacts with other social practices, pragmatism can be
regarded as an interactional theory of law. Fuller saw law as an interactional phenomenon:
it arises out of interactions between people and it serves to order and facilitate such
interaction (1981, 230) Especially in Dutch legal philosophy, interactionism is sometimes
regarded as a third theory of law distinct from legal positivism and natural law theory (e.g.
Franken 1990, 42; Witteveen 1996, 61-62). It is notquite clearwhich authors, except Fuller,
are to be regarded as interactionists, but it can certainly be argued for certain Legal Realists,
e.g. Karl Llewellyn.
The current rule is article 33e Vreemdelingenwet (Aliens Act); see Vermeulen (2000, 390)
on [he new bill.
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ends in two ways.31 First, it can be regarded as simply subservient to social
ends; then law is seen as a mechanism to realize pre-given goals. Second, it
can be seen as performing special social functions, for which law needs to be
an autonomous practice with authority. It is the second role that is primary.
The practice of law has a special task in realizing and shaping social values,
which it performs by guarding its own ideals in the course of executing its
functions. To return to my example: the right ofappeal for refugees is not only
a matter of fair procedure but also of equal concern and respect. Realization
of legal ideals helps shape broader social ideals.
Compare Westerman 1999, who distinguishes routine activity from creative activity (as two
extremes on a continuum). In routine activity means and ends are separated, while in
creative activity there is a continuous interplay between means and ends. Rulemaking can
be more routine or more creative (162).
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In het recht spelen idealen een belangrijke rol: denk aan rechtvaardigheid,
vrijheid, rechtszekerheid. Soms wordt er door betrokkenen bij de
rechtspraktijk expliciet naar verwezen, soms komen ze impliciet naar voren
bij de signalering of oplossing van een juridisch probleem. Idealen fungeren
als kritische maatstaf, als uitgangspunten voor verbetering. Hoe moeten we
idealen eigenlijk begrijpen? Welke eigenschappen hebben idealen: moeten we
idealen zien als een bepaald soort waarden of hebben ze andere kenmerken?
En meer toegespitst op het recht: welke functie heeft het begrip `ideaal' in de
theorievorming over het recht? Deze vragen worden behandeld in dit
proefschrift.
Voor een onderzoek naar de betekenis van idealen in de rechtstheorie is het
noodzakelijk de filosofische wortels van het begrip te bestuderen. Daarbij staat
de verhouding tussen ideaal en werkelijkheid centraal. Er zijn twee tradities
te onderscheiden die elk een eigen visie hebben op de ontologische vraag wat
werkelijkheid is en daarmee op de verhouding tussen ideaal en werkelijkheid.
Het transcendente ideaalbegrip ziet idealen primair als tegengesteld aan de
werkelijkheid: idealen maken geen deel uit van de wereld die wij om ons heen
zien, maar zijn perfecte ideeën die noodzakelijk zijn om de imperfecte wereld
om ons heen te begrijpen. Idealen oefenen wel in belangrijke mate invloed uit
op de werkelijkheid, omdat ze via hun geldingskracht voor het menselijke
bewustzijn gebruikt worden om de wereld te ordenen. Het immanente
ideaalbegrip ziet idealen als deel van de werkelijkheid: idealen zijn een aspect
van de sociale wereld die het waardevolle daarin uitmaken. In problematische
situaties zijn idealen niet geheel gerealiseerd en geven dan de richting aan
voor een goede oplossing.
Een immanent ideaalbegrip gaat uit van een bredere kijk op wat
werkelijkheid is dan het transcendente begrip. De sociale wereld van onze
ervaring waar idealen deel van uitmaken - immanentie - staat tegenover de
waarneembare werkelijkheid waarop idealen worden toegepast -
transcendentie. Dit heeft consequenties voor de kenmerken die aan idealen
worden toegeschreven. Het transcendente ideaalbegrip ziet idealen als perfect,
abstract, nooit geheel realiseerbaar en nooit volledig te formuleren. Het
immanente ideaalbegrip ziet idealen als waarden die inherent zijn aan de
werkelijkheid, die meestal impliciet blijven en in principe realiseerbaar zijn.
De verschillende uitgangspunten maken dat de twee tradities niet
complementair zijn; omdat de wereld anders gestructureerd wordt, hebben
idealen daarin zowel een andere plaats als een andere vorm.
In de rechtstheorie zijn deze twee tradities herkenbaar in de theorieën van
Gustav Radbruch en Philip Selznick. Beiden stellen idealen of waarden
centraal in hun benadering van het recht. Radbruch doet dat vanuit een neo-
Kantiaanse benadering met een transcendent ideaalbegrip, terwijl Selznick's
pragmatisme een immanent ideaalbegrip hanteert. In Radbruch's visie is het
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recht een deel van de culturele werkelijkheid, waarvoor kenmerkend is dat het
gericht is op de realisering van de rechtsidee. De rechtsidee bestaat uit een
drietal waarden, gerechtigheid, rechtszekerheid en doelmatigheid
(ZweckntuJ3igkeit). Gerechtigheid is een absolute waarde, die beschouwd kan
worden als een van de fundamentele, noodzakelijke uitgangspunten van
waardesystemen. De verhouding tussen de drie waarden en de invulling van
doelmatigheid zijn echter relatief: afhankelijk van het waardesysteem waartoe
iemand zich bekent. Radbruch heeft aldus een waardetheorie waarin absolute
met relatieve elementen gecombineerd worden.
Selznick ziet het recht als een praktijk die georiënteerd is op het `master
ideal of legality'. In zijn opvatting is legaliteit de voortschrijdende afname van
willekeur in het positieve recht en de toepassing daarvan. Recht is een van de
vele sociale praktijken waarin waarden latent aanwezig zijn. Idealen maken
in de kiem van nature deel uit van goed functionerende sociale praktijken,
maar de mate waarin zij gerealiseerd worden moet empirisch vastgesteld
worden. Daarmee combineert Selznick ideeën uit een Aristotelisch natuurrecht
met een pragmatische wetenschapstheorie.
Hoewel Radbruch en Selznick beiden de oriëntatie van het recht op
waarden centraal stellen, is hun invulling van de manier waarop dat gebeurt,
en vooral hun argumentatie, zeer verschillend. Radbruch hanteert een
filosofische methode van het deductief herleiden van waarden tot
noodzakelijke uitgangspunten, terwijl Selznick steeds een beroep doet op
empirisch vast te stellen verbanden tussen praktijk en ideaal. Radbruch
verklaart de variabele realisering van waarden in specifieke rechtssystemen
uit de relatieve invulling van de rechtsidee. Selznick stelt variabiliteit meer
centraal door - in navolging van Dewey - steeds de concrete ervaring van
problemen en de rol van idealen daarbij als uitgangspunt te nemen. Pas in de
bestudering van concrete situaties wordt de betekenis van een ideaal echt
duidelijk.
Zowel voor Radbruch als voor Selznick is de combinatie van de twee
belangrijkste onderdelen van hun waardetheorie een probleem. Bij Radbruch
is dat het samennemen van het absolute karakter van de fundamentele waarden
met relativisme, bij Selznick het combineren van de fundering van waarden
in de menselijke natuur met de pragmatische gerichtheid op probleemsituaties.
Radbruch heeft geen overtuigende argumenten waarom gerechtigheid zelfniet
vatbaar is voor een relativistische invulling en daarmee dringt zich de vraag
op in hoeverre de absolute waarden van zijn theorie van belang zijn voor de
vormgeving van specifieke systemen. De absolute waarden zijn dusdanig
abstract dat er weinig uit volgt, noch voor kritiek op bestaande systemen, noch
voor het verbeteren ervan. Radbruch's relativisme is problematisch omdat
daaraan geen kritische standaarden zijn te ontlenen: het ideaal is afhankelijk
van de invulling die een persoon daar op basis van eigen overtuiging aan geeft.
Selznick's universele waarden, die hun basis hebben in de menselijke
natuur, leiden aan een vergelijkbare tekortkoming als Radbruch's abstracte
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waarden: voorzover ze verdedigbaar zijn, zijn ze zo algemeen en vaag dat ze
geen kritische functie kunnen vervullen. Daarbij is de theorie over de
menselijke natuur die Selznick als onderbouwing van universele waarden
gebruikt, discutabel omdat hij uitgaat van een natuurlijke positieve neiging om
deze waarden te realiseren. Selznick's pragmatisme is een beter uitgangspunt
voor een theorie over idealen. Omdat idealen direct gerelateerd worden aan
concrete ervaringen en situaties is duidelijker wat hun kritisch potentieel is en
op welke manier ze praktisch functioneren. Misschien nog wel belangrijker is
dat idealen wel veranderlijk zijn, maar niet relatief aan persoonlijke
opvattingen.
In een pragmatische waardetheorie zoals die van Dewey, en gedeeltelijk
Selznick, zijn idealen relatief concreet en contextueel bepaald. Doordat een
pragmatisch ideaalbegrip de nadruk legt op een empirische benadering van
idealen, krijgen idealen een objectieve basis zonder dat daarvoor absolute
waarheden of rationele noodzakelijkheid hoeven te worden ingeroepen. Als
echter te zeer de nadruk komt te liggen op het ideaal in de context van een
concrete situatie, ontstaan er problemen bij de rechtvaardiging van idealen. In
het pragmatisme worden idealen afgerekend op hun praktische consequenties,
en daarbij wordt de rol van idealen voor de bepaling van de wenselijkheid van
bepaalde gevolgen verwaarloosd. Deze circulariteit in de rechtvaardiging van
idealen kan verminderd worden door meer aandacht te besteden aan de
theoretische achtergronden van idealen en aan de rol van idealen in praktijken.
Het pragmatisme wordt ook gekenmerkt door een optimistische kijk op de
samenleving, waardoor ook de visie op idealen wordt geraakt. Idealen worden
vooral gezien als behulpzaam bij het oplossen van problemen, terwijl zij toch
ook de oorzaak van problemen kunnen zijn. Een realistischer invulling van de
pragmatische waardetheorie kan een beroep doen op Radbruch's ideeën over
de conflicten die tussen idealen optreden. Zeker de complexe idealen die met
sociale praktijken verbonden zijn, bestaan uit waarden die samen de betekenis
van het ideaal uitmaken maar ook tegengestelde eisen stellen. Hiermee kan
ook de dynamiek van zulke centrale idealen van praktijken begrepen worden:
de precieze betekenis van de verschillende elementen van het ideaal is
afliankelijk van de concrete context.
De centrale idealen van het recht zijn bepalend voor de autonomie van
deze praktijk. Rechtvaardigheid en legaliteit kunnen beschouwd worden als
idealen die een centrale rol spelen in het recht; deze idealen zijn herkenbaar
in de juridische aandacht voor het procedurele. De autonomie van het recht is
echter beperkt, omdat verschillende praktijken met elkaar in contact staan.
Daarbij hebben idealen een bijzondere rol omdat de betekenis van een ideaal
steeds mede afhankelijk is van andere waarden. Om te begrijpen wat
rechtvaardigheid in een bepaalde juridische situatie inhoudt is een verwijzing
naar bijvoorbeeld een ideaal van morele gelijkheid nodig. Zo vormen de
idealen van de praktijk van het recht een verbinding met andere praktijken.
Een visie op het recht die de idealen van het recht centraal stelt, is ook een
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interessant alternatief in het rechtstheoretische debat. De discussie tussen het
rechtspositivisme en het natuurrecht kan op een vruchtbare manier begrepen
worden als een discussie over de scheiding tussen recht en moraal. Zowel het
rechtspositivisme als het natuurrecht hebben een eenzijdige visie op de rol van
waarden in het recht. Het rechtspositivisme, dat een moreel neutrale
beschrijving van het recht voorstaat, verwaarloost de rol van waarden door
deze alleen een plaats te geven buiten het juridische domein. Het natuurrecht
heeft wel oog voor de rol van waarden in het recht, maar vat waarden op als
objectieve universele morele standaarden. Door deze als evident te
beschouwen, wordt de mogelijkheid van meningsverschillen over waarden
niet onderkend; door alleen universele, morele waarden te betrekken bij de
visie op het recht, heeft het natuurrecht te weinig oog voor waarden die
specifiek zijn voor het recht. Anti-positivistische theorieën zoals die van
Radbruch, Selznick, en Fuller hebben wel oog voor specifiek juridische
idealen zonder daarbij de autonomie van het recht te verabsoluteren. Een niet-
positivistische, pragmatische theorie over de waarden van het recht benadrukt
de rol van het recht in de samenleving, maar beseft dat het bewaken van de
eigen idealen van het recht daarvoor van belang is.
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